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The  Materialist  Interpretation  of  John  Millar's  Philosophical  History: 
Towards  a  Critical  Appraisal 
This  dissertation  examines  aspects  of  John  Millar's  philosophical  history  in  order  to 
provide  grounds  for  a  critical  appraisal  of  the  content  of  his  contribution  to  social  and 
historical  science.  Using  Millar's  published  books  and  lectures  in  civil  law  as  primary 
sources,  it  is  suggested  that  Millar  applied  an  empiricist  method  to  the  principles  of 
jurisprudence.  Millar  shared  this  method  with  Hume  and  Smith.  Implicit  within  the 
method  was  the  abstraction  of  an  ideal  observer  or  spectator.  This  abstraction  was 
derived  from  the  use  of  an  empiricist  method  to  understand  the  operations  of  the 
minds  of  particular  individual  subjects  on  the  pre-determined  experience  of  immediate 
circumstances.  The  method  assumed  that  the  operations  of  subjects'  minds  on  the 
objects  of  their  experience  included  classification,  comparison,  generalisation, 
conjecture,  inference,  imaginative  identification  and  experiment.  Millar's  method  is 
therefore  characterised  as  both  conjectural  and  individualistic. 
Through  a  critique  of  Ronald  Meek's  seminal  statements  on  Millar's  materialism, 
certain  issues  are  investigated  for  further  critical  appraisal.  These  include  Millar's 
political  economy,  his  conception  of  civil  society,  and  his  political  theory.  It  is  argued 
Millar  had  a  conception  of  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange;  that  tws 
conception  was  derived  from  the  assumption  that  subjects  are  self-interested;  and  that 
the  latter  assumption  was  necessary  to  explain  the  origins,  emergence  and 
development  of  civil  and  political  society.  Millar  assumed  that  individuals'  pursuit  of 
self-interested  goals  gave  rise  to  ideas  of  positive  law,  freely  alienable  property, 
different  distributions  of  property,  and  feelings  of  liberty.  It  is  suggested  that  Millar's 
theorisation  of  the  effect  of  the  latter  on  forms  of  government  is  derived  from 
combined  use  of  Smith's  principles  of  authority  and  utility  with  Hume's  commercialisel 
Harringtonianism.  This  led  Millar  to  conjecture  that  generalised  commodity  production 
and  exchange  caused  two  contrary  tendencies  to  operate  on  the  political 
superstructure.  The  first  was  towards  despotic  forms  of  military  rule.  The  second  was 
towards  representative  forms  of  parliamentary  democracy.  Neither  of  these  tendencies 
were  controllable  and  it  was  an  accident  of  Britain's  island  status  that  a  balance 
between  the  two  tendencies  had  been  established.  The  dissertation  includes  a 
comparison  of  Millar's  method  with  Marx's,  and  a  discussion  of  the  possibility  that 
Millar's  philosophical  history  might  be  a  form  of  naturalistic  materialism. "Depend  upon  it,  this  rage  of  trade  will  destroy 
itself.  You  and  I  shall  not  see  it,  but  the  time  will 
come  when  there  will  be  an  end  of  it.  " 
Dr.  Joluison 
"Adults  cannot  become  children  again,  or  they 
become  childish.  But  do  they  not  find  a  joy  in  the 
child's  naivete,  and  must  they  themselves  not  strive 
to  reproduce  its  truth  at  a  higher  stage?  " 
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Chapter  One: 
A  Purview 
1.1  The  Origins 
My  interest  in  studying  John  Millar  started  over  ten  years  ago  in  1986  when  I  was 
studying  part-time  as  a  post-graduate  student  for  a  taught  Master's  qualification  at 
Glasgow  University's  Centre  for  Socialist  Theory  and  Movements.  The  Centre's 
brochure  advertised  the  Scottish  Enlightenment  as  a  topic  students  could  study.  One  of 
my  teachers  gave  me  an  article  written  by  Andrew  Skinner,  Professor  of  Political 
Economy  at  Glasgow  University,  to  read.  It  was  titled  "A  Scottish  Contribution  to 
Marxist  Sociology?  "'  Skinner  mentioned  Millar  in  this  article  which  had  been 
published  in  a  book  of  essays  in  honour  of  Ronald  Meek.  Meek  had  preceded  Skinner 
as  Professor  of  Political  Economy  at  Glasgow  and  had  published  books  and  articles  on 
the  history  of  economic  thought,  Smith,  Marx,  Turgot,  the  Physiocrats  and  the 
Scottish  Enlightenment.  He  i's  most  famous  for  his  book  on  the  labour  theory  of 
value.  2 
Further  reading  informed  me  that  Meek  had  been  a  student  at  Cambridge  and  that, 
like  certain  academics  teaching  at  Cambridge,  such  as  Roy  Pascal,  had  connections 
with  the  former  Soviet  Union  through  their  association  with  the  British  Communist 
Party.  Roy  Pascal  was  the  editor  of  an  early  English  edition  of  Marx  and  Engels'  The 
German  Ideology.  3  He  and  his  wife,  Fania,  were  members  of  the  "Friends  of  the  Soviet 
Union".  Fania  Pascal  had  taught  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  Russian  before  his  trip  to 
Moscow  in  1935.4 
In  the  1930s,  Pascal  had  written  a  highly  influential  article  on  prominent  and,  at 
that  lime,  neglected  thinkers  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment  such  as  Robertson, 
Ferguson  and  Millar.  In  this  article  lie  argued  that  the  Scots  had  a  version  of  Marx's 
materialist  understanding  of  history.  5  This  thesis  was  based  on  two  assumptions.  The 
first  was  that  the  Scottish  eighteenth  century  philosophers  paid  attention  to  activity 
motivated  by  the  satisfaction  of  subsistence  needs.  The  second  was  that  they  had 
recognised  the  influence  that  property  had  on  forms  of  government. 
ISkinner  A.  S.  (1982)  "A  Scottish  Contribution  to  Marxist  Sociology?  In  Bradley  &  Howard  (eds) 
Classical  andMarxian  Political  Economy,  London:  pp79-114. 
2Mcck  R.  L.  (1956).  5tudies  in  the  Labour  Theory  of  14alue.  London. 
3Marx  K.  &  Engels  F.  (1846)  The  Gentian  Ideology.  Parts  I  and.  111,  Pascal  R-  (ed.  )  New  York,  1947. 
413ascal  F.  (1984)  "Wittgenstchi.  A  Personal  Memoir.  "  In  Pjlccs  R.  (cd.  )  Recollections  of 
111ttgenstain,  Oxford:  pp1249.  Moran  J.  (1972)  "Wittgcnstein  and  Russia.  "  New  Lefi  Review.  73:  85- 
96. 
5Pascal  R.  (1938)  "Property  and  Society.  The  Scottish  Historical  School  of  the  Eighteenth  Century.  " 
Modern  Quarterly,  vol.  1:  167-179. 6 
Ronald  Meek  developed  this  thesis  in  an  article  he  wrote  in  the  1950S.  6  He  later 
added  that  the  Scots  knew  of  Marx's  distinction  between  economic  base  and  political 
superstructure.  7  Having  read  Pascal  and  Meek's  articles  on  the  Scots,  I  then  turned  to 
Andrew  Skinner's  articles  on  Adam  Smith.  I  found  out  that  Skinner's  earliest  articles  in 
the  1960s  used  Marxian  sounding  language  when  he  discussed  Adam  Smith.  However, 
in  later  publications  on  Smith's  historical  and  social  theory,  his  references  to  the  idea, 
for  example,  that  Smith  had  a  notion  of  "productive  forces"  became  fewer.  8  Skinner's 
article  in  honour  of  his  teacher  in  1982  was  a  review  of  the  Meek/Pascal  thesis  as 
applied  to  Smith.  It  concluded  that  Smith  was  "neither  determinist  nor  materialist  in  his 
interpretation  of  history".  Skinner  also  noted  that  Smith's  notion  of  individual 
motivation  was  "not  necessarily  materialistic"9  and  that  Meek  had  drawn  "very  limited" 
parallels  between  Millar  and  Marx.  10  What  Skinner  took  from  Meek,  however,  was  the 
salience  of  "four  stages"  (hunting,  pasturage,  agriculture  and  commerce)  in  accounts 
the  Scots  give  of  the  development  of  the  idea  of  property  and  changes  in  customs, 
manners  and  law. 
Following  a  quote  from  Robertson's  History  of  America,  II  Pascal  had  described 
the  "four  stages"  as  different  "modes  of  subsistence".  This  quote  is  important  because 
of  Robertson's  use  of  "modes".  A  "mode  of  subsistence"  sounds  something  like  a 
"mode  of  production".  In  the  Soviet  account  of  Marx,  history  was  supposed  to  move 
automatically  through  stages,  each  stage  with  its  corresponding  property  relations, 
towards  the  "socialist"  mode  of  production  (i.  e.  the  Soviet  Union).  "  The  Scots  were 
supposed  to  have  recognised  something  similar  as  having  happened  on  the  way  to 
commercial  society.  This  movement  through  stages  enabled  Pascal  and  Meek  to 
6Mcek  R.  L.  (1954)  "The  Scottish  Contribution  to  Marxist  Sociology.  "  In  Saville  J.  (cd.  )  Democracy 
and  the  Labour  Movement,  London.  Reprinted  with  amendments  in  Meek  PLL.  (1967)  Economics 
andIdeologyand0thorasays,  London:  pp34-50. 
7Mcck  R.  L.  (I  976a)  "The  Great  Whole  Man.  "  Thnes  LiteratySupplement,  3  December,  1976.  Quoted 
in  Skinner,  1982:  p86. 
8.  Compare  Skinner  A.  S.  (1965)  "Economics  and  History-the  Scottish  Enlightenincrit.  "  In  Scottish 
Journal  ofPolitical  EconontY,  vol.  12:  pp  1-22,  in  which  lie  rcfcrs  to  Millar's  cinpliasis  on  "historically 
inevitable"  productive  forces  (p7)  with  his  later  (1996)  "Historical  Theory.  ",  chap.  4  of  A  System  of 
Social  Science,  Oxford:  pp76-105.  In  the  latter  lie  rcfcrs  to  "economic"  forces  and  "modes  of 
subsistence"  whcn  discussing  the  Smith's  historical  theory.  Skinner  is  the  most  cminent  of 
contemporary  scholars  who  uphold  a  diluted  version  of  the  sociological  or  economic  interpretation  of 
Smith  and  Millar's  historical  thcory.  See  chaptcr  tlircc  for  his  use  of  "factors". 
9Skinner,  "Contribution?  ",  pI00. 
10Skinner,  "Contribution?  ",  P104. 
1  lRobcrtson  W.  (1777)  A  Histoty  ofAinerica  In  Works,  Stewart  D.  (ed.  )  in  one  volume,  Edinburgh, 
1840. 
12CO111111iSSion  Of  tlC  Central  Committee  of  the  C.  P.  S.  U.  (B).  (ed.  )  (1938)  The  History  of  the 
Communist  Parly  of  the  Soviet  Union  (Bolsheviks):  Short  Course.  See  in  particular  chaptcr  four,  part 
two:  "Dialectical  and  Historical  Materialism.  "  The  latter  was  written  by  Stalin  and  is  republished  in 
Franklin  B,  (ed.  )  (I  973)The  Dsential  Stalin,  London:  pp300-333. 7 
characterise  both  Marx  and  the  Scots  as  having  a  materialist  understanding  of  history. 
This  consisted  of  a  four  stage  theory  defined  by  modes  of  subsistence  or  production. 
The  use  of  the  phrase  "four  stage  theory"  has  now  become  quite  common  in 
literature  on  Millar  and  other  eighteenth  century  Scots  theorists.  It  is  the  only  thing  left 
of  the  original  Pascal/Meek  interpretation.  For  example,  it  continues  in  the  work  of 
Peter  Stein  and  Istvan  Hont,  both  of  whom  have  followed  Meek  by  examining  the 
origins  of  the  appearance  of  stages  in  ancient  and  early  modern  political  and 
jurisprudential  thought.  13  The  mode  of  subsistence  has  been  presented  as  the  key 
category  for  understanding  Millar's  method  in  a  few  recent  articles  by  Paul  Bowles. 
Unlike  Stein  and  Hont,  however,  Bowles  has  also  kept  alive  the  notion  of  an  affinity 
between  the  Scots'  social  and  historical  theory  and  historical  materialism  arguing,  for 
example,  that  Millar's  account  of  the  position  of  women  is  similar  to  Engels'.  14 
Skinner's  1982  article  also  made  reference  to  the  debate  on  the  transition  from 
feudalism  to  capitalism  between  Maurice  Dobb  and  Paul  Sweezy.  He  claimed  that 
Smith  would  have  agreed  with  Sweezy.  The  cause  of  the  transition  from  feudalism  to 
capitalism  was  "exogenous  rather  than  endogenous  pressures.  "15  Dobb's  commitment 
to  the  existence  of  "socialism"  arising  in  one  country  influenced  the  position  he  took  in 
this  debate.  Dobb  had  a  version  of  the  idea  that  capitalism  had  arisen  in  one  country. 
Capitalism  had  developed  first  in  England  through  primitive  accumulation  and  was 
then  exported  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  transition,  therefore,  was  not  a  world-wide 
development  but  a  national  one.  16 
The  relevance  of  Smith  to  this  debate  has  been  revived  recently  in  an  article  by 
John  Salter.  Salter  concludes  that  if  "materialist"  means  "secular"  then  Smith  indeed 
had  a  version  of  historical  materialism.  What  is  different  from  Skinner/Pascal/Meek  is 
that  Salter  has  moved  the  focus  away  from  modes  of  subsistence  to  how  Smith 
theorised  dependence  and  the  acquisition  of  surpluses.  17 
Reading  Skinner's  1982  article  led  me  to  choose  John  Millar's  social  philosophy  as 
a  topic  for  the  research-based  dissertation  component  of  my  Master's  degree. 
13Stein  p.  (1988)  "The  Four  Stage  Theory  of  the  Development  of  Societies.  "  In  Stein,  The  Character 
and  Influence  of  the  Ronian  Civil  Lasv,  London:  pp3  95409.  Also  Hont  1.  (1987)  "The  Language  of 
Sociability  and  Commerce:  Samuel  PuIendorf  and  the  Theoretical  Foundations  of  the  'Four  Stage 
Theory'.  "  In  Pagdcn  (cd.  )  The  Languages  of  Political  Theory  in  Early1fodern  Europe,  Cambridge, 
1987:  pp253-276. 
1413owlcs  P.  (1986)  "John  Millar,  the  Legislator  and  the  Mode  of  Subsistence"  History  of  European 
ideas,  7:  pp237-251.  Also  Bowles  P.  (1990)  "Millar  and  Engels  on  the  History  of  Women  and  the 
Family.  "  History  ofEuropean  Ideas,  vol.  12/5,1990:  595-610. 
"Skinner,  Contribution?,  pIOO. 
16Dobb  M.  (1946)  Studies  in  the  Development  of  Capitalism.  London.  For  Sweczy's  critique  see  his 
essays  in  Hilton  R.  (cd.  )  (1976)  The  Transition  froin  Feudalism  to  Capitalism,  London  &  New  York: 
pp33-56  &  pp102-108. 
17Saltcr  J.  (1992)  "Adain  Smith  on  Feudalism.  Commerce  and  Slavery.  "  Histoty  ofPolitical  Thought 
vol.  X111,2.  Summer:  pp219-24  1. 8 
According  to  Meek,  Millar  was  the  Scot  who  had  the  clearest  understanding  of  a  "true 
philosophy  of  history".  18  He  was  the  most  "materialist"  of  all  the  Scots.  If  the  thesis 
applied  to  Millar,  then,  given  his  closeness  to  Smith,  perhaps  it  could  also  have  been 
extended  to  his  teacher. 
The  dissertation  argued  that  the  term  "mode  of  subsistence"  as  applied  to  Millar's 
use  of  the  four  stages  was  misleading  because  it  implied  that,  according  to  "liar, 
individuals  were  exclusively  motivated  by  the  desire  to  satisfy  subsistence  needs  for 
food,  clothing  and  shelter.  Certainly  Millar  thought  that  the  satisfaction  of  such  needs 
prompted  individuals  to  engage  in  productive  activity;  however,  he  also  thought  that 
other  needs  were  as  important  (or  more  important).  Following  Smith,  he  thought  that 
the  needs  for  praise  or  respectful  attention  were  also  crucial.  He  thought  that  the  most 
obvious  means  to  the  end  of  satisfying  these  needs  was  the  acquisition  of  wealth  in  the 
form  of  surpluses.  These  could  either  be  exchanged  as  commodities  or  used  to  support 
dependants.  Moreover,  he  thought  that,  because  of  natural  scarcities,  only  a  few 
hardworking  and  thrifty  individuals  could  acquire  surpluses  through  their  labour.  It 
was  therefore  in  their  interests  to  agree  to  rules  that  secured  these  surpluses  as 
property.  Moreover,  it  was  in  the  interests  of  those  individuals  who  through 
misfortune,  fecklessness  or  prodigality  had  been  unable  to  acquire  surpluses,  to 
acquiesce  to  the  wishes  of  the  propertied  class  upon  whom  they  were  dependent  for 
subsistence  and  protection.  I  therefore  suggested  that  the  more  appropriate  terms  to 
describe  the  four  stages  would  be  "modes  of  acquisition  of  surpluses"  or  (given  the 
juridical  form  taken  for  granted  in  Millar's  theory)  "modes  of  the  acquisition  of 
prope  yll. 
1.2  A  Current  Impasse 
Reading  the  critical  literature  on  Millar  and  the  Scots  subsequent  to  Pascal  and 
Meek's  thesis  brought  me  to  the  conclusion  that  there  now  appears  to  be  an  impasse  in 
scholarship  over  tile  interpretation  of  the  development  of  ideas  in  the  Scottish 
Enlightenment.  There  appear  to  be  two  broad  interpretative  camps.  One  these 
emphasises  the  continuity  of  a  natural  law  tradition  in  Scotland.  It  is  especially 
associated  with  the  work  of  Duncan  Forbes  and  Knud  Haakonssen.  The  other  is  more 
disparate  but  tends  to  follow  the  work  of  J.  G.  A.  Pocock  on  the  Scots'  incorporation 
and  reworking  of  the  language  of  civic  virtue.  Both  camps  are  aware  that  a 
competitive  struggle  for  pre-eminence  is  awkward  and  have  been  in  the  process  of 
some  attempt  at  reconciliation  or  regroupment.  Both  Pocock  and  Haakonssen  have 
tried  to  reconcile  the  two  approaches  and  accommodate  the  one  to  the  other.  19 
18McckRýL.  (1976b)  Social  Science  and  lite  Ignoble  Savage,  Cambridge:  ppl6l-162. 
19Pocock  J.  G.  A.  (1983)  "Cambridge  paridigins  and  Scotch  pitilosoplicrs:  a  study  of  the  rclations 
bct%vccn  the  civic  humanist  and  the  civil  jurisprudential  interprctation  of  cightcenth-century  social 9 
Moreover,  Pocock  and  Haakonssen  have  attempted  to  engage  critically  with  the 
so-called  "economic"  or  "materialist"  interpretation  of  Meek  to  a  greater  or  lesser 
extent.  The  latter  has  been  identified  as  Marxian  in  character  and  inspiration.  Pocock's 
reaction  to  Pascal  and  Meek's  original  idea  that  Scots  such  as  Millar  had  an  economic 
interpretation  of  society  and  history,  has  emphasised  the  Scots'  reformulation  of  ideas 
of  virtue  handed  down  through  political  discourse  from  Machiavelli  through 
Harrington.  "  Forbes  and  Haakonssen,  on  the  other  hand,  have  taken  up  the  theme  of 
natural  jurisprudence,  placing  not  only  Hume  and  Smith,  but  also  Millar,  within  this 
context.  This  understanding  of  their  theorisation  of  the  progress  of  society  attempts  to 
reconcile  their  interest  in  economic  matters  within  a  developing  historical  science  of 
jurisprudence  pioneered  by  Montesquieu.  21 
1.2.1  Scientific  Whiggism  and  Natural  Jurisprudence 
An  important  influence  on  subsequent  research  on  Millar  has  been  that  of  Duncan 
Forbes.  Forbes  has  written  much  on  Smith,  Millar  and  Hume's  historiography 
emphasising  the  influence  of  the  tradition  of  natural  law  thinkers  going  back  to  Grotius 
and  Pufendorf  He  is  important  because  at  the  same  time  that  Meek  was  giving  his 
materialist  interpretation  of  Millar  in  the  mid-1950s,  Forbes  was  writing  about  Smith 
and  Millar  as  sceptical  or scientific  Whigs.  22 
Forbes  distinguishes  between  what  he  calls  the  vulgar  Whig  position  and  the 
position  taken  by  the  Scots.  The  former  was  associated,  amongst  other  things,  with  a 
glorification  of  the  1688  settlement,  the  denigration  of  the  freedoms  of  other  countries, 
and  the  notion  that  the  ancient  liberties  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  had  been  fought  for  and 
preserved  by  parliament  in  an  ancient  English  constitution.  The  Scots,  following 
Hume,  demonstrated  that  liberty  post-1688  was  of  a  qualitatively  different  nature  than 
that  of  the  "rude"  Germans  -  it  was  a  liberty  based  on  the  calming  and  calculating 
influence  of  commerce,  luxury  and  the  rule  of  law  rather  than  on  the  free  play  of 
violent  passions  caused  by  natural  scarcities  and  an  absence  of  law  and  order.  Their 
thought.  "  In  Hont  &  Ignatieff  (eds)lfleallh  and  Virtue,  Cambridge:  pp235-252.  Also  Haakonssen  K. 
(1989)  "Natural  Jurisprudence  in  the  Scottish  Enlightenment:  Summary  of  all  Interpretation.  "  In 
MacCoriiiick  &  Bankowski  (eds)  Enlightenment 
, 
Rights  and  Revolution,  Aberdeen:  pp3649. 
20Pocock,  paradignis,  pp242-243.  Pocock  concedes  to  Meek's  followers  that  the  Scots  came  close  to 
thinking  that  "men  create  themselves  in  history  through  their  modes  of  production".  In  contrast  lie 
expresses  impatience  with  interpreters  who  use  the  word  "bourgeois".  Michael  Ignatieff  (whose  article 
oil  Millar  attempts  to  syntlicsisc  all  tlircc  interpretations)  also  makes  concessions  to  materialist 
sociology  when  lie  refers  to  Millar's  "dialectic  between  improvements  in  the  mode  of  subsistence  and 
the  spiral  of  liuman  needs.  "  p.  336  of  Ignatieff  M.  (1983)  "John  Millar  and  individualism.  "  In  Hont  & 
Ignatieff,  lVealth  and  Virtue,  Cambridge:  pp317-343. 
21  Haakonsscii  makes  no  concessions  to  the  Marxian  language  of  the  economic  interpretation. 
22Forbes  D.  (1954)  "Scientific  Whiggism:  Adam  Smith  and  John  Millar.  "  Cambridge  Journal,  vol.  7: 
643-670.  Also  ill  Cunningliarn  Wood  (cd.  )  (1984)  Adant  Smith.  Critical  Assessments,  London  & 
Canberra:  pp273-96.  Forbes'  thesis  is  further  developed  in  his  "Sceptical  Whiggism,  Commerce  and 
Liberty.  "  In  Skinner  &  Wilson  (eds)  (1975)  &says  on  Adam  Smith,  Oxford:  ppl79-202. to 
aim  was  to  write  history  impartially,  -  free  of  the  party  prejudices  of  either  Whig  or 
Tory.  To  do  this  they  had  to  develop  a  philosophical  method  based  on  human  nature 
as  outlined  by  Hume  in  the  Treatise,  the  latter  being,  according  to  an  interpretation 
close  to  Forbes',  a  development  of  ideas  already  familiar  to  those  schooled  in  the 
natural  law  theories  of  Grotius,  Pufendorf  and  Locke.  23  Like  the  salience  given  by 
Meek  to  the  four  stages,  Forbes'  distinction  between  vulgar  and  scientific  Whiggism 
has  also  passed  into  the  literature.  24 
After  presenting  an  alternative  interpretation  of  the  significance  of  Smith  and 
Millar  to  that  of  Meek,  Forbes  went  on  to  write  a  book  on  Hume's  application  of  his 
philosophy  to  politics  and  history.  25  Forbes  suggested  in  this  book  that  there  is  more  in 
common  between  Hume  and  Millar  than  has  been  noticed  by  most  writers.  Hume's 
influence  on  Millar  had  been  ignored  by  Meek  on  the  grounds  that  Hume's  writings  on 
politics  and  history  did  not  demonstrate  a  clear  outline  of  four  modes  of  subsistence. 
In  the  1950s  it  appeared  as  if  there  were  two  competing  interpretations  of  Millar: 
Meek  versus  Forbes.  When  I  read  their  two  seminal  1950s  articles  together,  it  seemed 
to  me  that  Forbes  made  a  concession  to  Meek  when  he  admitted  that  Smith  and  Mllar 
had  a  notion  of  economic  progress.  I  was  also  impressed  by  Forbes'  depth  of 
knowledge  of  the  texts,  his  fluent  and  lively  style  of  writing,  his  concern  to  place  the 
Scots  in  the  context  of  the  politics  of  the  day,  and  his  historical  understanding  both  of 
the  intellectual  background  to  their  writings  and  of  their  original  contribution  to 
historiography. 
The  work  of  Knud  Haakonssen  in  this  area  has  also  been  influential.  21  Haakonssen 
has  developed  a  perspective  on  Millar,  Smith  and  Hume  which  situates  them  firmly 
within  a  developing  tradition  of  natural  jurisprudence.  However,  unlike  Forbes,  who 
chose  to  write  little  about  Pascal  and  Meek's  original  thesis,  Haakonssen  has 
confronted  the  challenge  head  on  by  criticising  vigorously  the  doctrine  of  "economic 
determinism"  and  arguing  that  it  has  no  relevance  to  Smith  or  Millar's  social  theory.  27 
He  has  gone  further  than  Forbes  by  stating  that  the  problem  with  so-called  Marxian 
interpretations  of  Millar  is  that  they  ignore  the  obvious  presence  of  natural  rightS.  28 
23Buckle  S.  (199  1)  Natural  Law  and  the  Theory  ofProperty:  Grolius  to  Hunle  Oxford. 
24For  a  recent  example  see  Kidd  C.  (1993)  Subverting  Scotland's  Past:  Scottish  Whig  Historians  and 
the  creation  of  an  anglo-British  Identity  1689-0800,  Cambridge.  Kidd  follows  Forbes' 
charactcrisation  by  rcferring  to  eightecrith  century  Scottish  social  and  historical  theorists  as 
"sociological"  Whigs.  Sociological  Whiggisin  demonstrated  that  the  personal  liberties  secured  by 
union  with  the  English  constitution  were  superior  to  those  guaranteed  by  the  ancient  Scottish 
constitution.  Kidd  offers  this  as  an  explanation  of  why  Scottish  nationalism,  -  unlike  nationalisms  in 
otlicr  European  nations  of  the  time,  -  failed  to  take  root  in  the  ninclecrith  century. 
25Forbes  D.  (1975)  Huntes  Philosophical  Politics,  Cambridge. 
26Haakonsscn  K.  (1996)  Natural  Law  and  Moral  Philosophy,  Cambridge. 
27Haakonssen  K.  (198  1)  The  Science  of  the  Legislator,  Cambridge:  pp  178-189. 
281-laakonsscn  K.  (1985)  "John  Millar  and  dic  Science  of  a  Legislator.  "  The  Juridical  Review, 
Edinburgh:  41-68.  Reprinted  with  amendments  in  Haakonsscn  Natural  Law.  -  ppl54-181.  "The  main Haakonssen's  critique  has  redressed  an  imbalance  in  previous  scholarship.  I  have 
attempted  to  acknowledge  his  contribution  in  this  dissertation.  19 
Although  Haakonssen  has  written  that  Millar's  spectator-based  jurisprudence  has  a 
place  for  history,  he  has  given  little  attention  to  the  relationship  between  juridical  and 
economic  categodes  in  scientific  Whig  historiography.  Like  almost  every  scholar  in  the 
field,  his  critique  had  assumed  that  people  would  understand  what  "economic"  meant 
when  used  as  an  adjective  to  qualify  "motive",  "progress",  "individual"  or 
"determinism".  It  is  clear  that,  although  most  writers  and  thinkers  on  Smith  and  Millar 
have  used  the  term  to  describe  aspects  of  Scottish  eighteenth  century  theories  of 
society  and  history,  they  have  used  it  uncritically.  This  assumption  about  the  use  of  the 
term  "economic"  has  been  typical  of  every  scholar  regardless  of  their  loyalties  or 
antipathies  to  the  Marxist  project  in  the  history  of  political  and  economic  thought. 
1.2.2  Civic  Virtue  and  Moveable  Property 
A  later  development  in  scholarship  on  Millar  includes  the  entry  of  the  American 
scholar  J.  G.  A.  Pocock  into  Scottish  Enlightenment  studieS.  30  Pocock  is  one  of  the 
leading  scholars  in  the  field  of  the  history  of  ideas.  31  Pocock  has  written  a  huge  book 
on  the  influence  of  Machiavellian  thought  on  subsequent  thinkers.  32  Pocock  draws 
attention  the  notion  of  civic  virtue  Machiavelli  took  from  the  ancients.  Civic  virtue 
became,  according  to  Pocock,  associated  with  landed  property  and  civilian  or  citizens' 
militias.  When  Pocock  moved  into  eighteenth  century  studies,  he  observed  how,  post 
1688,  the  country  ideologists  in  England,  such  as  Bolingbroke,  had  used  Harrington  to 
criticise  the  corruption  and  patronage  associated  with  the  ruling  group  of  court 
WhigS.  33  Pocock  examines  a  wide  range  of  political  writings  of  the  period  and 
obstacle  to  the  materialist  interpretation  of  Millar  is,  however,  the  presence  of  a  clear  idea  of  natural 
la%v  and  rights.  "  1985:  p65.1996:  p178. 
29Like  Haakonsscn,  Smith'sjurisprudencc  is  discussed  separately  from  his  social  and  Itistorical  theory 
in  Campbell  T.  D.  (197  1)  AdaniSinith's  Science  ofmorals,  London. 
30Pocock  mentions  Millar  in  his  (1975)  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  Princeton:  p502.  He  states  that 
Millar  uses  the  categories  of  vinuc  and  corruption  to  organisc  his  understanding  of  history.  See  also 
his  (1985)  "The  varieties  of  whiggisin  from  Exclusion  to  Reform:  A  history  of  ideology  and 
discourse.  "  In  Virtue,  commerce  and  history,  Cambridge:  pp215-315.  Millar  is  discussed  on  pp298- 
299  as  a  Whig  who  substitutes  corruption  for  the  royal  prerogative  as  the  chief  threat  to  constitutional 
liberty. 
31SCC  Pocock  J.  G.  A.  (1957)  The  Ancient  Constitution  and  the  Feudal  Law,  Cambridge,  and  his 
introduction  to  (1977)  The  Political  Works  of  Jaines  Ilarringlon,  Cambridge.  Pocock  attacks  the 
notion  that  Harrington  was  aware  of  the  economic  relations  of  his  day.  For  a  reply,  see  Macpherson 
C.  B.  (1962)  The  Political  Theoty  ofPossessive  Individualism,  Oxford:  pp  174-  182.  Macpherson  came 
the  closest  to  attempting  a  Marxian  interpretation  of  Locke,  Hobbes,  and  Harrington  of  any  academic 
during  the  Cold  War.  I  discuss  the  concept  of  economic  activity  Macpherson  uses  in  Itis  bold  article 
on  the  "economic  penetration"  of  classical  liberal  political  theory  in  chaptcr  five. 
32Pocock,  Moment,  1975. 
33TIic  "court"  and  "country"  distinction  was  based  on  different  factions  amongst  the  landed  gentry  of 
the  period.  -  "court"  being  the  faction  with  the  favour  of  the  monarch  and  "country"  being  the  faction 12 
concludes  that  a  change  takes  place  in  the  attitude  writers  have  to,  what  Millar  called, 
"moveable"  property  (as  opposed  to  "fixed"  property). 
Much  depends  on  the  interpretation  of  the  term  "moveable".  Pocock,  following  the 
language  used  in  eighteenth  century  literature,  classifies  money  and  capital  (as  opposed 
to  land)  as  mobile  property.  Nonetheless,  by  the  eighteenth  century,  most  landed 
property  in  England  had  taken  the  social  form  of  value.  34  It  therefore  became  not  only 
alienable  as  a  commodity  but  capitalised.  For  example,  revenue  in  the  form  of  ground 
rent  was  becoming  increasingly  dependent  upon  surplus  value  generated  through  the 
exchange  of  the  capital  of  industrialising  farm-owning  capitalists  with  the  labour 
power  of  an  agrarian  proletariat.  As  a  technical  instrument  of  production,  land  was  not 
moveable.  It  was  therefore  described  as  fixed  property.  However,  in  the  economic 
form  of  value,  like  every  other  commodity,  it  was  transferable  from  subject  to  subject 
according  to  the  interests  of  its  owner.  The  juridical  distinction  between  fixed  and 
moveable  property  both  masked  and  reflected  these  changing  economic  relationships. 
Millar,  for  example,  conceived  of  the  transference  of  all  forms  of  property  as  a 
right  that  became  self  evident  only  when  ideas,  customs  and  manners  had  changed  with 
the  maturation  of  the  division  of  labour.  In  other  words,  it  was  only  when  commodity 
production  had  become  generalised  within  a  commercial  society  that  every  thoughtful 
individual  could  perceive  the  right  of  transference  as  an  idea  that  naturally  addressed 
their  needs  for  economic  and  social  improvement.  The  free  alienation  of  all  forms  of 
property,  including  land,  was  what  he  called  a  "species"  of  natural  right.  The  justice  of 
this  natural  right  was  well  understood  if  individuals  were  to  adopt  the  perspective  of  a 
disinterested  spectator.  Thus  he  thought  that  customary  juridical  barriers  to  the  right 
of  alienation,  such  as  entails,  were  fetters  upon  the  individual's  natural  propensity  to 
better  thernselves.  35  His  examination  of  the  injustice  of  entails  prompted  him  to  state 
what  was  to  become  a  maxim  of  later  liberal  doctrine:  "When  a  law  is  directly  contrary 
to  the  bent  of  a  whole  people,  it  must  either  be  repealed  or  evaded.  "  (HV,  vol.  2, 
p403). 
Despite  the  persistence,  therefore,  of  Millar's  use  of  a  language  that  contrasted 
land  as  fixed  property  with  commodities  as  moveable  property,  once  commodity 
production  had  become  generalised  (so  that  land  itself  had  become  subject  to  frequent 
sales  and  purchases),  Millar  recognised  that  every  form  of  property  was  freely 
alienable  or  transferable.  The  alienable  nature  of  every  form  of  property  met  the 
without.  See  Dickinson  H.  T.  (1977)  Libertv  and  Properly.  Political  Ideology  in  Eighleenth-Century 
Britain,  London. 
34Marx  K.  (1894)  Capital  IWIJI,  Moscow  cdn,  1959.  Divergent  juristic  forms  of  landed  property 
take  on  the  economic  form  of  value,  so  that  land  "merely  represents  a  certain  money  assessment"  to 
the  landowner.  The  latter's  organic  connection  with  his  land  is  so  completely  severed  that  lie  "may 
spend  his  whole  life  in  Constantinople,  while  his  estates  lie  in  Scotland.  "  p603. 
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requirements  of  the  individual  subject  of  experience's  perception  of  his  natural  rights. 
The  actual  or  potential  perception  of  these  rights  was  a  necessary  condition  for  human 
social  life.  This  perception  flourished  within  civilised  societies  founded  on  the 
mundane  contractual  exchanges  of  commodities  and  the  rule  of  law.  When  land 
became  exchangeable  with  money,  like  every  other  commodity,  it  was  also  potentially 
moveable.  This  recognition  of  the  subordination  of  land  to  the  alienable  form  of  the 
commodity  and  money  is  present  in  his  jurisprudential  writings  despite  his  continued 
use  of  the  traditional  "fixed/moveable"  distinction. 
Pocock  claims  that,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  people  possessing  moveable 
property  in  the  form  of  money  and  capital  became  an  object  of  admiration  rather  than 
disparagement.  This  change  in  attitude  coincided  with  what  is  called  the  "financial 
revolution"  -  the  establishment  of  the  Bank  of  England  and  a  system  of  public  credit.  36 
The  state  became  dependent  on  loans  from  the  latter  as  a  source  of  revenue,  and 
financiers  and  merchants  were  able  to  move,  through  the  influence  of  the  crown  and 
the  bequest  of  land,  into  the  gentry  class.  Pocock  situates  the  Scots  as  the  group  of 
thinkers  who  made  civic  virtue  compatible  with  the  accumulation  of  wealth  and 
professional  armies,  thus  destroying  its  previous  association  with  landed  property  and 
citizen  militias. 
Pocock  is  clearly  correct  to  note  this  historical  change  in  eighteenth  century  ideas. 
However,  his  focus  on  the  role  of  the  personal  influence  of  the  crown  as  the  means  by 
which  merchants  came  into  the  possession  of  landed  property  is  too  limited.  The 
emergence  of  the  modern  credit  system  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries 
marked  a  successful  struggle  to  subordinate  the  ancient  form  of  usurer's  capital  as 
interest-bearing  capital  to  modern  productive  industrial  and  commercial  capital.  37 
Financiers  had  an  interest  in  lending  to  those  landowners  who  invested  their  capital  in 
improvements  that  rnade  land  more  productive  of  value.  These  included  turning  every 
tiller  of  the  land  into  a  wage  labourer  and  introducing  scientific  techniques  of 
agronomy. 
The  public  credit  system,  therefore,  helped  to  speed  up  the  transference  of  land 
from  landowners  who  had  extracted  a  surplus  in  the  form  of  rent  in  cash  or  kind  from 
the  labour  of  a  dependent  peasantry  to  landowners  who  extracted  a  surplus  in  the  form 
of  money-rents  given  to  them  by  independent  capitalist  farmers  as  loans  for  the  use  of 
their  land.  Landowners  also  used  credit  to  transform  themselves  into  capitalist  farmers 
who  derived  surplus  value  through  the  immediate  exploitation  of  an  agrarian 
proletariat.  As  historians  such  as  Devine  have  shown,  from  the  mid  to  late  eighteenth 
century  there  was  a  significant  economic  transference  of  land  in  Scotland  from  the 
36Dickson  P.  G.  M.  (1970)TheRinancialRevolution  in  England.  A  Study  in  theDevelopmentofPublic 
Credit,  1688-1756,  London. 
37Marx,  Capital  Vol.  111,  p589. 14 
impoverished  gentry  to  merchants  enriched  by  trade  in  tobacco.  311  Land  was  bought  in 
order  to  exploit  its  mineral  resources.  The  processes  of  capitalising  the  land,  investing 
in  agrarian  technique  and  transforming  unproductive  dependent  labour  into  productive 
wage  labour  were  therefore  rapidly  advanced. 
Pocock's  contribution  to  the  history  of  ideas  is  imposing  and  deserves  an  appraisal 
which  I  could  not  begin  to  attempt  here.  39  He  is  not  afraid  of  criticism  and  is,  himself, 
an  explicit  critic  of  what  he  understands  to  be  Marxist  approaches  to  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  century  hiStory.  40  As  a  result,  he  has  been  described  as  having  a 
"revisionist"  approach  to  the  history  of  ideas.  41  My  limited  understanding  of 
revisionism  in  history  follows  that  of  Christopher  Hill  who  opposes  it  to  realism.  Hill 
argues  that  real  social  changes,  (such  as  the  English  Revolution)  can  take  place  before 
they  are  given  a  name  (such  as  "revolution").  Just  because  there  is  no  word  for  a  thing 
does  not  mean  that  the  thing  does  not  exist.  42  Thus,  just  because  there  was  no 
language  in  the  eighteenth  century  to  distinguish  between  land  as  part  of  the  material 
technical  process  from  its  social  form  of  value,  and  therefore  land  continued  to  be 
referred  to  in  thejuridical  language  as  "fixed"  as  opposed  to  "moveable"  property,  did 
not  mean  that  land  had  not  become  a  commodity  like  every  other  means  of  production, 
and  therefore  exchangeable  as  money  and  capital. 
1.3  Natural  Law  and  the  Subject  of  Experience 
My  own  inclinations  have  drawn  me  closer  to  the  natural  law  interpretation  than  to 
Pocock's.  An  approach  that  confines  itself  solely  to  the  investigation  of  actually 
existing  language  usage  tends  to  look  backwards  into  history  rather  than  forwards.  It 
sees  thinkers  in  a  context  determined  exclusively  by  past  language  usage.  Ajthough 
such  an  approach  notes  changes  in  usage,  it  cannot  explain  them  except  by  referring 
back  to  previous  usages.  It  can  note  only  that  there  is  some  kind  of  unspecified 
correspondence  between  real  political,  social  and  economic  changes,  and  changes  in 
the  form  of  their  description.  There  also  seems  to  be  a  radically  sceptical  tendency 
latent  within  this  interpretation  that  motivates  criticisms  of  both  liberal  and  Marxist 
views  on  the  development  of  history  on  the  grounds  that  there  is  no  rational 
justification  for  thinking  that  there  can  be  progress  or  development  in  either  the 
38Dcvine  T.  M.  (1975)  The  Tobacco  Lords.  -  a  Rudy  of  the  Tobacco  Merchants  of  Glasgow, 
Edinburgh:  pp18  -33. 
39Pocock  has  a  developed  theory  of  the  history  of  ideis.  See  his  (1972)  "Languages  and  their 
Implications:  the  Transformation  of  the  Study  of  Political  Thought.  "  In  Pocock,  Politics,  Language 
and  Thne.  London:  pp34. 
40Pocock.  Varieties,  pp241-243. 
41Kraninick  I.  F.  (1982)  "Republican  Revisionism  Revisited,  "  American  Historical  Review  LY-XXVH, 
3:  629-664.  Mentioned  by  Pocock  as  placing  his  emphasis  on  the  republican  tradition  of  thought  in 
the  "reactionary  colunin"  of  bourgeois  scholarship.  Varieties,  p242. 
42Hill  C.  (1990)  "The  word  'Revolution'.  "  InA  Nation  of  Change  andAlovelly,  London:  ppl.  00-120. 15 
categories  of  thought  or  in  society  itself  Perhaps  this  is  one  of  the  reasons  the 
approach  has  been  labelled  "revisionist". 
On  the  other  hand,  a  Marxist  reading  of  the  natural  law  tradition  has  the  potential 
to  explain  the  close  relationship  between  the  emergence  of  a  scientific  conception  of 
society  and  the  needs  of  bourgeois  society.  For  example,  that  aspect  of  Roman  law 
called  thejus  gentitun  was  brought  into  being  by  trade  with  foreign  tribes  and  resident 
aliens.  Any  person  outwith  the  Roman  public  law  association  and  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  jus  civile  was  subject  to  these  regulations.  The  jus  gemium  was  therefore  both 
closely  connected  with  the  nature  and  purpose  of  economic  activity  and,  through  its 
universal  application  to  non-civilians,  had  the  appearance  of  natural  law.  It  was  the 
only  law  to  which  strangers  from  different  cultures  could  be  made  accountable.  The 
category  of  natural  law  in  the  ancient  world  therefore  co-incided  with  the  needs  and 
interests  of  commodity  owners  from  geographically  and  culturally  diverse  countries. 
Natural  law  could  not  have  taken  the  character  of  thejus  gentium  confined  to  the  local 
norms  and  customs  peculiar  to  isolated  tribes  and  civilisations.  Moreover,  as  Hume 
pointed  out  in  his  History  of  England,  the  rediscovery  of  Justinian's  Institutes  and  its 
elaboration  of  the  laws  applicable  to  mercantile  transactions  played  a  decisive  role 
within  the  sphere  of  ideology  in  assisting  a  transition  from,  as  he  perceived  it,  the 
"barbarism"  of  the  Medieval  period  to  the  "civil  isati  on"  of  his  own  times.  Natural  law 
became  the  chief  ideological  weapon  of  the  emergent  bourgeoisie  in  its  struggle 
against  feudalism.  It  assisted  mercantile  states  in  their  colonial  expansion  and  played  a 
crucial  role  in  the  conceptualisation  of  the  state  and  society  in  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  century  political  and  economic  writings.  43  Along,  therefore,  with  those  who 
emphasise  the  natural  law  tradition  in  Scotland,  such  as  Haakonssen,  I  have  given 
special  attention  to  the  core  of  Millar's  intellectual  work:  his  lectures  on  private  and 
public  law. 
If  Pashukanis  is  correct,  then  concepts  that  become  the  foundation  for  political  and 
economic  theories  such  as  contract,  alienable  property  and  rights  are  the  product  of 
43For  natural  law  as  the  ideology  of  the  bourgeoisie  in  its  revolutionary  period,  see  Pashukanis  E.  B. 
(1924)  Law  and  Alarxisin:  A  General  Theoty.  Tois,  ards  a  Critique  of  r-undainental  Juridical 
Concepts.  Einhorn  (trans,  )  Arthur  (cd.  )  Worcester,  1989:  pp73-84.  For  natural  law  and  modern 
theories  of  society  and  politics,  see  Gicrkc  0.  (1934)  Natural  Lan,  and  the  Theory  of  Society  ISOO- 
1800,  Cambridge.  Also  Binns  D.  (1977)  "From  Natural  Law  to  Sociology.  ",  chapter  eight  of  Beyond 
the  Sociology  of  Conflict,  London:  pp174-210.  For  natural  law  and  colonialism,  see  Pawlisch  H.  S. 
(1985)  "Law  as  an  Instrument  of  Colonialism.  ",  chapter  one  of.  Sir  John  Davies  and  the  Conquest  of 
Ireland.  Cambridge:  pp3-14.  Pawlisch  criticiscs  Pocock's  thesis  that  English  common  lawyers  had 
little  interest  or  knowledge  of  Roinan  civil  law  as  "extremely  narrow":  pl6l.  He  suggests  that  the 
assumption  that  English  lawyers'  preoccupation  with  "a  ni)1hical  Anglo-Saxon  past"  was  a  result  of 
such  ignorance  "needs  to  be  thoroughly  revised":  p.  175.  If  English  W%ycrs  were  both  aware  of  and 
used  the  categories  of  civil  law  for  colonial  purposes,  this  throws  doubt  upon  the  Pocock's  thesis  that 
there  was  "an  unique  Anglo-American  political  tradition  at  variance  with  the  conventional  ideas  of 
individualistic  liberalism.  "  Haakonssen,  Sununary,  p37. 16 
commodity  owners'  reflection  upon  social  relations  subsumed  by  exchange.  44 
Moreover  it  is  also  true  that  the  political  economy  of  Smith  and  the  Physiocrats 
emerges  out  of  a  combination  of  jurisprudence  with  the  Baconian  inspired  project  of 
scientific  inquiry.  The  latter  has  undoubtedly  contributed  to  the  development  of  the 
productive  forces  of  an  ascendant  capitalism. 
Empiricist  jurisprudence,  I  argue,  presupposed  that  the  subject  of  experience  and 
knowledge  was  sovereign.  This  subject  was  a  juridically  derived  abstraction  enriched 
by  the  results  of  scientific  inquiry.  However,  this  abstraction  was  not  just  a  product  of 
thought  imposed  upon  social  reality  by  philosophers  and  jurisprudentialists.  Nor  can  it 
be  reduced  to  an  epiphenomenal  excrescence  of  a  bourgeois  legal  superstructure.  41 
The  subject  of  experience  was  indeed  historically  contingent  upon  the  emergence  of  a 
commodity  capitalist  society.  However,  it  also  reflected  an  objective  social  reality, 
however  contingent,  in  which  real  subjects  of  experience  recognised  themselves  and 
others  as  possessing  rights,  interests  and  needs,  including  the  need  to  escape  from  the 
painful  experiences  of  natural  scarcity,  political  and  religious  oppression,  and  hard 
labour. 
What  is  unique  about  the  abstraction  is  that  historically  determined  subjects  of 
experience  perceived  their  rights,  interests  and  needs  as  inherent  aspects  of  human 
nature.  As  such,  the  needs  of  humans  at  a  particular  period  of  human  development 
were  perceived  to  coincide  both  with  humanity  at  every  possible  stage  of  its 
conjectured  development  in  the  past  and  at  every  possible  stage  of  its  imagined  future 
development.  This  period  of  human  development  coincided  with  the  eighteenth 
century  Enlightenment.  It  was  characterised  by  the  triumph  and  consolidation  of 
expansion  of  the  productive  forces  within  the  form  of  capital  accumulation.  It  is  a 
period  in  which,  despite  the  occasional  observation  on  the  corruption  of  sexual 
manners  and  the  deleterious  effects  on  the  minds  of  detail  labourers  within  a  technical 
division  of  labour,  the  subject  experienced  no  seriously  disturbing  limits  to  the 
potential  of  an  uncontrolled  market  to  satisfy  individuals'  physical  and  psychological 
needs.  Moreover,  the  interests  of  capital  appeared  for  a  short  time  to  coincide  with  the 
interests  of  humanity  as  a  whole.  Juridical  and  political  institutions  that  did  not 
guarantee  individual  freedoms  to  pursue  an  innocent  labouring  and  calculative  wealth- 
creating  interest  would  therefore  be  reformed  or  abolished  according  to  the  subject's 
well-informed  judgements  of  utility  and  propriety. 
44Pashukanis,  Laiv,  chapter  four:  "Commodity  and  Subject.  "  pp108-133. 
45This  "soap  bubble"  interpretation  of  the  Marxist  approach  to  the  determination  of  concepts  and 
categories  is  the  one  most  frequently  adopted  by  adversaries.  Labriola  comments  that  political  views, 
sciences,  and  systems  of  haware  not  "pure  appearances,  soap  bubbles"  but  "real  things"  that  constitute 
but  are  insufficient  to  explain  civilisation.  Their  derivation  and  development  require  explanation 
within  the  totality  of  the  determinations  of  humanity's  struggle  for  existence.  Labriola  A.  (1908) 
EssqvsoiitliekfaterialisticCoiiceptionofHislot:  v,  Chicago:  pp124-126. 17 
Thus  the  spectator-based  theory  of  property  used  by  Smith  and  Millar  is  closely 
related  to  an  empiricist  theory  of  knowledge.  This  theory  has  commodity  owners' 
needs  for  laws  that  protect  their  interests  at  its  heart.  Locke's  theory  that  the  natural 
right  to  property  was  established  because  the  individual  mixes  his  labour  with  the 
object  of  his  work,  was  too  limited  a  conception  for  the  Scots.  Smith  and  Millar 
needed  to  give  individuals  a  natural  right  to  property  acquired  through  the  exchange  of 
commodities  on  which  they  had  not  necessarily  expended  any  of  their  own  labour.  This 
property  is  money  and  capital.  They  therefore  developed  a  theory  that  divorced 
property  conceptually  from  labour  (except  insofar  as  the  painful  experience  of  labour 
was  one  of  the  considerations  the  spectator  would  bear  in  mind  when  determining  an 
act  of  injustice).  46  At  the  same  time  they  affirmed  a  strong  causal  connection  between 
a  complex  bourgeois  notion  of  property  (as  the  right  to  alienate  property  in  the 
individual's  exclusive  possession  freely)  and  activity  productive  of  exchangeable 
commodities.  This  theory  also  accounted  for  the  approval  individuals  felt  when 
confronted  with  people  who  controlled  wealth  in  the  value  form.  This  approval,  of 
course,  did  not  exclude  wealth  acquired  by  individuals  through  their  own  labour.  On 
the  contrary,  the  spectator's  approval  confirmed  both  the  justice  of  property  acquired 
through  the  individual's  own  labour  and  the  prudence  and  fortitude  of  the  independent 
commodity  producer.  Thus  Millar  was  quite  happy  to  use  the  language  of  the 
individual's  natural  right  to  the  "fruits  of  their  own  labour"  without  being  committed  in 
any  way  to  a  Lockean  labour-mixing  theory  of  property.  47 
I  have  tended  to  follow  a  qualified  approach  to  the  jurisprudential  path  of  an 
inquiry  into  the  relationship  between  Millar's  understanding  of  political  economy,  and 
his  philosophical  or  scientific  approach  to  history.  It  is  qualified  in  two  ways.  The  first 
is  that  a  jurisprudential  approach  to  history  that  pays  attention  to  the  subject's  interests 
in  economic  matters  does  not  necessarily  exclude  the  influence  of  Harrington.  Hume, 
for  example,  was  happy  to  use  Harrington's  principle  of  the  balance  of  property  to 
theorise  forms  of  government  and  political  changes.  48  This  principle  seems  to  me  to  be 
compatible  with  the  Baconian  notion  of  "political  arithmetic"  -  the  attempt  to  quantify 
aspects  of  social  reality  that  informed  the  seventeenth  century  writings  on  trade  by 
people  like  Petty  and  North.  Hume's  use  of  the  principle,  however,  was  an 
improvement  upon  Harrington's  because  he  focused  on  revenue  derived  from  property 
used  as  a  means  to  secure  the  political  and  economic  dependence  of  the  weak  upon  the 
strong  and  the  poor  upon  the  rich. 
46SCC  chapter  eight. 
47Sce  Haakonssen's  correction  of  Mcclick  and  LcPpcrI-Fogcn's  assumption  that  Millar  adopted 
Locke's  theory  of  property.  "Millar":  p62.  Natural  Law:  p  175. 
48SCC  chapter  eleven. 18 
Much  depended,  however,  on  how  the  distribution  of  property  could  be  measured. 
Harrington  was  ambiguous.  On  the  one  hand,  he  measured  property  technically  -  by 
the  size  of  a  piece  of  land  or  by  the  time  it  takes  to  cultivate  it.  He  had  the  yeoman 
farmer  or  free  independent  peasant  in  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  he  measured  property 
in  terms  of  the  revenue  derived  from  a  piece  of  land.  Harrington  did  not  specify  how 
the  extent  of  this  revenue  was  to  be  calculated.  There  are  three  connected  possibilities. 
It  could  have  been  calculated  either  in  the  form  of  the  valuation  made  by  the  state  for 
tax  purposes;  in  terms  of  its  exchangeable  value  were  the  land  to  be  sold;  or  in  terms 
of  the  value  the  produce  of  the  land  realised  when  it  reached  the  market.  Harrington 
neither  distinguished  these  different  forms  of  monetary  valuation,  nor  allowed  that 
wealth  in  the  form  of  money  or  commodities  -  his  "moveable"  property  -  be  included 
as  part  of  any  determination  of  the  balance.  Yet,  by  posing  the  possibility  of  measuring 
revenues,  he  made  it  likely  that  later  thinkers  would  include  merchant  and  industrial 
capital  invested  in  agricultural  production  as  sources  of  revenue.  These  could  be 
included  in  later  calculations  of  the  distribution  of  property  in  a  society.  Hume  and 
Millar  seem  to  make  these  moves  consciously  or  unconscioUS]y.  49 
The  second  qualification  is  that  a  jurisprudential  approach  to  history  that  focused 
on  the  judgements  an  ideal  spectator  made  about  the  juridical  and  political  institutions 
of  government  was  also  informed  by  actual  subjects'  perceptions  of  what  motivated 
them  to  engage  in  productive  or  economic  activity  -  what,  in  other  words,  they 
perceived  to  be  useful  means  to  the  satisfaction  of  valued  material  and  psychological 
ends  for  themselves  and  others,  -  whether  these  ends  be  the  respectful  attention  of 
others,  access  to  knowledge  and  education,  the  consumption  of  luxurious  commodities 
or  whatever  else,  including  forms  of  law  and  government,  that  interested  them.  This 
entailed  an  understanding  of  how  generalised  commodity  production  and  the  division 
of  labour  could  bring  benefits  to  the  self-interested  subject.  It  was  this  perception  that 
led  merchants  to  a  theoretical  inquiry  into  money,  value  and  the  commodity  in  the 
seventeenth  century  -  an  investigation  that  provided  philosophers  and  legislators  with 
the  concepts  and  categories  that  characterised  the  emergence  of  a  separate  discipline 
of  political  economy  in  the  following  century. 
The  adoption  of  a  qualified  approach  to  jurisprudential  historiography 
differentiates  the  content  of  this  dissertation  from  another  Marxian-inspired  critique  of 
Millar's  social  science.  This  is  associated  with  the  work  of  Hans  Medick  and  Annette 
Leppert-Fogen.  50  Medick  and  Leppert-Fogen  were  the  first  scholars  to  point  out  that 
Millar's  political  economy  was  incapable  of  grasping  the  concept  of  exploitation.  They 
correctly  showed  that  Millar  understood  capital  as  a  thing  rather  than  as  ,  social 
49SCe  chapter  eleven. 
5OMcdick  H.  &  Leppcri-Fogcii  A.  (1974)  Trulic  Sozialwisscnscitaft  als  Ideologic  des  Kleinen 
Burgeriums:  John  Millar  of  Glasgow  1735-180  1.  "  In  Sozialgeschichle  Heute,  Gottingen:  pp2248. 19 
relation.  They  clearly  demonstrated  two  salient  characteristics  of  Millar's  theorisation 
of  capital.  The  first  was  that  Millar  thought  that  capital  was  acquired  through  the 
frugal  and  parsimonious  habits  of  individualS.  51  The  second  was  that  Millar  conceived 
of  capital  as  a  technical  factor  of  production.  52  Medick  and  Leppert-Fogen  went  on  to 
argue  that  Millar  was  unable  to  accurately  conceptualise  the  dominant  social  relations 
of  commo  dity-capi  tali  st  society  because  his  thinking  reflected  contradictions  inherent 
within  the  consciousness  of  the  petit  bourgeoisie.  The  petit  bourgeoisie  were  a  class 
that  wanted  to  free  a  commodity-producing  society  from  legal  and  political  restrictions 
at  the  same  time  as  refusing  to  face  up  to  the  capitalist  consequences  of  ubiquitous 
exchange  on  the  proletariat.  53  Medick  and  Leppert-Fogen  suggest  that  Millar  was  an 
apologist  for  the  petit  bourgeoisie  and  that  the  contradictory  nature  of  the 
consciousness  of  this  class  explains  why  Millar  argued  that  greater  social  equality 
would  be  the  outcome  of  a  policy  of  laissezfaire  at  the  same  time  as  maintaining  that 
social  inequality  was  a  necessary  and  inevitable  feature  of  every  conceivable  form  of 
society.  54 
In  contrast  to  this  position,  I  argue  that  the  ideological  content  of  Millar's  science 
is  classically  bourgeois  precisely  because  it  rests  so  obviously  on  the  notion  of  the 
abstraction  of  the  individual  as  an  actual  or  potential  owner  of  commodities.  This 
conception  of  the  individual  followed  from  Millar's  adoption  of  the  empiricist  attempt 
to  explain  natural  law  according  to  the  operations  of  the  mind  of  the  self-interested 
subject  of  experience.  Millar  thought  that  individuals  would  be  interested  in  acquiring 
property  regardless  of  whether  they  were  actual  petit  commodity  producers, 
propertyless  proletarians,  capitalists,  landed  proprietors,  citizens,  savages,  women  or 
children.  He  thought  that  every  individual  had  an  interest  in  alienating  the  property  he 
51  "Gesaiiitokoiioiiiiscli  bildet  es  jenen  Teil  des  'national  produce',  der  das  Resultat  der  Spartatigkeit 
und  Konsunirestriktion  produktiv  arbeitender  Individuen  ist:  'capital  is  composed  of  what  is  saved 
from  tlie  produce  which  (has) 
...  not  been  consuined  by  individuals'.  "  [their  empliasis]  Medick  & 
Leppert-Fogen,  Truhe  Sozialwissenschaft",  p30. 
52"Gieicliwolil  ist  der  Ubergang  zur  Dreiklassentlicorie  auf  der  Grundlage  okonoinischer 
Bestimmungen  ideologisch:  Der  Ansatz  bei  den  technischen  Funktionen  des  Kapitals,  der  die  heute 
lierrschende  Theorie  von  der  Troduktivitat  des  Kapitals'  antizipieri,  lasst  die  Wirkung  des  Kapitals 
als  gesellschaftliches  Ausbeutungsverhaltnis  in  den  Hintergrund  treten,  ja  das  Kapital  selber  als  eine 
nur  zum  Wohl  der  Arbeiter  erfundene  Einrichtung  erscheinen.  "  Itlicir  ciiipliasisl  Medick  &  Leppert- 
Fogen,  Truhe  Sozialwissciiscliaft",  p31. 
53"Vieliiielir  sind  jene  Unstimmigkeiten  der  Theorie  aus  der  spezifischen,  in  sich  widerspruchlichen 
Situation  einer  Klasse  abzuleiten,  die  einerseits  die  warenproduzierende  Gesellschaft,  in  der  'cvery 
man  thus  lives  by  excltangiiig,  or  becomes  in  some  nicasure  a  nierchant',  von  den  Begregrenzungen 
eines  Subsysteins  befricien  wollte,  so  dass  schliesslich  Wie  society  itself  grow  to  be  what  is  properly 
called  a  coininercial  socicty',  wilirend  sie  auf  der  anderen  Seite  die  kapitalistischen  Konsequenzen 
des  ubititaren  Tauschs  sclieute.  "Itlicir  empliasisj  Medick  &  Leppcri-Fogen,  Truhe 
Sozialwissenschaft",  pp27-28. 
54"Docii  beugt  Millar  einer  allzu  radikalen  Auslegung  seiner  Intentionen  auch  vor,  wenn  er  ledliglich 
die  lexcessive  inequality  of  property'  zum  Gegenstand  seiner  Kritik  macht,  nicht  aber  die  'inequality' 
schlechthin,  die  nur  durch  eine  'equalization  of  property'  konsequent  aufzuheben  ware.  "  [their 
eiiipliasisl  Medick,  &  Leppert-Fogen.  Truhe  SozialwissenschafV.  p33. 20 
or  she  came  to  possess  free  from  arbitrary  juridical  and  political  restrictions.  It  was 
individuals'  experience  of  a  world  of  scarcities  of  the  means  of  subsistence  that  inclined 
them  to  recognise  an  interest  in  competing  against  others  for  the  accumulation  of 
property.  Millar  thought  that  forms  of  government  were  necessary  that  both  enforced 
the  rights  of  the  propertied  against  the  propertyless,  and  provided  opportunities  for 
propertyless  individuals  to  acquire  alienable  property  in  their  own  right.  For  example, 
Millar's  consciousness  of  the  deleterious  effects  of  the  technical  division  of  labour  on 
the  minds  of  manual  workers  led  him  to  argue  that  public  education  would  have  a 
twofold  beneficial  effect.  Firstly,  it  would  provide  manual  workers  with  the  practical 
knowledge  of  how  to  acquire  property.  Secondly,  it  would  provide  them  with  the 
theoretical  knowledge  of  the  political,  economic  and  juridical  inevitability  of  social 
inequality,  -  of  how  it  was  impossible  to  conceive  of  a  civilised  society  that  did  not  rest 
upon  a  social  division  between  a  superior  knowledgeable  class  of  individuals  and  an 
inferior  ignorant  class  of  individuals.  55  As  such,  Millar  tended,  if  anything,  to  anticipate 
nineteenth  century  forms  of  paternalistic  welfare  liberalism  rather  than  Marxian 
socialism.  Millar  was  not,  I  contend,  an  apologist  for  the  petit  bourgeoisie.  Rather,  he 
articulated  the  most  advanced  form  of  British  bourgeois  thought  possible  in  a  historical 
period  prior  to  the  emergence  of  proletarian  forms  of  consciousness.  The  latter  were 
to  posit  the  proletariat  as  a  collectivity  with  the  potential  to  transform  society.  This 
was,  of  course,  long  after  Millar's  death. 
1.4  The  Issues  and  their  Investigation 
The  following  inquiry  does  not  pretend  to  be  a  fully  comprehensive  reading  of 
Millar.  The  latter  would  go  beyond  the  scope  of  this  dissertation.  It  would  feature 
extensive  discussions  of  the  influence  of  Karnes  and  of  other  philosophers  and 
historians  that  Millar  recommended  his  students  read.  These  include  Sydney,  Locke, 
Temple,  Priestly  and  Robertson.  There  is  also  plenty  of  scope  for  further  research  on 
the  impact  of  contemporary  French  thought  on  Millar.  This  has  been  pioneered  by 
Michel  Faure's  work  on  the  relationship  of  Millar's  historiography  to  Diderot's  "science 
de  Momme  public".  Faure  has  pointed  out  the  similarity  of  Millar's  historiography  to 
that  of  contemporary  French  historians  such  as  Bossuet  and  Goguet.  There  is  work  to 
be  done  on  Millar's  philosophical  relationship  to  Voltaire  and  Rousseau.  Millar 
recommended  Voltaire's  historiography  and  criticised  Rousseau's. 
Moreover  a  more  comprehensive  account  of  Millar  would  pay  greater  attention  to 
his  relationship  to  developing  currents  in  Whig  political  thought  towards  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century  and  his  likely  responses  both  to  the  literature  provoked  by  the 
French  Revolution  and  to  the  repression  suffered  by  friends  and  allies  who,  like  Millar 
55Sce  chaptcr  dirce. 21 
supported  parliamentary  reform  and  opposed  the  war  against  France.  This  dissertation, 
for  example,  makes  no  reference  to  two  anonymous  political  pamphlets  attributed  to 
Millar,  7he  Letters  of  (rilo  and  The  Lellei-s  of  Siditey.  My  reason  for  doing  so  has 
been  based  on  the  doubts  Haakonssen  raised  concerning  the  attribution  of  their 
authorship  to  Millar.  I  have  taken  for  granted  Haakonssen's  argument  that  these 
pamphlets  could  as  well  have  been  written  by  his  nephew,  John  Craig,  or  by  one  of  the 
many  other  distinguished  pupils  Millar  taught.  56  Nonetheless,  whether  or  not  Nfillar 
was  the  author  of  these  pamphlets,  they  are  evidence  of  a  current  of  thought  for  which 
he  was  directly  or  indirectly  responsible.  There  is  clearly  further  work  to  be  done  both 
comparing  these  pamphlets  with  Millar's  lectures  and  books  and  comparing  them  with 
other  popular  political  writings  of  the  period.  A  fully  comprehensive  account  of 
Millar's  life  would  go  beyond  the  short  account  I  have  given  in  chapter  two.  It  would 
include  a  thorough  examination  of  the  political  economy  of  Scotland  in  the  eighteenth 
century;  a  well  developed  Marxian  theory  of  the  history  if  ideas,  and  an  application  of 
this  theory  to  the  Enlightenment  both  as  a  world-wide  socio-historical  movement  and 
as  a  phenomenon  specific  to  eighteenth  century  Scotland. 
This  account  would  also  pay  greater  attention  to  the  position  of  women  and 
children  in  eighteenth  century  society  and  the  implications  that  an  empiricist 
jurisprudence  had  for  including  women  within  the  abstraction  of  the  individual  as  a 
subject  of  experience.  I  have  assumed  throughout  this  dissertation  that  Millar  thought 
of  particular  subjects  as  patriarchal  heads  of  households  with  dependent  wives  and 
children  and  that  this  followed  from  an  application  of  empiricist  methods  to  an 
examination  of  the  rights  within  marriage  between  husbands  and  wives.  Nonetheless 
there  is  evidence  that  Millar  also  thought  that  women,  as  objects  of  male  attention,  had 
an  effect  on  men's  manners  and  customs.  The  empiricist  theory  of  the  operations  of  the 
mind  entailed  that  wornen  were  as  capable  of  sympathising  with  the  interested  and 
disinterested  passions  of  other  individuals  as  men.  The  emphasis  I  give  to  Millar's 
quasi-contractual  theory  of  acquiescence  mediated  by  utility  in  chapter  eight  therefore 
has  relevance  to  his  understanding  of  the  dependence  of  women  upon  men  for  a  means 
of  subsistence  and  protection.  It  is  a  short  step  from  recognising  this  relationship  to 
arguing  that  it  follows  from  Millar's  method  that  he  would  have  conceived  of  a  woman 
as  a  subject  of  experience  with  as  strong  an  interest  in  acquiring  alienable  property 
through  her  own  activities  as  any  other  propertyless  individual.  I  am  conscious 
therefore  both  of  the  under-theorised  nature  of  this  inquiry  as  well  as  the  possible 
56Sec  Haakonssen,  Natural  Law,  p155  n7. 22 
inaccuracies  of  some  of  the  empirical  detail  given  in  the  historical  account  of  Millar's 
life.  57 
What  follows  is  narrowly  focused  on  Meek's  interpretation  and  on  critical 
responses  to  this  interpretation  in  subsequent  research.  Following  Pascal,  Meek  is 
considered  to  be  the  authority  on  the  materialist  or  economic  interpretation  of  Milar. 
His  propositions  regarding  the  unity  of  the  relationship  between  Millar  and  Marx  are 
iternised  in  the  following  list: 
(1a)Millar  developed  a  "new  way  of  looking  at  society".  511 
(1b)This  was  a  philosophy  of  history  that  could  appropriately  be  called  a 
"materialist  conception  of  history".  59 
(2)Millar's  materialist  conception  of  history  assumed  that  "basic  economic 
factors"  influenced  "power-relations"  through  "changes  in  property 
relationstf.  60 
(3)Millar  identified  "what  might  be  called  'techno-economic  bases'  for  certain 
great  social  changes  ...  such  as  the  institution  of  private  property,  the  rise  of 
commodity  production  and  trade,  and  the  institution  and  abolition  of  slavery".  61 
(4)In  his  examination  of  English  history,  Millar  saw  "the  civil  war  quite  clearly  a 
class  war".  62 
(5)"Millar  was  certainly  well  aware  of  'the  existence  of  classes  in  modern 
society'.  1163 
Meek's  propositions  regarding  the  differentiation  between  the  relationship  between 
Millar  and  Marx  are  iternised  in  the  subsequent  list: 
57For  example.  my  discover),  of  Paul  B.  Wood's  1984  thesis  on  Reid  which  includes  details  of  his 
appointment  at  Glasgow  Uni  vcrsity.  canic  too  late  for  nic  to  find  out  whether  his  research  sheds  light 
on  ni),  speculations  regarding  Millar's  opposition  to  Reid's  appointment.  See  chapter  two. 
58Mcck.  "Contribution".  1967,  p4  1. 
59Mcck,  "Contribution",  1967,  p42. 
60ibid. 
61ibid. 
62Mcck,  "Contribution",  1967,  p43. 
63Mcck,  "Contribution",  1967,  p44. 23 
(6)Millar  had  no  "feeling  for  the  dialectic  of  social  change".  This  was 
"conspicuously  lacking".  64 
(7)Millar  "denied  that  the  labour-capital  relationship  was  based  upon 
exploitation".  What  impressed  Millar  was  "the  capacity  of  the  labourer  to 
become  a  little  capitalist  himself"  not  "the  subordination  of  the  labourer  to  the 
CapitaliSt,  1.65 
(S)It  followed  that,  unlike  Marx,  Millar  theorised  the  transition  from  feudalism 
to  capitalism  as  one  in  which  there  was  "the  emergence  of  a  state  of  economic 
and  political  intlej)en(lence"  [Meek's  emphasis]  not  "the  substitution  of  a  new 
ruling  class,  with  a  new  method  of  exploitation,  for  an  old  one.  "66 
The  truth  or  falsity  of  these  propositions  will  be  assessed  in  the  final  chapter.  In 
order  to  make  this  assessment,  it  will  be  necessary  to  engage  firstly  with  economic, 
juridical  and  political  aspects  of  Millar's  philosophical  history,  and,  secondly,  with 
Hume's  and  Smith's  influence  on  Millar.  Because  Hume  does  not  have  a  clearly  stated 
four  stage  theory,  Meek  tended  to  ignore  his  contribution  to  Millar's  intellectual 
development.  This  dissertation  has  attempted  to  re-establish  the  affinity  Millar  felt  for 
Hume's  philosophical  history.  It  presents  Millar  as  a  critical  follower  of  Hume.  Smith's 
influence  is  self-evident  and  I  have  spent  much  time  comparing  Millar's  thinking  on 
jurisprudence  and  political  economy  with  Smith's. 
Within  the  narrow  focus  I  have  chosen  to  adopt,  there  have  been  three  major 
issues  that  dominated  the  research.  The  first  was  whether  or  not  it  made  any  sense  to 
describe  Millar's  theory  as  an  economic  interpretation  of  society  and  history  -  indeed 
whether  it  was  appropriate  to  describe  it  as  a  species  of  economic  determinism  or  not. 
The  second  followed  from  Meek's  application  to  Millar  of  the  second  half  of  Pascal's 
general  assumptions  about  eighteenth  century  Scottish  social  and  historical  theory. 
This  was  that  Scottish  theorists  had  recognised  a  causal  relationship  between  the 
distribution  of  property  and  forms  of  government.  The  third  was  the  relationship,  if 
any,  Millar  might  have  had  to  Marx. 
There  are  three  appendices  attached  to  the  main  body  of  this  work.  Appendix  one 
consists  of  a  detailed  textual  examination  of  Millar's  short  essay  on  Ireland  in  volume 
four  of  Historical  Vieli).  67  Through  a  comparison  with  Hume's  remarks  on  the  Irish,  I 
64Meck.  "Contribution",  1967,  p43. 
65Meck,  "Contribution".  1967,  p45. 
66ibid. 
67A  fuller  version  of  this  can  be  found  in  Smith  P.  B.  (1996)  "Conjecture,  Acquiescence  and  John 
Millar's  History  of  Ireland.  "  The  European  Legacy  vol.  1.8:  2227-2248. 24 
attempt  to  show  how  Millar  reasons  historically  using  the  conjectural,  hypothetical 
method  discussed  in  chapter  eight  and  the  political  theory  discussed  in  chapter  ten. 
Appendix  two  consists  of  some  remarks  on  the  use  of  Millar's  lectures  in  the  main 
body  of  the  dissertation  and  appendix  three  is  a  reproduction  of  Millar's  lecture  notes 
on  ethics.  The  latter  have  particular  relevance  to  chapter  eight. 
John  Millar  is  a  minor  figure  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment.  His  intellectual 
achievement  is  overshadowed  by  those  of  his  contemporaries,  David  Hume  and  Adam 
Smith,  both  of  whom,  unlike  Millar,  have  made  world  historical  contributions  to 
science  and  philosophy.  In  a  grand  account  of  the  progress  of  world  culture,  it  would 
be  easy  to  ignore  Millar.  This  is  not  the  case  with  Hume  and  Smith,  who  were 
recognised  as  major  thinkers  in  their  life  times  and  became  the  starting  points  for 
future  scientific  inquiry.  Given  Millar's  close  proximity  to  and  affinity  with  Hume  and 
Smith,  it  would  prove  impossible  to  ignore  the  contribution  of  both  Hume  and  Smith 
to  Millar's  own  intellectual  development  in  this  dissertation.  Chapter  two  therefore 
comprises  a  biographical  account  of  Millar's  life.  This  will  mention  the  influence  Hume 
and  Smith  had  on  Millar  as  teachers  and  friends. 25 
Chapter  Two: 
Life  and  Intellectual  Development 
2.1  Early  Life  and  Education 
John  Millar  was  born  in  1735  at  Shotts,  twenty-four  miles  west  of  Edinburgh.  His 
father,  James  Millar,  was  an  ordained  minister  of  the  Church  of  Scotland.  Millar's 
mother  was  the  daughter  of  a  local  gentleman  "of  considerable  estate  in  the  county  of 
Lanark".  I  Millar  was  the  eldest  of  four  children. 
The  family  owned  a  small  estate  at  Nfilheugh  near  Blantyre  in  Lanarkshire.  John 
Craig,  Millar's  nephew  and  biographer,  described  the  natural  beauty  of  the  estate  at 
Milheugh  in  the  following  terms: 
"It  consists  of  several  small  meadows  separated  from  each  other  by  the  Calder,  a  little 
stream  which  winds  among  them,  sometimes  skirting,  at  other  times  intersecting  the 
valley.  The  bushes  which  fringe  the  edges  of  the  rivulet,  and  a  number  of  large  trees 
standing  near  the  house,  and  shading  some  of  its  principal  walks,  give  great  richness  to 
the  scene,  while  the  steep  banks  which  rise  from  each  side  of  the  valley  suggest  ideas 
of  retirement  and  seclusion.  "2 
The  estate  included  a  mill.  Millar's  ancestors  had  owned  and  worked  the  mill  at 
least  since  the  Reformation,  if  not  as  far  back  as  the  time  of  Robert  the  Bruce.  All  the 
male  inheritors  of  the  estate  had  been  christened  John,  and,  when  Millar  was  born,  the 
owner  of  estate  was  his  uncle,  also  called  John.  Millar's  uncle  was  a  lawyer  who  lived 
at  Milheugh.  He  suffered  from  bad  health  and  had  given  up  his  practice  in  Edinburgh 
to  retire  to  the  family  estate. 
In  1737,  when  Millar  was  aged  two,  his  father's  ministry  was  transferred  from 
Shotts  to  a  parish  in  Hamilton,  the  nearest  large  town  in  Lanarkshire  near  Milheugh. 
James  lived  in  Hamilton  until  his  death.  Millar's  father  was  an  active  member  of  the 
Kirk.  He  was  well  known  for  leading  a  clerical  opposition  to  an  evangelical  preacher 
called  George  Whitefield,  writing  polemical  pamphlets  and  organising  meetings.  3 
IJohn  Craig  (1806)  An  Account  a  the  Life  and  Writings  ofJohn  Millar  aq.  Prefix  to  John  Nfillar  ýf 
The  Origin  of  the  Distinction  of  Ranký  4th  edn  Edinburgh.  Reprint,  Bristol  1990:  pi.  Craig  and 
Lehmann's  (1960)  John  Millar  of  Glasgow  1735-1801,  (Cambridge)  are  the  chief  sources  for  this 
biography. 
2Craig,  Account,  plxxi. 
3WhiteficId  preached  to  open-air  meetings  of  tens  of  thousands  at  Cambuslang,  near  Glasgow,  in  the 
1740s.  His  emphasis  on  emotionalism  and  mass  conversion  was  seen  as  potentially  destabilising  of 
the  religious  and  political  establishment  by  both  liberal  theologians  and  orthodox  Calvinists.  See  Sher 
R-B.  (1985)  Church  and  University  in  the  Scottish  Enlightenment,  Princeton:  pp3  1-32. 26 
When  James  and  his  family  moved  to  Hamilton,  Millar  was  sent  to  live  with  his  uncle 
at  Milheugh.  Millar  spent  every  summer  with  his  parents  and  the  rest  of  the  year  with 
his  uncle.  John,  the  uncle,  became  a  surrogate  parent,  -  looking  after,  educating  and 
raising  his  young  nephew.  Moreover,  the  uncle  had  a  greater  influence  over  Mllars 
career  than  his  father.  After  considering  following  James  into  the  ministry,  Millar 
choselaw. 
The  uncle  taught  his  nephew  to  read  at  home.  At  the  age  of  seven,  Millar  went  to 
Hamilton  Grammar  School  where  he  learnt  Latin  and  Greek.  In  1746,  aged  eleven  (not 
an  unusual  age  for  a  student  to  start  university  studies  in  those  days),  he  was  accepted 
as  a  student  at  Glasgow  College  to  train  as  a  minister  of  the  Kirk.  Millar,  it  seems,  did 
not  enjoy  studying  orthodox  Presbyterian  doctrine  with  its  dreich,  gloomy  and  desolate 
conception  of  human  nature.  4  No  doubt  discussions  with  his  uncle  at  home  in 
Milheugh  influenced  his  mind.  Millar's  uncle  was  well  read  in  law,  jurisprudence  and 
the  constitutional  history  of  Scotland  and  England.  Millar  studied  law  at  Glasgow  for 
six  years  where  in  175  1,  aged  sixteen,  he  attended  Adam  Smith's  lectures  on  moral 
philosophy  and  jurisprudence. 
Adam  Smith  of  Kirkcaldy  was  then  an  eminent  figure  in  Scottish  intellectual 
circles.  Fluent  in  French,  Smith  was  knowledgeable  of  the  literary  movement  in 
Europe,  now  known  as  the  Enlightenment.  Smith  was  impressed  by  the  young  student, 
Millar,  and  conversations  between  them  established  a  lasting  friendship  based  on 
mutual  respect  and  esteem. 
2.2  A  Rapidly  Changing  Environment 
In  the  mid-1700s  when  Millar  studied  in  Glasgow,  the  city  had  a  small  population 
of  about  18,000.  When  the  English  author  Daniel  Defoe  visited  Glasgow  in  1721,  he 
described  it  as  "one  of  the  cleanliest,  most  beautiful  and  best  built  cities  in  Great 
Britain".  5  Broom  still  grew  on  the  Broomielaw.  Cattle  were  pastured  in  Cowcaddens. 
St.  Enoch's  Square  was  a  private  garden  and  the  life  of  the  town  clustered  around  the 
Cross,  Trongate,  Gallowgate  and  the  High  Street.  Glasgow  College  stood  beside  the 
High  Street  at  the  top  of  which  St.  Mungo's  Cathedral  still  stands  today. 
In  subsequent  decades,  Glasgow  changed  rapidly.  The  River  Clyde  was  deepened, 
allowing  ships  to  land  at  the  Broomielaw.  Scotland  had  united  with  England  in  1707 
4This  followed  Calvinist  and  Augustinian  conceptions  of  human  nature  prescribed  in  the  Westminster 
Confession  of  Faith  (1647).  Human  nature  was  "deceitful  altogether  and  desnerately  wicked"  and 
"disabled  and  made  opposite  to  all  Good,  and  wholly  inclined  to  all  Evil".  See  Lovejoy  A.  0.  (1961) 
Reflections  on  Hunian  Mature,  Baltimore:  p3.  Also  Downie  R.  S.  (1994)  introduction  to  Hutcheson's 
Philosophical  Writings,  London:  pxxi.  The  Confession  was  adopted  by  the  Scottish  Parliament  in 
1643  and  ratified  as  part  of  the  constitution  of  the  Kirk  in  1690  by  William  III.  See  Smout  T.  C. 
(1985)  A  Hisloq  of  the  Scottish  People  1560-1830,  London:  p63  &  p65. 
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and,  as  a  result,  Scottish  merchants  had  gained  access  to  trade  with  the  English 
colonies  in  America  and  the  West  Indies.  Glasgow  was  soon  to  become  a  leading  port 
of  entry  for  cargoes  of  sugar  'and  tobacco.  By  1755,  when  Millar  was  twenty, 
Glasgow's  population  had  grown  to  27,45  1.  At  the  time  of  his  death  in  180  1,  it  had 
almost  quadrupled  to  83,769.  In  1771,47  million  tons  of  tobacco  were  imported 
through  Glasgow.  Glasgow's  merchants  came  to  dominate  the  importation  of  tobacco 
world-wide,  out-competing  their  rivals  in  Bristol  and  Rotterdam.  A  newly  enriched 
commercial  class  invested  their  wealth  in  land  and  industry.  They  bought  estates  from 
impoverished  members  of  the  gentry  and  turned  them  into  profitable  capitalist 
enterprises.  They  encouraged  their  tenants  to  spin  and  weave  linen  and  cotton 
materials  for  export.  They  promoted  the  sciences  and  the  arts.  James  Watt's  discovery 
of  steam  power  provided  the  new  technology  that  brought  into  being  the  industrial 
revolution.  Powered  by  steam  engines,  capital  invested  in  mechanical  looms  and  free 
wage  labour  eventually  forced  the  older  mode  of  domestic  spinning  and  weaving  into 
extinction.  Factories  driven  by  steam  sprang  up  in  well-watered  places  such  as  New 
Lanark  by  the  Falls  of  the  River  Clyde.  Merchant  capital  was  quickly  converted  into 
banking  and  industrial  capital.  Skilled  and  unskilled  labour  was  sucked  into  Glasgow 
from  the  Highlands,  Ayrshire,  Lanarkshire  and  Ireland.  The  demand  for  labour  was 
greater  than  its  supply.  Wages  were,  -for  a  while,  generally  high.  The  standard  of  living 
of  even  the  poorest  labourer  seemed  to  be  rising.  6 
Millar  lived  through  these  changes  and  attempted  to  understand  their  effects  on  the 
social,  political,  intellectual  and  moral  lives  of  individuals.  Moreover,  he  was  aware 
that  such  changes  were  not  confined  to  Glasgow  or  the  West  of  Scotland  alone  but 
had  implications  for  a  world  in  transition  to  what  we  now  appreciate  to  be  a  mature 
form  of  industrial  capitalism. 
2.3  The  Movement  for  Improvement 
One  of  the  ways  in  which  members  of  the  Scottish  middle  class,  such  as  Mllar, 
helped  themselves  to  understand  and  promote  the  changes  they  experienced  was  to 
form  orjoin  an  "improving"  society.  Improvement  or  "betterment"  was  the  catch  word 
of  the  Scottish  version  of  the  Enlightenment.  The  word  had  a  long  history.  It  was 
associated  not  only  with  profitable  economic  activity  such  as  the  enclosure  of  land,  but 
also  with  the  profits  or  fruits  of  spiritual,  intellectual  and  moral  labour.  7  Thus  to  better 
oneself  not  only  involved  working  hard,  saving  and  investing  one's  wealth  prudently, 
6Wage  increases  from  1750  to  1790  rose  two  and  a  half  to  three  times  compared  to  only  a  fifty  per 
cent  rise  in  the  price  of  oatmeal,  the  staple  Scottish  food.  The  standard  of  living  for  unskilled 
labourers  therefore  rose  above  subsistence.  See  contemporary  statistics  mentioned  by  Smout,  History, 
1985:  p479. 
7Sce  discussion  of  Smith's  category  of  "betterment",  anO  Millar's  understanding  of  "improvement"  in 
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but  also  studying  regularly,  cultivating  polite  manners,  interesting  conversation  and 
sympathising  with  the  feelings  of  others.  To  become  a  respected  citizen,  the  individual 
had  to  better  himself  in  all  these  ways. 
Millar  was  both  a  philosopher  of  improvement  and  an  improver  in  his  practical 
affairs.  His  uncle  gave  him  Whitemoss,  a  small  farm  near  the  village  of  YjIbride  seven 
miles  from  Glasgow.  Every  summer,  Millar  focused  his  attention  on  making  the  farm 
more  comfortable  and  profitable: 
"Many  a  scheme  did  he  devise  for  raising  crops,  and  clothing  his  fields  with  verdure; 
and,  though  these  schemes  were  never  very  successful,  they  were  carried  on  at  little 
expense,  served  to  amuse  his  leisure,  and,  to  a  certain  degree,  diminished  the  natural 
bleakness  inunediately  round  his  house.  "8 
After  the  Union  in  1707,  the  notion  of  improvement  had  a  special  role  to  play  in 
Scotland.  Many  Scots  resented  losing  the  privileges  associated  with  an  independent 
Scottish  parliament.  Others  thought  that,  compared  with  England  and  France, 
Scotland  was  a  backward,  relatively  uncivilised  country.  They  supported  the  Union 
because  they  hoped  it  would  bring  them  economic  and  political  rewards.  In  order  to 
take  full  advantage  of  English  trade  and  to  promote  their  interests  in  the  government  at 
Westminster,  members  of  the  Scottish  middle  class  felt  the  need  to  improve  their 
written  and  spoken  English.  Some  of  the  first  improving  societies  were  established  for 
this  purpose  and,  early  on  in  the  century,  English  teachers  such  as  Thomas  Sheridan, 
the  father  of  the  playwright  Richard  Brinsley  Sheridan,  was  invited  to  Edinburgh  to 
give  lessons  in  elocution  and  rhetoric. 
Until  the  Union  of  the  Crowns  in  1603  when  James  VI  took  the  Scottish  court  to 
London,  French  had  been  one  of  the  preferred  languages  of  Scottish  sovereigns  and 
their  courtiers.  Although  there  was  an  established  philosophical  and  political  literature 
in  Scots,  knowledge  of  French  literature  continued  to  be  indispensable  to  most  people 
with  literary  aspirations.  However,  in  the  eighteenth  century  a  decisive  shift  took  place 
in  the  favour  of  English.  English  became  the  preferred  language  of  the  educated  Scot. 
David  Hume,  the  Scottish  philosopher  and  historian,  wrote  his  most  famous 
philosophical  work,  A  Treali.  ye  of  Human  Nature,  in  a  Jesuit  seminary  in  France  in  the 
1730s.  He  toyed  with  the  idea  of  writing  it  in  French  but  decided  that  it  would  be  more 
widely  read  if  written  in  English.  Adam  Smith  made  his  reputation  in  Edinburgh  by 
lecturing  not  in  philosophy  or  economics  but  in  rhetoric  and  belles  lettres.  These 
lectures  covered  topics  such  as  literary  style  and  forms  of  expression  in  different 
countries  and  at  different  historical  periods.  They  were  original  because  of  Smith's 
8Craig,  Account,  pplxviii-lxix. 29 
focus  on  world  literature  and  his  speculations  on  the  origin  of  languages.  Nonetheless 
the  practical  point  of  the  lectures  was  to  help  individuals  improve  their  written  English. 
Scottish  pride  in  their  improving  efforts  did  not  just  entail,  as  Hume  is 
acknowledged  to  have  done,  writing  English  better  than  anyone  in  England.  It  also 
inspired  poets  and  novelists  such  as  Robert  Bums,  James  Hogg  and  John  Gait  to  write 
eloquent  and  moving  songs  and  stories  in  vernacular  Scots.  This  helped  to  preserve 
and  advance  Scots  in  a  literary  and  oral  form.  It  ensured  that  Scots  would  continue  to 
be  the  creative  form  of  self  expression  and  assertion  of  national  difference  it  is  today. 
Societies  mushroomed  on  the  fertile  soil  of  the  improving  activities  of  Scots.  The 
Scottish  elite  was  determined  to  out-shine  the  English  and  the  French  by  their  cultural, 
scientific  and  economic  achievements.  All  aspects  of  literature  were  discussed  within 
them.  In  one  society  you  could  discuss  philosophical  literature  and  speculate  on 
whether  we  have  any  knowledge  of  the  world  other  than  internally  perceived  ideas  or 
impressions.  In  another,  you  could  listen  to  an  erudite  dissertation  on  horticulture  and 
debate  the  best  methods  of  growing  vegetables  more  profitably  in  your  garden  or 
estate.  Moreover  these  societies  were  open  to  any  member  of  the  Scottish 
establishment  and  their  firiends.  9 
Glasgow  College's  Literary  Society  was  one  such  example.  Professors  from  the 
College  established  the  Society  in  1752  when  Millar  was  seventeen.  It  probably 
continued  to  meet  until  after  Millar's  death  in  1801.  Members  included  academics, 
students,  doctors,  lawyers,  ministers,  architects  and  merchants.  Members  distinguished 
for  their  writing  were  the  philosophers  Adam  Smith,  David  Hume,  Adam  Ferguson 
and  Thomas  Reid;  politicians  such  as  Edmund  Burke;  scientists  such  as  the  engineer 
James  Watt,  the  chemist  William  Cullen,  and  the  mathematician  Robert  Simson.  The 
Society  rnet  at  the  College  every  Friday  evening  at  5.30p.  m.  from  November  until  May 
during  the  year.  Each  member  of  the  Society  was  obliged  to  give  a  talk.  Any  member 
who  failed  to  do  so,  would  be  punished  by  a  heavy  fine.  10  The  talk  was  given  and 
followed  by  an  informal  discussion  or  debate.  Afterwards,  those  who  wished  to 
continue  their  conversations  would  retire  to  a  local  tavern  in  the  town  such  as  "The 
Saracen's  Head"  for  refreshment.  Millar  was  an  ardent  devotee  of  the  Society  and  it  is 
in  this  setting  that  we  can  imagine  Millar  discussing  aspects  of  trade,  commerce  and 
industry  with  local  merchants.  " 
9McElroy  D.  (1969)  Scotland's  Age  oflinprovenient,  Washington. 
IOSee  Ifinutes,  Literary  Society  in  Glasgow  College  1764-19  (Glasgow  University  Special 
Collections.  Ms.  Murray  505). 
I  IMillar  gave  a  paper  entitled  "The  Expediency  of  restraining  the  importation  of  foreign  Grain  or 
bestowing  a  bounty  upon  the  exportation  of  what  is  produced  at  home.  "  on  28/11/77.  Most  of  the 
papers  lie  gave  were  on  topics  that  figured  strongly  in  his  lectures  and  books  e.  g.  the  English 
parliament  (25/l/65),  feudal  law  (17/l/66),  arts  and  manufactures  (6/l/69),  Spartan  government 
(9/l/67),  decline  of  the  arts  and  government  (8/l/68),  the  condition  of  servants  in  different  countries 30 
2.4  A  Tutor,  Lawyer  and  Teacher 
In  1757,  aged  twenty  two,  Millar  moved  into  the  household  of  Henry  Home,  Lord 
Karnes.  For  three  years  Millar  was  employed  as  a  private  tutor  to  Karnes'  son  George 
Drummond.  Karnes  was  one  of  the  most  influential  men  in  Scotland  of  his  day.  As  a 
commissioner  for  the  Forfeited  Estates,  he  was  involved  in  perhaps  the  most  difficult 
political,  juridical  and  economic  task  of  eighteenth  century  Scotland.  This  was  the 
management  and  disposal  of  the  Highland  estates  confiscated  by  the  government  after 
the  Jacobite  rebellion  of  1745.  This  confiscation  marks  the  beginning  of  political  and 
economic  changes  that  led  to  the  Highland  Clearances.  The  clearances  broke  up  the 
ancient  Gaelic  clan  system.  They  were  the  result  of  subordinating  the  land  in  the 
Highlands  to  capital.  The  land  was  transformed  from  communal  property  used  by  the 
whole  clan  as  a  means  of  subsistence,  into  private  property  used  for  capital-intensive 
sheep  and  cattle  farming  as  a  means  of  profit.  As  a  result,  thousands  of  Highland  Gaels 
were  forcibly  dispossessed  and  displaced.  Many  emigrated  to  Canada  and  America. 
Most  moved  into  the  towns  and  cities  of  the  Lowlands  in  search  of  waged  work. 
Karnes  had  the  responsibility  of  making  of  these  confiscated  estates  profitable  and 
secure.  Highland  Gaels  would  never  again  threaten  the  stability  of  Britain  by  assisting 
a  Catholic  pretender  to  the  throne.  Some  of  the  estates  were  given  back  to  clan  chiefs; 
the  majority  were  sold  to  whoever  would  buy  them.  Moreover,  Karnes  was  a  leading 
intellectual  in  his  own  right,  writing  extensively  on  law,  ethics,  aesthetics,  history,  and 
new  agricultural  techniques  such  as  the  application  of  machinery  to  the  land.  Millar 
must  have  impressed  Karnes,  because  Karnes  was  later  to  support  his  appointment  as  a 
professor.  It  is  likely  they  would  have  spent  many  hours  exchanging  philosophical 
ideas  whilst  Millar  was  employed  in  Kames'  home. 
Karnes  also  introduced  Millar  to  David  Hume,  who  was  shortly  to  find  great  fame 
by  turning  from  writing  philosophy  to  history.  His  Hisimy  of  Eingland  became  the 
standard  textbook  for  the  following  century.  Thereafter,  Hume  followed  Millals 
career  with  great  interest  and  considered  him  as  a  good  friend.  In  retum,  Millar 
dedicated  his  life  to  writing  a  philosophical  history  of  the  English  constitution.  This 
attempted  to  improve  on  and  correct  Hume's  own  perception  of  English  history  and 
included  dissertations  on  the  history  of  Scotland  and  Ireland.  12  Millar  also  defended 
Hume's  philosophy  against  the  criticisms  of  Thomas  Reid  in  vigorous  debates  during 
Literary  Society  meetings. 
In  1759,  aged  twenty-four,  Millar  married  a  Glasgow  woman,  Margaret  Craig. 
Eighteenth  century  Europe  was  a  patriarchal  society  in  which  women  were  denied 
(5/l/70),  Germanic  tribes  (15/11/76),  and  the  post-1688  settlement  (27/11/78).  An  exception  was  a 
paper  on  Horace  (4/l/7  1).  See  Minutes.  None  of  these  talks  survives  as  a  written  paper. 
12Sec  appendix  one. 31 
property  rights  and  citizenship.  Nonetheless,  Millar  was  an  attentive  husband  who 
believed  in  a  companionate  rather  than  a  mercenary  form  of  marriage.  In  his  first  book, 
7he  01-igili  of  1he  Dimitictioti  of  Ratiks,  he  attempted  to  explain  how  the  passion  of 
love  was  derived  from  the  effect  that  feudal  property  relations  had  on  the  sexual 
instinct.  He  thought  that  the  respectful  treatment  of  women  was  a  sign  of  a  civilised 
society,  that  the  company  of  women  improved  men's  behaviour,  and  that  the  social 
status  of  women  would  change  the  more  time  men  had  to  spend  socialising  with  them. 
He  fathered  thirteen  children  with  his  wife  Margaret.  Two  died  at  birth.  Ten  survived 
-  seven  daughters  and  four  sons. 
Millar  did  not  take  his  bar  examination  in  Edinburgh  until  1760,  when  he  was 
twenty-five.  As  an  advocate,  he  specialised  in  criminal  cases  and  became  known  as  an 
articulate  and  successful  defence  lawyer.  He  continued  to  practise  law  when  he  was 
appointed  to  his  first  and  only  academic  position.  This  was  the  Chair  of  Civil  Law  at 
Glasgow  College.  Millar  used  this  position  to  lecture  on  public  and  private  law,  and 
the  law  of  England  and  Scotland.  Both  Karnes  and  Smith  had  recommended  his 
appointment  and  he  started  teaching  a  year  after  he  qualified  as  an  advocate  in  1761, 
aged  twenty-six.  Millar  immediately  made  progressive  changes  to  the  teaching  of 
jurisprudence.  The  first  was  to  stop  teaching  and  examining  in  Latin  and  to  adopt 
English  as  his  mode  of  communication  and  assessment.  The  second  was  to  improvise 
rather  than  read  from  notes.  A  third  was  his  encouragement  of  student  discussion  after 
he  had  finished  lecturing.  Millar's  egalitarian  attitude  to  his  students  is  described  by  his 
nephew  in  the  following  way: 
"While  under  Mr.  Millar's  care,  all  his  pupils  were  treated  alike;  or  rather  the 
differences  which  might  be  remarked  in  his  attentions,  were  the  consequence  of 
superior  talents  or  application,  never  of  superior  rank.  "  13 
Millar  became  popular  with  his  students.  When  he  started  he  had  only  four  pupils 
attending  his  classes.  Within  a  few  years,  he  had  a  class  of  forty.  Millar's  efforts  made 
the  chair  in  civil  law  at  Glasgow  as  distinguished  as  Blackstone's  Viner  chair  at 
Oxford.  It  became  fashionable  to  study  law  with  Millar.  He  taught  some  of  the  most 
talented  young  men  of  the  Whig  elite  in  Britain,  shaping  the  minds  of  many  of  the  most 
distinguished  politicians  of  the  early  to  middle  periods  of  the  nineteenth  century 
including  one  prime  minister,  Lord  Melbourne. 
Millar's  popularity  is  well  evidenced  in  the  following  description  by  one  of  his 
students: 
13Craig,  Account,  plxviii. 32 
"He  was  a  fine  muscular  man,  somewhat  above  the  middle  size,  with  a  square  chest 
and  shapely  bust,  a  prominent  chin,  grey  eyes  that  were  unmatched  in  expression,  and 
a  head  that  would  have  become  a  Roman  senator.  He  was  said  to  be  a  capital  fencer. 
. 
. 
But  the  glory  was  to  see  his  intellectual  gladiatorship,  when  he  would  slay  or  pink 
into  convulsions  some  offensive  political  antagonist.  "14 
Apart  from  the  content  and  methods  of  his  teaching  which,  as  the  above  quote 
demonstrates,  clearly  entertained  his  student  audiences,  Millar's  reputation  amongst 
students  grew  because  he  was  prepared  to  defend  them  when  they  were  accused  of 
misconduct  by  the  College  authorities.  An  excellent  example  is  the  case  of  David 
Woodburn,  a  divinity  student,  whom  the  College  Senate  charged  with  heresy, 
blasphemy  and  conduct  unbefitting  a  student  in  1768.  Woodburn  was  put  on  trial  and 
Millar  defended  him.  Blasphemy  was  still  a  serious  charge  in  Scotland.  At  the  end  of 
the  seventeenth  century,  a  scandal  hit  Edinburgh  when  a  student  called  Aikenhead  had 
been  executed  for  blasphemy.  During  the  sixteenth  century,  there  had  been  powerful 
theocratic  tendencies  in  Scotland.  Attendance  at  parish  kirk  services  had  been 
compulsory.  Non-attenders  were  threatened  by  jougs",  a  form  of  handcuffing.  Evil 
talk  had  been  punished  by  the  "brank",  a  padlocked  helmet  of  iron  that  thrust  a 
triangular  tongue  into  the  victim's  mouth.  In  mid-eighteenth  century  Glasgow 
theocratic  oppression  had  lost  much  of  its  force.  Nonetheless  it  still  rested  on  a  body 
of  popular  support.  15  The  allegations  against  Woodburn  included  that  he  had  said  he 
could  learn  more  by  going  to  the  theatre  than  by  attending  classes  in  Logic  and 
Metaphysics.  Millar's  defence  of  Woodburn  at  the  trial  was  a  success.  It  must  have 
made  him  something  of  a  hero  to  his  students.  Millar  also  defended  students  charged 
with  libel  and  assault. 
2.5  Religion  and  the  Appointment  of  Reid 
Millar's  approach  to  religion  was  historical  and,  following  Hume's  lead,  he 
attempted  to  explain  how  religious  beliefs,  doctrines  and  rituals  changed  with  changes 
in  society.  He  preferred  his  own  country's  version  of  Christianity  to  any  other.  He 
criticised  religions  that  promoted  asceticism,  prevented  priests  from  marrying,  and 
cultivated  ignorance  and  superstition  amongst  the  masses.  Although  he  formally 
observed  the  rites  of  the  Kirk,  had  his  children  baptised  and  was  buried  after  a 
141,  chmann.  Millar,  p30. 
"The  "kirk  stool"  was  used  an  instrument  of  public  rebuke  and  humiliation  for  sexual  offcp:  es, 
drunkenness  or  breaches  of  sabbath  observances.  The  General  Assembly  retained  the  power  to  call  a 
national  fast  for  harvest  failure  or  military  defeat.  Ministers  might  make  home  visits  to  examine 
families  on  their  religious  beliefs  and  habits  of  domestic  worship.  The  frequency  and  intensity  of 
these  aspects  of  theocratic  oppression  were  in  decline  throughout  the  century  but  retained  an  influence 
on  the  population.  Smout,  History,  p219. 33 
Presbyterian  funeral,  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  was  especially  devout.  If  he  were, 
like  Hume,  inclined  to  agnosticism  or  atheism,  it  would  have  been  prudent  for 
someone  in  his  position  to  have  expressed  these  views  in  private.  Hume  had,  of 
course,  been  charged  with  heresy  by  the  Assembly  of  the  Kirk,  denounced  as  an  infidel 
and  atheist,  and,  as  a  result,  been  prevented  from  teaching  in  a  Scottish  University. 
Moreover,  Smith's  piety  had  been  challenged  on  the  grounds  that  he  had  not  observed 
Presbyterian  ritual  as  strictly  as  he  might  have  whilst  employed  as  Professor  of  Moral 
Philosophy  by  Glasgow  College.  Millar  followed  Hume  and  Smith  in  attempting  to 
explain  human  virtue  and  happiness  according  to  scientifically  observable  principles  of 
the  mind,  such  as  sympathy  and  utility.  These  principles  operated  in  every  social  and 
historical  circumstance.  They  helped  explain  the  moral  content  of  religious  doctrines 
and  were  applicable  to  secular  life. 
Millar's  teaching  appointment  started  in  1761  and  he  would  have  been  in  post  for 
three  years  before  Smith  left  to  be  replaced  by  Thomas  Reid.  Smith  had  followed  a 
threefold  division  within  the  Moral  Philosophy  curriculum  at  0asgow  of  natural 
theology,  ethics  and  natural  jurisprudence.  He  had  added  on  to  the  last  part  the  section 
on  police.  This  evolved  out  of  the  political  theory  contained  within  discussions  of 
public  law  within  the  section  on  jurisprudence. 
Reid  was  to  break  with  this  tradition,  restructuring  the  course  into  three  new 
sections:  pneumatology,  ethics  and  politics.  Pneumatology  covered  both  Reid's  theory 
of  the  mind  and  his  theory  of  morals  plus  an  examination  of  the  divine  mind.  The 
section  on  ethics  was  divided  into  "Duties  to  God"  and  "Duties  to  Others". 
Jurisprudence  was  subsumed  within  the  latter.  The  restructuring  of  the  course  marked 
the  end  of  the  teaching  ofjurisprudence  in  Glasgow  according  to  empiricist  principles. 
These  had  informed  the  teaching  of  moral  philosophy  of  Francis  Hutcheson,  Smith's 
predecessor.  Hutcheson  followed  Locke  and  Shaftesbury  by  attempting  to  theorise  the 
moral  sense  as  a  cognitive  faculty  perceiving  moral  qualities.  16  Thus  Hutcheson's,  and 
later  Hume's,  attempt  to  ground  natural  law  within  human  nature  grew  out  of  theories 
of  aesthetics  and  ethics  which  relied  on  a  notion  of  the  moral  sense  as  a  perceptual 
faculty.  17  The  introduction  of  the  notion  of  an  impartial  spectator  was  intended  by 
Hutcheson,  Hume  and  Smith  to  escape  some  of  the  epistemological  problems  of  the 
relationship  between  moral  perceptions  and  moral  qualities.  18  Perceptions  were  not 
moral  perceptions  unless  they  gained  approval  from  the  standpoint  of  the  disinterested 
mind  of  a  spectator  who  was  neither  the  initiator  nor  beneficiary  of  the  action 
16This  argued  by  Norton  D.  F.  in  (t985)  "Hutcheson's  Moral  Realism.  "  Journal  of  thc  History  of 
Philosophy,  23:  392-418. 
17"Following  Hutcheson,  Hume  explains  moral  and  aesthetic  perception  in  terms  heavily  indebted  to 
the  Lockian  account  of  secondary  qualities.  "  Buckle,  Natural  LC 
-,  p277. 
1813nckle,  Natural  Law,  p278. 34 
observed.  Approval  and  disapproval  depended,  in  turn,  upon  the  awareness  of  the 
spectator  of  feelings,  passions  or  sentiments  that  corresponded  (via  the  communicative 
mechanism  of  sympathy)  with  feelings  experienced  by  the  initiator  or  beneficiary.  In 
this  way  moral  ideas  of  virtue,  aesthetic  ideas  of  beauty,  and  juridical  and  political 
ideas  of  property  could  be  explained  as  perceptions  of  the  qualities  of  actions.  These 
actions  required  a  detailed  knowledge  of  their  subjective  intent  and  objective  effect. 
An  important  source  of  this  knowledge  was  gained  from  historical  and  other  forms  of 
literature. 
By  ditching  the  notion  of  ideas  and  feelings  as  the  immediate  internal  objects  of 
perception,  Reid  was  able  to  circumvent  the  problems  and  solutions  of  an  empiricist 
science  of  morals  and  law.  Virtue,  according  to  Reid,  was  founded  on  self-evident 
duties  proscribed  by  God.  Moral  truths  were  evident  to  anyone  who  can  "see  at  one 
glance  what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong  in  conduct".  19  Commenting  on  the  tradition  of 
natural  jurisprudential  writers  preceding  him,  he  stated  that  it  was  not  necessary  to 
offer  "Reasons  to  support  truths  that  are  self-evident  when  considered  in  general"20 
Self-evident  duties  did  not  require  reasoning  because  they  were  derived  from  God's 
relationship  to  humanity.  Knowledge  of  this  relationship  was  all  that  was  necessary  to 
understand,  for  example,  the  natural  rights  individuals  had  to  property.  Thus  his 
account  of  the  origin  of  the  right  to  property  was  both  parsonical  and  ahistorical.  Reid 
derived  the  natural  right  of  occupation,  the  foundation  of  property,  from  table 
manners.  God  is  the  Great  Entertainer  who  invites  all  his  creatures  to  feast  to  a  table  at 
which  everything  is  held  in  common.  The  greedy  person  who  takes  more  than  their  fair 
share  is  obviously  bad  mannered.  The  good  manners  of  the  "well-bred  man"  who 
wants  everyone  to  be  as  "cheerful  and  happy"  as  himself  only  takes  a  fair  share.  He 
therefore  taught  that  the  right  of  occupation  was  established  out  of  the  self-evident 
duty  the  individual  has  to  God  to  behave  well at  His  table.  21 
Reid  had  shown  no  interest  in  jurisprudence  whilst  at  Aberdeen.  After  his 
appointment  to  the  Glasgow  post,  he  had  to  produce  a  two-month  course  in  natural 
law  at  short  notice.  22  At  first,  he  seems  to  have  been  lost,  teaching  from  a  textbook  left 
by  Hutcheson  and  asking  students  for  copies  of  notes  they  had  taken  of  Smith's 
lectures.  Once  he  got  into  his  stride  he  taught  jurisprudence  without  giving  much 
attention  to  the  historical  origins  of  jurisprudential  ideas  and  institutionS.  23  It  is 
19Reid  T.  (1766-70)  Practical  Ethics:  Being  Lectures  and  Papers  on  Natural  Religion,  Sey, 
Government,  Natural  Jurisprudence,  and  the  Law  of  Nations.  Haakonssen  K.  (cd.  )  Princeton,  1990: 
p192. 
2ORcid,  Ethics,  p  192. 
21Reid,  Ethics,  pp205-206. 
221-laakonsscii's  introduction.  Reid,  Ethics,  p32. 
2313crry  C.  J.  (1992)  has  remarked  that  Reid  had  "little  expertise"  in  jurisprudcncc.  It  is  "therefore  not 
surprising  that  their  content  [Reid's  lectures]  is  not  novel  (there  is  little,  for  example,  of  the  historical 35 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  Reid's  lack  of  concern  for  historical  theorising  followed 
from  his  rejection  of  the  empiricist  commitment  to  the  existence  of  ideas  and  feelings 
as  internal  objects  of  perception.  If  the  right  to  property  was  a  self-evident  duty  in  all 
times  and  places,  then  Reid  might  have  thought  that  attempts  to  explain  how 
individuals  had  arrived  at  certain  ideas  of  property  (and  how  these  ideas  had  developed 
and  changed  according  to  their  different  command  of  knowledge  of  the  arts  and 
sciences)  was  an  unnecessary  form  of  false  reasoning.  This  line  of  thought  would,  of 
course,  require  more  argument  than  is  possible  here. 
The  point  of  the  above  digression  is  to  emphasise  the  breach  of  tradition  in  the 
theorising  and  teaching  of  moral  philosophy  and  jurisprudence  that  Reid's  appointment 
marked  at  Glasgow  in  1764.  Millar  opposed  this  appointment.  There  is  unfortunately 
no  evidence  I  am  aware  of  to  explain  the  reasons  for  Millar's  opposition.  24  The  most 
obvious  objection  would  have  been  that  Reid,  who  had  no  knowledge  or  apparent 
interest  in  the  topic,  would  have  been  an  incompetent  teacher  of  jurisprudence.  Millar 
and  Reid  shared  a  similar  political  outlook,  both  being  liberal  WhigS.  25  Both  thinkers 
supported  the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution. 
It  would  have  been  risky,  probably  foolhardy,  for  Millar  to  have  opposed  Reid  on 
religious  grounds.  For  example,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  Millar  would  have  objected  to 
Reid's  appointment  on  the  grounds  that  his  interpretation  of  moral  philosophy  and 
jurisprudence  had  a  theological  content.  Smith  and  Millar  had  to  work  within  an 
"atmosphere  of  jealous  and  censorious  theological  vigilance".  26  This  generated 
criticisms  of  Smith's  apparent  lack  of  piety  and  malicious  gossip  about  his  friendship 
with  Hume  the  atheist.  For  Millar  to  have  opposed  Reid's  appointment  on  religious 
grounds,  would  have  brought  Millar  into  conflict  not  only  with  his  former  patron, 
Kames,  (who  supported  Reid's  appointment),  but  also  with  the  whole  of  the  Moderate 
establishment  of  the  Presbyterian  Kirk,  of  which  Reid  was  a  notable  member.  27 
Moreover  such  an  opposition,  coupled  with  Millar's  acknowledged  friendship  with 
Hume  and  his  subsequent  defence  of  Hume's  philosophical  views  against  Reid,  could 
have  jeopardised  the  security  of  Millai's  own  appointment  and  reputation  in  the 
University. 
It  is  possible  to  imagine  that  Millar  might  have  thought  that  Reid  was  insufficiently 
qualified  to  take  on  the  complexities  of  the  administration  of  Glasgow  College.  Millar 
might  have  favoured  an  internal  appointee.  Glasgow  University  was  at  the  time  "two 
thcorising  around  which  Smith  organised  his  version  of  this  lecture  course).  "  Review  of  Reid's  Ethics. 
In  Utililas,  Nov:  p33  1. 
241-laakonsscii  states  that  they  "may  have  been"  intellectual.  Introduction  to  Reid,  Ethics,  p22. 
25ihid. 
26Rac  J.  (1895)  Dfý  ofAclamSmilh,  London.  Reprint,  1965,  New  Jersey. 
271-laakonssen's  introduction  to  Reid.  Ethics,  p.  12. 36 
distinct  corporations,  with  two  distinct  governing  bodies"28  This  generated 
considerable  administrative  friction  between  and  amongst  professors.  Smith  appears  to 
have  enjoyed  his  administrative  tasks,  managing  the  library  funds  as  Quaestor  from 
1758  until  1764,  holding  the  post  of  Dean  of  Faculty  from  1760  to  1762,  and  Vice- 
Rector  from  1762  to  1764.  Reid  had  thirteen  years  of  administrative  experience  at 
King's  College,  Aberdeen.  He  had  served  on  various  committees,  looked  after  the 
college's  finances,  represented  the  college  in  the  General  Assembly  of  the  Church  of 
Scotland,  initiated  educational  reforms  and  unsuccessfully  attempted  to  amalgamate 
the  two  Aberdeen  Colleges.  29  Although  his  administrative  competence  could  never 
have  been  in  question,  he  would  have  been  unfamiliar  with  the  continual  in-fighting  at 
Glasgow.  He  did  not  enjoy  his  first  year  of  administrative  work  at  Glasgow, 
complaining  to  an  Aberdonian  friend  that  he  had  to  attend  five  or  six  unpleasant 
meetings  every  week  dominated  by  "an  evil  spirit  of  party".  30 
However,  given  that  there  was  no  person  employed  at  Glasgow  who  had  as  great  a 
cornmand  of  moral  philosophy  as  Reid  (save  perhaps  Millar  himselo  this  possibility 
must  also  be  ruled  oUt.  31  It  is  clear  from  other  sources  that  he  opposed  Reid's 
philosophical  views  in  debates  over  papers  Reid  gave  in  the  Glasgow  College  Literary 
Society.  Reid  used  the  Society  to  try  out  material  that  later  figured  in  his  books.  He 
argued  strongly  against  Hume's  scepticism.  In  the  early  years  of  his  appointment  he 
gave  papers  on  moral  character  in  1766  and  whether  moral  obligation  is  discerned  by 
reason  or  sentiment  in  1769.32  The  texts  of  these  papers  have  been  lost,  but  from 
Craig's  account  of  Millar's  participation  in  the  debates  that  followed,  we  know  that 
Millar  vigorously  defended  Hume's  "metaphysical  opinions  ...  contained  in  his 
Essays".  Both  thinkers  "used  every  exertion  to  support  his  own  opinions  and 
overthrow  those  of  his  opponent".  This  was  a  "frequent,  and  even  acrimonious 
disputation".  33  On  the  other  hand,  according  to  Dugald  Stewart,  Reid  was  "delighted 
with  the  good  humoured  opposition  which  his  opinions  never  failed  to  encounter  in  the 
acuteness  of  Millar 
...  warm  from  the  lessons  of  a  different  school.  "34 
This  leads  one  to  speculate  how  far  Millar  was  conscious  of  being  the  sole 
remaining  representative  and  embodiment  of  a  school  of  thought  at  Glasgow  that  had 
its  immediate  predecessors  in  Smith,  Hume,  Kames,  Montesquieu,  Hutcheson  and 
Gershom  Carmichael,  and  roots  in  a  Lockean  interpretation  of  Pufendorf  and  Grotius. 
What  is  noticeable  about  this  school  in  general  is  the  secularising  tendencies  of  its 
28Rae,  Life,  pp69-70. 
291-laakonssen's  introduction  to  Reid,  Ethics,  p13. 
30Rac,  Life,  pp69. 
3  IFor  Millar's  command  of  moral  philosophy  see  the  reprint  of  his  lectures  in  appendix  three. 
32Haakojissen's  introduction  to  Reid,  Ethics,  p25. 
33Craig,  Account,  pplxi-lxii. 
34Stewart  D.  Works,  vol.  x.  p262.  Quoted  by  Lehmann,  Uillar,  p53n. 37 
approach  to  natural  law,  its  attempts  to  theorise  natural  law  within  the  framework  of 
an  empiricist  understanding  of  human  nature,  its  commitment  to  an  experimental 
hypothetico-inductive  method  of  inquiry  following  a  Baconian  agenda,  and  its  search 
for  uniform  principles  that  can  explain,  amongst  other  things,  the  origins  of 
jurisprudential  ideas  and  institutions  and  the  deviations  of  legal  and  customary 
practices  from  those  that  would  be  approved  by  a  well-informed,  disinterested 
observer.  These  features  of  the  school  included  testable  hypotheses  concerning  the 
probable  causal  connections  between  economic  activity  and  political  and  juridical 
institutions  and  ideas.  The  last  is  especially  associated  with  Millar,  whose  results  were 
the  outcome  of  a  comparative  and  hypothetical  method  shared  by  many  of  his 
empiricist  and  natural  jurisprudential  predecessors. 
2.6  Slavery  and  Reforin 
Millar  was  a  political  intellectual.  He  is  notable  for  his  contributions  both  to  the 
movements  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  and  for  parliamentary  reform. 
In  his  first  book,  7he  Origin  of  the  Distinction  of  Ranks  published  in  1771  when 
lie  was  thirty-six,  Millar  gave  moral  and  economic  arguments  against  slavery.  It  is 
likely  that  he  knew  of  land-owners,  such  as  the  Duke  of  Hamilton,  who  used  white 
slaves  bonded  by  debt  to  extract  coal  from  mines  on  an  estate  close  to  Milheugh  in 
Lanarkshire.  There  were  also  Glasgow  merchants  involved  in  the  African  slave  trade. 
For  example,  in  1760,  John  Glassford,  a  Glasgow  merchant  went  into  partnership 
with  an  English  merchant  to  exploit  the  West  Indian  market  in  tobacco,  indigoes  and 
sugar.  Glassford  owned  twenty-five  ships  and  his  business  had  an  annual  turnover  of 
half  a  million  poundS.  35  The  slave  trade  of  in  the  eighteenth  century  was  triangular. 
Ships  travelled  a  three-sided  journey  down,  across  and  back  over  the  Atlantic.  Pick-up 
points  were  in  Britain,  Africa  and  the  American  colonies.  The  slave  ship  sailed  from 
Glasgow  packed  with  a  cargo  of  manufactured  goods.  These  were  exchanged  for  a 
profit  on  the  coast  of  Africa  for  slaves.  Slaves  were  traded  for  another  profit  on  the 
plantations  for  sugar  or  tobacco.  Sugar  or  tobacco  was  then  taken  back  across  the 
Atlantic  and  sold  for  a  final  profit  to  wholesalers  who  distributed  the  commodities 
throughout  the  European  market.  The  slave  trade  was  not  unique  to  Glasgow.  It  had, 
of  course,  been  well  established  by  English  merchants  long  before  Scottish  merchants 
were  allowed  to  profit  from  its  wealth.  Nor  was  the  slave  trade  the  sole  source  of 
Glasgow's  growth  in  prosperity.  Nonetheless  the  trade  in  African  slaves  played  an 
3SWillianis  E.  (1944)  Capitalism  and  Slavery,  North  Carolina:  p102. 38 
important  role  in  accumulating  the  initial  capital  that  could  be  later  invested  in  other 
productive  ventures.  36 
Millar,  of  course,  was  not  alone  in  calling  for  the  abolition  of  slavery.  In  1791, 
Millar  moved  that  Glasgow  College  give  William  Wilberforce,  the  Member  of 
Parliament  and  Christian  leader  of  the  anti-slavery  movement,  an  honorary  degree  in 
law.  However,  he  was  perhaps  one  of  the  first  to  give  clear  economic  arguments 
against  the  trade.  Millar  used  statistics  to  show  that  a  greater  profit  could  be  gained 
from  the  exploitation  of  free  wage  labour  than  from  slave  labour.  37  It  is  arguable  that 
economic  considerations  (which  appealed  more  to  the  self  interests  of  merchants  and 
slave  masters)  were  more  decisive  in  winning  slaves  their  freedom  than  moral  or 
religious  ones.  The  white  slaves  of  Scotland  won  their  freedom  at  the  end  of  the 
century.  The  black  slaves  of  the  British  Empire  had  to  wait  until  1833. 
Millar  was  a  dedicated  Whig.  His  engagement  with  the  movement  for 
parliamentary  reform  was  therefore  motivated  by  his  commitment  to  the  freedoms 
established  by  the  English  parliament  in  the  1688  constitutional  settlement.  During  the 
eighteenth  century  Millar  was  fearful  that  the  wealth  of  the  Crown  had  grown  to  such 
an  extent  that  the  monarch  would  be  able  to  re-establish  effective  control  over 
parliament.  He  thought  this  influence  was  being  used  to  forward  the  interests  of  the 
Royal  family  and  their  allies  within  the  landed  aristocracy.  The  Crown's  wealth 
depended  on  loans  from  the  recently  established  Bank  of  England.  These  were  given  to 
fight  various  foreign  wars  including  the  Anglo-French  colonial  rivalry  in  the  Seven 
Years  War  from  1756  to  1763,  and  the  War  of  American  Independence  from  1776  to 
1783.  In  return,  financiers  were  given  political  and  other  privileges.  Millar  observed 
that  this  wealth  was  being  used  to  patronise  and  influence  parliamentary 
representatives.  In  1784,  lie  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  only  way  of  limiting  the 
power  of  the  Crown  was  to  increase  the  level  of  popular  representation  in  parliament. 
The  reform  movement  came  into  being  in  the  context  of  a  representative  system  in 
which,  as  late  as  1830,  only  3,000  people  were  eligible  to  vote  in  Scotland  out  of  a 
population  of  2,300,000.  Moreover,  the  representatives  sent  from  the  burghs,  now 
including  large  prosperous  cities  such  as  Glasgow,  were  appointees  and  unelected. 
There  was  only  one  such  representative  for  all  of  Glasgow,  Renfrew,  Rutherglen  and 
Dumbarton.  38 
The  hostile  attitude  of  those  opposed  to  reform  reveals  the  intensity  of  class 
division  on  the  issue.  In  1793,  Thomas  Muir,  a  Scottish  lawyer,  leading  reform  activist 
36"The  rise  of  banking  in  Glasgow  was  intimately  connected  with  the  triangular  trade.  "  Williams, 
Slaveq,  plOl.  Williams  notes  the  success  of  Andrew  Buchanan's  Ship  Bank.  A  typical  career 
progression  of  the  period  was  from  tradesman  to  merchant  to  banker  and  landowner. 
37SCC  chapter  twelve. 
381,  clunann,  Ifillar,  p72. 39 
and  former  student  of  Millar's,  was  charged  with  sedition,  found  guilty  and  sentenced 
to  transportation  to  Botany  Bay  for  fourteen  years.  Summing  up,  Judge  Braxfield 
described  the  reformers  as  a  "rabble  of  ignorant  weavers".  The  weavers  were,  of 
course,  one  section  of  the  newly  prosperous  literate  working  class.  This  section  was 
soon  to  be  driven  out  of  existence  in  competition  with  machine-driven  factories  reliant 
on  child  and  female  labour  -a  familiar  characteristic  of  the  shape  of  the  industrial 
revolution  in  the  early  nineteenth  century.  Braxfield  asked  of  the  weavers: 
"What  right  have  they  to  representation?  ... 
A  government  in  every  country  should  be 
just  like  a  corporation,  and  in  this  country  it  is  made  up  of  the  landed  interest,  which 
alone  has  the  right  to  be  represented.  As  for  the  rabble,  who  have  nothing  but  personal 
property,  what  hold  has  the  nation  on  them?  "39 
Weavers  had  property  in  their  tools  and  their  looms.  This  was  their  personal 
property.  The  cotton  they  wove  into  cloth  was  owned  by  merchant  nUdle-men.  In 
return  for  working  the  cotton,  they  were  paid  wages.  Real  property  was  the  land  on 
which  people  such  as  the  weavers  lived  and  had  to  pay  rent  for  out  of  their  wages. 
This  class  dimension  was  reflected  in  Millar's  thought.  Millar  adopted  Smith's 
distinction  between  the  three  major  classes  in  society:  land-owners  who  derived  a 
revenue  from  rent,  capitalists  who  got  theirs  from  profits,  and  labourers  whose  means 
of  subsistence  was  derived  from  wages.  40 
Thomas  Muir,  like  Millar,  was  a  member  of  a  reform  group  called  "The  Society  of 
the  Friends  of  the  People".  This  was  one  of  many  reform  societies  that  sprung  up  in 
Britain  towards  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  Scottish  section  of  the  "Friends 
of  the  People"  was  remarkable  in  that  subscription  rates  were  low  enough  for  wage 
workers  such  as  the  weavers  to  join.  The  weavers  were  typical  of  those  skilled 
workers  who  had  the  means  and  desire  to  better  themselves  through  hard  work,  saving 
and  study.  Reform  societies  such  as  the  "Friends"  anticipated  the  cross-class  alliance  of 
industrial  capitalists  and  workers  that  eventually  defeated  the  political  and  economic 
stranglehold  the  landed  aristocracy  had  over  the  British  government.  This  was 
symbolised  in  the  victory  of  the  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  in  the  early  nineteenth 
century. 
2.7  Revolution,  War  and  Death 
Like  most  of  his  liberal  Whig  contemporaries,  Millar  welcomed  the  French 
Revolution  in  1789.  Before  the  war  with  France,  he  attended  annual  dinners 
39Lclimann,  Millar,  p70. 
40Sce  chaptcr  seven. 40 
celebrating  the  fall  of  the  Bastille.  He  would  have  participated  in  toasting  the  standing 
army  of  France,  the  natural  rights  of  man  and  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade.  He 
hoped  that  the  example  of  the  Revolution  would  speed  up  the  process  of  reform  in 
Britain  and  thereby  weaken  the  power  of  the  Crown.  He  observed  in  a  letter  of  1790 
that: 
"it  is impossible  that  the  people  of  England  will  be  contented  with  a  national  assembly 
so  ill  constituted  while  they  have  the  example  of  one  so  much  superior  in  France.  "41 
Millar's  optimism  was  premature.  When  war  was  declared  against  France  in  1792, 
parliament  passed  a  series  of  acts  directed  both  at  the  reform  societies  and  the  newly 
emerging  combinations  of  workers  now  called  "trade  unions".  Corresponding  Societies 
in  which  people  communicated  their  hopes  for  reform  were  banned.  Books  such  as 
Thomas  Paine's  The  Rights  of  Mati,  which  compared  the  English  constitution 
unfavourably  with  the  French,  were  taken  out  of  libraries  and  burnt.  Many  of  the 
modern  methods  of  state  control  were  used  then:  censorship  of  the  press,  opening  of 
mail  by  a  secret  police,  the  banning  of  meetings,  the  imprisonment  of  radical  and  trade 
union  leaders,  and  state-encou  raged  jingoistic  mobs  shouting  "For  Church  and  King!  " 
These  physically  intimidated  dissidents  and  their  families,  invading  their  homes  and 
burning  them  down.  42 
The  subsequent  terror  was  particularly  severe  in  Scotland.  After  Muir's 
punishment,  all  Scottish  lawyers  had  to  be  careful  about  what  they  said  and  wrote  in 
public.  Millar  was  denounced  as  a  "Jacobin"  who  was  corrupting  the  minds  of  young 
people  in  his  lectures.  His  son  John,  a  reformer,  was  forced  to  flee  to  America 
convinced  he  would  be  charged  with  sedition.  Millar  was  one  of  the  few  who  refused 
to  give  up  their  convictions.  In  1793,  Millar  organised  a  petition  against  the  war 
consisting  of  40,000  signatures.  He  argued  that  the  government  had  gone  to  war 
abroad  in  order  to  stifle  the  movement  for  reform  at  home.  In  1798,  at  the  height  of 
the  repression  when  he  was  sixty-three,  Millar  moved  opposition  to  a  special  tax  of 
1300  imposed  by  the  government  on  Glasgow  College  in  aid  of  the  war  effort. 
Millar  was  no  revolutionary.  Like  many  of  his  liberal  Whig  friends  he  turned 
against  the  French  Revolution  when  it  was  forced  to  confront  working  class  demands. 
He  was  opposed  to  what  he  saw  as  the  Jacobins'  attempt  to  abolish  ranks.  Authority 
held  on  the  basis  of  wealth  was  necessary  for  social  order,  peace  and  the  rule  of  law. 
Moreover,  he  was  hardly  a  democrat.  Millar  was  opposed  to  universal  ýljffrage.  He 
41Millar's  letter  to  Samuel  Rose.  16  February  1790  (Glasgow  University  Special  Collcctions.  Ms  Gen 
520/48).  Quoted  in  Haakonssen,  Alatural  Law,  p  167,  n47. 
42See  Meikle  H.  W.  (1912)  Scotland  and  the  French  Revolution,  Glasgow. 41 
wanted  a  limited  extension  of  the  suffrage  to  include  the  commercial  and  industrial 
interests  of  his  day.  43 
Like  his  opponents,  Millar  tended  to  think  of  ownership  of  landed  property  as  the 
guarantor  of  social  stability  and  order.  Landed  wealth  inspired  a  proper  attitude  to 
authority.  Nonetheless,  he  welcomed  the  free  sale  of  land  to  whoever  had  the  capital 
to  make  it  the  most  productive  even  if  this  meant  the  impoverishment  of  ancient 
families  through  the  dismemberment  of  their  estates.  He  thought  that  what  he  called  a 
"fluctuation"  of  landed  property  through  the  sale  of  estates  would  cause  land  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  those  in  the  lower  ranks  who  had  made  their  fortunes  through 
commerce  and  manufactures.  He  thought  that  labourers  had  the  chance  of  becoming 
capitalists  if  they  worked  hard,  saved  their  wages  and  employed  others,  and  that  the 
concentration  of  the  most  economically  active  of  the  population  in  towns  facilitated 
combinations  of  employers  and  workers.  An  urban  population  was  therefore  more 
capable  of  resisting  and,  if  necessary,  overthrowing  oppressive  governments.  He 
thought  these  processes  would  naturally  bring  about  a  greater  element  of  social 
equality  and  liberty  to  society  and  government. 
His  liberal  principles  were  similar  to  those  of  his  teacher  Smith's:  the  state  would 
be  more  prosperous  and  secure  if  it  did  not  interfere  in  the  economic  activities  of  self- 
interested  individuals.  However,  if  capitalists  were  unable  to  provide  education  for 
their  workers,  the  state  should  step  in.  Like  Smith,  he  recognised  that  the  repetitive 
tasks  workers  were  forced  to  do  in  factories  destroyed  their  intelligence.  He  thought 
that,  without  a  proper  education,  labourers  would  be  less  productive  and  prone  to  the 
ideas  of  extremists  and  agitators.  Moreover,  he  observed  that  market  forces  had  a 
tendency  to  destroy  family  life  through  the  growth  of  prostitution  and  increased 
opportunities  for  men  to  be  unfaithful  to  their  wives.  He  thought  that  it  was  impossible 
for  governments  to  remedy  or correct  this  tendency. 
In  1785,  aged  fifty,  Millar's  uncle  died.  Millar  became  the  proprietor  of  the 
Milheugh  estate,  and  he  lived  many  happy  years  there  with  his  numerous  family  until 
his  death  in  1801.  Whenever  he  could,  he  turned  his  attention  to  landscaping  and 
improving  the  estate.  As  his  nephew  recalls: 
"He  removed  many  formal  hedges  which  sub-divided  the  little  meadows,  or  by  stiff 
unbending  lines  marked  too  distinctly  the  course  of  the  rivulet.  He  formed  the  old 
orchard  into  pleasing  groups  of  trees  around  the  house,  left  bushes  irregularly 
scattered  on  the  banks  of  the  stream,  and  carried  plantations  along  the  top  of  the 
banks.  Everything  dirove  in  this  sheltered  situation,  and  Millieugh  is  now  one  of  the 
43"Mr.  Millar  was  ever  decidedly  hostile  to  the  system  of  univemal  sitffroge"  [his  emphasis]  which 
would  "conipictcly  annihilate  the  control  of  the  wiscr  part  o'  the  nation"  and  "enable  the  poor  to 
dictate  laws  equally  unjust  and  destructive.  "  Craig.  Account,  pcvi. 42 
sweetest  retirements  that  could  be  desired.  Its  beauties  are  elegant  and  simple,  and 
perhaps  it  would  be  difficult  to  point  out  any  further  embellishments  that  would  accord 
with  the  character  of  the  place.  "44 
Millar  lost  his  wife  after  a  long  and  painful  illness  in  1795.  He  had  been  happily 
married  for  thirty-four  years.  Millar  himself  died  suddenly  in  the  summer  of  1801.  He 
sat  out  in  the  sun  for  too  long,  became  ill  with  sunstroke  and,  thus  weakened,  died 
from  pleurisy  overnight  aged  sixty-six.  He  had  recovered  from  a  serious  inflammation 
of  the  lungs  a  few  years  previously. 
2.8  A  Posthumous  Reputation 
Only  the  first  volume  of  Millar's  second  and  final  published  work,  A  Historical 
Vietv  of  the  English  Goveniment,  had  been  published,  in  1787.  It  was  well  received. 
We  do  not  know  whether  the  stressful  events  of  his  later  years  or  preoccupations  with 
his  family  and  estate  affected  his  writing.  However,  a  final  version  of  the  book  in  four 
volumes  was  edited  by  his  nephew  and  published  posthumously  in  1803. 
The  book  was,  at  one  level,  a  reply  to  Hume's  history  of  England,  correcting  biases 
and  inaccuracies  Millar  found  in  Hume's  work.  At  another,  it  was  also  an  example  of 
the  historiography  Hume  had  himself  promoted.  Hume  had  attempted  to  give  an 
impartial  account  of  English  history  based  on  empiricist  methods.  He  had  developed 
these  methods  in  his  Dquity  and  Essays.  Smith  had  applied  them  to  jurisprudence  in 
the  Lectures  Millar  attended.  Both  Hume's  and  Smith's  philosophical,  political  and 
economic  writings  were  crucial  influences  on  Millar's  own. 
Hume,  for  example,  had  tried  to  escape  the  influence  of  party  prejudices  that  had 
bedevilled  early  eighteenth  century  histories  of  England.  Many  people  thought  it  was 
impossible  for  an  Englishman  to  write  an  impartial  account  of  the  history  of  the 
country.  45  To  write  impartially  was  to  write  on  the  side  of  the  English  constitution.  A 
party,  by  definition,  put  its  sectional  interests  before  the  public  interest  of  the  country's 
laws  and  liberties.  Because  Tory,  Whig,  Court  and  Country  all  claimed  their  interests 
coincided  with  the  constitution,  party-influenced  histories  collided  in  competition  with 
one  another.  Hume's  history  can  therefore  be  understood  as  an  attempt  to  bring  unity 
and  coherence  to  the  British  ruling  class's  perception  of  its  origins. 
By  combining  opposing  views,  Hume  attempted  to  break  through  the 
historiographical  deadlock  of  the  preceding  politically  prejudiced  histories.  He  aspired 
to  write  a  non-party  history  of  England.  He  argued  that  the  transfer  of  power  from  the 
sovereign  to  the  commons  had  established  a  modern  form  of  liberty.  The  nature  of  the 
44Craig,  Account,  plxxi. 
45Forbcs,  Politics,  p233. 43 
latter  differed  from  ancient  Saxon  liberty.  The  new  liberty  coincided  with  changes  in 
the  circumstances  of  English  society,  in  particular  the  effect  of  commerce  and 
manufactures  on  manners,  customs  and  laws.  It  followed  that  blaming  any  of  the 
principal  actors  in  the  conflict  between  crown  and  parliament  was  improper.  Impartial 
history  was  therefore  non-party,  on  the  side  of  the  constitution,  and  explained  the 
difference  between  ancient  and  modern  liberty. 
Millar  thought  that  Hume  had  not  been  completely  successful  in  his  account.  Hume 
had  not  explained  English  historical  changes  in  a  connected  fashion.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  was  keen  to  demonstrate  that  history  could  be  written,  as  he  thought  Hume 
had  attempted  to  do,  with  the  use  of  a  scientific  method.  This  method  entailed 
adopting  forms  of  writing  that  integrated  a  narrative  account  of  events  in  the  lives  of 
famous  historical  individuals  with  causal  explanations  of  changes  that  affected  the 
whole  of  the  political  and  juridical  constitution  of  a  country. 
Millar's  views  on  historiography  are  to  be  found  in  his  lectures  on  government.  46  In 
these  he  compared  different  forms  of  historiography.  He  mentioned  histories  written  as 
a  form  of  biography  "in  which  the  achievements  of  particular  princes  or  great  men  are 
displayed,  and  in  which  every  other  circumstance  is  regarded  as  of  a  subordinate 
nature"  (LG  1792,6)  and  compared  them  with  histories  in  which  "observations 
concerning  customs,  manners,  and  laws,  come  to  be  more  and  more  intermixed,  by 
which  the  thread  of  the  narrative  was  in  some  degree  interrupted,  and  rendered  as  a 
mere  story  less  interesting.  "  (LG  1792,7). 
Exemplars  of  this  non-narrative  form  of  historiography  amongst  the  ancients  were 
Polybius  and  Tacitus,  and  amongst  the  moderns  were  Voltaire,  Robertson  and  Hume. 
Hume  had  "separated  a  number  of  details  from  the  main  course  of  the  narrative"  and 
therefore  produced  a  more  "scientific  method  of  writing  history".  This  method, 
according  to  Millar,  divided  historiography  into  six  separate  topics:  "I.  Events 
(containing  battles  and  negotiations)  2.  Civil  Government.  3.  Religious  Government.  4. 
Commerce  and  Manufactures.  5.  Arts  and  Sciences.  6.  Manners,  Customs  and  Private 
Laws.  "  (LG  1792,8).  By  writing  dissertations  on  these  separate  topics  Mllar  thought 
that  historians  were  better  able  to  compare  the  influence  of  one  upon  the  other.  It  is 
possible  to  go  through  Millar's  the  text  of  Hisloilcal  Vie)v  and  classify  the  content  of 
his  chapters  according  to  the  above  topics. 
Millar  therefore  down-played  narrative  in  favour  of  conjectural  hypotheses  on  the 
causal  influence  of  the  above  topics.  Thus  historical  changes  in  the  development  of  the 
arts  and  sciences  caused  changes  in  manners,  customs  and  laws;  changes  in  the 
development  of  commerce  and  manufactures  caused  changes  in  the  arts  and  sciences; 
changes  in  the  development  of  civil  or  religious  government  caused  changes  in 
46Ms  Gen  289-29,  Glasgow  University  Special  Collections.  Sce  appendix  two  for  details. 44 
commerce  and  manufactures  and  vice  versa.  Causal  relationships  were  also  reflected  in 
the  titles  he  gave  to  the  dissertations  in  the  last  volume  of  the  book.  47 
Chapters  of  Historical  Neiv  which  contain  narrative  without  mention  of  the  causal 
influence  of  the  topics  he  listed  in  the  lectures  are  rare.  There  is  only  one  such  chapter 
in  volume  one.  This  is  Chapter  X:  Evetitsfi-ont  Eigberl  to  the  Normaii  Cotiquest.  Even 
those  chapters  of  volumes  two  and  three  that  are  predominantly  narrative  in  form,  such 
as  his  accounts  of  the  reigns  of  Henry  VII  (11,  Chapter  IX),  Henry  VIII  (11,  Chapter 
X),  Edward  VI,  Mary,  and  Elizabeth  (11,  Chapter  XI),  Cromwell  (111,  Chapter  V)  and 
William  and  Mary  (III,  Chapter  VII),  all  connect  historical  events  with  discussions  of 
the  changing  nature  of  civil  government,  commerce  and  manufactures  and  arts  and 
sciences  during  the  periods  of  their  reigns. 
When  the  completed  four  volumes  of  Historical  Neu,  appeared  in  1803,  the  book 
was  critically  reviewed  by  Francis  Jeffrey  in  the  Eýdhiburgh  Rei,  ieiv.  Jeffrey  thought 
Millar's  book  failed  on  two  counts:  firstly  it  was  too  general  and  lacked  the  fine 
empirical  detail  that  was  required  for  a  good  account  of  English  history.  Secondly, 
Millar  could  not  escape  what  Jeffrey  considered  were  Whig  party  prejudices  when 
assessing  the  contribution  of  the  Stuart  monarchs  to  English  political  life.  Jeffrey 
suggested  that  Millar's  historical  inquiry  degenerated  into  "the  controversial 
wranglings  of  party  politicians"  at  this  point.  48  It  therefore  failed  to  be  a  truly  impartial 
account. 
The  political  and  intellectual  climate  had  changed  and  this  had  effects  on  the 
literary  tastes  of  the  British  elite.  Jeffrey  criticised  Millar  for  having  a  stodgy  and  plain 
style  of  writing  and  for  being  a  doctrinaire  historian  typical  of  the,  by  then, 
unfashionable  school  of  Scottish  historiography.  49 
Nonetheless,  English  "radicals"  such  as  the  young  utilitarian  thinker  John  Stuart 
Mill  remained  enthusiastic  about  the  work.  In  the  1820s,  Mill  described  Millar  as  a 
superior  writer  to  the  fashionable  French  historians  of  his  time.  50  Mill  compared  his 
work  with  Hume's  and  Hallam's  histories.  Hallam's  writing  consisted  too  much  of 
"tiresome  and  useless  narrative".  This  was  not  something  Mill  could  find  fault  with  in 
Millar's  writing.  As  observed  above,  narrative  played  a  subordinate  role  to  the 
explanations  Millar  gave  of  changes  in  the  constitution.  Mill  also  thought  that  Hume 
had  failed  to  produce  an  impartial  history.  Hume's  history  was  a  "standing  example"  of 
47For  example  "How  far  the  Advancement  of  Commerce  and  Manufactures  has  contributed  to  the 
Extension  and  Diffusion  of  Knowledge  and  Literature.  "  (Hlý4,138-161). 
48Jcffrey,  Review,  p  164. 
49Millar's  literary  style  was  "heavy,  cold  and  inelegant.  "  Jcffrcy.  Reviciv,  p155.  Millar  "asserted, 
where  lie  ought  to  have  proved,  advanced  a  conjecture  for  a  certainty".  Jeffrey,  Review,  p157. 
5OMill  J.  S.  (1826)  Modern  Erench  Historical  lVorks.  Westminster  Review  VI,  July.  In  Collected 
lVorks,  Robson  J.  M.  (cd.  )  vol.  X)(,  Toronto,  1985:  ppl7-52. 45 
the  deep  root  that  the  influence  of  party  could  have  "in  the  public  mind".  51  In  contrast 
to  Hume  and  Hallam,  Millar  was  the  greatest  philosophical  historian  Britain  had 
produced.  His  account  of  feudal  society  was  unsurpassed. 
After  Mill,  Millar  was  pretty  well  forgotten  in  Britain.  Shortly  after  publication  in 
Britain,  Millar's  Origins  of  Ranks  had  been  translated  into  German  and  reviewed  by 
Herder.  52  Much  later,  Millar's  intellectual  achievement  was  remembered  in  passing  by 
two  Germans:  Karl  Marx  and  Werner  Sombart.  In  the  1850s  Marx  copied  out  lengthy 
passages  from  Millar's  Ofigins  of  Ranks  in  notebooks  he  was  compiling  in  preparation 
for  writing  the  Grundrisse.  53  In  1923,  Werner  Sombart  mentioned  Millar  as  a  founding 
father  of  modern  SoCiology.  54  Millar  had  originated  the  "techno-economic" 
interpretation  of  hiStory.  55  The  twentieth  century  revival  of  interest  in  Millar  in 
English-speaking  countries  has,  until  recently,  been  forced  to  engage  with  this 
sociological  perspective  on  Millar's  philosophical  history.  This  is  so  regardless  of 
whether  Sombart  was  the  first  to  formulate  it  and  regardless  of  more  recent  contextual 
interpretations.  Possible  reasons  for  this  are  discussed  in  chapter  four. 
Perhaps  the  greatest  posthumous  tribute  to  Millar  came  from  his  nephew  and 
biographer.  Craig  described  him  as  a  man  who  exemplified  the  Scottish  eighteenth 
century  conception  of  virtue: 
"He  was,  indeed,  always  disposed  to  do  good,  whcther  to  a  friend  or  to  a  strangcr.  So 
farwas  lie  from  being  actuated  by  selfish  considerations,  that  his  generosity  sometimes 
exceeded  what  his  limited  fortune  might  altogether  warrant.  Nothing  was  so  despicable 
in  his  mind,  as  any  sordid  attention  to  money,  and,  while  he  knew  that  he  could  place 
51Mill,  French  Wor4  p19. 
52Hcrder  J.  G.  (1772)  Beinerk-ungen  uber  den  Unterschied  der  Stande  in  der  burgerlichen  Gesellschaft 
von  Joh.  kfillar  E-sq.  Aus  dein  Englischen.  Leipzig.  Ilen  Schividert  1772.  Sept.  In  Saintliche  Werke, 
vol.  V,  Supan  cdn,  Berlin,  1877:  pp452-456. 
53Marx's  unpublished  hand-written  copies  of  sections  of  chapters  1-5  of  Millar's  Origin  of  Ranky  in 
notebook  B59  pp6-16.  (International  Institute  of  Social  History,  Amsterdam).  Marx  does  not  appear 
to  have  known  about  Millar's  Historical  Tliesv.  As  far  as  I  know.  there  is  no  reference  to  Millar  in  any 
of  Marx's  original  work.  Nor  is  there  any  evidence  of  an  influence  that  Millar  might  have  had  on 
Marx.  The  observed  similarities  between  Millar  and  Marx  must  therefore  be  explained  in  terms  other 
than  direct  influence.  See  chapter  three. 
54Sombart  W.  (1923)Die  Anfange  der  Soziologie.  In  Palyi  M.  (cd.  )  Haupiprobleine  der  Soziologie: 
Erinnerungsgabe  an  Max  Weber,  2  vols.  Munich-Leipzig.  Vol.  l:  ppl  1-14.  Sombart  held  "that  Millar 
so  completely  anticipated  Engels's  ideas 
...  that  the  latter  contributed not  a  single  idea  not  already 
present  ... 
in  the  former.  "  Quoted  in  Lehmann,  Millar,  p133.  Bowles  (1990)  also  compares  Millar's 
Origin  of  Ranla  with  Engels'  Origin  of  the  Randly,  Private  Propeqv  and  the  State,  and  concludes 
that  a  feminist  contribution  to  the  explanation  of  the  origins  of  women's  oppression  might  be  better. 
55"Tcclino-cconomic"  is  a  phrase  Meek  took  from  Sombart.  Contribution,  p42.  Lehmann,  borrows  it 
to  characterise  both  Marx  and  Millar's  historical  and  social  theory  as  forms  of  "teclino-cconomic 
deterininisin.  "Mi/lar,  pp  13  1-133. 46 
his  family  in  independent  circumstances,  he  was  less  anxious  about  farther 
accumulation.  1156 
56Craig,  Account,  pcxxii. 0  Part  Two. 
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Chapter  Three: 
Philosophical  Considerations 
My  method  of  proceeding  in  this  initial  examination  of  Meek's  most  substantial  and 
contestable  thesis  on  Millar's  materialism  is  the  following:  I  shall  give  a  reading  of  one 
of  Millar's  essays  How  far  the  Advancement  of  Commerce  and  Manufactures  has 
contributed  to  the  Extension  and  Diffusion  of  Knowledge  and  Literature  (HV,  4,13  8- 
161).  This  reading  will  illustrate  the  various  aspects  of  Millar's  thought  I  intend  to 
develop  in  the  main  body  of  this  dissertation.  I  shall  therefore  focus  on  aspects  of  the 
essay  that  are  informed  by  Millar's  political  economy,  his  conjectural  method,  his 
individualism,  his  political  theory  and  his  thinking  on  the  relationship  between  property 
and  liberty.  I  shall  then  turn  to  two  considerations  that  would  throw  doubt  on  Meeles 
thesis.  These  are  that  the  thesis  is  misleading  for  the  following  reasons:  the  first  is  that 
it  does  not  help  students  to  distinguish  between  Millar's  empiricist  philosophy  of 
history  and  the  nature  of  eighteenth  century  materialism.  The  second  is  that  it  does  not 
help  students  to  distinguish  the  philosophical  presuppositions  Millar  took  for  granted 
from  those  of  Marx.  In  the  light  of  these  considerations  I  shall  briefly  consider  a  few  of 
Marx  and  Engels'  statements  on  the  materialist  understanding  of  history.  I  shall  argue 
that  they  identified  a  relationship  between  this  understanding  before  and  after  the 
impact  of  German  idealist  philosophy.  This  relationship  was  between  what  Marx  and 
Engels  understood  to  be  naturalistic  and  dialectical  forms  of  materialism.  The  former 
was,  as  they  put  it,  "in  the  toils  of  political  ideology".  '  I  shall  then  return  to  Millar's 
essay  in  order  to  illustrate  the  nature  of  this  ideology. 
Through  a  comparison  of  Millar's  fundamental  premises  of  human  history  with 
those  of  Marx  and  Engels',  I  shall  conclude  that  there  is  scope  for  agreement  with 
Meek.  This  scope  depends,  however,  on  whether  the  student  understands,  accepts  or 
rejects  a  dialectical  essentialist  approach  to  the  understanding  of  the  evolution  of 
society,  history  and  human  consciousness.  This  understanding  emerged  out  of  the  early 
nineteenth  century  school  of  Hegelian  idealist  German  philosophy.  At  best,  Meek's 
thesis  was  therefore  an  accurate  intuition  -  an  informed  guess  -  leading  to  a  dead  end. 
This  cul-de-sac,  as  I  shall  argue  in  chapter  four,  consisted  of  comparing  the  superficial 
appearance  of  a  similarity  between  steps  in  Millar's  modes  of  the  acquisition  of 
property  with  models  of  materialist  sociology  reproduced  in  undergraduate  textbooks 
and  elsewhere. 
'Marx  &  Engels  (1846)  Gentian  Ideology,  Arthur  (ed.  )  p49. 49 
3.1  An  Initial  Case  Study 
Wlar's  essay,  as  the  title  suggests,  set  out  to  demonstrate  the  causal  influence  of 
generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange  upon  the  quantity  and  quality  of 
knowledge  available  to  a  population.  Individuals  required  knowledge  of  various  kinds 
in  order  to  better  themselves.  For  example,  without  a  knowledge  both  of  their  own 
and  others'  interests,  they  could  neither  better  themselves  nor  have  any  comprehension 
of  the  circumstances  that  would  better  others.  Knowledge  of  interests  was  derived 
both  from  subjects'  experience  and  observation  of  the  internal  workings  of  their  own 
minds  and  also  of  their  experience  and  observation  of  external  circumstances. 
These  external  circumstances  were  "the  objects  around  us,  whether  of  art  or 
nature"  WA138).  If  subjects  used  the  faculty  their  minds  had  to  pay  attention  to 
these  objects,  then  they  could  exercise  their  "capacity  of  exercising  the  intellectual 
powers"  (ibid).  This  capacity  included  forms  of  reasoning  such  as  arrangements  of  the 
ideas  of  the  objects  according  to  their  "analogies  and  resemblances"  (ibid).  Individuals 
also  observed  that  when  their  faculty  of  attention  was  engaged  in  productive  activity, 
"which  is  necessary  to  preserve  a  relish  for  enjoyment",  they  experienced  pleasurable 
feelings  necessary  for  their  happiness.  Without  this  engagement,  "the  mind  sinks  into 
apathy  and  dejection"  (HV,  4,139).  Here  Millar  followed  Hume  who  had  written: 
"In  times  when  industry  and  the  arts  flourish,  men  are  kept  in  perpetual  occupation, 
and  enjoy,  as  their  reward,  the  occupation  itself,  as  well  as  those  pleasures  which  are 
the  fruit  of  their  labour.  "  (RA,  270) 
According  to  Hume,  when  the  subject's  faculty  of  attention  was  engaged  on  the 
object  of  productive  activity,  then  "a  relish  for  action  and  pleasure"  was  promoted 
(ibid),  and  the  mind  "acquires  new  vigour;  enlarges  its  powers  and  faculties".  In 
contrast,  when  the  subject's  mind  was  deprived  of  the  opportunity  of  labouring  for  a 
living,  then  it  would  sink  into  "languor  and  lethargy,  that  destroys  all  enjoyment" 
(ibid).  The  depressing  experience  of  the  landed  proprietor  who  did  not  make  his 
capital  work  for  him  in  productive  investment  was  well  known  to  the  eighteenth 
century  subject  of  experience.  Through  a  process  of  con  ectural  reasoning  it  could  be  j 
inferred  that  both  the  mind  of  the  savage  and  that  of  the  worker  who,  through 
unemployment,  fell  into  the  population  surplus  to  capital's  requirements  would 
experience  a  similar  feeling  of  depression. 
Nfillar  Tbserved  that  generalised  commodity  production  was  associated  with  an 
inequality  in  the  distribution  of  wealth.  Those  born  into  wealth  were  "exempted  from 
bodily  labour"  (HV,  4,139).  Their  minds  could  not,  therefore,  experience  the  enjoyment 
of  manual  work  in  the  same  way  that  an  craftsman  or  labourer  could.  However,  just  as 
the  subject  experienced  pleasure  both  from  productive  activity  and  from  the  objects  he 50 
produced,  so  the  minds  of  those  "born  to  affluent  fortunes"  (HV,  4,139)  could  enjoy 
"those  objects  which  are  agreeable  to  the  senses"  (ibid).  When  contemplating  the 
objects  produced  by  the  craft  labour  of  others,  the  subject  would  experience  a 
"pleasing  agitation"  of  the  passions  (HV,  4,140). 
Millar  theorised  the  division  of  labour  between  mental  and  manual  labour  in  terms 
of  two  empirically  observable  classes  of  people:  individuals  exempted  from  bodily 
labour  and  those  engaged  in  bodily  labour.  Both  classes  were  relatively  well  off,  but 
the  first  class  was  knowledgeable  and  the  latter  ignorant  and  stupid.  This  caused  him 
some  anxiety  for: 
"It  were  to  be  wished  that  wealth  and  knowledge  should  go  hand  in  hand,  and  that  the 
acquisition  of  the  former  should  lead  to  the  possession  of  the  latter.  "  (HV,  4,155) 
This  wish  had  not  come  true  and  afforded  "a  view  not  very pleasant  in  the  history 
of  mankind"  (ibid).  If  prosperous  manual  workers  were  ignorant  and  stupid,  then  there 
were  potentially  dangerous  political  consequences.  They  could  become  "the  dupes  of 
their  superiors"  (HV,  4,156).  The  ignorant  and  stupid  peasants  of  "what  are  called  the 
dark-ages"  were  persuaded  to  give  over  "a  proportion  of  their  possessions"  to  the 
knowledgeable  clergy  (HV,  4,157).  This  led  to  "ecclesiastical  tyranny"  (ibid).  By 
analogy  it  was  possible  to  reason  that  ignorant  manual  workers  would  also  be 
persuaded  to  give  up  their  liberty  to  their  more  knowledgeable  superiors.  This  would 
be  a  new  form  of  tyranny.  However,  Millar  argued  that  it  would  be  unlikely  that  the 
high-ranking  class  of  those  exempted  from  bodily  labour  would  find  it  in  their  interest 
to  establish  a  tyranny  of  the  intellect  over  low-ranking  manual  workers.  Millar  argued 
that  both  classes  would  find  it  in  their  mutual  interest  to  support  "a  liberal  plan  for  the 
instruction  of  the  lower  orders"  (HV,  4,161),  funded  out  of  public  revenue  and 
modelled  on  the  parish  schools  in  Scotland. 
The  higher  ranks  had  an  interest  in  the  security  of  their  property  from  "the 
commission  of  crimes"  (HV,  4,158).  They  would  be  interested  in  lower  orders  that 
were  "sober  and  industrious,  honest  and  faithful,  affectionate  and  conscientious  in  their 
domestic  concerns,  peaceable  in  their  manners,  and  averse  from  riot  and  disorder" 
Qbid).  The  lower  orders,  on  the  other  hand,  would  benefit  from  gaining  knowledge 
that  would  enable  them  to  better  themselves  by  learning  "to  form  a  proper  estimate  of 
the  objects  which  will  promote  their  true  happiness"  (HV,  4,159).  They  would  gain  the 
knowledge  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  good  citizen  and  be  able  to  detect  the  errors  of 
thinking  in  "religion,  morality,  or government,  which  designing  men  may  endeavour  to 
propagate"  (ibid).  They  would  therefore  be  less  inclined  to  succumb  to  "the  intrigues 
of  any  plausible  projector"  (ibid). 51 
There  is  an  apparent  contradiction  in  Millar's  separation  of  the  population  of  a 
commercial  society  into  the  two  classes  of  individuals  exempted  from  bodily  labour 
and  individuals  engaged  in  bodily  labour.  As  I  noted  above,  individuals  exempted  from 
labour  included  those  born  to  affluent  fortunes  whose  pleasure  was  derived  not  from 
their  own  labouring  activity  but  from  the  contemplation  of  the  objects  created  by  the 
labouring  activity  of  others,  On  the  other  hand,  as  I  shall  demonstrate  below,  the  class 
of  people  who  were  exempted  from  bodily  labour  included  individuals  whose  wealth 
was  derived  not  from  inheritance  but  from  their  economic  activity  within  a  social 
division  of  labour.  Moreover,  Mllar  was  to  make  inferences  concerning  the  effects  of 
artificial  and  natural  objects  on  the  minds  of  those  individuals  engaged  in  a  social 
division  of  labour.  These  inferences  would  attempt  to  explain  why  it  was  that  the  class 
of  people  exempted  from  bodily  labour  were  more  knowledgeable  than  those  engaged 
in  bodily  labour. 
As  I  shall  argue  in  chapter  seven,  Millar  made  no  distinction  between  the  social 
and  technical  divisions  of  labour.  Moreover  he  conceived  of  commodity  production 
and  exchange  as  a  material-technical  process.  Commodities  were  exchanged  according 
to  their  utility  to  the  subject.  The  subject  conceived  of  savings  of  labour-time 
expended  in  the  production  of  commodities  according  to  the  savings  in  revenue  a 
capitalist  gained  from  the  introduction  of  a  technical  division  of  labour,  and  also 
according  to  the  savings  of  labour-time  experienced  either  through  the  use  of 
machinery  or  through  the  hire  of  labourers. 
Thus  Millar's  observations  of  the  effects  of  generalised  commodity  production  on  a 
population  were  that  an  undifferentiated  division  of  labour  introduced  a  variety  of 
different  occupations.  These  were  the  "subject  of  lucrative  employments"  (HV,  4,141). 
This  "separation  of  different  trades  and  professions"  (HV,  4,144)  brought  into  being 
lawyers,  clergy,  doctors,  painters,  sculptors,  musicians,  scientists,  teachers,  athletes, 
merchants,  artificers,  and  mechanics  or  labourers.  Labourers  or  artificers  were  the 
majority  of  the  population.  The  latter  were  further  sub-divided  into  agricultural  and 
industrial  labourers.  All  these  were  lucrative  professions  and  Millar  observed  that  pin 
makers  (a  sub-class  of  the  class  of  industrial  labourers  or  commercial  mechanics) 
would  be  able  to  buy  good  clothes  and  books  out  of  their  wages  (HV,  4,154-5). 
Competition,  supply  and  demand  regulated  the  income  derived  from  these 
employments  whether  the  subject  was  engaged  in  the  production  of  commodities  as 
things  or  as  services.  Thus  teachers  or  instructors  were  hired  "at  an  expence  moderate 
to  individuals"  (HV,  4,147)  and  the  cost  of  their  hire  was  "cheapened  by  mutual 
competition  and  demand"  (ibid). 
The  inference  he  made  to  connect  the  class  of  people  exempted  from  bodily  labour 
with  intellectual  labour,  and  therefore  with  knowledge,  was  based  on  the  hypothesis 
that  the  division  of  labour  had  observable  effects  on  the  workings  of  the  mind  of  the 52 
individual  subject.  The  experience  of  individuals  engaged  in  mental  labour  was  that  the 
subject's  mind  was  engaged  in  an  "extensive  application  to  a  variety  of  objects" 
(HV,  4,144).  These  exercised  "the  united  powers  of  imagination  and  judgement"  (ibid). 
The  faculties  of  the  subject's  rnýind  were  therefore  fully  engaged  and  the  fund  of  ideas 
derived  from  attention  to  a  multiplicity  of  different  objects  enlarged. 
On  the  contrary,  the  experience  of  individuals  engaged  in  manual  labour  was  that 
the  attentive  faculty  of  the  subject's  mind  was  fixed  continuously  on  one  object.  Thus 
pin  makers  employed  their  "whole  labour  in  sharpening  the  point,  or  in  putting  on  the 
head  of  a  pin"  WA154).  As  the  employment  of  manual  workers  required  "constant 
attention  to  an  object  which  can  afford  no  variety  of  occupation  to  their  mýinds,  they 
are  apt  to  acquire  an  habitual  vacancy  of  thought"  (HV,  4,145).  Thus:  "In  proportion  as 
the  operation  which  they  perform  is  narrow,  it  will  supply  them  with  few  ideas"  (ibid). 
Millar  suggested  that  the  few  ideas  they  had  were  the  prospect  of  "the  grateful  returns 
of  bodily  repose  and  sleep"  (HV,  4,145-146),  and  wages  that  could  buy  them  pleasures 
such  as  "drinking  and  dissipation"  (ibid).  The  manual  worker's  constant  attention  to 
the  "minute  sub-division  of  labour"  (HV,  4,153)  entailed  that  he  was  "stripped  of  his 
mental  powers,  and  converted  into  the  mere  instrument  of  labour"  (HV,  4,152).  He  was 
no  longer  a  person  but  a  tool  or  a  machine.  Manual  workers  became  "like  machines, 
actuated  by  a  regular  weight,  and  performing  certain  movements  with  great  celerity 
and  exactness,  but  of  small  compass,  and  unfitted  for  any  other  use"  (HV,  4,146). 
The  acuteness  of  this  observation  of  the  dehumanisation  of  the  detail  labourer  -  the 
conversion  of  a  labourer  into  a  thing,  in  other  words,  the  reification  of  the  labourer  -  is 
reminiscent  of  aspects  of  Marx's  theory  of  alienation.  2  It  was  not,  however,  derived 
from  any  proto-Marxian  political  economy.  Millar,  for  example,  had  no  understanding 
that  the  social  division  of  labour  required  by  capital  entails  that  workers  sell  their 
labour  power  as  a  commodity.  He  did  not  have  the  slightest  idea  that  the  use  value  of 
labour  power  generates  surplus  value,  nor  that,  when  exchanged  for  variable  capital, 
the  worker's  living  labour  is  necessarily  subordinated  to  dead  labour.  He  could  not 
have  conceived  of  how  dead  labour,  embodied  in  machinery  and  raw  materials,  takes 
the  social  form  of  constant  capital. 
Millar's  observation  was  rather  derived  from  Hume's  and  Smith's  assumptions 
about  how  different  circumstances  would  affect  the  workings  of  the  subject's  mind. 
Hume  had  observed  that  the  powers  of  the  subject's  mind  were  invigorated  by 
industry.  Smith,  on  the  other  hand,  had  conceived  of  the  experience  of  labour  as  a 
2Marx  K.  (1844)  "It  is  true  that  labour  produces  wonderful  things  for  the  rich  -  but  for  the  worker  it 
produces  privation.  It  produces  palaces  -  but  for  the  worker  hovels.  It  produces  beauty  -  but  for  the 
worker  deformity.  It  replaces  labour  by  machines,  but  it  throws  one  section  of  the  workers  back  to  a 
barbarous  type  of  labour,  and  it  turns  the  other  section  into  a  machine.  It  produces  intelligence  -  but 
for  the  worker,  stupidity,  cretinism.  "  Economic  and  Philosophic  Manuscripts  of  1844,  Moscow,  1977: 
p70. 53 
painful  activity.  These  perceptions  were  not  necessarily  in  conflict  within  the 
experience  of  the  eighteenth  century  subject.  From  the  perspective  of  the  craft  or 
independent  producer  who  converted  the  value  of  the  commodities  made  and  sold  into 
capital,  labour  was  not  only  a  means  of  escaping  the  fear  of  not  having  a  means  of 
subsistence  but  also  to  the  imagined  end  of  the  pleasure  derived  from  having  needs  for 
praise  and  attention  met  through  his  possession  of  wealth.  Conversely,  from  the 
perspective  of  the  craft  or  independent  producer  unsuccessful  in  realising  the  value  of 
their  commodity  through  exchange,  labour  was  the  painful  experience  of  the  loss  of 
particular  concrete  skills.  Rather  than  becoming  a  capitalist,  this  producer  was 
converted  into  a  proletarianised  abstract  labourer  within  the  manufactory.  Finally  from 
the  perspective  of  both  the  independent  commodity  producer  and  the  commercialised 
landed  proprietor,  the  subject  had  the  prospect  of  the  enjoyment  of  the  commodities 
acquired  through  increasing  wages,  profits  or  rents. 
Millar  could  therefore  include  within  the  classification  of  individuals  who  were 
exempted  from  bodily  labour  both  those  who  were  leisured  through  having  inherited 
wealth  and  those  who  were  engaged  in  intellectual  labour.  The  former's  minds  were 
denied  the  enjoyment  gained  from  the  production  of  commodities.  Their  minds  would 
therefore  be  prone  to  feelings  of  apathy  and  dejection.  On  the  other  hand,  the  pleasure 
they  derived  from  the  contemplation  of  a  variety  of  objects  produced  by  intellectual 
labour,  such  as  music,  paintings  and  books,  was  sufficient  to  engage  their  attentive 
faculties,  supply  their  minds  with  an  enlarged  stock  of  ideas,  and  develop  their 
intellectual  powers. 
Millar  used  conjectural  reasoning  throughout  the  essay.  The  subject's  mind,  as  I 
have  demonstrated,  was  furnished  with  ideas  derived  from  objects  of  perception  that  it 
immediately  confronted.  So  furnished,  it  was  able  to  compare  resemblances  between 
objects  of  perception  and  reason  analogically  according  to  the  powers  of  the  sub  ect's  j 
imagination.  Its  intellectual  powers  were  "limited"  by  the  objects  of  attention  presented 
to  it  (HV,  4,143).  In  other  words,  the  operations  of  actual  minds  were  limited  by 
circumstances.  Certain  objects  and  activities  were  experienced  as  inherently 
pleasurable;  others  were  experienced  as  inherently  painful.  The  imagined  pleasures 
operated  on  the  mind  to  dispose  the  subject  to  admire  and  imitate  superiors 
(HV,  4,147).  By  this  means,  individuals  came  to  an  understanding  of  the  principle  of 
authority.  They  were  aware  of  passions  and  interests  that  were  in  opposition  to  one 
another  as  well  as  disinterested  passions  that  led  to  "ties  of  sympathy  and  affection" 
(HV,  4,140).  They  therefore  came  to  an  understanding  of  the  principle  of  utility.  They 
could  make  judgements  of  the  utility  of  "a  system  of  rules"  for  enforcing  the  subject's 
rights  to  his  person  and  property  (HV,  4,140).  They  could  judge  how  far  the  division  of 
labour  was  useful  to  every  subject  and  how  there  could  be  no  doubt  in  individuals' 
minds  that  economic  activity  was  "calculated  for  promoting  their  improvement" 54 
(HV,  4,143).  They  could  makejudgements  of  whether  it  was  advantageous  to  keep  the 
lower  orders  in  ignorance,  whether  this  idea  was  "revolting  to  all  feelings  of  humanity" 
(HV,  4,159),  and  whether  it  was  advantageous  to  the  public  to  promote  subsidised 
education  for  the  lower  orders. 
Mllar  was  therefore  able  to  make  various  observations  and  inferences  derived 
from  the  comparison  of  ideas  and  the  imaginative  use  of  analogy.  These  would  be  in 
accord  with  the  subject's  well  informed  experience  of  immediate  circumstances  and 
were  capable  of  being  falsified  through  both  private  thought  experiments  and  publicly 
observable  investigations. 
The  most  significant  of  these  focused  on  comparisons  of  rude  with  civilised  society 
and  on  how  the  subject's  mind  would  operate  in  the  imagined  circumstances  of  the 
absence  of  generalised  commodity  production  and  a  division  of  labour.  Writing  in 
Scotland  gave  Mllar  an  advantage.  Lowland  readers  could  compare  the  actual 
experience  of  the  long-standing  effects  of  the  division  of  labour  on  their  own  minds 
with  the  actual  experience  of  Highland  subjects  who  had  only  recently  come  to 
experience  its  effects.  Scotland  provided  the  perfect  experimental  conditions  to  test 
hypotheses  concerning  the  workings  of  the  mind  in  society  in  transition  from  barbarism 
to  civilisation.  Scotland  was  a  country  in  which  "commerce  and  manufactures  have 
made  less  progress  than  in  England"  (HV,  4,152).  Moreover,  compared  with  the 
"southern  counties  in  Scotland",  the  Highlands  were  "still  further  behind  in  commercial 
improvements"  (HV,  4,153). 
In  order  to  establish  what  effects  the  division  of  labour  had  on  the  intellectual 
powers  of  the  mind,  Millar  needed  to  know  what  would  have  been  the  effects  on  the 
mind  of  people  who  had  lived  before  a  division  of  labour  had  come  into  being.  The 
conjecture  that  the  minds  of  individuals  who  lived  in  original  rude  circumstances 
would  operate  in  a  similar  fashion  to  the  minds  of  individuals  living  in  contemporary 
rude  circumstances  could  be  proved  only  from  the  subject's  present  time  experience 
and  observation.  The  latter  was  of  a  world  in  which  generalised  commodity  production 
and  exchange  had  long  been  established.  Moreover,  through  the  theoretical  work 
undertaken  by  philosophers  of  jurisprudence,  it  had  been  established  that  every  subject 
was  free  and  equal  to  every  other  and  had  natural  rights  to  their  self-preservation  and 
property. 
Thus  Millar's  first  fundamental  conjecture  about  the  imagined  subject  living  in  an 
original  rude  condition  was  the  following: 
"The  first  aim  of  every  people  is  to  procure  subsistence;  their  next  is  to  defend  and 
secure  their  acquisitions.  Men  who  live  in  the  same  society,  or  who  have  any 
intercourse  with  one  another,  are  often  linked  together  by  the  ties  of  sympathy  and 
affection-,  as,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  apt,  from  opposite  interests  and  passions,  to 55 
dispute  and  quarrel,  and  to  commit  mutual  injuries.  From  these  different  situations, 
they  become  sensible  of  the  duties  they  owe  to  each  other,  and  of  the  rights  which 
belong  to  them  in  their  various  relations  and  capacities.  "  (HV4,140) 
The  universal  truth  of  the  above  propositions  could  be  confirmed  in  the  experience 
of  subjects  from  an  examination  of  both  the  operations  of  their  own  minds  as  self 
interested  agents  and  as  disinterested  spectators  of  their  own  and  others'  actions.  It 
could  also  be  confirmed  by  the  observation,  not  only  of  the  atomised  social  relations  of 
a  commodity  capitalist  society  but  also  of  the  disintegration  of  pre-capitalist  societies 
as  social  relations  and  surpluses  became  commodified.  What  could  be  concluded  from 
this  conjecture  was,  firstly,  that  the  abstract  subject  of  experience  was  universally 
motivated  by  interests  and  passions,  and,  secondly,  that  the  operation  of  passions  and 
interests  on  the  minds  of  concrete  particular  subjects  drew  them  inevitably  into  conflict 
with  one  another.  In  order  for  subjects  to  become  "sensible"  of  their  duties  and  rights, 
they  first  had  to  experience  this  conflict  in  terms  of  the  unpleasant  effects  of  passions 
such  as  resentment  and  disappointment.  Moreover,  as  I  shall  show  in  chapter  eight, 
particular  subjects  would  have  to  be  able  both  to  observe  the  interested  disputes  of 
others  impartially  and  to  experience  coincidental  and  comparable  feeling's  as 
sympathetic  spectators.  As  I  shall  argue  there,  the  assumption  that  informed  Smith's 
empiricist  theory  of  natural  rights  was  that  the  experience  of  circumstances  of  scarcity 
were  universal  and  eternal. 
The  second  conjecture  concerning  individuals  living  in  rude  circumstances  was 
that,  in  the  absence  of  laws,  morality  and  government  that  protected  their  persons  and 
property,  their  equality  of  ability  and  opportunity  to  compete  with  other  individuals  for 
scarce  resources  would  be  more  evident  than  in  a  civilised  society  in  which  people 
inherited  affluent  fortunes.  It  would  follow  that,  in  a  world  of  absolute  scarcity, 
individuals  motivated  to  acquire  the  knowledge  they  needed  to  better  themselves 
would  be  less  privileged  or  handicapped  by  inequalities  of  wealth.  Moreover,  the 
capacity  of  subjects'  minds  to  gain  ideas  through  their  labouring  activity  would  be  less 
limited  by  the  habits  of  dependence  and  submission.  Thus: 
"in  ruder  and  simpler  times,  before  labour  is  much  subdivided,  the  whole  stock  of 
knowledge  existing  in  a  country  will  be  scanty,  but  it  will  be  more  equally  diffused 
over  the  different  ranks,  and  each  individual  of  the  lower  orders  will  have  nearly  the 
same  opportunities  and  motives  with  his  superiors,  for  exerting  the  different  powers  of 
his  mind.  "  (HV,  4,149) 
Contemporary  observations  of  tribal  societies  in  which  it  was  supposed  that 
property  was  jointly  owned  and  in  which  inequalities  based  on  wealth  were  relatively 56 
unknown  would  confirm  the  truth  of  this  conjecture.  In  The  Ofighi  of  Ratiks,  Millar 
had  used  Bossuet's  observations  of  contemporary  native  Borneans  to  substantiate 
Gilbert  Stuart's  observations  that  "land  is  appropriated  by  tribes  before  it  becomes  the 
property  of  individuals"  (OR,  155,  n).  He  had  used  the  historical  testimony  of  Caesar  on 
the  Suevi  to  confirm  the  probability  of  the  truth  of  Stuart's  observation,  the  Suevi 
having  "no  separate  landed  possessions  belonging  to  individuals"  (OR,  156).  Moreover 
he  had  used  observations  drawn  from  the  Highland  clan  system  to  prove  the 
probability  of  the  existence  of  an  "ancient  community  of  pasture  grounds"  (OR,  158). 
His  explanation  of  these  facts  was  conjectural  and  based  on  jurisprudential 
assumptions  about  the  subject's  natural  rights  and  Millar's  empiricist  reading  of  the 
workings  of  the  subject's  mind  in  circumstances  of  scarcity.  Thus  he  argued  that 
individual  heads  of  households  would  recognise  that  it  was  in  their  interests  to  "unite 
and  assist  one  another"  in  the  management  of  the  hard  labour  involved  in  cultivating 
the  ground: 
"and,  therefore,  as  each  individual  is  entitled  to  the  fruit  of  his  labour,  the  crop,  which 
has  been  raised  by  the  joint  labour  of  all,  is  deemed  the  property  of  the  whole  society.  " 
(OR,  155) 
These  two  assumptions  -  firstly,  that  subjects'  perception  of  their  right  to  acquire 
the  means  of  self  preservation  through  their  own  labour  was  universal,  and,  secondly, 
that  there  was  an  equality  of  ability  and  opportunity  between  particular  subjects  in 
competition  for  scarce  resources  irrespective  of  rank  -  would  guide  his  comparison 
between  the  operation  of  the  intellectual  powers  of  the  "rude  mechanic"  (HV,  4,149) 
and  "mechanics  of  a  commercial  nation"  (HK4,151).  This  would  lead  to  Millar's 
conclusion  that  the  intelligence  of  the  rude  mechanic  was  superior  to  that  of  the 
commercial  mechanic. 
This  conclusion  was  important  because  it  entailed  that,  in  common  with  those 
high-ranking  individuals  born  to  inherited  wealth  and  their  professional  allies,  labourers 
circumstanced  by  a  scarcity  of  the  means  of  subsistence  would  be  more  likely  to  be 
knowledgeable  of  the  public  utility  of  a  system  of  law  and  government  that 
safeguarded  their  private  interests  in  bettering  themselves.  This  was  primarily  of 
historical  import  in  explaining  how  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange 
and  a  social  division  of  labour  had  come  into  being.  However,  Millar's  conclusions 
could  also  be  used  for  contemporary  political  argument.  If,  for  -ý!  xample,  the 
independence  of  industrial  workers  entailed  that  their  mode  of  work  led  both  to  a 
dissolution  of  previous  habits  of  deference  and  submission  to  their  superiors  and  also 
to  a  diminution  of  their  intellectual  powers  through  a  subordination  of  their  labour  to 
the  technical  division  of  labour,  then  it  would  be  the  superior  intelligence  of  the 57 
peasantry  and  of  a  population  surplus  to  the  requirements  of  capital  who  would 
appreciate  the  advantages  of  continued  submission  to  the  wealthy  and  powerful. 
Millar  did  not  have  a  conceptual'framework  within  which  to  theorise  a  population 
surplus  to  capital's  requirements.  Nonetheless,  he  observed  the  existence  of  a 
population  of  unable  to  find  or  keep  work.  Thus  he  remarked  that: 
"in  a  commercial  and  populous  nation,  in  which  the  bulk  of  the  people  must  work  hard 
for  a  livelihood,  many  individuals  are,  by  a  variety  of  accidents,  reduced  to  indigence; 
while  at  tile  same  time,  from  their  numbers,  as  well  as  from  the  prevailing  spirit  of  the 
age,  their  misery  is  little  regarded  by  their  fellow  creatures.  "  (OR.  287-288) 
Millar  suggested  that  it  was  the  accident  of  individuals'  personalities  that  caused 
the  misery  of  this  population.  The  self-interested  "spirit  of  the  age"  paid  little  attention 
to  their  suffering.  Nonetheless,  the  utilitarian  aspect  of  Millar's  principle  of  authority 
entailed  that  dependence  of  this  surplus  population  on  the  poor-rate  for  subsistence 
would  incline  indigent  individuals  to  realise  that  it  was  in  their  interests  to  submit  to 
the  wealthy  and  knowledgeable  more  immediately  than  those  working  "hard  for  a 
livelihood". 
Millar  argued  that  the  character  of  the  rude  mechanic  would  be  "very  different 
from  that  of  a  mechanic,  in  a  more  advanced  country"  (HV,  4,150).  The  latter 
"combine,  like  the  wheels  of  a  machine,  in  producing  a  complicated  system  of 
operations"  (HV,  4,15  1).  In  contrast,  in  a  rude  nation,  subjects  "individually  provide  for 
themselves"  (HV,  4,150).  In  the  absence  of  the  socialising  effects  of  generalised 
commodity  production  and  exchange  and  a  social  division  of  labour,  "No  man  relies 
upon  the  exertions  of  his  neighbour"  (ibhý.  In  a  rude  nation,  the  mechanic  made  his 
own  tools,  his  own  clothes,  his  own  house,  took  up  arms  to  defend  the  town  he  lived 
in,  and,  as  patriarchal  head  of  a  household,  "directs  his  wife  and  children  in  cultivating, 
a  small  patch  of  ground,  on  which  he  raises  part  of  his  provisions"  (HV,  4,149).  As  I 
shall  show  in  chapters  six,  seven  and  eight,  despite  his  observations  on  original 
communal  property  and  his  explanation  of  how  the  idea  of  freely  alienable  property 
arose,  Millar  could  not  escape  the  temptation  of  imagining  individuals  as  having  the 
capacity  and  opportunity  to  alienate  any  surpluses  they  had  acquired  as  property 
through  their  own  labour.  Thus  the  rude  mechanic  "must  buy  the  materials,  and  sell  or 
barter  the  produce  of  his  labour"  (HV,  4,149-150).  He  was  therefore  not  only  a  soldier, 
horticultlirist,  a  tool-maker,  a  house-builder  and  a  tailor,  but  also  "in  some  respects, 
a  merchant"  (HV,,  ',,  150). 
These  conjectures  about  the  rude  mechanic  were  empirically  confirmed  by 
observations  of  the  activities  of  contemporary  peasants.  Peasants  ploughed,  sowed  and 
reaped  the  land.  They  made  and  repaired  their  own  tools.  They  reared  cattle,  rode 58 
horses,  and  were,  in  some  respects,  merchants,  preparing  the  products  of  their  labour 
for  the  market,  and  becoming  "frequently  a  grazier  and  a  corn  merchant"  (HV,  4,153- 
154). 
Millar's  conjectures  about  the  rude  mechanic  appear  to  be  contradictory. 
Throughout  his  work,  he  presupposed  that  it  was  the  individual  subject's  experience  of 
scarcity  that  motivated  him  to  produce  and  exchange  commodities  and  acquire 
property  through  the  saving  of  his  labour.  As  a  result  of  this  activity,  a  division  of 
labour  had  come  into  being.  However,  in  the  example  of  the  rude  mechanic,  he 
presupposed  that  there  was  a  social  division  between  labouring  activity  in  the  towns 
and  the  countryside.  There  was  also  a  regular  exchange  of  raw  materials  with  finished 
products.  His  conjectural  method  therefore  led  him  to  presuppose  the  existence  of  a 
division  of  labour  in  order  to  explain  how  a  division  of  labour  came  into  being. 
This  apparent  contradiction  becomes  clearer  as  Millar  developed  his  argument 
concerning  the  comparative  intelligences  of  the  rude  with  the  commercial  mechanic. 
Unlike  the  latter  whose  attention  was  fixed  on  one  object,  Millar  argued  that  the  rude 
mechanic's  attention  was  directed  to  many  objects.  It  is  clear  from  the  following 
statement  that  Millar  had  no  way  of  distinguishing  a  society  in  which  a  social  division 
of  labour  existed  on  the  basis  of  commodity  production  and  exchange,  from  a  world  in 
which  there  was  a  technical  division  of  labour  specific  to  a  commodity  capitalist 
society. 
"all  the  members  of  a  rude  nation,  being  forced  to  exercise  a  great  number  of 
unconnected  professions,  and  individually  to  provide  for  themselves,  what  each  stands 
in  need  of,  their  attention  is  directed  to  a  variety  of  objects;  and  their  knowledge  is 
extended  in  proportion.  "  (HV,  4,150) 
Millar  assumed  that,  in  the  absence  of  the  technical  division  of  labour  specific  to  a 
commodity  capitalist  society,  there  would  be  no  social  division  of  labour.  The  products 
of  human  labouring  activity  would  be  unconnected  by  sale  and  purchase  and  men 
would  therefore  labour  in  an  isolated  fashion  providing  for  themselves  and  their 
dependent  wives  and  children  in  separate  households.  In  the  absence  of  the  social  form 
that  the  division  of  labour  had  taken  in  a  commodity  capitalist  society,  there  could  be 
no  form  of  society  except  isolated  nuclear  families  and  no  division  of  labour  but  a 
natural  one  between  men  and  women.  As  I  shall  show  in  chapter  nine,  these  families 
would  associate  together  only  for  securing  protection  or  a  means  of  subsistence,  if  the 
father  thought  it  was  in  his  interests  to  do  so. 
However,  if  subjects  gained  knowledge  through  ideas  derived  from  their  attentive 
faculties  being  focused  on  a  variety  or multiplicity  of  objects,  then  they  would  be  more 
intelligent  than  individuals  whose  faculties  were  fixed  on  to  one  object.  Thus  the  rude 59 
mechanic  "employs  for  the  relief  of  his  wants,  or  in  defence  of  what  belongs  to  him, 
either  the  strength  of  his  body  or  the  ingenuity  of  his  mind,  all  the  talents  which  he  has 
been  able  to  acquire,  all  the  faculties  with  which  nature  has  endowed  him"  (HV,  4,150). 
Millar's  conjectural  comparison  of  the  effects  of  a  technical  division  of  labour  on  the 
minds  of  the  subject  with  that  of  the  operation  of  his  mind  in  its  absence  led  him  to 
infer  of  the  commercial  mechanic  that: 
"He  would  be  greatly  inferior  in  real  intelligence  and  acuteness;  much  less  qualified  to 
converse  with  his  superiors,  to  take  advantage  of  their  foibles,  to  give  a  plausible 
account  of  his  measures,  or  to  adapt  his  behaviour  to  any  peculiar  and  unexpected 
emergcncy.  "  (HV,  4,155) 
Millar  argued  that  both  the  intellectual  worker  within  the  division  of  labour  and  the 
peasant  outwith  it,  were  more  intelligent  than  the  manual  worker.  This  was  because 
peasants'  and  intellectual  workers'  attentive  faculties  were  engaged  in  occupations  that 
enabled  them  to  derived  a  large  fund  of  ideas  -  what  Millar  called  "general  knowledge" 
(HV,  4,139).  Without  this  fund  of  ideas,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  the  subject  to  have 
the  knowledge  of  an  interest  in  betterment  or  improvement,  for  "in  proportion  as  the 
people  are  more  intelligent  and  quick-sighted,  they  will  be  more  apt,  in  their  mutual 
intercourse,  to  have  their  private  interest  in  view,  as  well  as  to  be  more  artful  and 
subtle  in  pursuing  it"  (HV,  4,153). 
As  I  have  noted  above,  Millar's  conclusions  led  him  to  worry  that,  if  a  majority  of 
the  population  were  manual  industrial  workers  and  the  circumstances  of  their  work 
made  them  less  intelligent,  then  they  would  lose  sight  of  the  possibilities  of  further 
betterment  or  improvement.  If  their  minds  were  "unenlivened  by  any  prospects,  but 
such  as  are  derived  from  the  future  wages  of  their  labour,  or  from  the  grateful  returns 
of  bodily  repose  and  sleep"  (HV,  4,145-146),  then  they  would  lose  sight  of  their 
interest  in  preserving  the  practice  "of  the  various  duties  incumbent  upon  them"  to  be 
"sober,  industrious,  honest  and  faithful"  (HV,  4,158-159).  If  their  work  disabled  them 
from  the  knowledge  of  these  interests,  then,  dissipating  their  wages  on  alcohol  or 
other  items  of  luxurious  consumption,  they  would  not  save  sufficient  to  hire  the  labour 
of  others  and  accumulate  capital.  They  would  be  less  able  to  take  advantage  of  the 
foibles  of  their  superiors.  Their  minds  would  be  unable  to  "form  a  proper  estimate  of 
the  objects  which  will  promote  their  true  happiness"  (HV,  4,159).  Without  publicly 
funded  education,  they  would  not  have  sufficient  knowledge  to  realise  that  it  was  in 
their  interests  to  avoid  the  "commission  of  crime",  to  be  "peaceable  in  their  manners, 
and  averse  from  riot  and  disorder"  (HV,  4,158).  Given  that  the  encouragement  of 
manual  workers'  knowledge  of  their  interests  was  also  to  the  advantage  of  the  wealthy 
and  knowledgeable,  Millar  thought  the  latter  class  should  consider  plans  that  would 60 
involve  state  expenditure  on  "the  institution  of  schools,  and  seminaries  of  education,  to 
communicate,  as  far  as  possible,  to  the  most  useful,  but  humble  class  of  citizens,  that 
knowledge  which  their  way  of  life  has,  in  some  degree,  prevented  them  from 
acquiring"  (HV,  4,160). 
Moreover,  it  is  clear  that  Millar  was  not  just  recommending  this  plan  to  the 
enlightened  legislative  elite  of  British  society  but  to  the  "the  other  mercantile  countries 
of  Europe"  (HV,  4,15  1).  His  method  entailed  that,  where  there  were  the  same  external 
circumstances,  the  subject's  mind  would  experience  the  same  effects.  Millar  tried  to 
demonstrate  the  truth  of  and  explain  the  reasons  for  the  universally  held  belief  that  "in 
proportion  to  the  advancement  of  commerce  and  manufactures,  the  common  people 
have  less  information,  and  less  curiosity  upon  general  topics;  less  capacity,  beyond  the 
limits  of  their  own  employment,  of  entering  into  conversation,  or  of  conducting,  with 
propriety  and  dexterity,  the  petty  transactions  which  accident  may  throw  in  their  way" 
(HV,  4,151-152). 
3.2  Two  Considerations 
I  have  discussed  the  essay  above  not  only  to  illustrate  topics  I  shall  cover  in  the 
main  body  of  this  dissertation  but  also  to  give  the  reader  sufficient  information  to  make 
a  judgement  on  the  character  of  Millar's  philosophical  history.  This  judgement  is 
required  in  order  to  confirm  or  deny  Meek's  claim  that  Millar  developed  a  new  way  of 
looking  at  society  that  was  materialist  in  conception. 
There  are  two  substantial  considerations  that  throw  doubt  on  Meek's  claim.  The 
first  is  that  to  accept  its  truth  would  be  to  blur  distinctions  that  exist  between  Millar's 
philosophical  approach  to  history  and  other  eighteenth  century  approaches  to  history 
that  might  have  been  considered  materialist  in  conception.  The  second  is  that  to  accept 
its  truth  would  be  to  blur  and  further  confuse  Millar's  approach  with  that  of  Marx  and 
Engels. 
The  most  famous  and  influential  candidate  for  a  materialist  conception  of  society  in 
the  eighteenth  century  was  Montesquieu's  explanation  of  differences  in  customs, 
manners  and  laws  according  to  the  effects  of  climate  on  the  physical  constitution  of  the 
individual.  Montesquieu  had  conjectured  that  heat  and  cold  had  different  effects  on  the 
human  body.  Using  experiments  he  had  conducted  with  a  microscope  on  the  tongue  of 
a  dead  sheep,  half  of  which  had  been  frozen,  Montesquieu  concluded  that  differences 
in  temperature  had  an  effect  on  the  nerves.  When  he  compared  the  frozen  part  of  the 
tongue  with  the  unfrozen  part  under  the  microscope,  he  observed  that  small 
protuberances  had  disappeared  in  the  former  that  were  present  in  the  latter.  He 
conjectured  that,  when  the  protuberances  were  visible,  the  sheep  would  have  a  vivid 
sensation  of  taste,  but  when  they  were  invisible  its  sensation  would  be  dull.  By  a 
process  of  analogy  and  inference,  he  reasoned  that  a  cold  climate  would  make  the 61 
nerves  and  muscular  fibres  of  the  human  body  contract.  A  hot  climate  would  make 
them  expand.  A  contraction  would  cause  the  blood  to  push  against  the  heart,  and  the 
heart  would  have  more  power.  A  more  powerful  heart  would  mean  that  people  were 
more  courageous.  In  contrast,  a  hot  climate  would  relax  the  muscles  and  nerves. 
Blood  would  flow  from  the  heart  to  other  parts  of  the  body.  The  heart  would  be 
weaker.  Therefore  people  would  be  timid.  Cold,  by  contracting  the  nerves  of  the  skin, 
would  make  people  less  sensitive  to  pain.  Heat,  by  opening  the  nerves  would  make 
them  more  susceptible  to  pleasure.  People  in  hot  climates  would  therefore  be  more 
interested  in  sex  and  love.  People  in  cold  climates  would  be  more  capable  of  enduring 
pain.  It  followed  from  these  arguments  that  People  in  hot  countries  tended  to  be  lazy 
and  peaceable  -  people  in  cold  countries  industrious  and  war-like.  3 
Montesquieu  thought  that  all  the  passions  could,  in  theory,  be  explained  with 
reference  to  physical  changes  in  the  heart,  muscles  and  nerves  caused  by  changes  in 
temperature  and  diet.  As  I  shall  show  in  chapter  eight,  Millar  followed  Hume's 
scepticism  regarding  the  influences  of  physical  causes  on  the  passions.  Consistent  with 
their  empiricism,  they  rejected  these  hypotheses,  not  because  they  thought  that 
physical  causes  did  not  operate  on  the  body  and  mind,  but  because  contemporary 
science  was  insufficiently  advanced  to  construct  experiments  that  enabled  the  subject 
of  experience  to  observe  the  causal  connections  between  physical  changes  in  the  body 
and  the  passions.  Millar  and  Hume  thought  that  it  would  be  sufficient  to  explain 
differences  in  customs,  manners  and  laws  between  nations  according  to  the  experience 
subjects  had  of  the  workings  of  their  minds  on  immediate  circumstances.  A  thorough 
examination  of  the  contents  of  the  mind  of  the  eighteenth  century  subject  revealed  that 
there  were  certain  universal  goals  motivating  individuals  to  act.  These  included, 
amongst  other  things,  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  derived  from  attention,  praise  and  the 
company  of  others  and  delight  in  artificially  manufactured  or  natural  objects.  They  also 
included  the  avoidance  of  pain  derived  from  hunger,  thirst  or  isolation  and  the 
prevention  of  distress  caused  by  disappointment  or  frustrated  expectations.  These 
pleasures  and  pains  caused  certain  passions  to  arise,  the  intensity  of  which  was 
channelled  in  a  positive  direction  by  rational  calculative  judgements  of  utility  and 
interest. 
Millar  and  Hume's  scepticism  concerning  the  operation  of  physical  causes  on  the 
mind  did  not  rule  out  the  possibility  of  establishing  causal  connections  between  a 
material  environment  on  the  passions  and  interests.  If  science  could  establish  these 
connections  and  make  them  visible  in  the  experience  of  the  subject,  then  they  would 
have  adapted  their  hypotheses  accordingly.  Whilst  he  rejected  the  influence  of  climate 
on  the  passions  on  the  grounds  that  the  same  passions  motivated  the  subject  to  act 
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irrespective  of  whether  the  climate  was  hot  or  cold,  Millar  was  well  aware  that  "the 
fertility  or  barrenness  of  the  soil,  the  nature  of  its  productions"  (OR,  2)  had  a  causal 
effect  on  the  range  of  objects  the  mind  could  pay  attention  to.  The  material 
environment  was  therefore  crucial  to  explaining  the  ideas  to  which  universally 
experienced  passions  became  attached.  For  example,  if  people  lived  by  the  sea,  their 
appetite  for  food  would  adapt  to  this  environment.  Rather  than  hunt  animals,  they 
would  learn  to  fish,  build  and  navigate  boats  as  a  means  to  avoiding  the  pain  of 
hunger.  A  passion  of  vanity  attached  to  the  idea  of  the  praise  and  attention  the  subject 
gained  from  his  skills  would  motivate  him  to  acquire  surpluses  of  fish  and  not  of 
animal  meat. 
If,  as  I  have  suggested  above,  Hume  and  Millar  were  sceptical  materialists,  then 
the  distinction  between  their  approach  to  history  and  Montesquieu's  is  retained  and  the 
consideration  that  threw  doubt  on  Meek's  characterisation  of  Millar  loses  some  of  its 
force.  Millar  was  conscious  of  his  debt  to  Montesquieu.  As  I  shall  show  in  chapter 
eight,  Millar  regarded  Montesquieu  as  being  the  first  thinker  to  have  established  causal 
connections  between  economic  activity  and  laws,  customs,  manners  and  ideas  of 
property. 
Nonetheless,  Meek's  intention  was  not  to  establish  a  philosophical  affinity  between 
Millar  and  eighteenth  century  materialists.  It  was  rather  to  establish  an  affinity  between 
Millar  and  nineteenth  century  materialists  such  as  Marx  and  Engels.  I  turn  now  to  the 
second  consideration  that  throws  doubt  on  the  truth  of  his  claim. 
This  consideration  makes  the  point  that  the  philosophy  that  informs  Marx's  theory 
of  history  is  so  qualitatively  different  from  the  empiricism  guiding  Millar's  that  to 
suggest  that  they  are  related  does  a  disservice  to  both.  Any  relation  that  they  do 
appear  to  have  is  a  pure  coincidence.  It  gains  force  in  the  absence  of  any  references 
Marx  or  Engels  made  to  Millar.  The  consideration  takes  into  account  that  Marx's 
theory  of  history  is  incomprehensible  without  an  understanding  of  an  essentialism  he 
learnt  from  Hegel  and  Aristotle.  Marx  was  committed,  like  Aristotle  and  Hegel,  to  an 
ontology  of  entities  with  real  substantial  natures  irreducible  to  the  atomised  contents 
of  sensory  experience.  I  have  argued  here  that  Hume  and  Millar's  starting  point  was 
the  experiential  contents  of  the  mind  of  an  abstract  universal  subject  derived  from  the 
actual  phenomenal  content  of  the  minds  of  concrete  particular  eighteenth  century 
subjects.  In  complete  contrast,  Marx's  starting  point  was  the  concrete  universal  of 
homogeneous  human  labour  and  the  specific  historical  social  forms  within  which 
labour  is  conducted.  4  To  state,  therefore,  as  Meek  did,  that  Millar  had  no  feeling  for 
the  dialectic  of  social  change  is  jejune.  It  is  jejune  because,  without  an  understanding 
4"SinCe  there  are  only  people  and  their  activities  (concrete  useful  labour,  and  labour  time),  all 
particular  historical  forms  in  which  people  labour,  and  all  the  categories  specific  to  those  historical 
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of  contradiction  between  the  concrete  universal  of  human  labour  and  specific  social 
forms,  there  can  be  no  knowledge  of  a  dialectic  of  social  change.  NEllar  neither 
possessed  this  understanding,  nor  could  he  have  ever  had  this  understanding  whilst  he 
remained  an  empiricist  theorist  ofjurisprudence. 
If  these  methodological  considerations  are  correct,  then  they  are  perhaps  the 
strongest  force  that  would  incline  the  student  to  reject  the  truth  of  Meek's  claim.  The 
only  evidence  that  could  be  used  to  support  it  would  be  Marx  and  Engels'  own 
characterisation  of  their  eighteenth  century  French  and  English  predecessors.  They 
stated  that  the  French  and  English  had  made  the  "first  attempts  to  give  the  writing  of 
history  a  materialistic  basis  by  being  the  first  to  write  histories  of  civil  society,  of 
commerce  and  industry.  "5  In  conclusion,  I  shall  attempt  to  explain  firstly  what  they 
might  have  meant  by  this  statement;  secondly  the  distinction  Marx  made  between 
naturalistic  and  dialectical  materialism,  and  finally  the  relevance  that  an  understanding 
of  naturalistic  materialism  might  have  to  an  appreciation  of  Millar's  essay  discussed 
above. 
3.3  Some  Superficial  Similarities 
When  Marx  and  Engels  wrote  the  above  statement  they  were  in  the  process  of 
coming  to  terms  with  their  philosophical  and  intellectual  heritage.  This  was  German 
idealism.  They  were  "dealing  with  the  Germans".  6  They  stated  that  the  Germans  had 
never  had  a  historian.  German  historiography's  finest  thinker  had  been  Hegel,  but 
Hegel's  philosophy  of  history  was  not  real  history.  Hegel  and  his  followers  had 
conceived  of  real  interests  as  "pure  thoughts".  7  The  result  was  a  form  of 
historiography  that  made  religion  into  the  driving  force  of  history. 
The  Germans  had  never  had  a  real  historian  because  their  methodological  starting 
point  was  abstract  consciousness  not  the  real  consciousness  of  actual  living 
individuals.  The  starting  point  of  real  history  was  real,  active  humans,  living  individuals 
with  the  kinds  of  consciousness  that  belongs  to  them.  '  This  emphasis  on  real 
individuals,  however,  did  not  entail  that  their  method  was  individualistic.  Marx  and 
Engels  retained  the  belief  inherited  from  their  idealist  past  that  the  consciousness  of 
individuals  could  be  comprehended  only  as  a  mediated  "moment"  within  a  natural  and 
social  totality  or  evolving  substantial  entity.  This  totality  changed  through  the 
reciprocal  action  of  its  various  sides.  These  came  into  contradiction  with  one  another, 
and,  through  a  process  of  supersession,  the  totality  changed  as  it  retained  what  was 
rational  and  abolished  what  was  irrational.  Marx  and  Engels'  notion  of  rationality  was 
5Marx  &  Engels,  German  Ideology,  pp4849. 
6Marx  &  Engels,  Gennatt  Ideology,  p48. 
7Mar.  x  &  Engels,  German  Ideology,  p60. 
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Aristotelian  and  Hegelian  in  conception.  It  therefore  entailed  an  inquiry  into  the  form 
and  content  of  substantial  species  and  non-species  activity  necessary  for  the  survival, 
flourishing  and  realisation  of  the  potential  of  human  individuals. 
Marx  and  Engels  identified  four  mediated  moments  within  the  evolving  totality. 
They  described  these  as  universal  premises  or  aspects  of  social  activity  that  have 
"existed  simultaneously  since  the  dawn  of  history  and  the  first  men,  and  which  still 
assert  themselves  today.  "9  These  four  moments  consist  of,  firstly,  the  production  of  the 
means  to  satisfy  needs  such  as  "eating,  drinking,  a  habitation,  clothing  and  many  other 
things";  secondly,  the  production  of  new  needs,  thirdly,  reproductive  and  productive 
relations  between  women  and  men,  children  and  parents;  and,  fourthly,  the 
combination  of  the  specific  modes  of  the  production  and  reproduction  of  the  three 
preceding  moments  of  the  totality  of  human  life  with  a  specific  modes  of  co-operation. 
The  modes  of  production  and  co-operation,  each  analytically  distinguishable  but 
genetically  united,  are  separately  and  combined  forces  of  production.  10 
Each  of  the  four  moments  within  the  totality  is  mediated  through  a  form  of 
reciprocal  action  both  between  labouring  individuals'  relation  with  nature  and  with  one 
another,  None  of  the  moments  is  a  stage  in  history.  Each  moment  is,  separately  and 
combined,  a  universal  precondition  for  actual  human  history  and  the  study  of  it.  It 
followed,  according  to  Marx  and  Engels,  that  the  study  of  actual  human  history  was 
inconceivable  without  a  study  of  different  social  forms  that  industry  and  exchange  have 
taken  and  continue  to  take.  Given  that  the  French  and  English  had  written  histories  of 
industry  and  exchange,  then  they  were  materialistic  in  "an  extremely  one-sided 
fashion".  II 
The  fifth  moment  within  the  totality  is  human  consciousness.  This  is  the 
consciousness  human  individuals  have  of  the  other  four  moments.  Consciousness  takes 
an  objective  form  with  language.  Language,  which  has  existed  throughout  human 
history,  articulates  the  consciousness  of  real  individuals  in  their  social  relations  as 
producers  of  needs.  Language  and  consciousness  originate  within  specific  modes  of 
production  and  co-operation.  It  follows  that  theoretical  language  can  come  into  being 
only  with  the  emergence  of  a,  division  of  labour  between  mental  and  manual  labour. 
The  nature  of  this  division,  in  turn,  depends  upon  the  social  form  of  the  surplus 
produced  through  specific  modes  of  production  and  co-operation.  If  the  various 
historically  emergent  forms  of  artistic,  religious,  political,  juridical  and  scientific 
knowledge  have  their  origin  within  the  totality  of  productive  forces,  it  follows  that 
Nam  &  Engels,  German  Ideology,  p5O. 
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they  have  their  origin  within  the  production  of  needs,  new  needs,  and  the  family  as  the 
latter  changes  shape  within  modes  of  production  and  co-operation.  Ideas  are  formed 
within  "the  mass  of  productive  forces"  that  are  handed  down  from  one  generation  to 
another.  12  If  consciousness  and  language  are  objectified  in  the  skills,  techniques  and 
products  of  artistic,  religious  and  scientific  labour,  and  if  consciousness  is,  itself,  a  fifth 
moment  within  the  social  totality,  it  follows  that  consciousness  is  also  a  productive 
force.  However,  as  a  moment  of  the  totality,  consciousness,  like  the  other  moments, 
can  come  into  contradiction  with  the  totality  of  productive  forces.  13 
It  is  within  this  critique  of  German  idealism  -a  critique  that  in  the  process  of 
negating  its  idealist  form  reaffirmed  its  metaphysical  content  -  that  Marx  and  Engels 
positively  appraise  eighteenth  century  histories  of  industry  and  exchange.  At  the  level 
of  appearance,  it  is  not  difficult  to  approximate  aspects  of  Millar's  philosophical  history 
with  the  requirements  laid  down  by  Marx  and  Engels  for  a  history  of  humanity.  Millar, 
indeed,  paid  attention  to  the  first  three  universal  moments  or  premises  of  history.  As  I 
observed  in  chapter  two,  Millar  identified  his  own  historiography  with  the  "more 
scientific  method  of  writing  history"  (IG1792,1,1,6)  of  Voltaire,  Robertson  and 
Hume.  The  latter  historians  had  written  general  histories  of  industry  and  exchange. 
They  had  given  histories  of  the  progress  of  commerce  and  manufactures  separately  or 
integrated  within  their  narratives. 
As  Pascal  and  Meek  noticed,  Millar  and  his  contemporaries,  had  recognised  that 
the  first  needs  that  humans  paid  attention  to  were  the  production  of  those  needs 
necessary  for  subsistence.  They  had  reasoned  that,  when  these  needs  were  met,  they 
paid  attention  to  the  production  of  new  needs  -  "luxuries"  or  "conveniences".  Millar 
had  written  a  general  history  of  men's  relationships  with  women  in  The  Orighi  of 
Ranks.  He  had  made  reference  to  children's  relationships  with  their  parents,  especially 
sons'  relationships  with  their  fathers.  As  I  have  discussed  above,  he  had  written  on  the 
relationship  between  the  emergence  of  a  division  of  labour  and  generalised  commodity 
exchange  and  the  extent  of  knowledge  within  a  population. 
Nonetheless,  these  superficial  similarities  are  overwhelmed  by  the  profound 
differences  between  Millar's  and  Marx's  methods.  Marx  and  Engels'  theorisation  of 
consciousness  as  a  universal  moment  of  a  totality  entailed  that  the  nature  of  this 
consciousness  had  its  origin  within  the  interaction  of  the  other  four  moments.  The 
particular  consciousnesses  of  real  individuals  were  therefore  determined  by  -  and 
determining  forces  of  -  the  circumstances  given  to  those  individuals  by  pre-existing 
productive  forces.  Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  posed  the  consciousness  of  an  abstraction 
of  the  individual  subject,  the  operation  of  whose  mind  would  be  universally  known  if 
12Marx  &  Engels,  Gennan  Ideology,  p59. 
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real  individual  subjects  were  to  generalise  from  the  particular  ideas  and  feelings  they 
immediately  experienced.  The  consciousness  of  this  abstract  subject  was  therefore  a 
result  of  a  process  of  generalisation  from  particular  ideas  and  feelings  causally 
connected  with  experiences  of  actual  circumstances,  to  those  ideas  and  feelings  the 
subject  would  be  likely  to  experience  in  imagined  different  circumstances.  As  I  shall 
stress  throughout  this  dissertation,  the  generalised  ideas  and  feelings  the  subject  was 
imagined  to  experience  in  every  similar  circumstance,  were  derived  from  the 
experience  of  real,  living  eighteenth  century  individuals,  rich  or  poor,  propertied  or 
propertyless,  women  or  men.  The  consciousness  of  the  abstract  universal  subject  was 
therefore  limited  by  the  development  of  the  totality  of  productive  forces  at  a  specific 
historical  period. 
This  difference  of  method  is  well  illustrated  by  their  treatment  of  private  and  public 
interests.  Marx  and  Engels  conceived  of  conflicting  private  interests  arising  out  of 
private  property  and  the  division  of  labour.  They  conceived  of  private  property  and  the 
division  of  labour  as  "identical  expressions"  of  the  same  moment  of  the  development 
of  forces  of  production.  This  moment  characterises  every  form  of  society  in  which 
surplus  labour  is  pumped  out  of  the  immediate  producers:  the  "power  of  disposing  of 
the  labour  power  of  others".  14  Private  property  is  the  expression  of  this  moment  in  the 
form  of  the  disposal  of  the  product  of  labour  power.  The  division  of  labour  is  the 
expression  of  this  moment  in  the  form  of  the  activity  of  disposing  of  labour  power 
itself.  The  consciousness  of  contradiction  between  a  private  interest  and  a  public 
interest  therefore  presupposed  a  real  contradiction  between  the  disposal  of  labour 
power,  its  products  and  the  social  form  of  the  mode  of  production  and  co-operation, 
such  as  slavery,  serfdom  or  wage  slavery. 
Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  conceived  of  private  property  and  a  division  of  labour 
arising  out  conflicting  private  interests.  Millar's  ideal  consciousness  of  the  abstract 
subject  conformed  the  requirements  of  natural  law.  The  subject  was  ideally  free,  equal 
and  autonomous.  In  contrast,  the  actual  consciousness  of  the  eighteenth  century 
subject  was  that  individuals  were  socially  unequal,  dependent  on  commodity 
production  and  exchange  for  subsistence,  and  atomised  in  competition  with  one 
another  for  markets  in  capital  and  labour  power.  The  experience  of  this  subject  was  of 
both  being  driven  by  passions  and  interests  to  compete  and  of  exercising  a  capacity  to 
empathise  with  the  passions  and  interests  of  competitors. 
As  I  have  mentioned  above,  Millar's  universal  premises  of  human  history  were 
twofold.  Firstly,  individuals  had  to  "procure  subsistence"  and,  secondly,  they  had  to 
"defend  and  secure  their  acquisitions"  (HV,  4,140).  Millar  inferred  from  the  subject's 
actual  and  ideal  experience  that  wherever  formally  free  and  equal  individuals 
14Marx  &  Engels,  Gentian  Ideology,  pp52-53. 67 
associated  they  would  be  driven  to  "dispute  and  quarrel"  because  of  opposing  passions 
and  interests.  Built  in  to  this  inference  is  the  assumption  that  the  circumstances  of 
scarcity  would  determine  the  ideas  and  feelings  of  the  subject  in  every  imaginable 
situation  or  condition.  Particular  ideas  of  property  and  justice,  a  division  of  labour, 
commodity  production  and  exchange  and  the  non-familial  associations  of  individuals, 
would  therefore  come  into  being  out  of  subjects'  reflection  on  their  interests  and 
passions.  Once  the  subject's  actual  opposing  passions  and  interests  were  brought  into 
accord  with  the  requirements  of  the  formal  equalities  and  liberties  of  the  ideal  subject 
in  natural  law,  private  property  and  a  division  of  labour  became  universal  conditions 
for  the  reproduction  not  only  of  civil  society,  but  of  every  conceivable  civilised 
society.  Without  subjects'  recognition  of  their  interests  in  freely  alienable  private 
property,  of  a  division  of  labour  between  capitalists,  landlords,  and  labourers;  and  of 
the  preservation  of  those  disinterested  passions  that  assisted  betterment  and 
submission;  the  freedom  of  actual  subjects  to  act  on  their  opposing  passions  and 
interests  would  correspond  to  anarchy  and  barbarism. 
As  I  have  shown  above,  the  effect  of  the  technical  division  of  labour  on  the  minds 
of  industrial  workers  prompted  Millar's  concern  that  such  workers  might  lose  sight  of 
the  knowledge  of  interests  self-evident  to  an  ideal  subject  of  experience.  I  have  also 
remarked  that  Millar's  method  led  him  into  apparent  contradictions  regarding  human 
history.  These  included  the  presupposition  that  the  emergence  of  a  division  of  labour, 
generalised  commodity  exchange  and  social  inequality  required  a  subject  with  a  pre- 
historical  knowledge  of  these  historically  specific  determinations  of  productive  forces. 
3.4  Naturalistic  and  Dialectical  Materialism 
The  differences  of  method  I  have  highlighted  above  were  hinted  at  by  Marx  as  he 
wrote  notes  to  himself  for  further  development  in  the  Gi-iwdl-isse.  In  these  notes,  he 
made  a  distinction  between  his  own  dialectical  method  of  understanding  history  and 
what  he  called  "naturalistic  materialism".  He  wrote: 
"Accusations  about  the  materialism  of  this  conception.  Relation  to  naturalistic 
materialism.  Dialectic  qf  the  concepts  productive.  force  (means  qf  production)  and 
relation  of  production,  [his  italics]  a  dialectic  whose  boundaries  are  determined,  and 
which  does  not  suspend  [aufliebt]  the  real  difference.  "15 
Marx  made  further  reference  to  this  method  in  his  Preface  when  he  instructed  the 
historian  to  determine  the  dialectical  boundaries  between  material  forces  of  production 
15Marx,  Grundrisse,  p109.  What  follows  is  indebted  to  Mcsziros's  unpublished  paper.  It  was  a  talk 
that  Meszaros  gave  to  this  paper  at  Glasgow  University  in  1997  that  brought  this  distinction  to  my 
attention. 68 
and  relations  of  production  within  the  totality  of  the  economic  structure  of  society.  16 
My  reading  of  this  passage  is  that  the  dialectical  boundaries  of  the  "material  forces  of 
production  and  relations  of  production"  correspond  to  the  fourth  moment  of  the 
universal  premises  of  human  history  that  Marx  and  Engels  mention  in  the  Germail 
ldeoloS,  y.  This  is  the  combination  between  modes  of  production  and  co-operation.  The 
latter,  as  I  have  suggested,  includes  the  three  preceding  moments.  My  reading  of 
"economic  structure",  in  the  Preface,  is  that  it  refers  to  the  dialectical  interaction 
between  all  four  moments  within  the  evolving  social  totality  from  the  stage  when  value 
is  peripheral  to  the  productive  forces  to  the  stage  when  value  dominates  them.  My 
reason  for  this  reading  is  that,  when  Marx  introduced  the  foundation/superstructure 
metaphor,  he  used  it  illustrate  the  determined  relationship  between  "forms  of  social 
consciousness"  and  economic  structure.  I  have  discussed  "forms  of  social 
consciousness"  above  as  a  fifth  moment  within  the  totality  in  my  interpretation  of 
Marx  and  Engels'  historical  method  in  the  Germali  Ideoloýy  above. 
it  is  easy  to  be  misled  by  metaphors  if  they  are  taken  literally.  The 
foundation/superstructure  metaphor  is  spatial.  Taken  literally,  it  entails  that  forms  of 
consciousness  are  built  on  top  of  the  economic  structure.  If  the  economic  structure 
collapses,  then  the  forms  of  consciousness  built  on  it  automatically  collapse  with  it.  If 
old  forms  of  consciousness  are  exploded,  the  same  economic  structure  can  be  used  to 
build  new  forms  of  consciousness  out  of  the  rubble  of  the  old.  Conversely,  dismantle 
the  economic  structure,  and  the  forms  of  consciousness  are  dismantled  with  it. 
Dismantle  the  forms  of  consciousness,  however,  and  the  economic  structure  persists 
until  either  it  too  is dismantled  or  new  forms  of  consciousness  are  built  on  it.  Taken 
literally,  the  metaphor  is  suggestive  of  a  form  of  social  engineering  alien  to  Marx's 
conception  of  revolutionary  social  change  through  contradiction  and  supersession.  It  is 
also  suggestive  of  the  peculiar  reasoning  that  a  collapse  of  financial  markets,  as 
happened  in  Asia  at  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century,  would  lead  to  an  automatic 
collapse  of  the  structure  of  the  state. 
As  a  metaphor,  however,  it  was  a  powerfiil  reminder  of  the  imperative  Marx  and 
Engels  set  for  historians  to  explain  the  emergence  of  the  skills,  techniques  and  the 
products  of  artistic,  religious  and  scientific  labour  influencing  the  consciousness  of  real 
individuals  according  to  the  division  between  mental  and  manual  labour.  As  I  have 
mentioned  above,  the  nature  of  this  division,  in  turn,  depends  upon  the  social  form  of 
the  surplus  produced  through  specific  modes  of  production  and  co-operation.  17 
16Mar.  x,  Preface,  p20. 
171t  was  also  a  reminder  to  intellectuals  and  revolutionaries  that  their  consciousness  is  not  only 
determined  by  their  autonomous  subjectivity,  but  also  by  the  evolving  social  totality.  This  could  not  be 
changed  by  critical  revolutionary  activity  isolated  from  the  objective  categories  in  the  process  of  their 
dialectical  movement  through  contradiction.  Subjective  fornis  of  critical  consciousness  arc  necessary 69 
Millar,  like  Marx,  used  the  metaphor  of  foundation/superstructure.  This  allows  for 
a  further  superficial  approximation  of  his  thinking  with  that  of  Marx's.  Just  as  Marx 
used  the  metaphor  to  encapsulate  one  aspect  of  his  dialectical  method,  so  Millar  used 
it  to  give  a  brief  outline  of  his  own  theory  of  history.  Thus  he  wrote  at  the  beginning  of 
Historical  View: 
"it  ought  to  be  considered,  that  the  foundations  of  our  present  constitution  were  laid  in 
that  early  [Saxon]  period;  and  that,  without  examining  the  principles  upon  which  it  is 
founded,  we  cannot  form  a  just  opinion  concerning  the  nature  of  the  superstructure.  " 
(HV,  1,6) 
As  I  shall  discuss  further  in  chapter  eleven,  this  quote  proves  that  there  is  a 
continuity  of  the  use  of  the  metaphor  from  Harrington  to  Millar.  However,  if  it  is  a 
mistake  to  use  the  metaphor  to  prove  an  unbroken  continuity  of  historical  method 
from  Harrington  and  Millar,  so  it  would  be  an  even  greater  mistake  to  suppose  that 
there  was  a  continuity  of  method  from  Harrington  to  Marx.  Put  differently,  it  would  be 
Harrington  in  the  seventeenth  century,  rather  than  Millar  or  the  other  Scots  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  that  anticipated  Marx's  dialectical  materialist  conception  of 
history.  II 
Millar's  superstructure  is  much  narrower  in  scope  than  Marx's.  Marx's  legal  and 
political  superstructure  corresponds  to  the  form  of  consciousness  of  individuals  as 
privately  interested.  However,  the  category  of  private  interest,  according  to  Marx, 
arose  historically  from  the  different  forms  of  the  disposal  of  labour  power  and  its 
products  within  modes  of  production  and  co-operation,  the  social  form  of  which 
entailed  the  extraction  of  a  surplus  labour  from  the  immediate  producers.  As 
Hirschman  has  indicated,  it  was  a  category  that  emerged  to  prominence  in  the 
consciousness  of  individuals  during  the  transitional  period  from  a  feudal  form  of  the 
appropriation  of  the  surplus  to  a  capitalist  form.  19 
but  insuflicicnt  to  bring  into  being  the  rational  society  dcsired  by  intellectuals  and  revolutionaries. 
Collective  realisation  of  these  forms  of  consciousness  requires  objective  universal  conditions. 
"This  is  precisely  what  Bernstein  attempted  to  do.  According  to  Bernstein,  Harrington  was  an 
exponent  of  "modern  scientific  socialism".  Cronnyell  and  Communism,  (p210).  This  was  because  of 
his  "historical  mode  of  treatment,  which  represents  a  noble  anticipation  of  the  materialistic 
conception  of  history  elaborated  by  Marx  and  Engels"  (p  199). 
1914irschinan's  starting  point  and  conclusion  is  Weber's  The  Protestant  Ethic.  He  thinks  that 
capitalism  was  ".  in  assault  on  prc-existing  systems  of  ideas  and  of  socio-cconoinic  relations"  and 
suggests  the  intercsWpassions  dichotomy  was  a  transitional  development  in  the  history  of  ideas. 
197  1.  p4.  The  transition  lie  focuses  on  is  not  between  fbudalisin  and  capitalism  but  between  Christian 
disapproval  and  secular  approval  of  the  desire  for  money.  Following  Weber,  lie  tries  to  be  value- 
neutral,  hoping  that  his  thesis  will  be  useftil  to  "both  critics  and  defenders  of  capitalism",  and  that  it 
will  "raise  the  level  of  debate"  between  the  antagonists.  Passions  and  the  Interests,  (pl35). 
Hirschman's  thesis  is  discusssed  further  in  chapter  nine. 70 
In  contrast,  according  to  Millar,  the  form  of  consciousness  that  characterised  the 
superstructure  of  the  eighteenth  century  British  government  was  "the  diffusion  of 
liberty  through  a  multitude  of  people"  (HV,  1,6).  These  ideas  and  tbelings  of  liberty  in 
turn  depended  on  changes  in  the  distribution  of  property  and  a  means  of  subsistence 
since  the  time  of  the  Saxons.  Whilst  the  rude  Saxon's  passions  were  unrestrained  by 
laws  that  secured  the  subject's  interests  in  accumulating  property,  he  had  a  certain 
liberty  to  exercise  them  in  robbery  and  plunder.  In  contrast,  the  civilised  eighteenth 
century  Briton's  interests  in  accumulating  property  were  safeguarded  by  laws  that 
promoted  the  general  interest.  He  was  less  dependent  upon  his  superiors  for 
subsistence  and  protection  and  he  belonged  to  a  class  of  independent  commodity 
producers  that  controlled  the  legislative  powers  of  the  superstructure.  The  principles 
that  explained  these  changes  were  those  of  authority  and  Utility.  20  These  principles 
were  abstracted  from  the  eighteenth  century  subject's  experience  of  the  operations  on 
his  mind  of  immediate  circumstances.  These  circumstances  were  the  totality  of  social 
relations  at  a  particular  stage  in  which  the  potential  antagonism  between  labour  and 
capital  had  made  little  impact  on  consciousness.  These  principles  remained,  as  Marx 
and  Engels  put  it,  "in  the  toils  of  political  ideology".  Authority  was  the  Tory  principle 
and  utility  the  Whig  principle.  They  also  remained  in  the  toils  of  juridical  and  economic 
ideology.  The  fetishism  of  commodities  influenced  the  methods  of  an  empiricist 
jurisprudence.  These  required  that  juridical,  economic  and  political  relations  between 
individuals  be  theorised  as  relations  between  reffied  sensory  perceptions,  impressions, 
ideas  and  feelings  within  the  minds  of  abstract  individual  subjects.  The  applications  of 
these  methods  were  to  serve  a  useful  political  purpose  in  uniting  what  had  been 
mutually  antagonistic  factions  within  the  ruling  class  into  a  consensus  that  economic 
improvement  was  in  the  general  interest. 
Marx's  note  in  the  Grundrisse  is  the  only  time  that  he  mentioned  naturalistic 
materialism.  Nonetheless,  it  is  possible  to  give  a  reading  of  what  he  might  have  meant 
by  the  term  from  other  passages  in  which  he  referred  to  materialist  philosophy  and 
eighteenth  century  thought.  It  is  possible  to  discuss  Millar's  philosophical  history  in  the 
light  of  this  reading.  In  the  Theses  on  Fetterhach  he  noted  a  defect  in  "hitherto 
existing  materialism".  This  was  that: 
"the  thing,  reality,  sensuousness,  is  conceived  only  in  the  form  of  the  object  of 
contemplation,  but  not  as  sensuous  human  activity,  practice,  not  subjectively"  [his 
emphasis]21 
20SCC  chapter  ten  for  discussion. 
21Marx  K.  (1845)  "Theses  on  Fetierbach,  P,  reprinted  in  Arthur  (cd.  )  1970:  pl2l. 71 
To  develop  an  overall  interpretation  of  eighteenth  century  empiricist  philosophy  on 
the  basis  of  this  remark  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  dissertation.  It  would  require  a 
thorough  examination  of  the  attitude  of  German  idealism  to  empiricism  and  eighteenth 
century  materialism.  Nonetheless,  if  Marx's  insight  is  helpful  in  appraising  Meek's 
proposition  about  Millar,  then  it  would  follow  that  Millar  would  conceive  of  objects  of 
sensory  perception  contemplatively  whether  they  be  internal  objects  such  as 
impressions,  ideas  or  passions,  or  external  objects  such  as  things  or  actions.  The 
evidence  that  he  was  inclined  to  a  contemplative  appreciation,  is  in  the  essay  discussed 
above.  Millar  described  circumstances  external  to  the  subject's  mind  as  "objects  around 
us,  whether  of  art  or  nature"  (HV,  4,138).  These  caused  the  subject  to  have  internally 
experienced  ideas  which  could  be  arranged  according  to  analogical  or  comparative 
reasoning.  They  also  caused  the  subject  to  experience  various  pleasures  or  pains.  The 
subject  therefore  had  the  capacity  to  reflect  experimentally  on  the  contents  of  the 
rnind.  This  brought  individuals  to  the  consciousness  that  they  had  interests  in  acquiring 
"those  objects  which  are  agreeable  to  the  sense"  (HV,  4,139).  When,  as  spectator,  the 
subject  observed  the  actions  of  others,  the  faculty  of  the  imagination  enabled  the  mind 
to  experience  feelings  that  corresponded  to  those  of  others.  For  example,  it  was  the 
subject's  imagination  of  the  feelings  of  pleasure  the  rich  individual  acquired  as  an 
object  of  the  admiration  and  praise  of  others  that  produced  a  corresponding  feeling  of 
pleasure.  Further  reflection  on  these  feelings  gave  individuals  the  idea  that  it  was  in 
their  interests  to  take  the  required  forms  of  action  that  would  better  themselves.  The 
question  arises  whether  these  acts  of  reflection  are  synonymous  with  the  contemplative 
attitude  that  Marx  thought  was  a  defect  of  the  forms  of  materialistic  philosophy  that 
preceded  his  own. 
When  Marx  stated  that  sensuous  activity  or  practice  was  not  viewed  subjectively 
by  materialist  philosophy,  at  first  sight  this  would  appear  to  have  no  relevance  to  the 
empiricist  assumptions  Millar  adopted.  Millar,  following  Hume,  thought  that 
theoretical  and  'practical  activity  was  experienced  subjectively  as  a  "relish  for 
enjoyment"  (HV,  4,139).  This  implies  that  he  thought  that  activity  was  inherently 
pleasurable.  It  was  pleasurable  whether  or  not  the  subject  paid  any  attention  to  the 
feelings  of  pleasure  he  experienced.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  subject  were  to  have  a 
knowledge  of  his  interests,  he  would  have  to  adopt  a  contemplative  or  reflective 
attitude  to  the  objects  that  caused  him  to  have  pleasurable  or  painful  sensations. 
Millar's  detail  labourer  was  unable  to  adopt  such  an  attitude.  Millar  thought  that  the 
only  idea  that  gave  labourers  pleasure  was  the  anticipation  of  relief  from  bodily  and 
mental  exhaustion  and,  of  course,  their  wages.  Their  attentive  faculties  focused  on  the 
one  object  at  work,  they  were  incapable  of  thinking  much  beyond  the  pleasures 
derived  from  the  satisfaction  of  his  bodily  appetites  for  sleep,  food,  drink  and  buying 
clothes.  They  were  even  incapable  of  reflecting  on  the  pleasures  derived  from  the 72 
company  of  their  peers,  drawing  "but  little  improvement  from  the  society  of 
companions"  WA146).  The  "theoretical  attitude"  that  Marx  thought  was  typical  of 
"all  hitherto  existing  materialism"  was  not,  according  to  Millar,  typical  of  manual 
workers'  subjective  perception  of  sensuous  activity.  The  theoretical  attitude  that  would 
enable  them  to  acquire  knowledge  of  the  utility  of  cultivating  sober  and  industrious 
habits,  and  avoiding  crime,  had  to  be  brought  to  them  by  placing  them  in  "schools  and 
seminaries  of  education"  (HV,  4,160).  The  consciousness  of  the  manual  worker  was, 
however,  clearly  the  object  of  the  theoretical  attitude  of  a  philosopher.  This 
philosopher,  Millar,  was  equipped  with  a  well  developed  theory  of  how  circumstances 
were  likely  to  effect  the  mind  of  the  subject. 
The  third  of  Marx's  Theses  on  Feuerbach  states  the  following: 
"The  materialist  doctrine  concerning  the  changing  of  circumstances  and  upbringing 
forgets  that  circumstances  are  changed  by  men  and  that  it  is  essential  to  educate  the 
educator.  This  doctrine  must,  therefore,  divide  society  into  two  parts,  one  of  which  is 
superior  to  society"  [his  emphasis].  22 
Again,  at  the  level  of  superficial  appearance,  the  truth  of  Meek's  substantial 
proposition  on  the  materialist  nature  of  Millar's  philosophical  history  can  be  affirmed. 
As  I  have  shown,  Millar  divided  the  populations  of  both  pre-commercial  and 
commercial  societies  into  two  broad  classes:  the  superior  knowledgeable  class  of 
individuals  exempted  from  bodily  labour,  and  the  inferior  ignorant  class  of  individuals 
engaged  in  bodily  labour.  In  the  dark  ages  of  pre-commercial  society,  the  interests  of 
the  superior  class  led  them  to  use  their  knowledge  to  dupe  the  inferior  class  into  giving 
them  part  of  their  property.  In  the  enlightened  age  of  commercial  society,  the  more 
theoretically  minded  of  the  superior  class  realised  that  it  was  in  the  public  interest  that 
the  state  provide  education  for  the  inferior  class. 
This  placed  intellectual  workers  in  an  antagonistic  relationship  to  manual  workers. 
There  could  be  no  process  of  reciprocal  learning  in  education  process.  The  intellectual 
worker  could  learn  nothing  from  the  manual  worker  because  the  latter  possessed  little 
if  any  knowledge.  The  manual  worker  had  no  knowledge  or  skills  other  than  that  of 
the  end  of  a  pin  and  how  to  sharpen  it.  The  manual  worker's  conditions  of  work  and 
their  effect  on  the  mind  were  well  known  to  the  intellectual  worker.  The  latter  had  a 
theory  to  explain  it.  Contemplating  its  effects  would  give  the  intellectual  worker  no 
pleasure.  According  to  theory,  it  would  evoke  a  sympathetic  feeling  of  distress.  At 
best,  reflections  on  this  feeling  might  prompt  the  spectator  to  think  that  it  was  unjust 
that  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange  should  make  the  majority  of  the 
22Marx,  "Theses  on  Fetierbach  HP,  reprinted  in  Arthur  (cd.  )  1970:  p  12  1. 73 
population  ignorant  and  stupid.  Millar's  reflections  did  not  go  this  far;  however,  in 
calling  on  his  class  to  institute  a  "liberal  plan  for  the  instruction  of  lower  orders",  he 
did  appeal  to  the  "humanity  and  public  spirit  of  the  present  age".  If  the  eighteenth 
century  subject's  experience  of  feelings  of  humanity  and  utilitarian  reasoning  could 
introduce  measures  "for  the  maintenance  of  the  poor,  for  the  relief  of  the  diseased  and 
infirm,  and  for  the  correction  of  the  malefactor"  (HV,  4,161),  then  they  could  also 
introduce  public  education. 
Moreover,  as  I  shall  discuss  in  chapter  nine,  Millar  adopted  the  explanation  Smith 
gave  of  betterment  and  submission.  This  required  that  the  division  of  society  into 
superior  and  inferior  parts  was  a  necessary  condition  for  civilisation  and  morality.  The 
circumstances  necessary  for  betterment  required  that  there  be  divisions  between  rich 
and  poor  and  between  the  knowledgeable  and  the  ignorant.  Poor  inferiors  had  to  be 
able  to  imagine  the  pleasures  of  their  rich  superiors  in  order  to  be  motivated  to 
industry  and  assume  the  appropriate  deferential  manners.  Ignorant  inferiors  had  to  be 
instructed  by  knowledgeable  superiors  that  the  praise  and  admiration  the  wealthy 
acquired  was  not  necessarily  on  account  of  their  virtue.  Virtue  was  acquired  through 
the  strenuous  exercise  of  the  subject's  command  of  inappropriate  manifestations  of  the 
passionS.  23  In  both  cases,  superiors  could  learn  little  from  their  inferiors.  The  rich 
learnt  little  that  could  give  them  pleasure  from  the  contemplation  of  the  poor.  The 
knowledgeable  learrit  little  about  virtue  from  the  lack  of  self-command  the  ignorant 
had  over  their  passions.  The  empirical  observations  that  women  tended  to  suffer  pain 
with  greater  fortitude  than  men,  or  that  a  merchant  tended  to  be  less  courageous  than 
a  savage  were  not  intended  to  inspire  the  subject  to  virtue.  They  were  an  application  of 
a  theory  of  the  workings  of  the  mind  to  actual  circumstances.  Millar's  own  vision  of  a 
more  equal  society  presupposed  a  continued  division  of  society  into  superior  and 
inferior  parts.  Betterment,  submission,  the  fluctuation  of  property  and  public  education 
would  ensure  that  there  was  an  equal  opportunity  for  every  individual  who  possessed 
the  appropriate  habits,  manners  and  knowledge  of  interests  to  move  from  a  position  of 
inferiority  to  one  of  superiority. 
Marx  made  few  direct  references  to  eighteenth  century  ideas.  One  of  these  is  found 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Grundrisse: 
"Smith  and  Ricardo  still  stand  with  both  feet  on  the  shoulders  of  the  eighteenth  century 
prophets,  in  whose  imagination  this  eighteenth  century  individual  -  the  product  on  the 
23Craig  described  Millar's  conception  of  virtue  in  the  following  way:  "The  degree  of  applause  excited 
by  virtue  is  not  dependent  solely  on  the  propriety  and  utility  of  the  action.  but  also  on  the  difficulty 
which  we  know  the  agent  must  have  overcome,  and  the  niental  energy  which  lie  has  displayed,  in 
reducing  his  feelings  to  the  level  of  those  of  the  unconcerned  spectator.  The  passions,  in  many  cases, 
being  slightly  affected,  a  small  exertion  is  sufficient-,  in  other  situations,  the  utmost  self-command  is 
indispensibic"  (Ol?,  xxx). 74 
one  side  of  the  dissolution  of  the  feudal  forms  of  society,  on  the  other  side  of  the  new 
forces  of  production  developed  since  the  sixteenth  century  -  appears  as  an  ideal,  whose 
existence  they  project  into  the  past.  Not  as  an  historic  result  but  as  history's  point  of 
departure.  As  the  Natural  Individual  appropriate  to  their  notion  of  human  nature,  not 
arising  historically,  but  posited  by  nature.  This  illusion  has  been  common  to  each  new 
epoch  to  this  day.  "24 
If  Marx  intended  his  followers  to  examine  the  relationship  between  the  ideal  of  the 
natural  individual  and  the  consciousness  of  real  eighteenth  century  individuals,  then  it 
should  be  possible  to  appraise  the  naturalistic  materialism  of  Millar's  philosophy  of 
history  critically.  In  which  case,  Meek  may  well  be  proved  right  in  having  described 
Millar's  jurisprudential  historiography  as  being  materialist  in  conception.  On  the  other 
hand,  Meek  was  wrong  to  state  that  Millar  produced  a  new  way  of  looking  at  society 
that  was,  by  virtue  of  its  conception,  necessarily  true.  By  the  time  Millar  was  writing 
Hisiorical  View,  he  was  reproducing  an  old  way  of  looking  at  society.  The 
publication  of  Millar's  book  in  1803  marked  the  end  of  a  classical  tradition.  The  book 
was  the  last  example  of  history  written  by  an  eighteenth  century  empiricist  philosopher 
informed  by  a  school  of  natural  jurisprudence  stretching  back  to  Hobbes  and  Grotius. 
Millar  was  rediscovered  through  a  peculiar  accident  of  twentieth  century  history.  This 
was  that  Millar's  historiography  appeared  to  be  identical  to  received  sociological 
models.  These  are  derived  from  what  became  an  apologetic  doctrine  of  stages  of 
modes  of  production  so  artfully  promoted  throughout  the  world  by  friends  of  the 
former  Soviet  Union,  their  allies  and  fellow  travellers. 
24Marx,  Grundrisse,  pp83-84. 75 
Chapter  Four: 
Sociological  Considerations 
4.1  The  Emergence  of  a  Sociological  Approach 
The  neglect  Millar  suffered  from  in  the  development  of  Anglo-American 
intellectual  life  in  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries  was  shared  by  most  of 
his  contemporaries  excepting  Smith  and  Hume.  Nonetheless  the  establishment  of  a 
discipline  of  academic  sociology  and  the  debate  over  whether  sociology  could  achieve 
scientific  status  prompted  early  twentieth  century  scholars  to  suggest  that  the  origins 
of  sociological  method  lay  in  the  Enlightenment  in  general  and  Scottish  eighteenth 
century  thought  in  particular.  '  Moreover,  the  revival  of  interest  in  the  latter  coincided 
with  attempts  by  academics  who  were  sympathetic  to  the  former  Soviet  Union  to 
establish  a  place  for  the  teaching  of  a  version  of  Marx  within  bourgeois  universities. 
The  consensus  established  amongst  orthodox  economists  was  that  the  foundations 
of  Marx's  political  economy  in  a  labour  theory  of  value  were  unscientific.  Orthodox 
economics  rejected  the  doctrine  on  the  basis  of  the  Austrian  economist  Bohm- 
Bawerk's  criticisms  of  Marx's  Capital  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century.  2  There 
could  be  no  place  for  Marx  in  the  teaching  of  an  economic  science  that  considered  the 
labour  theory  of  value  to  be  a  pre-scientific  doctrine.  3  A  space,  however,  could  be 
made  within  sociology  departments  for  a  version  of  Marx.  This  is  the  thinker  who  had 
some  interesting  insights  into  the  relationship  between  society  and  the  individual. 
Establishing  that  Marx's  insights  were  similar  to  Ferguson's  or  Millar's  could  assist  this 
project  if  it  could  be  argued  that,  not  only  had  twentieth  century  sociological  methods 
IPascal  mentions  Huth  H.  (1907)  Soziale  und  individualistische  Auffassung  ini  l8ten  Jahrhundert, 
Leipzig,  as  providing  material  which  shows  how  Ferguson  laid  the  basis  for  a  modem  comparative 
"sociological  method"  ("Property  &  Society",  173,  n2).  American  pioneers  of  the  thesis  that  the  Scots' 
social  theory  anticipated  sociology  are  Lehmann  W.  C.  (1930)  A  dain  Ferguson  and  the  Beginnings  of 
Modern  Sociology,  New  York,  and  Bryson  G.  (1945)  Man  and  Society:  The  Scottish  Inquiry  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century,  Princeton,  reprint  New  York,  1968:  ppl48-172.  For  a  succinct  review  of  the 
significance  sociologists  have  given  to  the  Scots,  see  Berry  C.  J.  (1997)  Social  Theory  of  the  Scottish 
Enlightennient,  Edinburgh:  ppl94-196. 
2Bolim-Bawcrk  E.  von.  (1896)  Zuni  Abschluss  des  Marxischen  Sýystein.  Sweczy  P.  M.  (ed.  )  (1949) 
Karl  Marx  and  the  close  ofhis  systent,  New  York. 
3Throughout  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries,  the  teaching  of  Marx's  political  economy  has 
taken  place  in  Britain  almost  exclusively  outwith  the  economics  departments  of  universities.  An 
exception  was  Maurice  Dobb  at  Cambridge.  Dobb,  under  the  influence  of  Pierro  Sraffa,  was 
responsible  for  the  growth  of  a  neo-Ricardian  interpretation  of  Marx.  See  MacIntyre  S.  (1980)  A 
Proletarian  Science:  Marxism  in  Britain  1917-1933,  Cambridge:  pp.  169-171.  Neo-Ricardian 
"Marxism"  has  taken  root  in  a  few  economics  departments  since  the  Second  World  War.  Meek's 
contribution  to  this  school  was  to  re-establish  the  credibility  of  the  labour  theory  of  value  of  Smith, 
Ricardo  and  Marx  as  a  topic  of  interest  to  economists. 76 
but  also  Marx's  methods  been  anticipated  almost  a  hundred  years  previously  by  certain 
obscure  Scottish  philosophers. 
Thus  Pascal  criticised  sociological  interpreters  of  Ferguson  for  ignoring  the  "main 
theme"  of  Ferguson's  social  theory.  This  was  that: 
"'civil  society'  owes  its  form  and  development  to  the  structure  and  development  of 
private  property,  and  that  the  mode  of  this  social  development  is  one  of  progress 
through  internal  contradictions,  through  the  struggle  between  classes  with  an 
antagonistic  relationship  to  property.  114 
Pascal  thought  that  Ferguson,  like  Marx,  had  a  theory  of  contradiction  and  class 
struggle.  If  Ferguson  were  truly  so  advanced  in  his  social  theory,  then  it  would  appear 
that  Pascal  was  correct  to  suggest  that  a  Marxist  philosophy  of  history  and  society  had 
come  into  being  before  Marx's  birth.  Moreover  if  the  latter  were  true  (and  it  were  true 
that  Marx  was  an  original  sociological  theorist),  then  sociologists  had  a  mistaken  or 
one-sided  appreciation  of  the  historical  significance  of  Ferguson  to  their  discipline. 
Pascal's  reading  of  the  introduction  to  Millar's  The  Orights  of  Rai&  gave  additional 
support  to  his  correction  of  writers  such  as  W.  C.  Lehmann  who  had  interpreted  the 
significance  of  the  Scots  in  terms  of  their  anticipation  of  modern  sociological  methods. 
Pascal  stated  of  Millar's  introduction  that  it  is  a  "succinct  statement  of  historical 
materialism".  This  was  so  because  Millar,  according  to  Pascal,  isolated  econonýc 
factors  that  determined  individuals'  thinking,  behaviour,  feelings,  choices,  class 
identities,  as  well  as  their  laws  and  governments.  5  Pascal  referred  the  reader  to 
Sombart  for  his  "admiring  account"  of  Mllar.  Pascal  was  either  unaware  or  uncritical 
of  the  fact  that  Sombart  considered  Millar  a  better  sociologist  than  EngelS.  6 
By  the  time  that  Lehmann  published  his  book  on  Millar  in  1960,  an  interpretation 
had  emerged  that  conceived  of  Millar  and  other  Scottish  thinkers  such  as  Smith, 
Ferguson  and  Robertson  as  founders  of  a  type  of  sociology  which  shared  more  with 
Marx  than  any  other  subsequent  sociological  theorist.  This  type  of  sociology  has  been 
described  as  "materialist",  thus  making  a  strong  connection  between  Millar  and  what 
was  understood  to  be  the  Marxist  materialist  conception  of  history.  The  latter  was 
thought  of  as  hinging  on  a  philosophical  doctrine  of  economic  determinism.  Thus 
Lehmann  made  reluctant  concessions  to  Pascal's  criticisms.  He  referred  to  the  "loosely 
termed",  "so-called",  "if  it  should  be  called  that  at  all"  techno-economic  determinism 
of  Mllar's  approach  to  history  and  society.  7 
4Pascal,  "Property  &  Society",  178.1  shall  discuss  Millar's  notion  of  class  in  chapter  twelve. 
5Pascal,  "Property  &  Society",  175. 
6Pascal,  "Property  &  Society",  178.  See  chapter  two  for  Sombart's  remarks. 
7Leliniann,  Millar,  pp.  129,131  &  132. 77 
4.2  Sociology  and  Social  Science 
Sociology  can  be  distinguished  from  social  science.  To  state,  for  example,  that 
eighteenth  century  Scots  are  the  founders  of  modern  social  science  is  somewhat 
different  from  stating  that  they  are  the  founders  of  a  particular  type  of  sociology. 
There  is  sufficient  evidence  to  show  that  Millar  and  Smith  were  concerned  with  a 
scientific  approach  to  society.  Moral  philosophy,  at  the  time  they  were  writing, 
included  explorations  into  the  explanation  of  human  behaviour  in  society.  Moreover 
the  successes  derived  from  observation  and  experiment  in  natural  philosophy  inspired 
an  exploration  of  the  use  of  these  methods  in  moral  philosophy. 
The  idea  that  the  project  of  the  Enlightenment  was  inspired  by  the  philosophical 
and  scientific  achievements  of  Bacon,  Locke  and  Newton  is  orthodox  and  well- 
established.  8  Millar,  following  Smith  and  Hume,  adopted  an  experimental, 
comparative,  inductive  or  probabilistic  method  to  the  study  of  societies.  9  Moreover, 
the  emergence  of  political  economy  from  jurisprudence  as  a  particular  branch  of  the 
"science  of  the  legislator"10  reinforces  the  point  that  the  changing  political  and 
economic  establishment  of  bourgeois  society  in  the  eighteenth  century  needed 
explanations  and  theories  that  would  explain  the  development  and  difference  of  the 
new  form  of  market  society  from  previous  non-market  forms.  This  was  necessary  for 
economic,  political  and  social  policy  to  take  shape  in  the  form  of  legislation. 
There  is  no  difficulty,  therefore,  in  showing  that  one  of  the  most  significant 
contributions  that  the  Enlightenment  made  to  human  civilisation  is  the  birth  of  a 
recognisably  modern  form  of  social  science  with  political  economy  as  its  crowning 
glory.  "  However,  the  sociological  readings  under  consideration  make  a  different 
claim.  This  is  that  the  Scots  invented  or  pre-figured  a  type  of  sociology  that  is 
materialist.  This  claim  does  not  make  sense  without  a  particular  reading  of  the 
significance  of  Marx  as  a  sociologist  who  categorised  societies  according  to  schemas 
or  types  called  "modes  of  production". 
8"The  [French]  philosophes  themselves  saw  three  Englishmen  as  the  prophets  of  Enlightenment,  and 
they  dedicated  their  Encyclopedie  to  Bacon,  Locke,  and  Newton.  "  Kramnick  I.  F.  (1995)  The  Portable 
Enlightenment  Reader,  Penguin:  pix.  Millar  signposted  two  of  these  influences,  Bacon  and  Newton, 
comparing  Moiitcsquieu  with  the  former  and  Smith  with  the  latter.  He  therefore  acknowledged  all 
four  as  pioneers  in  the  methods  lie  adopted  himsclE  (HK2,429). 
9Sce  chapter  eight. 
1OHaakoiisscii  (1981,1996)  adopts  this  phrase  as  a  title  for  the  natural  jurisprudential  interpretation 
lie  has  furthered.  Its  origins  are  in  Smith's  definition  of  political  economy  as  "a  branch  of  the  science 
of  a  statesman  or  legislator".  (Iff,  1,  Iiitro.  1,428). 
11  See  chapter  seven. 78 
4.3  Textbook  Models 
The  sociological  models  I  discuss  here  have  been  taken  from  textbook  readings  of 
Marx,  the  most  important  text  of  his  being  the  Preface  to  the  Contributioti  to  the 
Critique  of  Political  ECOIIOMy.  12  This  text  is  usually  understood  to  be  an  authoritative 
statement  of  the  philosophical  method  underpinning  the  doctrines  of  historical 
materialism  and  economic  determinism.  13  In  this  text,  Marx  mentioned  four  modes  of 
production  -  the  Asiatic,  ancient,  feudal  and  modem  bourgeois  modes  of  production. 
The  Preface  mentioned  a  conflict  between  "productive  forces"  and  "relations  of 
production"  which  brought  into  being  social  revolution.  It  also  described  the  economic 
foundation  of  society  as  something  which  determined  the  political,  juridical,  artistic 
and  religious  superstructure.  Property  relations  were  described  by  Marx  as  the  legal 
form  in  which  relations  of  production  take  shape.  14 
In  the  first  sociological  model  derived  from  this  text,  productive  forces  are 
conceived  of  as  pure  technique  abstracted  from  social  form  and  the  economic 
organisation  of  social  labour.  15  Smith  has  been  acclaimed  as  the  founder  of  this 
model.  16  A  favourite  additional  source  of  authority  for  this  version  is  a  quote  from 
Marx's  The  Poverty  of  Philosophy: 
"In  acquiring  new  productive  forces  men  change  their  mode  of  production;  and  in 
changing  their  mode  of  production,  in  changing  the  way  of  carning  their  living,  they 
change  all  their  social  relations.  The  hand-mill  gives  you  society  with  the  feudal  lord; 
the  stearn-mill,  society  with  the  industrial  capitalist.  "17 
This  sociological  model  states  that  the  mode  of  production  is  a  type  of  society  in 
which  scientific  and  technical  developments  determine  all  other  social  relations.  " 
12Marx  K.  (1859)  Critique,  Dobb  M.  (ed.  )  Moscow,  1970:  pp  19-23. 
131  have  given  a  different  reading  of  this  text  in  chapter  three. 
14Mar,  x,  (7fitique,  p-21 
"Thus  Bilton  T.,  Bonnctt  K.,  Jones  P.,  Skinner  D.,  Stanworth  M.,  and  Webster  A.,  (eds)  (1996)  ask 
students  whether  "a  focus  on  the  production  of  goods"  is  the  best  way  to  analyse  society.  Introductory 
Sociology,  3rd  cdn:  p87. 
16According  to  Rigby  S.  (1987)  Robertson,  Smith  and  Millar,  were  the  founders  of  this  sociological 
model,  not  Marx.  Rigby  calls  it  "productive  force  determinism".  Rigby  cites  Meek  as  his  authority. 
Marxism  and  History,  Manchester:  pp72-73. 
17Marx  K.  (1847)  Poverty,  Peking  cdn,  1978:  p  103. 
18Marx  is  not  sojejunc.  He  distinguished  between  economic  categories  and  productive  forces  (in  the 
form  of  machinery  and  a  technical  division  of  labour).  Thus:  "Machinery  is  no  more  an  economic 
category  than  the  bullock  that  drigs  the  plough.  Machinery  is  merely  a  productive  force.  "  (Poverly, 
p128).  His  discussion  presupposed  the  distinction  between  the  social  and  technical  divisions  of  labour. 
Thus  the  general  rule  lie  described:  "The  less  authority  presides  over  the  division  of  labour  inside 
society  [social  division  of  labourl  the  more  the  division  of  labour  develops  inside  the  workshop 
[technical  division  of  labourl"  (Poverty,  p.  130).  For  the  modern  technical  division  of  labour  in  a 
workshop  or  factory  to  become  an  economic  category,  Marx  thought  that  tile  productive  process 
needed  to  be  subsumed  within  a  social  division  of  labour  dominated  by  the  value  form.  The 79 
Within  this  sociological  model,  economic  activity  is  understood  to  be  productive 
activity  embodied  within  the  forms  of  tools,  machinery  and  a  technical  division  of 
labour.  The  latter  are  now  thought  of  as  determining  all  other  social  relations.  The 
productive  process  is  therefore  a  technological  rather  than  an  economic  process.  19 
In  the  second  sociological  model  derived  from  Marx's  Preface,  productive 
relations  are  conceived  of  as  relations  between  classes.  A  favourite  additional  source 
of  authority  for  this  version  is  a  quote  from  Marx  and  Engels'  The  Matiffiesto  of  the 
Communist  Party: 
"The  history  of  all  hitherto  existing  society  is  the  history  of  class  struggles.  1120 
Class  relations  are  characterised  by  different  patterns  of  ownership  of  the  means  of 
production.  Patterns  of  ownership  correspond  to  different  forms  of  property  or  legal 
relations.  21  Thus  if  capitalists  own  the  means  of  production  and  most  workers  are 
wage-workers,  then  the  society  has  a  capitalist  mode  of  production.  The 
corresponding  juridical  relations  will  enforce  private  property  in  the  factories, 
workshops  and  machinery,  and  individual  freedoms  to  buy  and  sell.  If  lords  and  barons 
own  the  means  of  production  and  most  workers  are  peasants,  then  the  society  has  a 
feudal  mode  of  production.  The  corresponding  juridical  relations  will  enforce  private 
property  in  the  land  and  the  bondage  of  serfdom  to  the  land.  If  ancient  civilians  own 
the  means  of  production  and  most  workers  are  slaves,  then  the  society  has  a  slave 
mode  of  production.  The  corresponding  juridical  relations  will  enforce  private 
property  in  the  ownership  of  slaves,  and  political  freedoms  for  the  civilians  but  not  for 
slaves.  Finally,  if  the  nation  owns  the  means  of  production  and  the  majority  of  the 
population  is  working  class,  the  society  has  a  "socialist"  mode  of  production.  The 
corresponding  juridical  relations  will  enforce  nationalised  property  relations  and 
restrict  or  outlaw  individual  freedoms  to  buy  and  sell.  Each  stage  of  society  or  mode 
of  production  has  its  own  matching  property  or  legal  relations.  Societies  move  from 
distinction  lie  made  between  the  technical  and  social  divisions  of  labour  is  discussed  further  in 
chapter  seven. 
19Productive  activity  and  technique  would  be  economic  if  they  generated  commodities,  value  or 
surplus  value.  They  would  be  economic  if  production  were  geared  to  a  market  or  they  were  themselves 
subsumed  vAthin  the  commodity  form.  They  would  be  economic  categories  within  these  particular 
social  forms.  This  is  argued  below  and  assumed  throughout  chapter  seven. 
2OMarx.  K&  Engels  F.  (1848)  "Manifesto".  In  Tucker  R.  C.  (cd.  )  (1978)  The  Marx-Engels  Reader. 
2nd.  edn,  London  &  New  York. 
21Tlius  Bilton  T.,  Bonnett  K.,  Jones  P.,  Skinner  D.,  Stanworth  M.,  and  Webster  A.  (eds)  tell  students 
that  capitalists  acquire  a  surplus  "purely  and  simply  by  virtue  of  being  owners".  The  model  states  that 
class  is  determined  by  property  rights  in  the  process  of  production:  capitalists  have  rights,  but  workers 
do  not.  The  model  is  then  shown  to  be  mistaken.  Introducimy  Sociologv:  p  143. 80 
one  mode  of  production  to  another  "through  the  struggle  between  classes  with  an 
antagonistic  relationship  to  property.  1122 
The  above  models  can  be  used  conjointly.  23  Thus  at  the  same  time  as  the  class 
struggle  overthrows  the  property  relations  of  the  old  mode  of  production,  there  is  a 
new  development  of  technique.  This  is  the  economic  base  that  determines  the 
superstructural  character  of  the  property  relations  of  the  new  mode  of  production. 
The  relationship  between  these  models  and  Marx's  social  science  is  a  matter  of 
controversy  amongst  interpreters.  Scott  Meikle,  for  example,  has  argued  that  they 
have  little,  if  any,  relationship  to  Marx's  historical  method.  24  They  have  persisted  as  the 
dominant  interpretation  of  Marx's  theory  of  history  because  of  their  codification  within 
Stalinist  history  textbooks.  If  Meikle  is  correct,  then  these  models  will  disintegrate  and 
disappear  as  quickly  as  has  former  USSR.  25  This  section,  however,  reviews  the 
problems  of  scholarship  that  have  arisen  with  the  notion  that  Millar  is  a  materialist 
sociologist  of  the  type  committed  to  one  or  both  of  the  models  outlined  above. 
4.4  Modes  mid  Stages 
Along  with  Ferguson  and  Robertson,  Pascal  argued  that  Millar  elaborated  upon 
foundations  laid  by  Smith  for  "a  new  interpretation  of  society  which  is  undoubtedly 
materialistic".  26  Pascal  mentioned  three  possible  criteria  for  this  interpretation.  The 
first  was  that  a  materialist  interpretation  was  one  in  which  the  evolution  of  society  is 
described  as  a  "secular  process".  27  The  second  is  that  societies  are  classified  according 
to  "modes  of  subsistence"  -a  term  derived  from  Robertson.  28  The  third  is  that 
22Pascal,  "Property  and  Society",  p178. 
23Rigby  pits  one  model  against  the  other  and  decides  that  the  second  based  on  "productive  relations" 
is  more  useful  for  historians  than  the  first  based  on  "productive  forces".  Marxism:  p299. 
241n  contrast  Rigby  argues  that  students  will  find  a  discussion  of  this  argument  confusing  and 
pointless.  He  thinks  that  the  way  history  students  have  used  textbook  models  reveals  more  about  the 
truth  of  Marx's  abstractions  than  an  inquiry  into  the  role  they  played  in  Marx's  own  theory.  Thus, 
"Putting  Marx  to  work  is  rather  a  better  way  of  assessing  his  contribution  to  historiography  than  the 
futile  labour  of  attempting  to  discover  what  lie  really  meant.  "  Marxism:  p3. 
25MeikIe  S.  (1995)  argues  that  sociological  models  are  interesting  because  they  leave  out  Marx's 
theory  of  value  ("Marx  and  the  Stalinist  History  Textbook.  "  In  Critique  27,181-201).  Taken  as  a 
complete  theory,  they  "can  be  stated  without  mentioning  surplus,  class.  or  value.  "  189.  Marx's  theory 
of  history  is  "sociological"  only  in  the  sense  that  it  aspires  to  a  social  science  that  unites  an 
Aristotelian  (and  Hegelian)  inspired  philosophical  view  with  political  economy.  Sociological  models 
tend  to  conceive  of  laws  in  terms  of  efficient  causation.  Marx's  conception  of  law  relies  on  a 
conception  of  the  normal  behaviour  of  a  whole  entity  "in  this  case  a  social  forination,  its  potentialities 
of  development,  and  the  limits  of  its  possibilities  of  adaptation  to  change.  "  187. 
26Pascal,  "Property  &  Society",  173. 
27Pascal,  "Property  &  Society",  171. 
280r  "mode  of  production".  Thus  "The  form  of  the  group  is  determined  by  the  mode  of  production, 
and  lie  [Ferguson]  distinguishes  the  same  four  forms  of  society  as  Smith.  "  Pascal,  "Property  & 
Society",  173. 81 
property  is  given  a  determining  role  in  explanations  of  different  forms  of 
government.  29 
It  is  the  second  claim  that  has  had  the  most  influence.  The  observation  is  that  the 
Scots  periodised  social  and  historical  development  into  four  stages  of  different  modes 
of  subsistence  based  on  hunting,  pasturage  of  animals,  agriculture  and  commerce.  30 
This  perception  was  developed  by  Ronald  Meek  and  applied  to  Millar.  As  mentioned 
previously,  Meek  has  stated  that  the  four  stages  are  a  "master-principle"  which  Millar 
applied  as  a  "true  philosophy  of  history".  31  For  Meek  it  is  the  evidence  of  the  four 
stages  theory  which  proves  that  Millar  had  a  materialist  interpretation.  Millar  was 
therefore  a  classical  "sociologist"  with  a  theory  similar  "in  its  broad  outlines"  to 
"Marxist  sociology".  The  truth,  according  to  Meek,  was  that  Millar  applied  modes  of 
subsistence  to  history  more  expertly,  more  explicitly  and  more  carefully  than  any  other 
eighteenth  century  thinker.  32  Ever  since  Meek  recommended  that  scholars  pay 
attention  to  modes  of  subsistence  in  Millar,  they  have  therefore  tended  to  ignore 
Hume's  influence  on  him.  Meek  found  an  "almost  studied"  absence  of  such  modes  in 
Hume's  essays.  33  Meek's  evaluation  suggested  an  irreconcilable  gap  between  the 
theories  of  the  two  historians.  34 
Meek  has  claimed  that  the  sequence  of  modes  of  subsistence  he  finds  in  Smith  is 
"the  organising  principle  of  considerable  power  and  importance".  35  Meek's 
presentation  of  Millar's  "master-principle"  leaves  the  reader  in  no  doubt  that  he  intends 
this  to  refer  to  the  organising  principle  of  the  four  stages.  36  Thus  Meek  writes: 
"We  could  select  almost  any  part  of  the  first  section  of  his  lectures  on  Government, 
where  the  four  stages  theory  appears  as  the  guiding  principle  throughout;  almost  any 
2911like  Smith  and  Ferguson,  lie  [Marx]  considers  that  the  forms  of  social  development  arc  determined 
by  the  nature  and  forms  of  property.  "  Pascal,  "Property  &  Society",  174  nI.  Also  "Millar  shows  how 
property  relationships  determine  the  form  of  family  relationships,  sexual  morality,  and  love.  "  Pascal, 
"Property  &  Society",  176. 
30SCC  chapter  eight  for  Millar's  use  of  these  stages  and  their  relationship  to  different  ideas  of  property. 
31Meck,  Ignoble  Savage,  pp161-162. 
32Meck,  Ignoble  Savage,  p162. 
33Mcck,  Ignoble  Savage,  pp30-3  1.  This  may  be  a  reason  why  sonic  writers  make  cautious 
comparisons  between  Hume's  economic  approach  to  history  and  Adam  Smith's  and  Millar's.  The 
following  avoid  strong  inferences  from  Hunic  to  Smith  and  Millar.  Stockton  C.  N.  (1976)  "Econon-dcs 
and  the  Mechanism  of  Historical  Progress  in  Hume's  History.  "  In  Livingston  &  King  (eds)  Hume:  A 
Re-evalualion,  New  York:  pp296-320.  Danford  J.  W.  (1990)  "Hume's  History  and  the  Parameters  of 
Economic  Development.  "  In  Capaldi  &  Livingston  (eds)  Libert.  V  in  Hume's  History  of  England, 
Dordrecht:  pp155-194.  In  contrast  Stein  argues  that  Hunic  "cleared  the  way"  for  a  fourth  commercial 
stage.  "The  Four  Stage  Theory",  pp401-402. 
34Paul  Bowles  upholds  Meek's  evaluation.  See  Bowles,  "John  Millar,  the  Legislator".  Also  (1985) 
"The  Origin  of  Property  and  the  Development  of  Scottish  Historical  Science.  "  Journal  of  the  History 
of1deas.  46.  April:  197-209.  Hume  is  not  mentioned  as  an  antecedent  in  either  article. 
35Mcck,  Ignoble  Savage,  p120. 
36Meck,  Ignoble  Savage,  p  165. 82 
of  the  chapters  on  his  'Origin  of  Ranks";  a  large  number  of  passages  in  the  early 
chapters  of  his  "Historical  View  of  the  English  Government";  and  almost  any  of  the 
remarkable  dissertations  published  posthumously  as  Vol.  IV  of  the  third  (1803)  edition 
of  the  Historical  ViCW".  37 
4.5  A  Weberian  Alternative 
In  contrast  to  Meek  (who  emphasised  the  Scots'  attention  to  empirical  accounts  of 
the  development  of  different  societies  in  the  literature  available  to  them),  Hopfl  has 
argued  that  the  Scots  were  unconcerned  whether  or  not  the  actual  history  of  particular 
societies  conformed  to  supposed  historical  sequence  of  the  four  stages.  38  They 
adopted  a  model  of  history  that  relied  on  a  Weberian  ideal  type  of  society.  This  had  a 
typical  starting  point  -  the  rude  and  savage  condition;  a  typical  terminus  -  the  polished 
and  civilised  condition;  and  a  typical  course  of  advancement  from  hunting,  through 
pasturage  and  agriculture,  to  commerce.  39 
Millar's  four  stages,  therefore,  were  not  intended  to  describe  society  in  its  actual 
development  but  the  kind  of  progress  that  would  take  place  as  a  result  of  the 
unintended  consequences  of  individuals'  typical  conduct  in  the  ideal  circumstances  of 
an  imagined  typical  nation  or  society.  This  conduct  was  regulated  by  a  narrow  range  of 
motives  such  as  Hume's  "ambition,  avarice,  self-love,  vanity,  friendship,  generosity, 
and  public  Spirit".  40 
If  Hopfl  is  correct  about  the  use  the  Scots  make  of  stages,  then  the  question  arises 
whether  the  materialist  sociological  model  to  which  they  are  assimilated  also  relies  on 
ideal  types  of  society.  They  would  be  ideal  types  of  society  if  no  actual  societies 
conformed  to  the  models  proposed  but  the  models  helped  to  classify  certain  types  of 
individual  goal-directed  ends.  If  it  is  not  possible  to  read  off  the  actual  forms  of 
juridical  relations  and  government  from  the  type  of  productive  activity  that  dorninates 
a  particular  society,  then  the  sociological  utility  of  the  model  tends  to  diminish.  If 
actuality  demonstrates,  for  instance,  that  wage-labour  and  private  property  co-exist 
with  absolute  monarchies  and  totalitarian  states,  then  a  model  that  specifies  that 
representative  democracy  is  the  ideal  type  of  government  for  a  capitalist  society  may 
appear  false. 
For  the  moment  however  it  is  enough  to  remark  that  for  Pascal  and  Meek,  a 
materialist  sociology  is  one  that  causally  connects  the  material-productive  process  with 
other  forms  of  activity.  Stages  are  types  of  society  organised  either  around  different 
37Mcck,  Ignoble  Savage,  ppl65-166. 
38Hopfl  H.  M.  (1978)  "From  Savage  to  Scotsman:  Conjectural  History  in  the  Scottish  Enlightenment.  " 
Journal  ofBritish  Studies  17.  -  1940. 
39Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  25. 
40Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  34.1  shall  discuss  Hopfl's  interpretation  in  chapters  eight  and  nine. 83 
aspects  of  the  material-technical  process  or  around  particular  types  of  property 
relations.  Within  one  model,  the  level  of  the  development  of  technique  is  an  indicator 
of  the  level  of  the  development  of  society  as  a  whole.  Within  the  other,  the  differing 
types  of  property  relations  are  an  indicator  of  the  state  of  the  class  struggle.  In  both 
models,  the  way  in  which  the  surplus  is  pumped  out  of  unfree  labour  and  the  particular 
social  form  of  that  productive  activity  takes  drop  out  of  view. 
4.6  Textbook  Marxism  Assessed 
This  materialist  interpretation  was  furthered  in  Skinner's  early  work.  41  Skinner 
applied  a  sociological  model  to  Smith  and  suggested  that  the  "exchange  economy"  or 
"agrarian  capitalism"  corresponded  to  Smith's  fourth  stage  of  commerce  and 
manufactures.  Skinner  conceived  of  the  Scots'  stages  as  stages  in  the  development  of 
the  productive  forces.  Quantitative  developments  in  the  productive  forces  (understood 
as  an  increasing  number  of  people  being  involved  in  manufacturing  and  trade)  caused  a 
qualitative  change  in  the  nature  of  the  relations  of  dependence  between  villains  and 
their  feudal  masters.  Skinner  thought  of  feudalism  in  terms  of  Smith's  third  agricultural 
stage  and  capitalism  as  a  fourth  commercial  stage. 
Salter  is  the  latest  scholar  to  defend  the  materialist  interpretation.  However,  his 
version  retains  very  little  that  resembles  the  textbook  sociological  models  derived  from 
simple  readings  of  Marx.  What  is  left  of  the  interpretation  is  a  definition  of 
"materialism"  as  a  doctrine  that  states:  "for  certain  actions,  laws,  policies  and  political 
and  legal  conditions  to  be  possible,  certain  material  conditions  have  to  be  present  and 
that  these  material  conditions,  while  usually  the  result  of  human  actions  are  not  the 
result  of  design,  of  purposeful  human  action.  "42  If  the  word  "material"  is  left  out  of 
this  definition,  then  the  doctrine  ceases  to  be  controversial.  It  merely  re-states  Pascal's 
insight  that  the  Scots'  philosophy  of  history  is  conceived  of  in  secular  or  naturalistic 
terms.  it  is  consistent  with  Hopffs  descriptions  of  the  Scots  as  wanting  to  eliminate 
from  explanations  "everything  except  ordinary  ('natural')  interests  and  motives, 
requiring  no  superhuman  (or,  indeed,  above-average)  largeness  of  views,  genius,  or 
nobility  of  purpose.  "43  It  is  also  consistent  with  the  opinion  that  the  Scots' 
observations  on  society  include  a  notion  of  social  outcomes  as  the  consequence  of 
unintended  actionS.  44 
Thus  Pascal's  and  Meek's  original  thesis  that  Smith  and  Millar  are  founders  of  a 
particular  type  of  sociology  conforming  to  materialist  sociological  models  has 
41Skinner,  "Economics  and  History". 
42Saltcr,  "Adam  Smith",  223. 
43Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  31. 
44Forbcs,  "Scientific  Whiggism".  Also  Schneider  L.  (1972).  "Tension  in  the  Thought  of  John  Millar.  " 
Studies  in  Burke  and  his  Time  13:  2083-2098. 84 
gradually  dropped  from  view.  Salter  is  forced  to  admit  both  that  it  is  a  mistake  to 
redefine  "Smith's  categories  in  terms  of  Marxian  ones",  and  that  the  four  stages 
referred  to  as  "modes  of  subsistence"  are  not  concepts  that  correspond  to  "what  Marx 
meant  by  mode  of  production".  45  On  the  other  hand,  as  a  result  of  a  rethinking  of  the 
question  of  the  relationship  between  Smith  and  Marx,  there  has  been  a  positive 
outcome.  This  is  that  Salter  brings  back  into  view  the  relationship  between  political 
economy  and  social  science  when  he  focuses  on  the  categories  of  surplus  and 
dependence  in  the  two  thinkers. 
Skinner  mentions  the  surplus  when  referring  to  Smith's  discussion  of  changes  in 
property  rights  in  the  feudal  period.  46  Salter  recognises  correctly  that  Marx  gave 
central  place  "to  the  way  in  which  the  economic  surplus  was  generated  from  the 
labourer.  "47  The  question  then  arises  of  whether  Smith  and  Millar  have  a  concept  of  an 
economic  surplus  and,  if  so,  how  this  is  conceived.  Salter  states  that  the  difference 
between  Smith  and  Marx  on  the  role  that  the  surplus  played  in  their  different  accounts 
of  transition  is  that  Smith,  unlike  Marx,  drew  attention  to  the  way  in  which  the  surplus 
was  consumed  rather  than  the  way  it  was  produced.  He  states  that,  according  to 
Smith,  the  landlord  shared  his  surplus  with  his  tenants  and  that  this  was  the  source  of 
his  authority.  48 
The  category  of  economic  dependence  surfaces  in  Salter's  criticisms  of  Winch  and 
Haakonssen.  Salter  states  that  the  latter  are  reluctant  to  recognise  that  for  Smith 
"wealth  and  political  power  hinges,  at  least  partly,  on  the  economic  dependence  of  the 
poor  on  the  rich.  "49  This  dependence  is  created  by  the  feudal  landlord  sharing  his 
surplus  with  his  tenants.  Salter,  therefore,  suggests  that  Smith  has  a  concept  of 
dependence  that  is  logically  or  causally  connected  to  the  notion  of  a  surplus  and  that 
both  surplus  and  dependence  are  economic  categories.  50 
4.7  The  Problem  of  Economic  Determinism 
Part  of  the  problem  with  the  models  of  materialist  sociology  described  above,  is 
that  they  have  also  been  described  as  "economic  determinist". 
Meek  writes  of 
45Salter,  "Adam  Smith",  228. 
46Skinncr,  "Contribution?  ",  "the  great  proprietor  has  still  nothing  on  which  to  expend  his  surpluses 
other  than  on  the  maintenance  of  dependants.  "  p94. 
47S,  aller,  "Adam  Smith".  240. 
48Saltcr,  "Adain  Smith",  233  &  241.  Millar's  concept  of  surplus  is  discussed  in  chapters  six  and 
seven. 
49Salter,  "Adarn  Sinith",  235. 
"Millar's  concept  of  dependence  is  discussed  in  chapter  eleven. 85 
"the  ubiquity  in  Smith's  work  of  the  modem  notion  of  a  causal  link  between  economic 
basis  and  social  superstructure"51 
He  continues: 
"Those  of  us  who  have  noticed  the  importance  of  these  elements  in  Smith's  work,  but 
have  hesitated  about  committing  ourselves  to  a  term  as  extreme  as  econon-dc 
determinism,  need  hesitate  no  longer"52 
The  notion  that  materialist  sociology  is  the  same  doctrine  as  economic  determinism 
is  a  consequence  of  textbook  readings  of  Marx.  Following  Pascal/Meek,  "materialism" 
and  "economic  determinism"  have  been  understood  as  two  labels  describing  the  same 
sociological  models.  In  these  models,  economic  or  material  needs  are  understood  as 
subsistence  needs  for  food,  shelter  and  clothing.  These  determine  the  ideas  that  people 
have.  Ignatieff,  for  example,  recommends  "materialism"  as  the  correct  word  to 
describe  Millar's  theory  because  it  makes  "the  satisfaction  of  basic  human  needs,  rather 
than  conscious  intention,  the  motor  of  historical  change".  It  makes  "laws,  manners  and 
rank  systems  as  dependent  upon  stages  of  subsistence".  53  In  this  view,  Millar  explained 
the  progress  of  society  in  terms  of  stages  in  the  means  by  which  individuals  satisfy 
their  basic  subsistence  or  "economic"  needs. 
Haakonssen  also  follows  Pascal,  Meek  and  Skinner  uncritically.  He  does  not 
attempt  to  make  any  distinction  between  "economic"  and  "materialist":  the  two  terms 
are  interchangeable  and  the  proposition  that  an  economic  interpretation  of  history  is  a 
materialist  one  is  tautologous.  Thus  he  can  refer  to  those  scholars  who  take  Millar's 
achievement  to  be  "a  materialist,  or  economic  interpretation  of  history"  as  describing 
an  identical  theory  with  two  different  possible  names.  He  notes  that  this  interpretation 
suffers  from  vagueness.  54  However,  this  vagueness  does  not  prevent  him  from  trying 
to  make  sense  of  it  in  order  to  criticise  it.  Haakonssen  decides  that  it  is  both  a  theory 
of  determining  factors,  and  also  a  theory  of  economic  motivation. 
Economic  determinism  has  therefore  been  taken  to  mean,  firstly  a  doctrine  that 
reduces  ideas,  institutions  and  individual  subjectivity  to  economic  activity;  secondly,  a 
doctrine  that  states  that  individuals  are  motivated  exclusively  or  predomýinately  by 
subsistence  need  or  monetary  gain;  and  thirdly,  a  doctrine  based  on  the  hypostatised 
language  of  causal  factors. 
5IMeek,  "The  Great  Whole  Man.  "  Quoted  in  Skinner,  "Contribution?  ",  p86. 
52Mcck,  "The  Great  Whole  Man.  " 
53jgllatiCff,  "Millar",  p318. 
54Haakonsscn,  Legislator,  p182. 86 
4.8  Economic  Determinism  and  Epiphenomona 
The  first  notion  is  that  economic  determinism  entails  a  reduction  of  subjectivity  in 
general  and  intellectual  activity  in  particular  to  economic  activity.  One  version  of  this 
idea  has  come  to  be  known  as  epiphenomenalism.  According  to  this  doctrine,,  mental 
events  are  understood  exclusively  as  the  effects  of  physical  changes  in  the  body.  When 
consciousness  is  understood  as  a  phenomenal  process  caused  by  physical  activity  in  the 
brain,  then  the  experience  of  the  will  as  a  subjectively  experienced  mental  activity 
appears  to  be  an  illusion.  Mental  activity  is  reduced  to  what  appears  to  be  the  activity 
of  the  brain.  It  has  no  effect  on  the  activity  of  the  brain.  Thought  of  in  this  way,  the 
notion  of  free  will  can  be  disposed  of  as  a  metaphysical  error  with  superstitious 
connotations.  The  complexity  of  mental  activity  is  reduced  to  a  succession  of  simple 
atomistic  internal  events.  These  are  nothing  more  or  less  than  events  in  the  brain. 
These  events  can  be  further  reduced  to  the  behaviour  of  molecular  or  atomic  particles. 
Epiphenomenalism  is  a  sub-species  of  what  Meikle  has  called  "reductive 
materialism".  55 
By  analogy  with  this  theory,  a  crude  interpretation  of  Marx's  statement  of  method 
in  the  Preface  has  come  into  being.  56  The  doctrine  that  has  come  to  be  known  as 
economic  determinism  looks  on  social  consciousness  as  exclusively  the  effect  of 
productive  activity.  This  is  usually  narrowly  conceived  of  as  pecuniary  activity  directed 
to  the  satisfaction  of  subsistence  needs  for  food,  clothing  and  shelter.  Just  as  mental 
activity  has  no  effect  on  the  activity  of  the  brain,  so,  by  analogy,  it  follows  that  legal, 
political,  religious,  artistic  or  philosophical  activity  has  no  effect  on  economic  activity. 
The  complexity  of  social  consciousness  is  reduced  to  a  succession  of  economic  events 
of  production,  exchange  and  consumption.  These  events  can  be  further  reduced  to  the 
desires  of  atomistic  individuals  motivated  by  the  satisfaction  of  pleasures  and 
avoidance  of  pains.  If  the  possession  of  money  triggers  pleasurable  sensations  and  its 
absence  is  accompanied  by  pain  or  distress,  then  all  forms  of  social  consciousness  can 
be  reduced  to  the  economic  motives  of  individuals. 
There  is  therefore  a  relationship  between  the  differing  notions  of  the  doctrine  of 
economic  determinism  as  a  reduction  of  ideas  to  economic  activity  and  of  motives  to 
monetary  gain.  This  relationship  is  clear  to  a  reader  familiar  with  positivist  models  of 
scientific  explanation.  Positivist  accounts  of  science  oblige  the  inquirer  to  commit 
55Meikle  S.  (1985)  Essentialism  in  the  Thought  ofKarl  A'larx,  London:  p  154. 
56This  pre-dites  the  textbook  models  discussed  above.  Miclntyre  states  that  it  was  an  "established 
Fabian  criticism"  of  Marxism  in  the  1920s.  It  was  used  by  Raniscy  MacDonald,  Harold  Lask;. 
Bertrand  Russell,  Grahain  Wallas,  and  Cyril  Joad.  Proletarian  'ýcience,  pp]  15-116.  In  the  Preface, 
Marx  stated  that  changes  in  the  cconornic  foundation  of  society  lead  to  changes  in  what  lie  called  the 
"superstructure".  The  inctaphor  of  a  society  as  a  building  with  a  foundation  below  ground  and  a 
structure  above  ground  was  used  by  Harrington,  Millar  (111',  1.127)  and  Marx.  See  discussion  in 
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themselves  to  various  metaphysical  or  ontological  assumptions.  These  include  a  theory 
of  knowledge  that  prioritises  sensory  impressions  or  sense  data.  The  latter  are  the 
foundations  of  all  knowledge.  A  crude  positivist  account  of  the  relationship  between 
economic  activity  and  other  forms  of  activity  might  start  with  impressions  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  then  move  to  basic  desires  and  needs  for  food,  shelter  and  clothing.  These 
give  pleasure  when  satisfied  and  pain  when  denied.  The  next  move  is  to  suppose  that 
individuals  are  motivated  to  engage  in  the  exchange  of  money  for  commodities  as  a 
means  to  satisfy  pleasures  and  relieve  pains.  Property,  law  and  government  then 
become  necessary  to  encourage  exchange  and  prevent  the  distress  caused  by  any 
interference  with,  interruption  or  breakdown  of  the  means  to  the  satisfaction  of 
pleasures. 
In  this  account,  ideas  of  property,  law  and  government  are  reduced  to  impressions 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  the  reasons  for  such  social  institutions  are  reduced  to  the 
mechanistic  operation  of  a  total  aggregate  of  individuals'  economic  motives.  The 
positivism  evident  in  this  account  is  to  be  found  in  the  attempt  to  give  explanations  in 
terms  of  the  interaction  of  atomistic  entities:  social  institutions  in  terms  of  individuals' 
motives  and  the  ideas  of  these  institutions  in  terms  of  sensory  impressions  of  pleasure 
and  pain. 
Recently  Marxist  philosophers  have  challenged  positivist  interpretations  of  Marx  in 
an  attempt  to  re-establish  the  classical  foundations  of  Marx's  essentialist  and  dialectical 
method  of  explanation.  57  Some  scholars  have  also  made  efforts  to  show  that  this  sort 
of  account  has  little  relationship  to  Smith's  thinking  on  moral  philosophy, 
jurisprudence  and  political  economy. 
Thus  both  Winch  and  Hopfl  reject  a  description  of  the  Scots'  philosophical  history 
in  terms  of  a  "base/superstructure"  paradigm  because  consciousness  and  political  and 
legal  institutions  are  treated  as  "epiphenomenal".  58  This  rejection  is  important  for  three 
reasons.  The  flrst  is  that  the  crude  positivist  understanding  of  "economic  determinism" 
has  been  internalised  into  many  scholars'  readings  of  Marx  (or  in  Marxian-sounding 
language  when  applied  to  the  Scots). 
The  second  is  that  they  want  to  emphasise  the  independence  of  the  political  and 
juridical  spheres  from  economic  activity  in  the  Scots'  writings.  Thus  the  Scots  do  not 
57Mcikle  S.  Essentialism.  See  also  Meikle  S.  (1986),  "Making  Nonsense  of  Marx.  "  Inquiry  29:  29-43, 
and  Meikle  S.  (1991)  "History  of  philosophy:  the  metaphysics  of  substance  in  Marx.  "  In  Carver  T. 
(ed.  )  The  Cambridgc  Companion  to  Marx,  Cambridge:  pp296-319.  Also  Meszaros  1.  The  Mature  of 
Histo-ical  Determination  unpub.  paper.  n.  d.  22  pages. 
58"To  the  latter  ['ideational'  and  'political'  agencies),  'economic  determinism'  allots  only  a  derivative, 
secondary  or  merely  cpiphenonicnal  status.  "  Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History".  33.  See  also:  "Political  and 
legal  institutions  are  treated  as  cpiplicnonicnal  to  underlying  economic  forces.  "  p.  258  of  Winch  D. 
(1983)  "Adain  Smith's  'enduring  particular  result'.  "  In  Hont  &  Ignaticff  (cds)  pp.  253-269.  The  point 
is  ftirflicr  repeated  in  Winch  D.  (1978)  Adajn.  'ýniilh's  1"ofilics:  ar  Essqv  in  flisforiographic  Revision. 
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"minimise  the  significance  of  political  as  opposed  to  economic  circumstances  ...  still 
less,  to  allot  to  economic  circumstances  an  automatic  causal  priority.  "59  And:  "No 
Scottish  philosopher  was  prepared  to  assert  anything  comparable  to  the  view  that  the 
character  of  the  political  institutions  of  a  society  is  merely  derivative  from  its  economic 
arrangements.  1160 
The  third  is  that  they  want  to  show  the  utility  the  Scots'  philosophical  history  had 
to  the  contemporary  legislator  or  policy  maker  when  attempting  to  "remove  injustices 
and  adapt  institutions  to  changing  circumstance.  "61 
Concomitantly,  scholars  have  been  keen  to  show  that,  although  the  Scots  give 
explanations  of  individuals'  social  motivation,  these  explanations  can  not  be  easily 
confined  to  simple  internal  promptings  for  the  satisfaction  of  subsistence  need  or 
monetary  gain  (what  is  thought  of  as  an  economic  motive).  Thus  Hopfl  states  that  the 
Scots  explained  changes  in  customs  and  manners  by  reference  to  a  variety  of  different 
motives.  Thus  as,  mentioned  above,  he  quotes  Hume's  list  of  "ambition,  avarice,  self- 
love,  vanity,  friendship,  generosity,  public  spirit"  (E-HII,  65,83).  Hopfl  states  that  "no 
motive  or  interest"  (such  as  the  passion  of  "avarice"  -  the  closest  in  meaning  to 
"economic  motive")  had  "an  automatic  priority  over  the  otherS.  "62 
Winch's  project  is  to  refute  what  he  identifies  as  an  influential  story  of  Smith's  role 
within  the  history  of  ideas.  This  is  that  Smith  is  "an  upholder  of  a  system  of  natural 
liberty  within  which  individuals  possess  certain  natural  rights  and  pursue  selfish  ends  of 
an  economic  character.  "63  That  Smith  might  be  an  economic  determinist  of  a  Marxian 
type  is  a  small  part  of  a  wider  story  that  situates  Smith  in  a  line  of  evolution  from 
Locke  to  Marx.  Marxian  interpretations  of  Smith  are  a  divergent  variant  of  what  he 
calls  the  "liberal  capitalist  perspective".  This  relies  on  the  notion  that  the  classical 
thinkers  of  the  bourgeoisie  have  a  notion  of  the  individual  as  economically  motivated. 
Winch's  book  sides  with  Pocock's  characterisation  of  the  Scots  as  civic  moralists  as 
much  concerned  with  the  market's  corruption  of  the  citizen's  virtue,  as  with  its 
extensions  of  the  individual's  liberty  and  opportunities  to  acquire  property.  64  Thus: 
"Smith  does  not  make  use  of  the  construct  known  as  'economic  man'.  Self-interest  is 
not  directed  solely  by  pecuniary  motives  towards  econornic  ends:  honour,  vanity, 
59Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  35. 
60Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  36. 
61Wincli,  "'particular  result"',  p258. 
62Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  35. 
63  Winch,  Sinith's  Politics,  p  13. 
64Wi, 
. nch.  Smilli's  Politics,  Winch  records  his  debt  to  Pocock  (and  Forbes)  in  his  (1996)  Riches  and 
Poverl.  v:  An  intellectual  hisforV  oj*polilical  econom.  v  in  Britain:  1750-1834.  Cambridge:  ppl7-18. 89 
social  esteem,  love  of  case,  and  love  of  domination  figure  alongside  the  more  usual 
considerations  of  commercial  gain  as  motives  in  economic  as  well  as  other  pursuits.  "65 
Winch's  denial  that  Smith  has  a  notion  of  man  as  an  economic  animal  is  a 
corrective  to  those  economists  who  might  want  to  make  Smith  conform  to  a  model  of 
human  behaviour  that  ignores  moral  or  political  motives.  However  it  is  less  convincing 
as  a  corrective  of  C.  B.  Macpherson's  thesis.  This  is  that  there  are  certain  assumptions 
that  unite  both  classical  bourgeois  political  and  economic  thinkers  of  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries  and  the  later  conception  of  a  liberal-democratic  society.  66 
Winch's  correctives  depend  upon  exposing  the  crude  conflation  of  the  concept  of  self- 
interest  with  "pecuniary  motive"  or  monetary  gain.  Although  this  may  or  may  not  be  a 
mistake  made  by  nineteenth  century  economists,  it  is  not  one  that  Macpherson,  or  for 
that  matter  Marx,  appear  to  make.  The  Marxian  insight  is  that  the  notion  of  private 
interest  is  socially  determined  rather  than  an  eternal  natural  attribute.  It  therefore 
presupposes  a  society  in  which  commodity  production  and  exchange  is in  the  process 
of  becoming  generalised  to  all  forms  of  activity.  This  insight  does  not  entail  reducing 
the  category  of  self-interest  to  a  "pecuniary  motive".  Rather  it  suggests  that  there  are 
limits  to  theories  that  make  the  self-interested  subject  the  key  theoretical  abstraction 
for  the  scientific  understanding  of  society. 
The  Marxian  insight  does  not  therefore  contradict  Winch's  remarks  that  despite  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century  concept  of  interest  often  connoting  a  pecuniary 
interest,  Smith's  employment  of  the  term  was  intended  to  cover  "men's  aspirations  or 
ambitions  in  general".  67  Smith's  notion  was  no  doubt  much  richer  than  that  of  his 
nineteenth  and  twentieth  century  followers.  If  Smith's  notion  of  self-interest  included 
the  satisfaction  gained  from  the  esteem  and  praise  of  others  -  whether  morally 
deserved  or  not  -  and  if,  (once  the  martial  virtues  of  barbarism  began  to  lose  their 
influence),  economic  activity  became  the  main  path  to  the  realisation  of  this  goal,  then 
the  subjective  end  can  happily  differ  from  the  objective  means  of  achieving  the  end.  I 
argue  throughout  this  thesis  that  Millar  follows  Smith  in  this  respect.  68 
Although  Haakonssen  makes  the  connection  between  economic  determinism  and 
economic  motives  more  explicitly  than  Winch,  his  argument  uses  a  similar  example. 
His  notion  of  an  economic  motive  is  broader  than  monetary  gain  and  includes  "the 
procurement  of  the  necessities  for  subsistence.  "69  Haakonssen  challenges  Meek's 
statement  that  the  Scots  think  that  "the  way  in  which  people  get  their  living  is 
65  Winch,  Smith's  Politics,  p  167. 
"Macpherson,  Possessive  Individualism. 
67Winch,  Smith's  Politics,  p  168. 
68See  chapters  eight.  nine  and  ten. 
69Haakonssen,  Legislator,  p183. 90 
conceived  to  determine  the  main  lines  along  which  they  think  and  behave.  "  70  He  argues 
that  Smith  denies  that  subsistence  needs  motivate  people,  rather  it  is  taste  and  vanity. 
For  Smith  it  is  aesthetic  rather  than  economic  needs  that  motivate  people.  The  passage 
he  quotes  is  from  Smith's  Yheory  of  Moral  Seittimews.  He  quotes  Smith  on 
betterment:  "it  is  the  vanity,  not  the  ease,  or  the  pleasure,  which  interests  us.  " 
(TA,  fSj.  iii.  2,1,50).  Haakonssen  reads  "economic  needs"  to  mean  "subsistence  needs". 
He  therefore  thinks  he  can  refute  the  claim  that  Smith  has  an  economic  interpretation 
of  history.  He  writes: 
"it  is  not  economic  needs  which  motivate  men  to  make  the  world  go  round.  It  is  rather 
an  aestheticized  version  of  the  taste  and  delicacy  which  raised  men  above  the  rest  of 
the  animal  creation".  71 
Haakonssen  also  argues  that  Smith  has  no  notion  of  determinism  in  the  sense 
discussed  above  as  a  doctrine  opposed  to  free  will. 
4.9  One  Factor  or  Many? 
The  question  arises  whether  these  scholars  have  been  tilting  at  windmills  with  their 
criticisms  of  the  attribution  of  the  doctrine  of  economic  determinism  to  the  Scots' 
philosophical  history.  Most  scholars  are  happy  to  admit  that,  for  Millar,  economic 
activity  has  some  bearing  upon  their  explanation  of  changes  in  society.  72  But  they  have 
yet  to  give  a  coherent  account  of  how  Millar  conceives  of  economic  activity  and  the 
role  it  plays  in  explaining  changes  in  ideas,  habits,  laws  and  governments.  If  the  thesis 
were  presented  in  a  textbook  fashion  with  the  apologetic  intent  of  establishing  a  space 
for  academics  sympathetic  to  the  former  Soviet  Union  in  the  British  establishment, 
then  it  would  be  no  surprise  that  the  arguments  made  against  it  should  also  appear  to 
be  disjointed  and  based  on  long-standing  prejudices  against  and  positivist 
misconceptions  over  the  nature  of  Marx's  historical  theory. 
Pascal's  and  Meek's  original  thesis  used  a  cluster  of  words  such  as  "basic  economic 
factors",  "economic  base  and  superstructure",  and  "mode  of  production".  I  have 
indicated  above  how  these  are  essential  to  the  type  of  materialist  sociology  thought  of 
as  Marxist.  The  jargon,  however,  also  included  examples  of  the  non-Marxian 
hypostatised  language  of  "factors".  There  is  a  parallel  use  of  "factors"  in  orthodox 
econoMiCS.  73 
70Mcek,  "Contribution",  40.  Quoted  in  Haakonssen,  Legislator,  p  18  L 
71Haakonsscii,  Legislator,  p18l. 
72Tlius:  "III  Millar 
...  everything  is  explained  in  terms  of  the  progress  of  society,  and  the  economic 
interpretation  is  basic.  "  Forbes,  (1954)  "Scientific  Whiggisin".  663-664. 
73juSt  aS  in  economics,  capital,  labour  and  land  become  hypostatiscd  factors  of  production  that  are 
causally  connected  within  a  model  that  can  operate  indcpcndently  of  social  relations,  so  the 91 
Thus  Pascal,  quoting  Millar's  recommendation  to  study  circumstances  such  as  "the 
fertility  or  barrenness  of  the  soil;  the  nature  of  productions,  the  nature  of  the  labour 
required;  the  size  of  population;  the  proficiency  in  arts;  the  advantages  accruing  from 
mutual  transactions"  in  order  to  understand  the  causes  of  the  differing  laws  and 
governments  in  the  world  (OR,  2),  commented  that  these  circumstances  constitute 
economic  factors  which  produce  habits,  attitudes,  and  forms  of  behaviour.  Meek 
reiterated  Pascal  in  the  statement  that  Millar's  theory  assumes  "basic  economic  factors" 
which  influence  "power  relations",  through  the  mediation  of  "induced  changes  in 
property  relations".  74 
Skinner  favours  a  multifactoral  theory  which  allows  non-economic  factors  a  role. 
He  concluded  his  assessment  of  Meek's  contribution  by  stating  that,  although  Smith 
"gave  due  weight  to  the  importance  of  economic  factors",  he  also  took  into 
consideration  "quirks  of  character,  physical  elements  and  pure  accident".  75 
In  the  absence  of  specifying  exactly  what  they  understood  by  Marx's  theory  of 
history,  Pascal,  Meek  and  Skinner  stated  that  Smith  and  Millar  conformed  to  it  by 
making  the  economic  factor  the  sole  determining  condition  for  the  actions  of 
individuals.  This  has  allowed  the  imagination  of  later  scholars  to  understand  the 
economic  factor  both  as  a  hypostatised  entity  that  restricts  individual  free  will,  and  as 
an  economic  motive  for  subsistence  satisfaction  or  pecuniary  gain.  This  is  the 
substance  of  Haakonssen's  and  Winch's  criticisms. 
Haakonssen,  following  Skinner,  interprets  Smith's  social  and  historical  theory  as 
conforming  to  a  multifactoral  theory.  He  links  factors  to  motivation  and  appeals  to 
consensus  scholarship  to  affirm  this  viewpoint: 
'Ieveryone  agrees  that,  according  to  Smith,  economic  factors  can  only  be  socially 
determining  through  their  influence  on  individuals"76 
As  a  multi-factoralist,  Haakonssen  wants  to  include,  amongst  other  factors, 
religious,  legal,  political,  moral  and  chance  factors  as  socially  determining.  His  list  of 
factors  also  includes  the  individual  factor.  The  economic  was  just  one  factor  or  motive 
amongst  many.  He  thereby  characterises  Millar  and  Smith  as  "methodological 
individualists"  who  recognised  that  there  are  a  "multiplicity  of  elements  at  play".  77 
"economic"  becomes  causally  connected  to  other  social  factors  such  as  the  "religious",  the  "political" 
and  the  "juridical"  etc.  within  a  sociological  model  that  can  operate  independently  of  social  relations. 
For  a  critique  of  the  hypostatised  concept  of  factors,  see  Pickhanov  G.  V.  (1897)  "On  the  Materialist 
Understanding  of  History"  inSelected  Philosophical  Works  vol.  2.  Moscow,  1976:  pp222-250. 
74Mcek,  "Contribution",  p42. 
75Skinner,  "Contribution?  ",  p102. 
76Haakonssen,  Legislator,  p182. 
77Haakonssen,  Legislator.  p182. 92 
Along,  therefore,  with  the  textbook  models  discussed  above,  econon& 
determinism  has  also  come  to  be  understood  as  a  sociological  doctrine  that  states  that 
an  economic  factor  has  the  sole  determining  influence  on  political  and  other 
institutions.  Determinism  (as  opposed  to  free  will)  had  become,  for  Haakonssen,  the 
central  issue  at  stake.  Haakonssen  wanted  to  free  Smith  from  the  suggestion  of  the 
notion  of  a  determinism  that  denies  the  possibility  of  free  will.  By  emphasising  the  role 
of  accident  in  Smith's  historiography,  he  unwittingly  suggested  that  individual  freedom 
is  to  be  found  in  chance  events.  Haakonssen  therefore  presented  Smith  as  arguing  that 
all  factors  have  some  determining  influence.  There  are  "hard"  determining  factors, 
"like  the  absence  of  sea  transport  for  a  country",  and  "soft"  ones  "like  an  individual's 
decisions  to  act.  "  And  there  are  "many  other  causal  influences  besides  motiveS".  711  The 
suggestion  of  an  infinite  number  of  subjective  individual  motives  and  the  casual  use  of 
the  term  "factors"  is,  I  would  suggest,  neither  helpful  nor  illuminating. 
Concluding  his  discussion  of  Smith's  historical  methodology  he  writes: 
"If  we  have  to  choose  between  the  view  that  "the  economic"  is  a  necessary  and 
sufficient  condition  for  historical  change,  and  the  view  that  it  is  merely  a  necessary 
condition,  we  can  safely  say  that  the  formcr  was  not  Smith's  view.  But  the  latter  is 
obviously  true  in  the  sense  that  certain  broad  generalisations  of  an  economic  kind  are 
necessary  for  certain  broad,  general  kinds  of  social  and  political  organisation".  79 
Thus,  according  to  Haakonssen,  either  (1)  Smith  thought  that  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  of  historical  change  that  is  not  also  economic  change,  but  that  it  is  possible  to 
conceive  of  economic  changes  that  are  not  historical  changes,  or  (2)  Smith  thought 
that  it  is  possible  to  conceive  of  historical  change  that  is  not  economic  change,  but 
impossible  to  conceive  of  economic  changes  that  are  not  historical.  Haakonssen's 
meaning  is  unclear.  If  he  intends  (1),  then  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  what  a  non-historical 
economic  change  might  be.  If  he  intends  (2),  and  he  also  wants  to  prove  that  Smith's 
historical  method  is  qualitatively  different  from  Marx's,  he  brings  the  two  thinkers  into 
a  close  alliance.  Marx  would  have  agreed  with  (2). 
4.10  Opposing  Economic  to  Juridical 
What  is  interesting  about  Haakonssen's  discussion  is  that,  taking  a  lead  from 
Pascal,  Meek  and  Skinner,  he  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  define  or  discuss  the 
category  or  meaning  of  "economic".  Other  than  references  to  the  notion  of 
"subsistence"  and  "mode  of  subsistence"  that  have  peppered  the  literature  on  the  four 
78Haakonssen,  Legislator,  pp186-187. 
79Haakonssen,  Legislator,  p.  188. 93 
stages,  Haakonssen  did  not  discuss  what  it  was  that  might  be  distinctively  "economic" 
in  Smith's  conception  of  historical  change.  We  are  therefore  left  in  the  dark  concerning 
the  kind  of  "broad  general  i  sati  ons"  Haakonssen  considers  to  be  "economic"  and  how 
they  can  in  any  meaningful  way  be  said  to  be  "necessary". 
Haakonssen  has  no  sympathy  for  the  economic  interpretation  of  Millar,  because 
the  latter  has  had  no  place  for  "the  presence  of  a  clear  idea  of  natural  law  and 
rights.  "80  Sociological  accounts  ignore  the  "normative  discipline  of  natural 
jurisprudence"  that  he  has  given  so  much  attention  to  in  his  book  on  Smith  and 
elsewhere.  Yet  on  Millar,  he  states: 
"As  in  Smith  the  economic  elements  dominate  and  are  necessary  for  any  social  change, 
but  they  are  hardly  ever  alone  or  sufficient".  81 
However,  rather  than  attempting  to  grapple  with  the  necessary  relationship 
between  economic  elements  and  juridical  change,  he  is  content  to  remark  that  it  is 
difficult  to  make  any  sense  of  the  economic  or  materialist  interpretation.  He  quotes 
Millar  on  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  French  Revolution  being  the  progress  of 
knowledge,  science  and  philosophy,  and,  appealing  to  the  well-informed  reader  either 
wryly  or  in  puzzlement,  comments  that  Millar  is,  indeed,  a  "strange  historical 
materialist.  "' 
In  conclusion,  I  have  suggested  that  much  of  the  confusion  caused  by  describing 
Smith  and  Millar  as  economic  determinists  is  derived  from  textbook  readings  of  Marx, 
internalised  by  students  without  much  attention  to  the  philosophical  content  of  Marx's 
critical  theory.  There  is  a  body  of  orthodox  writings  demonstrating  that  Marx  does  not 
reduce  ideas  to  epiphenomena  flitting  out  of  economic  activity  -  floating  like  soap 
bubbles  on  the  surface  of  a  lake.  83  He  does  not  reduce  individual  motivation  to  a  desire 
for  subsistence  or  monetary  gain.  He  does  not  deny  free  will.  If  these  doctrines  are 
essential  to  the  doctrine  of  economic  determinism,  they  have  no  bearing  on  Marx's 
historical  theory.  That  these  ideas  have  come  to  be  associated  with  classical  Marxism 
therefore  requires  a  social,  historical  and  intellectual  explanation  that  would  go  beyond 
the  scope  of  this  dissertation. 
As  Hopfl,  Winch  and  Haakonssen  have  shown,  economic  determinism,  so 
conceived,  has  no  application  to  Millar  and  Smith.  What  has  been  lost,  however,  in  this 
negative  characterisation  is  the  relationship  that  Millar  thought  existed  between 
economic  activity,  ideas,  and  juridical  and  political  institutions.  Scholars  agree  that 
8OHaakonssen,  "Millar",  65  &  Natural  Law,  p  178. 
"Haakonsscri,  "Millar",  65  &  Natural  Law,  p178. 
82Haakonsscn,  "Millar",  65  &  Natural  Law,  p  178. 
83Labriola,  Essays,  p126. 94 
there  is  some  such  relationship.  If  they  were  to  follow  Macpherson  in  conceiving 
property  as  an  economic  category  then  it  would  be  easy  to  show  that,  like  other 
thinkers  before  him,  Millar  thought  that  there  was  a  causal  relationship  between 
economic  activity  and  the  political  constitution.  Millar  states  unequivocally: 
"The  distribution  of  property  among  any  people  is  the  principal  circumstance  that 
contributes  ...  to  determine  the  form  of  their  political  constitution.  "  (HV,  1,127). 
This  maxim  is  found  in  the  works  of  James  Harrington  and  is,  arguably,  as  ancient 
as  Aristotle.  84  The  evidence  of  this  quote  alone  would  justify  describing  Millar  as  a 
"property  determinist".  115  I  discuss  what  it  could  have  meant  to  Millar  in  chapter 
eleven. 
84According  to  James  Madison,  fourth  President  of  the  United  States  and  founding  father  of  the 
American  Constitution,  this  maxim  was  as  "old  as  political  science  itscIP'.  In  essay  Number  Tcri  of 
The  Federalist,  Madison  attributed  the  maxim  that  property  is  "the  true  basis  and  measure  of  power" 
to  Aristotle,  Bacon,  PLaleigh  and  Harrington.  Quoted  in  Beard  C.  A.  (1957)  The  Economic  Basis  of 
Politics  and  Related  Writings,  New  York:  p3  8. 
"The  assumption  that  property  is  an  economic  rather  than  a  juridical  category,  led  Beard  to  c1rim 
Madison  for  his  own  theory  of  politics.  Madison  wrote:  "From  the  protection  of  different  and  unequal 
faculties  of  acquiring  property,  the  possession  of  different  degrees  and  kinds  of  property  immediately 
results.  "  Beard  comments:  "This  inexorable  economic  fact  is  the  basis  of  political  fact.  "  Economic 
Basis,  p35.  Lehmann  remarks  that  Beard  thought  Madison  was  the  "most  systematic  exponent  of 
feconoinicdcterminism'  after  Harrington.  "  Millar,  p154. 0  Part  Three,, 
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Chapter  Five: 
Economic  Activity 
As  I  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  notion  of  "economic  activity"  is  taken  for 
granted  in  much  of  the  recent  work  on  Millar  and  Smith.  It  has  been,  on  the  one  hand, 
thought  of  as  productive  activity  and,  on  the  other,  as  the  satisfaction  of  individuals' 
requirements  for  subsistence.  These  are  analytically  different  categories,  although 
genetically  related.  For  example,  from  the  perspective  of  immediate  subjective 
experience  (presupposing  the  abstraction  of  market  or  bureaucratically  induced 
scarcities),  it  appears  that,  if  individuals  are  to  gain  a  means  of  subsistence,  their 
working  activity  must  be  productive  of  value  or of  use-value. 
What  follows  is  therefore  an  attempt  to  establish  the  content  of  the  category  of 
"economic".  This  is  necessary  in  order  to  discuss  whether  or  not  Millar  had  any 
understanding  of  it,  and,  if  he  did,  the  category's  relationship  to  his  jurisprudence  and 
philosophical  history.  I  have  based  the  following  investigation  on  a  critique  of  two 
opposing  understandings  of  the  notion  of  "economic". 
The  first  is  a  typical  twentieth  century  liberal  understanding.  This  is  theorised  by 
Ludwig  von  Mises  in  his  seminal  critique  of  socialism.  The  second  is  a  typical 
twentieth  century  Marxian  understanding.  This  is  theorised  by  C.  B.  Macpherson.  The 
outcome  of  this  critique  resolves  itself  into  a  statement  of  my  own  understanding  of 
the  classical  Marxist  notion  of  the  category.  This  is  that  economic  activity  is  the  form 
that  productive  activity  takes  when  social  relations  are  commodified.  The  aim  of  this 
chapter  is  to  clarify  the  specific  concept  of  "economic".  This  is  necessary  to  assess 
whether  or  not  the  notion  can  be  found  in  Millar's  writings  and  what  determining  role, 
if  any,  it  has  in  his  account  of  history.  The  following  discussion  therefore  also  makes 
reference  to  the  use  of  the  notion  of  economic  activity  in  the  literature  on  Smith  and 
Millar,  especially  Haakonssen's  in  his  book  on  Smith's  jurisprudence. 
5.1  Von  Mises  and  Monetary  Calculation 
Von  Mises  understands  economic  activity  as  rational  activity  and  rational  activity 
as  activity  motivated  by  the  valuation  of  ends.  The  latter  are  reducible  to  pleasure  or 
satisfaction  understood  broadly  as  subjective  desire.  Thus  : 
"The  sphere  of  economic  activity  is  coterminous  with  the  sphere  of  rai:  onal  action.  It 
consists  firstly  in  valuation  of  ends,  and  then  in  the  valuation  of  the  means  to  these 
ends.  All  economic  activity  depends,  therefore,  upon  the  existence  of  ends.  "I 
I  Von  Mises  L.  (195  1)  Socialism,  Yale:  p  125. 97 
The  valuation  of  ends  takes  place  in  the  mind  of  the  individual.  It  is  subjective  and 
therefore  unobservable.  The  means  to  the  satisfaction  of  these  ends,  on  the  other  hand, 
can  be  observed.  They  are  observed  in  the  calculations  of  value  that  individuals  make 
with  money.  The  essence  of  economic  activity  is  therefore  "the  carrying  out  of  acts  of 
exchange.  "2  The  essence  of  rational  activity  is  the  money  calculations  that  individuals 
make  in  order  to  get  what  they  want  out  of  life.  Because  von  Mises  regards  acts  of 
exchange  as  unthinkable  without  the  calculation  of  the  amounts  of  money  involved, 
then  economic  and  rational  activity  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  3 
Nonetheless  he  is  prepared  to  concede  that  there  is  a  justification  for  separating 
"purely  economic"  activity  from  all  other  forms  of  rational  economic  activity.  "Purely 
economic"  activity  is  "nothing  but  the  sphere  in  which  money  calculation  is  possible.  "4 
It  follows  that  money-calculating  activity  through  exchange  is  also  the  essence  of 
purely  rational  activity. 
Finally,  economic  activity  as  money-calculating  activity  is  the  activity  of 
individuals.  Historically  individuals  recognised  that  they  were  naturally  unequal.  As  a 
result  they  decided  to  co-operate  in  order  to  satisfy  their  subjective  desires.  On  this 
basis  they  got  the  idea  of  the  division  of  labour.  5  The  idea  of  the  division  of  labour 
became  the  foundation  of  the  idea  of  society.  Society  grew  "out  of  self-sufficient 
individuals.  "6  Society  is  the  product  of  the  "thought  and  will"  of  individuals  who 
choose  to  co-operate  to  achieve  their  own  satisfactory  endS.  7 
The  idea  of  the  division  of  labour  and  society  have  no  objective  existence  outside 
the  subjective  intentions  and  desires  and  ends  of  individuals.  Society's  "being  lies 
within  man,  not  in  the  outer  world.  It  is  projected  from  within  outwardS.  "8 
As  I  have  argued  above,  the  problem  with  Smith  and  Millar  scholarship  so  far  is 
that  individuals'  economic  motives  have  been  associated  with  sociological  textbook 
versions  of  Marx's  materialist  understanding  of  history.  Haakonssen's  discussion  of 
Smith's  view  of  society  and  history  is  a  good  example  of  this  association.  Haakonssen 
2  Vol,  Mises.  Socialism,  p  118. 
3This  idcntity  of  "economic"  and  "rational"  is  iicccssary  if  von  Miscs  is  to  argue  successfully  that 
socialism  is  all  irrational  idea.  Thus  "Socialism  is  the  renunciation  of  rational  economy.  "  Socialism, 
p122. 
4VOII  Mises,  Socialism,  p125. 
SVon  Miscs,  Socialism,  p293. 
6Von  Miscs,  Socialism,  p29  1. 
7"That  :  -.  cicty  is  possible  at  all  is  due  to  the  fact  that  (lie  will  of  one  person  and  the  will  of  another 
find  themselves  lipkcd  in  a  joint  cndeavour.  Community  of  work  springs  from  community  of  will. 
Because  I  can  get  what  I  want  only  if  my  fellow  citizen  gets  what  lie  wants,  his  will  and  action 
become  the  means  by  which  I  can  attain  my  own  end.  Because  in),  willing  necessarily  includes  his 
willing,  my  intention  cannot  be  to  frustrate  his  will.  Oil  this  fundanicntal  fact  all  social  life  is  built 
up.  "  Socialism,  P298. 
Won  Mises,  Socialism,  p29  1. 98 
defines  an  economic  motive  as  one  that  aims  to  satisfy  a  subsistence  need.  9  A 
subsistence  need  is  also  a  material  need  in  the  sense  that  an  individual  can  not  survive 
without  the  satisfaction  of  this  need  (e.  g.  for  food,  shelter  and  clothing).  From  this 
starting  point  he  then  argues  that  Smith  understood  human  motivation  in  non- 
economic  terms.  Haakonssen's  account  of  Smith  entails  that  human  motivation  is  the 
satisfaction  of  a  subjective  desire  of  individuals  with  a  foundation  in  human  nature. 
The  emphasis  on  the  subjective  desires  of  individuals  is  so  far  consistent  with  von 
Mises'  thinking.  But  Haakonssen  then  argues  that  Smith  thought  that  the  desire  for 
social  recognition  or  approval  is  a  more  important  motive  to  action  than  the  desire  for 
material  survival.  However,  because  Haakonssen  is  arguing  against  the  textbook 
materialist  sociologist,  he  does  not  discuss  whether  Smith  thought  that  either  the  ends 
of  subsistence  need  or  social  approval  are  best  satisfied  through  the  means  of  acts  of 
exchange  and  the  calculation  of  money.  If  Smith  did  not  think  that  the  satisfaction  of 
interested  passions  were  best  realised  through  the  means  of  monetary  calculation,  then 
it  could  be  argued  that  he  did  not  have  a  concept  of  an  economic  motive  similar  in 
meaning  to  von  Mises'. 
Von  Mises'  understanding  of  economic  activity  as  individual  motivation  involving 
money  calculations  is  evident  in  Millar's  writings.  These  exist  but  they  are  few.  For 
example,  Millar  refers  to  a  "pecuniary  interest"  (HV,  4,227  &  258).  According  to  von 
Mises,  this  would  be  evidence  of  Millar's  understanding  of  individuals'  econornic 
motives.  Haakonssen's  point,  however,  is  that  the  eighteenth  century  concept  of  self- 
interest  is  broader  than  a  "pecuniary"  interest  (or  an  interest  in  satisfying  basic 
subsistence  needs  by  non-pecuniary  means).  Vanity  is  one  such  self-interested  passion 
amongst  many  others.  10  Because  the  desire  for  the  esteem  of  others  does  not  logically 
entail  the  desire  for  food,  clothing  or  money,  Haakonssen  argues  it  is  therefore  not  an 
economic  motive.  However,  if  it  were  the  case  that  Smith  and  Millar  thought  that  the 
usual  or  most  natural  means  by  which  individuals  could  realise  their  interest  in 
escaping  from  scarcities  of  food,  clothing  necessary  for  survival  (or  scarcities  of  the 
respectful  attention  of  others  necessary  for  a  sense  of  their  own  esteem)  was  within 
the  sphere  of  money  calculating  activity,  then  Smith  and  Millar  would  be,  according  to 
von  Mises,  thinking  of  individuals  as  both  economically  and  rationally  motivated.  II 
Von  Mises,  unlike  his  classical  liberal  forerunners,  does  not  make  explicit  the 
assumption  that  exchange  is  necessary  in  a  world  of  natural  and  eternal  scarcity.  For 
von  Mises,  therefore,  economic  activity  is  the  activity  of  individuals  involved  in 
9Haakonssen,  Legislator,  p183. 
IOSee  chapter  nine. 
II  Ignaticff  has  come  close  to  understanding  that  economic  activity  as  exchange  has  an  important  role 
to  play  in  Millar's  philosophical  history.  He  comments  that  Millar  dcfincs  "commercial  society"  by 
"the  gencraliscd  principle  of  exchange,  permeating  all  social  relations  of  authority  in  the  household, 
in  the  economy  and  in  the  polity  ... 
based  on  contract  ratlicr  than  status  relations.  "  Millar,  p325. 99 
everyday  exchange.  This  entails  (1)  the  exchange  of  commodities  with  commodities 
(which  von  Mises  appears  to  ignore  unless,  of  course  he  accepts  that  money  itself  is  a 
commodity);  (2)  the  exchange  of  commodities  for  money,  revenue  or  capital;  and  (3) 
of  the  exchange  of  capital,  revenue  and  money  for  commodities.  Put  differently, 
economic  activity  is  the  activity  of  buying  or  selling  -  of  purchase  and  sale.  There  are 
many  references  to  this  simple  notion  of  economic  activity  in  Millar's  work.  12 
5.2  Macpherson  and  Production 
Macpherson  is  another  thinker  who  has  attempted  to  give  some  understanding  of 
what  it  means  to  say  that  an  idea  or  assumption  is  "economic".  Macpherson  attempts 
to  provide  a  sketch  of  what  a  Marxian  or  Marxist  theory  of  the  history  of  ideas  rnýight 
look  like.  13  He  also  gives  a  clear  indication  of  one  of  the  goals  of  good  political 
theory:  the  explanation  of  the  subordination  of  the  many  to  the  few.  Millar  shares  this 
goal  with  Macpherson. 
5.2.1  The  Goals  of  Political  Theory 
Macpherson  describes  political  theory  in  these  terms: 
"Political  theory  is  about  relations  of  dependence  and  control  between  people"  14 
This  definition  of  political  theory  expresses  a  concern  for  the  conditions  that  are 
necessary  for  the  good  of  the  whole  of  the  polis.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  relations  of 
dependence  and  control  are  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  polis,  then  they  must  be 
conserved  or  extended.  If  they  are  antagonistic  to  the  good,  they  must  be  altered  or 
abolished. 
For  example,  Millar  taught  his  students  to  reflect  on  whether  relations  of 
dependence  and  control  are  necessary  to  the  good  life  in  the  following  passage: 
"When  we  contemplate  the  government  of  any  large  country  and  well  regulated  state,  it 
can  hardly  fail  to  excite  a  degree  of  admiration.  We  behold  a  vast  multitude  of  people; 
notwithstanding  their  opposite  inclinations  and  passions,  living  together  in  peace  and 
tranquillity,  and  submitting  to  certain  common  regulations.  '17he  benefit,  at  the  same 
time,  is  far  from  being  equal.  By  far  the  greatest  part  live  in  poverty  and  indigence, 
12Sce  chapter  six. 
DMacphcrson  C.  B.  (1978)  "we  might  take  the  extent  to  which  economic  relations  arc  thought  to  set 
not  merely  the  problems,  but  the  inescapable  requirements  (his  emphasis)  of  the  political  system.  Or, 
if  You  like,  the  extent  to  which  it  is  thought  that  (to  adapt  Mar.  \'s  much  quoted  statement),  the 
anatomy  of  political  society  is  to  be  sought  in  political  economy.  "  p103  of  "The  Economic  Penetration 
of  Political  Theory.  "  Journal  of  the  History  ofIdeas,  vol.  XXXIX,  1,  Jan-March:  101-118. 
14Macpherson,  "Economic  Penetration",  102. 100 
and  are  obliged,  by  hard  labour,  to  earn  a  pitiful  subsistence.  While  a  small  proportion 
loll  in  ease  and  riot  in  luxury,  assuming  the  power  to  direct  and  controul  the  conduct  of 
their  inferiors.  And  it  is  weil  if  a  single  person  does  not  acquire  an  absolute  dominion 
over  the  whole  Cornmunity,  so  as  to  render  them  subservient  to  his  grandeur  or  his 
pleasure.  By  what  means  are  the  many  retained  in  subjection  to  the  few?  What 
prevents  the  former  from  seizing  the  latter,  stripping  them  of  their  wealth,  and  forcing 
them  to  an  equal  communication  of  power  and  privileges?  What  is it,  in  short,  that  has 
introduced,  and  which  maintains  that  subordination  of  ranks  which  we  observe  in 
every  civilised  nation?  "  (LG  1792,13).  15 
According  to  Millar  and  Macpherson,  good  political  theory  tries  to  answer  the 
question:  why  are  the  many  dependent  on  and  subordinate  to  the  few?  Answers  to  this 
question  fall  broadly  into  two  sets.  The  first  set  of  answers  justifies  the  subordination 
of  the  many  to  the  few.  It  is  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  polis  that  the  many  be 
dependent  upon  the  few.  Political  activity  is  then  determined  by  the  goal  of 
maintaining  or  securing  this  relationship  of  subordination  for  the  good  of  all. 
The  second  set  explains  the  relationship  between  the  many  and  the  few.  Once  the 
causes  of  this  dependence  are  known  then  political  activity  is  informed  by  the 
explanations  given  of  the  relationship.  If  the  relationship  between  the  many  and  the 
few  is  deemed  to  be  one  that  enables  everyone  to  flourish,  the  explanation  enables  the 
intelligent  ruler  to  consolidate  and  extend  his  or  her  rule.  If  it  is  deemed  to  be  an 
unhealthy  one  -  for  example,  if  it  is  actually  or  potentially  destructive  of  a  part  or  the 
whole  of  humanity  and  civilisation  -  then  the  citizen  has  the  knowledge  she  or  he  needs 
to  change  or  end  it.  They  can  work  either  to  ameliorate  or  abolish  it.  They  can 
attempt  to  bring  into  being  social  relations  that  enable  humanity  and  civilisation  to 
flourish  more  completely. 
At  a  high  level  of  abstraction,  the  task  of  justification  can  be  separated  from 
explanation.  In  reality,  however,  the  two  tasks  are  melded  together.  Explanation  often 
involves  justification  or  moral  condemnation  of  the  relationship.  Explanatory 
frameworks  may  be  presented  in  such  a  way  as  to  assert  that  the  relationship  exists 
within  the  sphere  of  nature,  thereby  denying  its  social  reality.  The  latter  is  a  example  of 
theory  embodying  some  kind  of  apologetics. 
Macpherson's  argument  is  that  this  process  can  be  seen  most  clearly  in  the  move 
from  classical  political  economy  to  "pure"  economic  science.  The  latter  adopts  a 
conceptual  framework  blind  to  the  relationship  in  question  and  becomes  concerned 
solely  with  the  pragmatic  management  of  the  relationship  rather  than  with  its 
explanation.  Such  frameworks  or  "models"  are  self-justificatory  and  circular,  assuming 
15Title:  "Gencral  principles  of  Government.  " 101 
the  market  enlarges  real  individual  freedoms  rather  than  confining  them  to  the  juridical 
form  required  for  the  market  to  reproduce  itself  Von  Mises'  understanding  of  rational 
activity  as  money-calculating  activity  is  apologetic  in  this  sense.  As  we  have  seen,  he 
assumes  that  relationships  of  dependence  and  control  are  accounted  for  by  original 
natural  inequalities  between  individuals.  It  therefore  requires  no  further  explanation  or 
description.  Apologetics  is,  however,  less  easy  to  detect  in  a  political  and  moral  theory 
that  distances  itself  from  any  economic  content  and  deals  with  abstract  universals  such 
as  social  justice,  community  and  human  welfare. 
Macpherson  notes  how  useless  orthodox  economics  is  to  political  theory.  He 
remarks  that,  once  a  theory  becomes  dominated  by  a  model  of  people  being  "related  to 
each  other  as  demanders  and  exchangers  of  things",  then  the  relations  of  dependence 
and  control  are  "dropped  out  of  sight.  "  16 
Having  defined  the  goal  of  good  political  theory,  Macpherson  attempts  to  make  a 
strong  connection  between,  firstly,  economic  ideas  and  political  ideas;  secondly,  a 
changing  economic  reality  and  changes  in  economic  ideas;  and  thirdly,  a  changing 
economic  reality  and  changes  in  political  ideas.  Thus  on  the  last  connection  he  poses 
the  hypothesis  that: 
"political  theory  varies  with  the  extent  of  recent  or  current  change  in  actual  economic 
relations"17 
As  actual  economic  relations  change  there  are  corresponding  changes  in  political 
theory.  There  is  an  observable  causal  relationship  between  changes  in  economic 
relations  and  changes  in  political  theory.  The  most  noticeable  change  he  observes  is 
one  from  classical  political  theory  (in  which  he  includes  the  classical  political  economy 
of  Smith,  Ricardo  and  Marx)  to  contemporary  political  theory.  From  Aristotle  to  J.  S. 
Mill,  he  suggests,  most  classical  political  thinkers  make  reference  to  obvious  economic 
assumptions  and  ideas.  After  Mill,  there  is  noticeable  change.  Political  theorists  have 
tended  to  avoid  economic  assumptions  and  ideas.  "'  Actual  economic  relations  and 
thinkers  understanding  of  these  changes  have  caused  changes  in  political  theory.  Thus: 
16MaCpherson,  "Economic  Penetration",  102. 
17Macpherson,  "Economic  Penetration",  106. 
18The  reason  for  this  is,  firstly,  the  growth  of  a  socialist  movement  rootcd  in  the  working  class  in  the 
ninteentli  century.  This  threatens  the  viability  of  capitalist  society;  secondly,  the  response  of  political 
theorists  to  the  changed  situation  in  the  world  after  the  Bolshevik  revolution;  and  thirdly,  "the 
continuance  and  revival  of  Marxism  in  the  non-Western  world  in  this  century.  "  Macpherson, 
"Economic  Penetration",  116. 102 
"In  looking  for  explanations  of  the  varying  penetration  of  political  theory  by  econon-tic 
assumptions,  we  may  look  first  for  mere  correlations  between  the  changing  penetration 
and  some  other  factors,  and  then  enquire  if  the  correlations  suggest  causal  relations.  "19 
Macpherson  uses  a  "penetration"  metaphor  to  illustrate  his  thesis.  He  implies  that 
there  is  a  causal  relationship  between  economic  relations  and  economic  assumptions, 
and  between  economic  relations  and  political  theory.  Macpherson  suggests  that  the 
way  to  discover  the  nature  of  this  causal  relationship  is  to  observe  the  connections  that 
thinkers  make  between  economic  and  political  assumptions. 
The  question  arises  of  the  exact  nature  of  the  causal  relationship  between 
economic  reality  and  economic  and  political  ideas.  A  realist  might  answer  this  question 
by  saying  that  certain  categories  are  instantiated  in  reality  before  they  take  shape  in  the 
minds  of  thinkers.  20  For  example,  the  realist  might  argue  that  the  idea  of  property 
entails  both  the  actual  appropriation  of  nature  and  the  free  alienation  of  the  social 
powers  of  humanity.  She  might  argue  that  the  latter  are  social  processes  that  take 
place  irrespective  of  whether  the  idea  of  property  is  theorised  as  "appropriation  of 
nature",  "free  alienation"  or  within  the  framework  of  other  concepts  and  ideas.  Other 
questions  then  follow  such  as  whether  the  idea  of  property  specific  to  a  particular 
thinker  at  a  particular  time  can  be  explained  by  the  evolving  nature  of  property 
relations  in  society  as  a  whole.  If  the  answer  is  positive  one,  then  a  causal  relationship 
between  economic  relations  and  notions  of  property  specific  to  a  period  in  the  history 
of  ideas  could  be  established.  Much  therefore  depends  on  whether  it  can  be  proved 
whether  property  relations  are  either  logically  or  genetically  related  to  economic 
relations.  As  will  be  argued  in  chapter  eight,  Millar  thought  that  there  was  a  genetic 
relation  between  economic  relations,  ideas  of  property  and  the  distribution  of  property. 
Macpherson's  thesis  relies  on  the  reader  accepting  that  when  a  particular  thinker 
within  the  classical  tradition  gives  certain  categories  a  salience  in  their  theories  of 
politics  and  government,  then  these  are  clear  indications  of  economic  assumptions  or 
ideas. 
5.2.2  Economic  Ideas 
Macpherson's  definition  of  "economic  idea"  is  to  found  in  the  following  statement: 
19Macphcrson,  "Economic  Penetration",  104. 
201-lill's  argument  is  that  it  makes  sense  to  state  that  there  was  a  revolution  in  England  in  the  mid- 
1640s  before  the  concept  of  "revolution"  emerged  as  a  category  within  which  it  could  be  properly 
thcoriscd  and  understood.  ('Revolution',  1980).  Mciklc  argues  along  similar  lines  that  it  makes  sense 
to  state  that  Aristotle  was  trying  to  theorisc  equivalence  in  exchange  before  the  category  of  economic 
value  took  shape  in  the  ininds  of  classical  political  economists.  See  his  (1995)  Aristotle's  Economic 
Thought,  Oxford. 103 
I  take  'economic  ideas'  to  be  ideas  or  assumptions  about  the  necessary  or  possible 
relations  between  people  in  their  capacity  as  producers  of  the  material  means  of  life".  21 
The  key  phrase  here  is  "producers  of  the  material  means  of  life".  An  economic 
idea,  therefore,  must  refer  to  social  relations  of  production  of  the  material  means  of 
life.  In  this  general  sense,  there  is  an  economic  aspect  to  every  society  it  is  possible  to 
imagine.  It  is  not  possible  to  imagine  a  society  within  which  there  is  no  social 
production  of  the  material  means  of  life.  Every  possible  form  of  society  would  entail 
the  transformation  of  raw  materials  provided  by  nature  (or  by  previous  human  activity) 
into  products  for  human  use.  It  would  entail  that  certain  tools  or  machinery  be  used  to 
make  this  transformation.  It  would  entail  the  expenditure  of  certain  quantities  of 
human  energy  within  a  certain  time  in  order  for  this  transformation  to  take  place.  It 
would  entail  that  production  takes  place  socially.  It  would  also  entail  that  economic 
ideas  refer  to  aspects  of  the  material-technical  process. 
Productive  activity  therefore  becomes  a  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for 
every  form  of  economic  activity.  It  would  not  be  possible  to  imagine  an  economic 
activity  that  is  not  productive  in  this  general  sense.  An  economic  activity  that  does  not 
entail  the  transformation  of  natural  materials  (and  socially  manufactured  materials)  into 
a  social  product  would  not  be  economic. 
Macpherson  does  not  want  to  rest  on  this  definition  of  economic  relations  as 
productive  relations  alone.  He  also  wants  to  include  other  ideas  within  the  category  of 
"economic".  These  other  ideas  are  property,  class  and  "bourgeois  man"  as  a 
"possessive  individualist". 
To  be  successful  in  the  project  of  identifying  a  causal  relationship  between 
economic  relations  and  political  theory,  the  ideas  he  picks  out  as  quintessential  must  be 
strong  enough  to  carry  the  weight  he  gives  them.  But  neither  property  nor  class,  on  its 
own,  can  be  assumed  to  be  "economic"  without  supporting  arguments.  Macpherson 
seems  to  recognise  this  when  he  writes  of  property  and  class: 
"Moreover,  since  these  relations  between  individuals  and  between  classes  require,  and 
become  congealed  in,  some  institutions  ofproperly  [his  emphasis  throughout]  we  may 
take  economic  ideas  to  include  ideas  about  the  relation  of  property  to  other  political 
rights  and  obligations.  I  say  other  political  rights  and  obligations  because  property  is 
a  right  which  has  to  be  maintained  politically.  Property,  as  Bentham  said,  'is  entirely 
the  work  of  law'.  "22 
21Macpherson,  "Economic  Pciietration",  101. 
22Macplicrson,  "EconomicPenctration",  117. 104 
Macpherson  has  moved  from  property  as  an  idea  that  arises  from  productive 
relations  to  the  statement  that  it  arises  from  juridical  relations.  The  connection 
between  the  two  is  left  uncertain.  If  Bentham  is  right,  then  the  notion  of  property  as  an 
economic  idea  appears  at  first  sight  to  be  ruled  out. 
If  property  and  class  are  essentially  economic  ideas  then  Macpherson  needs  to 
show  the  logical  and  real  relation  they  have  to  "the  necessary  and  possible  relations 
between  people  as  producers.  "  This  he  leaves  open.  23 
Finally  there  is  the  model  he  uses  of  bourgeois  man  as  a  possessive  individualist: 
"man  as  infinite  appropriator".  24  Classical  modern  political  theorists  such  as  Hume, 
Bentham  and  James  Mill  have  a  "generalised  model  of  man  or  of  society".  25  This 
model  then  determines  their  political  theory. 
Macpherson's  suggestion  is  that  the  conception  of  human  beings  as  naturally 
greedy,  acquisitive,  self-interested  and  competitive  individuals,  and  of  society  as  an 
aggregate  of  such  individuals  connected  in  various  ways  is  an  idea  created  by  market 
society.  If  the  relationship  of  this  idea  of  human  nature  to  market  society  is  a  reflection 
of  real  economic  relations,  then  by  Macpherson's  definition  it  is  caused  by  the 
influence  of  productive  relations  necessary  for  market  society  to  exist  in  the  minds  of 
these  thinkers. 
However,  Macpherson's  definition  of  economic  relations  as  productive  relations  is 
too  general  to  explain  the  idea  of  the  individual  as  naturally  self-interested,  competitive 
and  acquisitive.  Macpherson's  conception  of  productive  relations  includes  not  only 
those  relations  necessary  for  the  reproduction  of  the  material-technical  process,  but 
also  class  and  property.  According  to  Macpherson,  productive  relations  therefore 
entail  juridical  and  political  relations.  An  explanation  of  political  or  juridical  relations 
in  terms  of  Macpherson's  conception  of  economic  relations  as  productive  relations 
would  therefore  be  circular. 
Productive  relations  need  to  be  conceived  more  specifically  in  their  form  as 
commodity,  money  and  capital.  The  latter  are  more  clearly  economic  categories  and 
therefore  less  liable  to  a  juridical  interpretation.  Commodity,  money  and  capital 
presuppose  a  competition  of  interests.  The  conflict  of  interests  caused  by  competition 
presupposes  law.  Where  there  is  competition  between  capitals  and  by  capitals  for 
labour,  then  there  is  also  a  competition  of  individual  interests  and  wills  requiring  legal 
arbitration  and  the  recognition  of  rights.  The  concept  of  rights  presupposes  certain 
23This  inay  be  because  lie  wants  to  distinguish  bct%%,  ccii  inarka  and  non-rna-t-ct  societies  (i.  e. 
capitalism  and  socialism)  in  tcrnis  of  juridical  relations.  Macplicrson  mentions  non-markct  sc%cictics 
that  exist  in  separate  countries.  In  tlicsc  countries,  property  relations  arc  nationaliscd  and  juridical 
frccdonis  to  sell  and  buy  do  not  exist.  Thus  lie  writcs  of  "the  global  tlircat  of  the  socialist  and  Third 
World  socictics.  ""Econornic  Penetration",  116. 
24Macphcrson,  "Economic  Penetration".  I  11. 
25Macplicrsoii,  "Economic  Penetration",  104. 105 
types  of  juridical  or  property  relations,  especially  the  formal  freedom  of  the  individual 
to  alienate  his  or  her  creative  powers  through  a  contract  enforced  in  law. 
Macpherson,  for  example,  notes  that  market  relations  require  that  the  individual  be 
free  to  own  and  sell  commodities.  Pashukanis  argues  that,  for  every  individual  in  a 
market  society  to  be  recognised  as  actual  or  potential  owners  of  commodities,  it  must 
be  assumed  that  he  or  she  possesses  an  autonomous,  self-determining  will  with  a 
juridically  recognised  subjectiVity.  26  Without  this  necessary  feature  of  the  abstract 
personality  as  a  bearer  of  rights,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  conceive  of  the  individual 
alienating  their  capacity  to  work  as  a  commodity  in  the  form  of  a  contract. 
This  is  an  objective  universal  feature  of  such  a  society  and  distinguishes  it  from  a 
society  based  on  slavery.  For  example,  it  was  absent  before  the  market  came  to 
dominate  all  forms  of  activity  and  absent  in  non-market  societies  such  as  the  former 
USSR.  The  idea  of  the  autonomous  self-determining  individual  with  juridically 
recognised  rights  is  not  therefore  just  a  part  of  a  model  of  human  nature  as 
possessively  individualistic  as  Macpherson  argues,  it  is  also  a  social  reality  that  exists 
as  long  as  a  world  exists  within  which  the  commodity  form  dominates  all  spheres  of 
human  activity.  27 
5.3  The  Commodity 
Economic  activity  has  so  far  been  considered  in  two  ways.  Von  Mises  conceives  of 
economic  activity  as  the  activity  of  rationally  motivated  individuals  who  satisfy  their 
subjective  desires  through  acts  of  exchange  and  the  calculation  of  money. 
Macpherson,  on  the  other  hand,  conceives  of  economic  activity  as  activity  that  is 
necessary  for  the  production  of  the  material  means  of  life. 
These  two  conceptions  have  certain  common  elements.  Firstly,  whether  economic 
activity  is  thought  of  as  exchange  between  free  individuals  or  as  the  production  of  the 
means  of  life,  both  conceptions  assume  that  economic  activity  is  useful.  For  von  Mises, 
exchange  is  the  means  to  satisfying  those  desires  that  the  individual  finds  subjectively 
useffil.  Macpherson  assumes  that  productive  activity  is  necessary  for  human  life  to 
continue  and  therefore  useful. 
Secondly,  both  conceptions  have  consequences  on  the  way  society  is  conceived. 
For  both,  a  rational  society  without  economic  activity  is  inconceivable.  For  von  Mises, 
26Pasliukaiiis,  Laiv  andMarxisin. 
27This  is  important  to  understand  why  class  tends  to  be  ignored  in  bourgeois  political  and  economic 
theory.  TI..;  freedom  that  the  individual  wagc  worker  has  to  sell  his  or  her  labour  power  guaranteed 
through  contract  and  law  only  poses  the  possibility  of  the  freedom  to  acquire  property.  It  does  not 
thereby  make  the  wage  worker  into  a  property  owner.  Rather  it  presupposes  the  opposite:  a  class  of 
propertyless  proletarians.  If  the  dominant  form  of  property  is  capitalist  private  property,  then  its 
nature  is  to  command  the  labour  power  of  others  in  order  to  continue  as  capital.  For  the  wage  worker 
to  become  a  property  owner  she  or  lie  must  cease  to  be  av  gc  worker  and  become  a  capitalist.  This 
occasionally  but  rarely  happens.  When  it  does.  much  of  a  hullabaloo  is  made. 106 
a  rational  society  without  exchange  is  inconceivable.  Society  comes  into  being  as  a 
product  of  the  autonomous  wills  of  individuals.  It  is  sustained  through  individuals' 
inventing  exchange  and  a  division  of  labour  as  a  means  to  satisfying  their  desires. 
Conversely,  for  Macpherson  a  rational  society  without  production  is  inconceivable. 
The  two  conceptions  are  different  in  the  following  ways.  For  von  Mises  the 
individual's  will  and  imagined  subjective  desires  exist  prior  to  the  act  of  exchange  and 
to  society  arising  out  of  acts  of  exchange.  For  Macpherson,  however,  productive 
relations  come  first,  and  the  notion  of  the  individual  will  is  an  example  of  an  ideal 
model  of  human  nature.  Von  Mises'  conception  of  exchange  and  society  would  be, 
according  to  Macpherson,  another  example  of  the  bourgeois  model  of  humanity 
imposed  upon  reality.  It  is  a  product  of  market  society  and  serves  to  justify  it  rather 
than  explain  it. 
The  appeal  of  von  Mises'  account  of  economic  activity  is  that  it  is  founded  on  a 
category  that  has  some  basis  in  reality.  From  the  perspective  of  individual  subjectivity 
it  appears  to  be  the  case  that  exchange  with  another  individual  involves  free  will  and 
the  existence  of  formally  equal  autonomous  atomised  self-interested  subjects.  The 
appeal  of  Macpherson's  account  is  that  he  suggests  that  the  subject's  freedom  to 
exercise  a  capacity  for  exchange  is  not  an  eternal  aspect  of  every  productive  relation. 
We  have  seen,  however,  that  Macpherson's  understanding  of  market  society  is 
incomplete.  In  order  to  distinguish  between  market  and  non-market  forms  of  society, 
he  introduces  the  idea  of  "freedom  to  own  and  sell".  This  presupposes  that  which  he 
wants  to  expose.  The  autonomous  self-determining  and  formally  equal  subject  upon 
which  the  freedom  to  own  and  sell  depends  is  the  same  ideal  construct  that  von  Mises' 
assumes.  It  manifests  itself  in  the  reality  of  the  experience  of  the  subject,  and  the 
relationship  it  has  to  economic  reality  is  left  unexplained.  The  category  of  the  subject 
just  happens  to  coincide  with  the  development  of  market  relations.  There  is  no 
necessary  connection  between  the  two  other  than  a  particular  conjunction.  It  was 
argued  above  that  this  category  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  subjectivity  of  apologists  of 
the  bourgeois  order  -a  matter  purely  of  intellectual  creation  -  but  has  an  objective 
existence  enshrined  within  bourgeois  social  relations  especially  juridical  relations. 
in  order,  therefore,  to  clarify  further  the  meaning  of  economic  activity  and  its 
relationship  to  property,  the  task  now  becomes  one  of  finding  a  category  that  is,  by 
nature,  economic,  social,  objective,  inconceivable  without  both  production  and 
exchange,  and  entails  historically  specific  juridical  relations,  in  particular  a  modern 
notion  of  rights. 
The  category  that  fulfils  all  these  conditions  is  the  commodity.  It  is  clearly  an 
economic  category.  It  is  a  social  relationship  between  people  which  manifests  itself  in 107 
relationships  between  things  such  as  money  and  capital.  "  These  exist  independently  of 
individuals'  subjective  experience  of  them.  It  is  therefore  both  social  and  objective. 
The  commodity  does  not  exist  without  production  and  exchange.  Moreover 
"commodities  cannot  go  to  the  market  and  make  exchanges  of  their  own  account.  1129 
Commodity  exchange  brings  into  being  a  juridical  relationship  of  ownership  and 
contract.  The  social  relationship  of  the  exchange  of  commodities  is  therefore  both  an 
objective  economic  relationship  and  a  juridical  relationship.  Commodity  exchange 
entails  the  existence  of  juridically  recognised  subjects  with  rights.  Commodity  owners 
alienate  their  commodities  in  order  to  subsist  or  to  make  a  profit.  This  is  not  possible 
without  contract  or  an  agreement  between  two  autonomous  wills  enforced  by  law. 
According  to  Pashukanis,  within  commodity-capitalist  society:  "the  social  relations  of 
production  assume  a  doubly  mysterious  form.  On  the  one  hand  they  appear  as  relations 
between  things  (commodities),  and  on  the  other  of  legal  subjectS.  "30  A  legal  fetishism 
therefore  accompanies  a  commodity  fetishism.  Commodity  fetishism  entails  that  the 
social  relation  of  equalised  homogeneous  labour-time  becomes  value:  a  property  of 
particular  things  such  as  commodities,  money  and  capital.  Legal  fetishism  entails  that 
the  social  relation  of  commodity  production  and  exchange  appears  to  be  brought  into 
being  by  autonomous,  free  and  equal  subjects  exercising  their  wills  expressed  in 
contracts  enforced  by  laws,  police  and  the  courts. 
5.4  The  Commodity  and  Production 
The  next  step  in  the  process  of  clarification  is  to  explain  the  plausibility  of  both  von 
Mises  and  Macpherson's  accounts  of  economic  activity  at  the  same  time  as  showing 
the  limits  of  both. 
Von  Mises'  account  is  plausible  to  the  extent  that  he  recognises  that  the  exchange 
of  commodities  entails  a  subjective  form  of  consciousness.  Once  a  commodity  falls  out 
of  circulation,  it  is  consumed  as  a  utility. 
A  commodity  in  its  aspect  of  use-value  is  "an  object  outside  us,  a  thing  that  by  its 
properties  satisfies  human  needs  of  some  sort  or  another.  The  nature  of  such  wants, 
whether,  for  instance,  they  spring  from  the  stomach  or  from  fancy,  makes  no 
difference".  31  A  commodity  can  satisfy  bodily  needs  for  shelter,  clothing  and  food, 
moral  needs  for  demonstrating  love  and  affection  or  aesthetic  needs  for  beaUty.  32 
28Marx  K.  (1864)  Capital  VoU  trans.  Moore  &  Avcling  from  the  3rd  German  cdn  by  F.  Engels, 
London,  1887.  Chapter  one,  section  four:  "The  Fetishism  of  Commodities  and  the  Secret  thereof.  " 
pp4l-55. 
"Marx,  Capital  1161.1,  p56. 
30Pasliukaiiis,  Law  andUarxisin,  p.  117. 
31Marx,  Capital  VoLI,  ppl-2. 
32SMith  gives  a  nice  example  of  two  watches,  one  that  "falls  behind  above  two  minutes  in  a  day",  sold 
at  a  couple  of  ,;  Uiricas,  and  another  that  "will  not  lose  above  a  ininute  in  a  fortnight",  bought  for  fifty 
guineas.  The  difference  in  their  utility  in  satisfying  the  ji.  -cd  to  attend  appointments  and  meetings  on 108 
A  commodity,  however,  is  also  an  expression  of  value.  This  is  the  objective  social 
form  that  equalised  labour-time  takes  within  the  market.  The  limit  of  von  Mises' 
account  of  economic  activity  therefore  is  the  rejection  of  any  substantial  notion  of 
society.  Von  Nfises  reduces  the  objectification  of  economic  activity  through  exchange 
to  the  realisation  of  the  subjective  desires  of  individuals.  Von  Mises  understands  an 
objective  social  relationship,  value,  instantiated  through  commodity  exchange  and 
production,  as  an  interaction  between  the  properties  of  natural  objects  and  individual 
subjectivity. 
In  order  to  explain  how  society  comes  into  being  he  is  therefore  driven  to  rely  on 
the  idea  of  the  individual's  will  and  thought.  This  is  not  only  useless  for  the  purposes  of 
differentiating  different  forms  of  society  but  presupposes  that  the  abstraction  of 
individual  freedom,  equality  and  rationality  is  inconceivable  without  law  and  the 
market.  This  is  fine  for  someone  who  wants  to  prove  that  socialism  -a  society  within 
which  law  and  the  market  will  wither  away  -  is  impossible  but  useless  for  someone 
who  wants  to  understand  the  nature  of  law  and  the  market  as  historically  specific 
moments  of  an  evolving  social  totality. 
If  von  Mises  were  right  then  society  would  not  exist  outside  the  minds  of 
individuals.  It  would  have  no  nature  other  than  an  abstract  means  for  the  satisfaction 
of  individuals'  wills.  It  follows  that  if  these  wills  were  to  decide  freely  and  rationally 
that  there  are  greater  satisfactions  gained  from  being  completely  isolated  than  from 
associating  with  others,  there  would  be  no  reason  for  considering  society  as  the  most 
useful  means  to  this  end.  Such  a  conception  of  society  as  the  product  of  the  wills  of 
potentially  isolated  individuals  may  truly  express  something  of  the  nature  of  the 
subjectivity  of  individuals  atomised  by  the  market,  but  is  no  foundation  for 
comprehending  whether  society  has  a  substantial  nature  with  particular  forms.  If  von 
Mises  is  right  then  only  individuals  have  a  birth,  development,  maturation,  decay  and 
death,  certainly  not  particular  forms  of  society.  33 
The  appeal  of  Macpherson's  conception  of  economic  activity  is  that  it  is 
understood  in  terms  of  productive  relations.  The  use  of  "relations"  suggests  the  reality 
of  an  objective  social  being  that  requires  production  if  it  is  to  evolve.  It  is  a  universal 
truth  that  there  can  be  no  social  being  without  productive  activity  and  no  productive 
activity  Without  social  being. 
time  is  marginal,  but  the  one  machine  induces  a  greater  delight  in  the  "perfection"  of  its  manufacture 
than  the  other.  (TMSIV.  1.5,180).  This  is  an  excellent  example  of  an  aesthetic  need  being  satisfied 
within  an  economic  form:  the  exchange  of  a  commodity  for  money,  and  money  for  a  more  expensive 
commodity.  Smith,  of  course,  implies  that  the  higher  price  of  the  more  perfect  watch  is  determined 
more  by  the  demand  for  greater  perfection  of  systems  than  by  the  greater  amount  of  social  labour- 
time  necessary  for  the  production  of  new  technology. 
3317or  Millar's  conception  of  society,  see  chapter  nine. 109 
However,  this  truth  is  limited  by  its  very  universality.  The  specific  nature  of  this 
productive  activity  is  ignored.  Once  the  commodity  is  focused  upon  as  the  defining 
economic  category  then  certain  important  distinctions  come  into  being.  The  first  is  the 
distinction  between  productive  activity  for  use  and  productive  activity  for  value. 
Commodity  production  entails  both.  The  commodity  has  a  dual  nature  embodying  both 
utility  and  value.  A  market  society  is  identical  with  a  society  in  which  the  essential 
social  relations  have  the  form  of  commodity  production  and  exchange.  By 
Macpherson's  definition,  as  we  have  seen,  a  non-market  society  is  economic  because  it 
involves  productive  activity  aimed  towards  the  satisfaction  of  the  material  means  of 
life.  Yet,  within  a  non-market  society,  there  are  no  commodities  produced  for 
exchange  -  there  are  only  products  which  satisfy  human  needs.  Moreover  within  a 
market  society  there  are  clearly  forms  of  economic  activity,  which  are  connected  only 
tangentially  to  productive  activity,  for  example  dealing  in  stocks  and  shares,  or  with 
insurance  in  the  financial  sector  of  the  market. 
Either  all  forms  of  productive  activity  are  economic  or  only  some  are.  Either  all 
forms  of  economic  activity  are  productive  or  only  some  are.  Macpherson's  definition 
implies  that  all  forms  of  productive  activity  are  economic  and  all  forms  of  economic 
activity  are  productive.  If  a  political  theorist  such  as  Smith  describes  a  relation  of 
production,  then  by  this  definition  he  is  clearly  introducing  an  economic  idea.  As  is 
well  known,  Smith  distinguishes  between  productive  activity  and  unproductive 
activity.  By  Macpherson's  definition,  the  former  would  be  an  economic  activity  and  the 
latter  would  not.  34 
The  limits  of  Macpherson's  definition  of  what  counts  as  an  economic  idea  or 
assumption  is  that  it  is  so  broad  that  it  does  not  capture  the  essential  characteristics  of 
the  category  of  the  economic.  The  essential  characteristics  of  economic  relations,  I  am 
suggesting,  are  that  they  are  relations  between  commodities.  It  follows  that  economic 
ideas  and  assumptions,  such  as  money,  wages,  capital,  rent,  etc.  must  therefore  entail 
commodity  relations.  And  if  Macpherson  wants  to  include,  as  he  does,  the  ideas  of 
34SCC  Marx  K.  (1862-3)  Theories  of  Surplus  Plalue  Part  /,  Moscow,  1975:  pp  152-174.  Marx  reads 
two  different  understandings  of  productive  activity  in  Smith's  account.  The  first  accords  with 
Macpherson's  definition:  for  an  activity  to  be  productive  it  must  produce  a  material  object  to  be 
consumed.  An  activity  that  does  not  produce  a  material  object.  such  as  a  service,  is  unproductive.  This 
produces  the  anomaly  of  financial  services  being  understood  to  be  activitics  which  arc  not  economic. 
The  second  definition  accords  with  the  commodity  form  as  an  embodiment  of  value.  An  activity  is 
productive  if  it  contributes  to  an  increase  in  value  and  is  exchangcd  with  capital.  This  means  that 
those  "productive"  activitics  that  arc  exchanged  for  state  revenue  arc  unproductive  and  therefore  in  a 
sense  "uneconomic".  To  some  extent  this  accords  with  contemporary  language  usage.  Mines  in  which 
workers  produce  coal  by  exchanging  their  labour  capacity  for  state  revenue  in  the  form  of  a  public 
subsidy  are  deemed  to  be  "uneconomic"  because  they  arc  a  drain  on  money  that  could  be  used  more 
productively  as  capital  elsewhere  in  the  economy-,  whereas  mines  in  which  workers  produce  coal  by 
exchanging  their  labour  power  for  the  capital  of  a  private  owner  arc  deemed  to  be  "economic"  because 
they  enable  the  owner's  capital  to  accumulate  and  increase  in  value  and  surplus  value. 110 
property  and  class  within  the  category  of  the  economic,  then  these  ideas  must  entail 
commodity  relations. 
Economic  activity,  therefore,  is  better  conceived  as  productive  activity  within  the 
commodity  form.  The  latter  has  a  two-fold  nature  as  an  embodiment  of  use-value  and 
of  value,  value  being  the  specific  social  form  that  labour-time  takes  when  equalised 
through  the  process  of  exchange.  35 
5.5  Conclusion 
I  am  now  in  a  position  to  define  "economic  activity".  Economic  activity  is 
productive  activity  that  takes  the  social  form  of  the  commodity  and  has  both  use-value 
and  value.  The  nature  of  value  is  socially  equalised  labour-time  within  an  exchangeable 
form.  It  is  therefore  possible  to  conceive  of  a  society  within  which  production  and 
consumption  takes  place  without  economic  activity.  For  example,  historically,  it  is 
possible  to  distinguish  societies,  such  as  ancient  slave  and  serf-based  societies,  in 
which  surpluses  were  extracted  by  coercion  in  a  non-economic  fashion,  from  economic 
activities,  such  as  barter,  mercantile  trade,  usury  and  simple  commodity  production.  In 
whatever  society  in  which  value's  social  equalisation  of  labour-time  determines  social 
relations  there  would  be  some  form  of  economic  activity. 
This  definition  makes  the  relationship  between  economic  activity  and  productive 
activity  a  historically  necessary  but  logically  contingent  one.  It  is  clear  that  it  was  not 
an  accident  that  a  market  society  evolved  out  of  the  simpler  forms  of  exchange  such  as 
barter.  it  is  also  clear  that  pre-capitalist  societies  were  not  dominated  by  economic 
relations.  In  early  societies  economic  relations  such  as  barter  took  place  at  the 
periphery.  Where  there  are  no  relations  determined  by  the  exchange  of  commodities,  it 
is  difficult  to  distinguish  economic  activity  from  the  totality  of  productive  activity. 
Economic  activity  begins  to  be  differentiated  from  other  activities  as  a  distinct  sphere 
of  social  relations  only  when  exchange  emerges  and  value  begins  to  determine 
relations  between  people.  This  is,  of  course,  not  to  deny  that  commodity  exchange  did 
not  happen  in  ancient  societies  but  that  it  was  peripheral  to  the  dominant  forms  of 
productive  activity.  Commodities  were  exchanged  but  most  productive  activity  was 
neither  intended  for,  nor  dependent  upon,  the  existence  of  a  market.  For  example, 
unlike  market  society,  the  surplus  produced  in  a  slave-owning  ancient  society  was 
based  on  relationships  of  force  and  personal  dependency  not  on  the  value-form,  yet 
there  was  extensive  trade  between  these  societies  and  forms  of  both  merchant  and 
usurers'  capital. 
35This  understanding  is  consistent  with  the  distinction  within  Marxian  political  economy  between 
productive  activity  viewcd  from  the  standpoint  of  its  technical  methods  and  instruments  of  labour  and 
the  same  activity  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  its  social  form  as  value.  This  distinction  is  used  to 
evaluate  Millar's  political  economy  in  chapter  seven. III 
A  similar  consideration  applies  to  juridical  relations.  These  do  not  begin  to  be 
distinguished  from  religious,  moral  and  customary  relations  until  exchange  emerges 
and  economic  activity  becomes  distinguished  from  other  forms  of  actiVity.  36  Systems 
of  law  arose  to  meet  the  needs  of  trading  transactions  between  peoples  outwith  a 
unified  sphere  of  authority.  Trade  with  foreigners  and  aliens  called  into  being  thejus 
gemium  which  rejected  everything  unconnected  with  the  economic  relation  upon 
which  it  was  based.  37 
The  above  definition  permits  the  conception  of  forms  of  productive  activity 
logically  distinguishable  from  economic  activity  as  economically  productive.  Examples 
are  those  forms  of  political,  religious,  artistic  and  juridical  activities  that  are  productive 
of  value  and  surplus  value.  This  is  in  accord  with  ordinary  language  usage:  a  teacher  is 
"economic"  when  she  is  employed  by  a  private  employer  who  extracts  a  profit  from 
her  employment.  She  is  not  conceived  as  such  when  she  is  employed  by  a  government 
that  makes  no  profit  from  her,  however  productive  and  useful  her  work  may  be  in 
other  ways. 
"Productive",  it  is  argued,  has  two  related  meanings:  firstly  a  meaning  that  falls 
outwith  the  sphere  of  economic  relations.  This  coincides  with  the  idea  that  every  form 
of  activity  is  productive  when  it  is  socially  useful.  For  example,  if  military  activity  is 
considered  socially  harmful,  then  it  is  unproductive.  The  second  meaning  is  economic. 
This  coincides  with  the  idea  that  those  activities  that  are  productive  are  those  which 
generate  value  and  surplus  value.  It  is  economically  productive  because  it  is  the  kind  of 
activity  that  is  exchanged  not  only  for  money  but  also  produces  a  commodity  which 
has  a  greater  quantity  of  value  expressed  within  it  than  in  the  money  or  capital  which 
bought  it.  This  kind  of  productive  economic  activity,  therefore,  corresponds  to  Marx's 
category  of  labour  power. 
Having  defined  "economic  activity",  my  next  task  is  to  demonstrate  whether 
Millar's  historical  and  social  theory  made  reference  to  such  activity.  I  shall  argue  that 
Millar  recognised  that  commercial  society  is  a  society  of  generalised  commodity 
production  and  exchange.  Every  individual  is  therefore  actually  or  potentially  engaged 
in  some  sort  of  economic  activity  connected  with  the  production  and  exchange  of 
commodities.  I  shall  argue  in  the  following  chapter  that  Millar  had  an  understanding  of 
economic  categories  such  as  commodity,  value,  money  and  labour;  that  he  clearly 
recognised  the  existence  of  economic  relations  that  were  distinguishable  from  other 
social  relations.  However  Millar's  conceptual  isation  differed  from  Marx's 
fundamentally.  I  shall  argue  that  often  the  language  used  is  similar,  but  the  juridical 
content  he  gave  to  this  language  was  specific  to  a  fusion  of  mercantile  thinking  with 
36P,  isliukaiiis,  Law  andMarxism,  p.  57. 
37Pashukanis,  Law  andMarxism,  p.  95. 112 
empiricist  moral  philosophy  and  jurisprudence  that  occured  in  the  eighteenth  century.  I 
shall  suggest  that  the  economic  categories  Millar  used,  presuppose  an  abstraction  of 
the  individual  as  a  self-interested  subject  of  experience.  However,  to  avoid 
anachronism,  it  will  be  necessary  to  distinguish  between  the  use  of  the  term 
"economic"  in  this  dissertation  and  Millar's  use  of  the  same  term.  This  is  undertaken  in 
the  following  chapter. 113 
Chapter  Six: 
Economic  Categories 
6.1  The  Meaning  of  "Economic" 
As  I  shall  discuss  in  the  next  chapter,  Millar  took  an  interest  in  and  wrote  about 
political  economy.  It  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  therefore  that  he  understood  the 
concept  of  economic  activity.  This  supposition  is,  however,  open  to  a  possible 
objection.  This  is  that  the  supposition  that  Millar  had  a  conception  of  econonýc 
activity  comparable  to,  for  example,  Marx's  entails  giving  an  anachronistic  and 
therefore  incorrect  reading  of  Millar's  work.  This  objection  could  well  be  based  on 
Millar's  use  of  language.  It  is  anachronistic  to  assume  that  Millar's  use  of  "econon&" 
terms  such  as  "commodity,  "exchange",  "capital",  "value",  "profit",  "interest",  "rent" 
or  "wages"  is  similar  to  the  use  of  these  same  terms  by  nineteenth  or  twentieth  century 
thinkers.  If  the  context  in  which  they  were  used  was  different,  then  their  mearling 
would  be  different.  To  assume,  for  example,  that  Millar  had  a  concept  of  economic 
activity  as  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange  comparable  to  Marx's 
would  be  to  ignore  the  specific  historical  context  in  which  Millar's  use  of  "commodity" 
was  uttered. 
This  opens  up  the  possibility  of  an  unbridgeable  gap  of  understanding  between  past 
thinkers  and  our  own  thought.  It  can  only  be  filled  in  conjecturally  by  imagining  the 
use  of  these  terms  in  their  proper  linguistic  context  and  this  is  not  possible  without  a 
historical  knowledge  of  the  total  linguistic  context  of  the  period  of  utterance  or 
writing.  The  argument  might  continue  that  to  evaluate  or  criticise  Millar's  concept  of 
economic  activity  from  the  standpoint  of  the  linguistic  context  of  today  or  of  periods 
subsequent  to  Millar's  would  inevitably  lead  to  distortions  and  a  blindness  to  Millar's 
intentions. 
For  example,  it  could  be  argued  that  when  Millar  used  the  term  "economic"  he 
meant  something  very  different  from  Marx.  The  propositions  or  statements  he  used 
that  included  the  term  "economy"  were  not  making  any  references  to  generalised 
commodity  production  of  exchange.  Therefore  if  he  were  whisked  out  of  the  late 
eighteenth  century  in  a  time  machine  to  the  time  of  Marx  or  even  later  to  today,  then 
he  would  completely  fail  to  understand  someone  who  uttered  the  word. 
Millar,  in  fact,  rarely  used  the  term  and  when  he  did  it  was  in  contexts  that 
suggested  a  meaning  surviving  today  largely  outwith  contemporary  treatises  on 
philosophy,  econcniics,  politics  and  jurisprudence.  This  is  the  meaning  we  are  familiar 
with  when  we  say  of  someone  or  something  that  their  use  of  their  material  or  financial 
resources  is  "economical".  Thus  a  car's  engine  might  be  described  as  economical  if  the 114 
amount  of  petrol  it  consumes  is  low  and  the  number  of  miles  the  car  can  travel  on  this 
amount  is  high.  The  good  economy  of  the  car's  engine  is  associated  both  with  the 
savings  of  money  its  owner  makes  on  journeys,  and  the  savings  of  time  she  or  he 
makes  having  to  fill  the  tank  up  at  petrol  stations.  Conversely  "bad  economy"  is 
associated  with  wastefulness  of  financial  and  material  resources.  As  we  shall  see, 
Millar  was  well  aware  of  both  concepts  of  "economy"  as  a  saving  of  time,  material  and 
money.  So  how  does  Millar  use  the  terms  "economy"  and  "economical"? 
Millar  wrote  approvingly  of  Elizabeth  I's  rigid  "oeconomy"  in  the  use  she  made  of 
public  revenue.  Elizabeth  invested  this  in  "enterprizes"  that  parliament  conceived  to  be 
so  intimately  "connected  with  the  public  welfare"  that  they  were  happy  to  grant  her 
"whatever  sums of  money  she  thought  proper  to  require"  (HV,  2,448).  Here  the 
concept  of  saving  is  not  mentioned;  however,  the  notion  of  the  revenue  being  put  to  a 
profitable  use  and  therefore  not  wasted  was  implied  by  Millar's  use  of  "public  welfare". 
This  is  understandable  if  Elizabeth  were  using  public  revenue  to  promote  and  protect 
the  interests  of  those  gaining  a  profit  from  merchant  capital,  and  the  "public  welfare" 
was  conceived  to  include  those  who  were  benefiting  from  the  increased  productivity  of 
labour  through  the  developing  capitalisation  and  industrialisation  of  agriculture. 
In  contrast,  James  I  was  "profuse  in  his  expences,  and  extravagantly  liberal  to  his 
favourites"  (HV,  3,159).  Moreover  the  crown  revenue  had  "shrunk  to  almost  nothing" 
(HV,  3,160).  Disputes  between  the  crown  and  parliament,  in  which  the  "bad  economy 
of  the  prince"  was  a  subject  of  disapproval  and  criticism,  were  therefore  inevitable 
over  the  burden  of  taxation  he  was  to  impose  (HV,  3,159).  James  not  only  used  public 
revenue  unproductively  but  wasted  it  on  granting  personal  favours  to  his  family  and 
friends.  Because  the  majority  of  those  in  parliament  did  not  benefit  from  his 
uneconomical  use  of  revenue,  they  resented  being  taxed. 
Elizabeth's  "rigid"  economy  and  James's  "bad"  economy  refer  to  practices 
comprehensible  within  an  eighteenth  century  linguistic  context.  Both  entailed  some 
notion  of  the  prudent  management  of  limited  resources,  implying  a  notion  of  the 
saving  of  public  revenue  in  order  that  it  be  invested  productively  and  profitably  in 
trade  and  industry.  The  limited  resources  took  the  form  of  money  used,  in  the  first 
case,  to  promote  enterprises  "connected  with  the  public  welfare"  and  in  the  second 
case  to  promote  the  private  interest  of  a  powerful  individual  -  the  monarch.  Mllar's 
use  of  "economy"  did  not  logically  entail  "generalised  commodity  production  and 
exchange".  Those  who  raise  the  objection  of  anachronism  might  argue  that  the 
relationship  between  "economy"  and  commodity  production  and  exchange  appears  to 
be  contingent  upon  a  later  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  the  concept  of  "economy". 
However,  when  we  examine  some  of  the  other  rare  instances  of  Millar's  use  of  the 
term,  we  find  that,  whilst  there  may  be  no  logical  relationship  between  a  contextualised 
understanding  of  Millar's  use  of  "economy"  and  the  existence  of  generalised 115 
commodity  production  and  exchange,  he  clearly understood  that  there  was  a  causal 
relationship  between  the  management  of  limited  resources  and  the  acquisition  of 
wealth  and  that  the  latter  was  best  achieved  through  the  exchange  and  production  of 
commodities.  "Economic"  activity  for  Millar  was  not  only  conceivable  without  the 
existence  of  a  knowledge  of  a  division  of  labour  but  actually  happened  in  non- 
commercial  societies.  Thus  in  a  "rude"  or  "barbarous"  society  "where  the  women  are 
universally  regarded  as  the  slaves  of  the  other  sex"  (OR,  39),  men  acquired  women  in 
order  "to  be  intrusted,  under  the  husband's  direction,  with  a  great  part  of  the  domestic 
economy".  The  prudent  management  of  the  family's  limited  resources,  in  particular 
those  resources  necessary  for  the  subsistence  of  dependent  children,  was  certainly 
conceivable  in  a  world  where  the  production  and  exchange  of  commodities  was 
completely  unknown.  The  use  of  "economy"  was  concerned  with  the  management  of 
the  patriarchal  household.  The  latter  was  the  unit  of  production  in  the  ancient  world.  It 
included  slaves  as  well  as  kin.  "Economy"  was  used  in  a  linguistic  context  that  can  be 
studied  through  the  residue  of  actual  language  use  found  in  ancient  texts.  It  also  refers 
to  a  social  world  within  which  commodity  production  and  exchange  had  no  role  to 
play  in  the  generation  of  surpluses  (other  than  through  the  deceitful  and  fraudulent 
practices  of  merchants). 
Millar's  social  world,  however,  was  the  same  modern  social  world  that  has 
continued  into  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries.  With  the  ancients  (such  as  Plato 
and  Aristotle)  he  shared  an  awareness  that  the  activity  of  "tradesmen,  manufacturers 
and  merchants"  differed,  through  a  division  of  labour,  from  that  of  hunters,  gatherers, 
herdsmen  and  horticulturists.  However,  unlike  the  ancients  he  recognised  that  the 
former's  productive  and  exchanging  activities  were  the  most  significant  way  in  which 
surpluses  were  generated,  bringing  them  and  their  political  patrons  great  wealth. 
Thus  Millar  wrote  of  the  "tradesmen,  manufacturers,  and  merchants  of  England"  in 
the  early  seventeenth  century,  as  social  "classes"  of  people,  many  individuals  of  which 
were: 
"by  successful  industry  in  the  more  lucrative  branches  of  trade,  and  by  a  rigid  and 
persevering  economy,  the  natural  effects  of  their  habits,  enabled  to  acquire  splendid 
fortunes"  (HV,  3,103). 
Here,  a  "rigid  and  persevering  economy"  of  the  management  of  the  privately  held 
capital  was  an  activity  exemplified  by  the  "habits"  of  individuals  concerned  with  the 
production  and  exchange  of  commodities.  It  helped  them  to  accumulate  "splendid 
fortunes".  Millar  thought  that  "economy"  (as  a  saving  of  both  money  and  time)  was 116 
productive  of  profit.  '  He  also  thought  that  landed  proprietors  who  exercised  a  poor 
"economy"  over  their  revenues,  spending  them  in  luxurious  over-consumption  rather 
than  productive  investments,  fell  into  debt,  and  were  forced  to  sell  their  estates.  This 
was  a  salient  cause  of  the  changes  in  the  distribution  of  property  that  determined  one 
of  the  political  forms  of  "commercial  society":  the  rule  of  the  "people"  through  the 
parliamentary  institution  of  representative  democraCy.  2 
The  point  here  to  be  made  is  only  that  Millar  thought  that  there  was  a  causal 
relationship  between  "economic"  management  and  the  acquisition  of  wealth,  and  that 
this  management  was,  in  turn,  the  effect  of  individuals'  engaged  in  commodity 
production  and  exchange.  Contrasting  the  position  of  the  "lower  people"  in  a 
"commercial"  period  of  history  with  that  of  the  "lower  people"  in  "rude  times",  Millar 
therefore  taught  his  students  that  the  knowledge  of  "commerce"  altered  the 
"character"  of  the  "bulk  of  the  people"  involved  in  trade  and  manufactures.  It  enabled 
them  "to  acquire  fortunes".  The  independent  commodity  producer  and  exchanger 
knew,  according  to  Millar,  that  a  knowledge  of  good  economy  brought  him  constant 
employment,  and  that,  through  his  own  efforts,  he  had  a  chance  of  becoming  rich. 
"Being  besides  a  good  Oeconomist,  he  must  soon  acquire  Wealth"  (LG1771,33-34). 
Contextual  i  sing,  therefore,  Millar's  use  of  the  term  "economy"  or  "Oeconomist" 
might  show  that  his  use  of  these  terms  did  not  mean  that  "economy"  and  "generalised 
commodity  production  and  exchange"  were  synonymous  at  the  time  he  was  writing. 
However,  it  does  not  entail  that  there  is  an  unbridgeable  gap  of  meaning  between  his 
use  and  nineteenth  or  twentieth  century  usages  of  the  terms.  On  the  contrary,  a 
discussion  of  Millar's  usage  of  "Oeconomist",  for  example,  to  refer  to  the  "natural" 
habits  of  someone  engaged  in  commodity  production  and  exchange  reveals 
assumptions  and  presuppositions  that  Millar  made  about  the  acquisition  of  wealth  in  a 
commodity-producing  society,  for  example  that  the  habit  of  saving  and  the  invention 
of  divided  forms  of  the  organisation  of  labour  and  technology  that  save  time  and 
money  were  productive  of  capital.  These  have  been  hinted  at  here  and  will  be 
developed  further  in  the  next  chapter.  3 
6.2  Commodity,  Money,  Value  and  Labour 
The  assumption  I  have  made  so  far  is  that  Millar  had  a  concept  of  economic 
activity  and  that  this  concept  consisted  in  the  notion  of  activity  that  generalises 
I  See  chapter  seven. 
2SCC  chapter  eleven. 
3Thc  gap  of  meaning  will  not  be  filled  here,  for  it  would  require  a  more  general  theory  on  the 
relationship  of  changes  in  linguistic  usage  to  changes  in  society.  All  that  needs  to  be  noted  is 
that,  wheruis  the  language  used  may  be  the  same,  the  categories  expressed  within  that  language 
have  evolved,  and  that  if  there  are  contradictions  within  the  real  social  entities  or  activities 
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commodity  production  and  exchange  throughout  world  society.  This  is  comparable  to 
but  significantly  different  from  Marx's  in  ways  that  will  become  clear.  When  addressing 
the  possible  objection  of  anachronism,  I  also  indicated  that  the  specific  historical 
context  in  which  Millar's  use  of  "commodity"  was  uttered  might  entail  differences  in 
meaning  from  later  understandings.  This  section  therefore  addresses  the  use  that  Millar 
made  of  the  term  commodity.  This  use  is  assessed  within  the  perspective  of  a  body  of 
knowledge  known  as  classical  political  economy  culminating  in  the  work  of  Marx. 
Classical  political  economy  is  famous  for  its  theoretical  investigation  into  the  nature  of 
the  qualitative  and  quantitative  relationships  between  the  categories  of  commodity, 
money,  value  and  labour,  especially  that  of  equivalent  and  non-equivalent  exchange.  4 
I  shall  argue  that  Millar  had  no  notion  of  value  expressing  an  equivalent 
relationship  of  labouring  activities  (or  of  the  products  of  labour  through  the  exchange 
of  commodities  for  money  or  for  capital).  He  did,  however,  have  notions  of  value, 
labour  time,  and  equivalence.  All  were,  however,  estimated  subjectively.  He  conceived 
of  value  as  utility,  labour  time  as  pain  or  hardship,  and  equivalence  as  the  contractual 
or  consensual  agreement  of  mutually  self-interested  subjects.  The  latter  were  formally 
equal  in  the  judgements  of  a  disinterested  spectator. 
Millar,  therefore,  was  therefore  not  committed  to  an  objective  labour  theory  of 
value.  Unlike  Smith,  for  whom  the  exchange  of  commodities  was  regulated  both  by 
the  quantities  of  labour  expended  or  purchased  and  by  supply  and  demand,  Mllar 
thought  that  supply  and  demand  was  sufficient  to  explain  regularities  in  exchange. 
Thus  he  wrote,  "if  we  have  commodities  for  which  there  is  a  general  demand,  we  can 
seldom  remain  long  without  an  opportunity  of  turning  them  into  money"  (HV,  4,109). 
This  general  demand  regulated  both  the  amount  of  commodities  in  circulation  as  well 
as  the  amount  of  money  which  assisted  the  circulation  of  commodities. 
Millar,  like  Smith,  theorised  the  origins  of  generalised  production  and  exchange  as 
the  causal  effect  of  a  division  of  labour.  The  latter  in  turn  arose  out  of  the  individual 
subject's  faculties  of  the  mind  operating  on  a  world  of  natural  scarcity.  The  passions 
caused  by  the  harmful  effects  of  scarcities  of  goods  on  the  mind  and  body  drove  the 
subject  to  attempt  to  satisfy  natural  necessities  such  as  hunger,  thirst,  shelter,  clothing, 
and  the  esteem  or  recognition  of  others.  It  was  the  "separation  of  trades  and 
professions"  that  led  to  a  "degree  of  traffic  or  exchange  of  commodities"  (HV,  1,318). 
Commodities  were  both  the  products  of  labour  and  exchanged  for  use  and 
consumption  "according  to  the  demand  of  different  individuals"  (OR,  87)  "and  thus 
manufactures,  together  with  commerce,  are  at  length  introduced  into  a  country". 
4The  definition  of  political  economy  I  adopt  is  the  following:  "Political  economy  deals  with 
human  working  activity,  not  from  the  standpoint  of  its  technical  mcthods  and  instruments  of 
labour,  but  from  the  standpoint  of  its  social  form.  "  Rubin  1.1.  (1928)  Essqvs  on  Uarx's  Theory  of 
Value,  trans.  Samordzya  &  Perlman,  3rd  Moscow  edn,  Detroit,  1972:  p.  3  1. 118 
Without  a  division  of  labour,  there  could  be  no  "regular  exchange  of  commodities" 
(LJ1789,  vol.  2,  lec.  22,  p65)  The  drive  towards  commodity  production  was  labour 
applied  to  a  "variety  of  objects"  that  satisfied  the  "useful  purpose"  of  providing 
clothing  and  lodging  (OR,  87).  This  "renders  every  man  capable  of  maintaining  himself 
by  his  own  labour"  (LJ1789,2,23,72).  "Different  individuals  are  endowed  with 
different  talents,  and  by  exerting  their  industry  in  a  variety  of  employments,  come  to 
possess  different  subjects"  (LJ1789,3,35,1).  Individuals  were  driven  to  the  labour  that 
produced  commodities  by  the  avoidance  of  the  pain  and  the  satisfaction  of  pleasures  in 
circumstances  of  scarcity.  The  faculties  of  the  mind  or  "talents"  necessary  for  the 
production  of  commodities  were  unequally  distributed  across  the  population.  Millar 
explained  the  division  of  labour  necessary  for  commodity  exchange  to  come  into  being 
through  the  exercise  of  a  conjectural  hypothesis  in  his  lectures: 
"Let  us  suppose,  that  the  husbandmen  of  a  village  are,  by  improvement  of  agriculture, 
enabled  to  make  some  advances  with  respect  to  the  conveniences  of  life.  This  will 
produce  greater  application  to  those  employments,  which  tend  to  procure  food  or 
lodging.  Particular  persons,  from  accident  or  from  particular  talents,  discover  a 
superior  proficiency  to  others.  Being  often  employed  in  the  exercise  of  these  to  assist 
their  neighbours,  they  are  at  length  encouraged  to  demand  sonic  compensation  in 
return  for  their  labour;  and  thus  finding  constant  employment  in  one  art,  they  are  led  to 
abandon  every  other,  and  are  enabled  to  earn  their  livelihood  by  exchanging  either 
labour  or  the  product  of  their  labour,  with  what,  other  people  are  willing  to  give  for  it. 
In  this  manner,  the  Smith,  Brewer,  the  taylor,  the  weaver,  the  carpenter  and  a  variety 
of  artificers  are  gradually  introduced.  "  (LJJ  789,3,35,4-9) 
The  first  part  of  this  explanation  relied  on  the  notion  that  production  is  solely  a 
technical  affair  -  the  result  of  the  individual's  labouring  relationship  to  nature.  Thus 
"particular  persons,  frorn  accident  or  from  particular  talents,  discover  a  superior 
proficiency  to  others.  "  Millar's  focus  here  was  on  the  technical  proficiency  of 
individuals  found  within  an  already  given  division  of  labour.  A  division  of  labour 
within  which  individuals  are  already  technically  proficient  in  certain  tasks  is  therefore 
presupposed  in  order  to  explain  how  a  division  of  labour  came  into  being.  It  is 
therefore  circular  and  unconvincing.  Elsewhere,  Millar  wrote  that  it  is  the  subject's 
"application  of  labour  to  a  variety  of  objects"  which  produced  commodities,  the 
exchange  of  which  brought  into  being  a  division  of  labour  based  on  "manufactures, 
together  with  commerce"  (OR,  87).  However,  in  the  lectures,  the  temporal  order  of  the 
discovery  of  technical  knowledge,  commodity  exchange  and  a  division  of  labour  is 
reversed.  It  was  the  discovery  of  the  art  of  manufactures  that  "gives  rise  to  the  division 
of  labour  among  different  tradesmen  and  artificers"  (I-JI789,2,23,72).  The  division  of 119 
labour  in  turn  gave  rise  to  "the  frequent  exchange  of  commodities".  Millar  therefore 
tended  to  think  of  exchange  as  a  generalisable  technical  skill  discovered  along  with 
other  particular  technical  skills  such  as  working  metals,  carpentry  etc.  The  knowledge 
of  the  exchange  of  commodities  arose  with  the  knowledge  of  how  to  produce  them. 
The  subject's  perception  of  their  interest  in  commodity  production  and  exchange  (as  a 
means  of  escaping  from  natural  necessity  and  of  satisfying  needs  of  body  and  mind) 
therefore  brought  into  being  a  non-familial  and  inter-group  social  and  political 
correspondence  between  individualS.  5 
The  second  part  of  Millar's  conjecture,  however,  also  explained  the  origins  of  an 
exchange  of  commodities  in  terms  of  the  subjective  "compensation"  demanded  by  the 
commodity  producer  for  his  painful  and  difficult  labouring  efforts.  This  Part  of  the 
explanation  relied  on  a  notion  of  natural  justice  regulating  contract  that  would  find  the 
approval  of  every  disinterested  spectator.  As  Millar  put  it  elsewhere  in  his  lectures: 
"at  first  he  helps  those  who  are  not  so  skilled  a  himself  and  this  he  will  do  for  nothing. 
By  degrees  however  the  many  applications  that  are  made  to  him  will  render  it 
necessary  that  they  give  him  some  gmtification  for  his  trouble.  -  Thus  he  comes  to 
work  for  Hire  -  by  this  lie  is  encouraged  to  abandon  every  other  art  but  this  particular 
one  by  which  lie  sees  lie  can  gain  a  livelyhood  -  and  Custom  will  make  him  prefer  it  to 
all  others.  "  (LGI  771,28-29). 
The  division  of  labour  that  is  supposed  to  give  rise  to  a  generalised  exchange  of 
commodities  here  arises  out  of  the  demand  that  the  commodity  producer  makes  "for 
his  trouble",  -  the  subjective  estimation  of  the  producer  of  the  hardship  caused  by  the 
constant  application  of  his  labour  to  the  assistance  of  others.  The  sympathetic  response 
of  a  spectator  would  require  that  he  be  rewarded  with  an  exchange  of  goods  in  return 
for  his  hardship  and  this  would  be  regulated  by  the  law  of  contract.  Again  Millar's 
explanation  is  circular,  presupposing  the  juridical  relationship  of  contract  established 
naturally  prior  to  the  existence  of  a  division  of  labour  and  the  exchange  of 
commodities.  Moreover,  Millar  is  inconsistent  with  his  account  of  contract  elsewhere 
in  his  lectures  where  the  idea  of  contract  comes  into  being  after  generalised 
commodity  exchange  has  come  into  being.  6 
Nonetheless,  however  unconvincing  this  might  appear  as  a  historical  explanation,  it 
is  wholly  consistent  with  Millar's  conjectural  method.  The  latter  is  reliant  on  an  appeal 
to  judgements  that  would  meet  the  approval  of  a  well  informed  spectator.  The  latter, 
5See  chapter  nine. 
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reflecting  in  a  disinterested  fashion  on  the  experience  of  the  self-interested  subject, 
would  conclude  that  a  compensation  for  the  hardship  of  his  labour  was  naturally  jUSt.  7 
In  the  following  chapter,  I  shall  argue  that  Millar's  conception  of  exchange  as  both 
a  natural  technical  process  discovered  through  the  individuals'  capacity  for  knowledge 
and  the  application  of  his  skills  (an  objective  feature  of  all  societies),  and  also  as  a 
subjective  reward  for  the  effort  and  trouble  the  producer  is  imagined  to  suffer 
approved  by  an  impartial  spectator,  is  a  duality  that  dominates  his  contribution  to 
political  economy.  The  notions  that  profit  is  both  the  result  of  the  labour  and  revenue 
saving  effects  of  machinery,  and  also  a  just  compensation  for  the  efforts  the  capitalist 
expends  on  supervising  and  controlling  the  process  of  production,  follow  from  the 
above  assumptions.  " 
For  the  present  purpose  of  establishing  Millar's  understanding  of  economic 
categories,  it  is  sufficient  to  argue  that  Millar's  account  of  the  origins  of  commodity 
production  and  exchange  demonstrates  the  following  points:  firstly,  he  conceived  of 
the  commodity  as  a  product  of  labour.  Secondly,  he  conceived  of  commodity 
production  and  exchange  as  technical  discoveries;  and  thirdly,  that  he  thought 
exchange  was  regulated  by  the  subject's  moral  and  juridical  judgements  concerning 
individuals'  interests.  He  therefore  had  a  subjective  conception  of  the  relation  of 
equivalence  expressed  within  the  value-form  of  the  commodity. 
On  the  latter  point,  Millar  mentioned  that  the  "real  value  and  adequate  mercantile 
profit"  was  realised  through  the  exchange  of  money  for  commodities  (M-C)  as  much 
as  through  the  exchange  of  commodities  for  money  (C-M).  This  "real  value"  is 
connected  with  supplying  "the  wants  of  the  inhabitants"  (HV,  4,108).  Millar  suggested 
here  that  "real  value"  is  recognised  by  its  qualitative  satisfaction  of  the  subjectively 
assessed  needs  of  individuals.  Writers  on  trade  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries  had  distinguished  between  the  meanings  of  "value"  as  the  subject's 
assessment  of  personal  worth  and  as  a  quantitative  relation  between  commodities  and 
money  found  in  exchange.  9  These  distinctions  of  meaning  were  to  separate  out  into  the 
distinction  between  "use-value"  and  "exchange-value".  Smith  in  The  Wealth  of  Natiolls 
clearly  made  this  distinction.  He  also  made  it  clear  that  his  investigation  into  the 
regulation  of  value  was  of  the  "exchangeable  value  of  commodities"  which  he  equated 
with  their  "natural  price"  around  which  their  "market  price"  oscillates  (WN,  Liv.  17,46). 
The  evidence  that  Millar  had  an  understanding  of  value  as  "exchangeable  value"  is 
strongest  when  he  discussed  the  assessment  of  property  for  taxation  purposes  by  the 
state.  Thus,  when  he  referred  to  the  "right  of  election"  at  the  time  of  Cromwell's 
71bid. 
8Sce  chapter  seven. 
9"In  English  writers  of  the  l7th  century  we  frequently  find  'worth'  in  the  sense  of  value  in  use, 
and  'value'  in  the  sense  of  exchange  value.  "  Marx  K.  Capital  1,761.1,  p2,  n3. 121 
protectorate,  he  wrote  that  it  belonged  to  "such  as  possessed  a  landed  estate, 
amounting  to  the  value  of  E220".  Millar  did  not  indicate  whether  this  quantity  of  value 
referred  to  the  value  of  the  annual  produce  extracted  by  the  landed  proprietor  as 
revenue,  or  whether  it  referred  to  an  assessment  of  the  market  value  of  the  land  were  it 
to  be  sold.  10  However,  that  value  referred  to  a  quantity  of  money  is  evident.  This 
entailed  that  either  the  concept  of  the  exchangeability  of  land  itself,  or  the 
exchangeability  of  the  produce  of  the  land  was  understood.  This  quantitative  notion  of 
exchange  value  is  re-iterated  in  various  other  sections  of  Historical  View.  Millar 
wrote  of  the  right  of  suffrage  of  the  English  knights  of  the  shires  in  the  reign  of  James 
the  First  "all  of  who  held  lands  of  a  certain  value,  whether  as  vassals  of  the  crown  or  a 
of  subject"  (HV,  3,75-6).  Those  who  were  entitled  to  vote  were  "all  who  enjoyed  leases 
for  life  to  the  same  amount". 
Millar  observed  that  the  assessment  of  the  value  of  landed  or  moveable  property 
for  tax  purposes  did  not  correspond  to  its  "real  value".  In  his  lectures,  for  example,  he 
stated  that:  "The  taxes  are  never  rated  upon  a  thing  according  to  reality.  As  for 
example  in  this  country  were  you  to  consider  the  rated  land  tax  you  could  not  have  any 
idea  of  the  real  value  of  the  land"  (LG1771,72).  Here  Millar  distinguished  real  value 
from  a  set  evaluation  used  for  the  raising  of  taxes.  This  he  repeated  elsewhere  when  he 
recognised  that  the  rateable  value  Henry  the  Sixth  used  to  assess  the  eligibility  for  the 
vote  was  "settled  at  forty  shillings  which  continues  till  this  day  notwithstanding  of  the 
disproportion  of  the  value  of  money"  (LGI  771,166). 
The  distinction  Millar  made  between  rateable  value  and  real  value  implied  that  the 
determination  of  the  latter  could  be  understood  separately  from  the  former.  The  value 
of  money  or  commodities  was  regulated  independently  from  the  subjective  assessment 
of  state  officials  for  electoral  taxation  purposes. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  also  examples  of  Millar's  use  of  "value"  to  refer  to  a 
qualitative  subjective  assessment  of  moral  or  personal  worth  in  other  sections  of  his 
writings.  Millar  wrote  of  the  husband  who  values  a  woman  "more,  from  the 
consideration  that  she  has  been  valued  by  others"  (OR,  23)  when  explaining  the 
violation  of  the  "laws  of  chastity  before  marriage"  by  Native  Americans.  He  wrote  of 
the  raising  of  the  "value"  of  non-military  occupations  "in  proportion  as  men  live  in 
greater  security"  on  the  grounds  that  they  were  "found  more  useful"  (HV,  4,187). 
Millar's  language  referred  to  the  "standard  of  approbation"  and  "estimation".  This 
implies  a  subjective  qualitative  evaluation  of  personal  worth. 
However,  in  most  contexts  where  Millar  used  "value"  it  is  unclear  whether  he  was 
referring  to  a  quantitative  or  a  qualitative  relationship,  exchange  or  use  value,  or  an 
objective  relationship  of  vaiue  between  commodities  and  money,  or  a  subjective 
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relationship  of  value  between  things  and  persons,  or  persons  and  persons.  The  closest 
he  came  to  recognising  the  relationship  that  Smith  observed  between  value  and  "labour 
purchased  or  expended"  is  in  the  following  passage: 
"But  after  a  person  has  long  cultivated  the  same  field,  his  possession  becomes 
gradually  more  and  more  complete;  it  is  continued  during  the  whole  year  without 
interruption;  and  when  by  his  industry  and  labour  he  has  increased  the  value  of  the 
subject,  lie  seems  justly  entitled,  not  only  to  the  immediate  crop  that  is  raised,  but  to 
the  future  advantages  arising  from  the  melioration  of  the  soil.  "  (OR,  158) 
The  relation  between  the  industry  and  labour  of  the  individual  on  the  land  and  its 
increased  value  appears  here  to  make  an  objective  connection  between  a  quantitative 
relation  expressed  within  the  exchange  of  commodities  and  the  quantity  of  labour 
expended  upon  the  commodity.  On  the  other  hand,  this  interpretation  is  immediately 
contradicted  when  the  jurisprudential  language  of  just  entitlement  to  both  the  crop  and 
the  land  is  considered.  Millar  was  using  the  example  of  the  individual's  labour 
expended  on  the  product  as  an  illustration  of  his  spectator-based  theory  of  property. 
The  advantages  the  individual  gained  both  through  working  on  the  land  and  producing 
a  crop  were  assessed  subjectively  according  to  the  sympathetic  reactions  that  a 
spectator  would  have  with  the  pains  the  individual  experienced  in  working  the  land  and 
the  pleasures  expected  from  the  enjoyment  of  the  crop  produced.  Millar's 
understanding  of  an  increase  in  the  value  of  the  subject  is  therefore  consistent  with  the 
notion  that  there  was  an  increased  expectation  of  use  of  the  product  of  labour  by  the 
individual  producer:  "increased"  meaning  an  intensification  of  feelings  of  anticipated 
pleasure  which  the  right  to  continued  exclusive  possession  safeguarded. 
Although  Millar  made  no  explicit  statement  of  commitment  to  a  subjective  theory 
of  value,  neither  did  he  make  any  commitment  to  an  objective,  labour  theory  of  value. 
For  the  purposes  of  Millar's  historical  focus  of  investigation  into  the  relationship 
between  changes  in  knowledge  of  the  arts,  ideas  of  property,  and  customs,  manners 
and  laws,  it  was  sufficient  for  him  to  assume  that  generalised  commodity  production 
and  exchange  was  brought  into  being  through  the  natural  processes  of  the  individual's 
improving  activities.  There  was  no  need  for  him  to  have  a  theory  of  value 
distinguishable  from  his  theory  of  property.  However,  that  he  would  have  been  aware 
of  different  theorisations  of  value  is  clear  from  the  references  he  made  to  Smith  and 
the  Physiocrats  and  the  "older  writers  on  trade",  especially  Locke  who  formulated  the 
first  theory  of  supply  and  demand,  changes  in  value  being  dependent  upon  the 
proportion  of  sellers  to  buyers.  The  subjective  theory  of  value  (that  value  derives  from 
the  usefulness  of  commodities  and  their  capacity  to  satisfy  needs  and  wants)  had  a 123 
history  as  far  back  as  Nicholas  Barbon,  a  contemporary  of  Locke's.  II  It  was  kept  alive 
both  by  Physiocrats  such  as  Turgot  and  by  opponents  of  the  Physiocrats  such  as 
Condillac  who  were  writing  at  the  same  time  as  Millar. 
Evidence  that  Millar  tended  to  adopt  a  subjective  theory  of  value  can  also  be  found 
in  his  writings  on  the  origins  of  money  in  the  section  on  contract  in  his  lectures  on 
Justinian  (LJ]789,3,35,1-20).  As  mentioned  previously,  he  wrote  of  the  equivalent 
relation  in  exchange  as  a  "compensation"  or  a  "reward"  for  labour  expended  by 
autonomous,  self-determining,  equal  individuals.  A  subjective  theory  is  also  evident  in 
Millar's  attempts  to  theorise  the  nature  of  capital,  profits,  rent  and  wages.  12 
When  he  wrote  about  the  origin  of  money,  he  followed  Smith  to  the  extent  that  he 
recognised  that  money  was  a  commodity  like  other  commodities.  It  was  an 
exchangeable  product  of  labour  whose  usefulness  lay  in  its  function  as  a  means  of  the 
circulation  of  other  commodities.  Millar  observed  that  the  specific  form  of  money  as  a 
commodity  that  is  easily  divisible  was  naturally  determined.  It  could  therefore  can  act 
as  currency  or  specie.  However,  he  thought  that  the  amount  of  money  required  for 
circulation  depended  solely  upon  the  demand  and  supply  of  commodities  surplus  to  the 
individual's  subjective  perception  of  his  needs  for  personal  consumption  and 
subsistence.  Thus: 
"When  the  use  of  exchange  becomes  more  frequent,  it  will  often  happen,  that  a  person, 
who  has  a  superfluity  to  dispose  of,  has  no  immediate  demand  for  the  only  commodity 
which  lie  can  obtain  from  a  purchaser;  in  which  case  lie  may  take  that  commodity  in 
exchange;  provided  it  be  a  thing  for  which  there  is  a  general  demand  in  society.  Thus  if 
I  have  grain  to  dispose  of  , 
for  which  I  wish  to  procure  cloth,  I  may  only  take  in 
exchange  my  neighbour's  cattle  because  I  know  that  will  afterwards  enable  me  to 
purchase  the  cloth,  which  I  have  occasion  for.  Thus  what  is  called  money  is  introduced 
and  the  use  of  it  becomes  more  and  more  frequent,  in  proportion  to  the  frequency  of 
exchange.  It  depends  upon  the  particular  circumstances  of  a  people,  what  particular 
commodities  pass  for  money  amongst  them.  Though  every  commodity  for  which  there 
is  a  general  demand  may  be  taken  in  exchange,  several  circumstances  will  cultivate  to 
make  some  commodities  be  preferred  to  others.  If  a  person  is  to  take  a  commodity  for 
which  lie  has  no  immediate  use,  it  will  be  of  advantage  that  the  commodity  can  be 
easily  kept  till  a  purchaser  is  found  -  that  it  can  be  easily  transformed  to  any  place 
when  a  market  may  occur  -  that  it  can  be  easily  divided  so  as  to  suit  any  future 
purchaser  -  that  the  quantity  of  the  commodity  or  any  part  of  it,  can  be  easily  and 
11  Rtibiu  I.  1.  (1929)  A  HislogofEcononticTliought,  trans.  Filtzer.  London.  1979:  pp.  66-67. 
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exactly  ascertained  -  Cattle  are  commodity  used  as  nioney.  by  a  nation  of  shepherds. 
(Of  general  demand  -  easily  kept  -  In  sonic  degree  divisible)"  (LJI  789,3,35,4-9) 
In  this  passage,  Millar  retained  the  perspective  typical  of  classical  political 
economy:  wealth  consisted  in  commodities  and  commodities  were  products  of  the 
atomised  labour  of  the  individual  producer.  Thus  exchange  presupposed  a 
"superfluity"  of  commodities  over  and  above  the  immediate  "wants"  or  needs  of  the 
individual.  This  was  in  accord  with  Millar's  contrast  between  "luxuries"  or 
"conveniences"  as  opposed  to  "necessaries".  Production  of  the  former  was  impossible 
to  conceive  of  without  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange.  However, 
the  "superfluity"  was  originally  in  "necessaries"  -  food  in  the  form  of  "grain"  and 
materials  necessary  for  clothing,  or  the  source  of  both  food  and  clothing  in  the  form  of 
"cattle".  Money  represented  wealth  because  it  was  a  "particular  commodity"  for  which 
there  was  a  "general  demand"  and,  by  this  definition,  any  particular  commodity  could 
in  theory  function  as  money  as  long  as  it  was  easily  divisible  into  parts.  The  utility  of 
money  was  its  function  as  a  means  to  facilitate  the  circulation  of  other  commodities. 
This  function  was  subordinate  to  the  "frequency  of  exchange"  of  other  commodities. 
Thus  the  circulation  of  money  in  exchange  was  regulated  by  tile  need  for  a  circulation 
of  commodities.  Millar  was  aware  of  the  full  circuit  of  the  exchange  of  commodities 
C-M-C  and  that  the  unity  of  this  circuit  can  be  interrupted  temporarily  into  two 
moments  C-M  and  M-C.  Money  in  the  first  moment  had  no  "immediate  use"  to  the 
seller  until,  through  "general  demand",  he  found  a  buyer  for  the  commodity  he  held  as 
money.  The  subjective  advantage  of  taking  money  in  exchange  was  that  it  provided  the 
seller  tile  opportunity  to  become  a  purchaser  once  more: 
"Thus  if  I  have  grain  to  dispose  of,  for  which  I  wish  to  procure  cloth,  I  may  take  in 
exchange  my  neighbour's  cattle  because  I  know  that  will  afterwards  enable  me  to 
purchase  tile  cloth,  which  I  have  occasion  for.  "  (LJI  789.3,35,8) 
This  passage  demonstrates  the  subjective  foundation  Millar  gave  to  the  circuit  of 
the  exchange  of  commodities.  His  use  of  the  first  person  indicates  the  presence  of  the 
self-interested  subject  of  experience.  The  latter's  sympathy  for  the  interests  of  other 
subjects  was  founded  upon  experience.  A  spectator  would  approve  of  the  use  of 
money  because  lie  was  capable  of  sympathising  with  the  advantage  money  gave  to 
every  seller  and  purchaser.  The  seller  was  only  able  to  consume  and  purchase  because 
of  others'  subjectively  assessed  "wants"  for  the  commodity  he  possessed  as  money. 
The  use  of  money  as  a  particular  commodity  facilitated  the  circulation  of  other 
commodities.  It  was  therefore  in  the  interests  of  and  for  the  good  of  every  subject. 
Money  possessed  value  because  the  subject  experienced  it  as  a  useful  means  of 125 
circulation  of  the  commodities  he  desired  for  consumption,  show  or  gifts.  Every 
individual  subject  had  "wants"  and  needs.  He  was  as  equally  interested  in  the  outcome 
of  successful  purchases  and  sales  as  any  other. 
Millar's  account  therefore  disregarded  whether  or  not  the  exchange  of  commodity 
for  money  or  of  commodity  for  commodity  expressed  a  quantitative  relationship  of 
value  as  a  social  substance.  Millar  did  not  remark  on  the  relation  of  quantitative 
equivalence  of  value  in  the  exchange  of  money  for  commodity  or  of  commodity  for 
money.  Quantitative  equivalence  was  expressed  solely  in  the  natural  or  material 
divisibility  of  the  money  commodity  according  to  weight  or  size.  The  ease  of 
divisibility  (and  its  ability  to  be  stored  for  periods  of  time  without  deterioration) 
determined  the  selection  of  the  particular  commodity  preferred  as  the  means  of 
circulation.  This  depended,  in  turn,  on  "the  particular  circumstances  of  the  people". 
The  equivalence  in  exchange  of  commodities  for  money  and  of  money  for  commodities 
was  therefore  an  expression  of  juridically  equivalent  subjective  interests,  desires  and 
wants  of  individual  producers  and  exchangers. 
The  category  of  equivalence,  referred  to  by  Millar,  assumed  that  the  personalities 
of  the  subjects  of  the  experience  of  commodity  production  and  exchange  were 
juridically  equivalent.  This  meant  that  in  any  breach  of  contract  both  offender  and 
victim  would  gain  an  equal  amount  of  attention  from  a  magistrate  or  arbitrator. 
Millar's  jurisprudential  perspective  forced  him  to  understand  the  equality  of  exchange, 
not  as  objective  value  expressed  in  an  equivalence  of  the  time  spent  in  the  production 
of  commodities,  but  as  the  equality  presupposed  in  contract,  persons  deserving  equal 
recognition  by  a  magistrate  or  sovereign  in  disputes  that  arose  through  breaches  of 
agreements. 
Millar  expressed  the  justice  of  (and  self-interest  involved  in)  equivalent  exchange 
thus: 
"The  most  expedient  and  the  only  just  method  of  procuring,  either  my  neighbour's 
property,  or  the  exertion  of  his  talents  in  my  favour,  is  by  obtaining  his  consent,  and 
the  only  way  in  most  cases,  of  persuading  him  to  give  his  consent,  is,  by  offering  an 
equivalent,  either  in  labour  or  in  goods,  upon  what  I  wish  to  acquire.  This  may 
produce  an  agreement  to  make  an  exchange,  which  appears  conducive  to  our  mutual 
interest.  "  (LI1789.3,35,  I) 
Agreement,  consent,  contract  and  the  motivation  to  exchange  labour  and  goods 
was  caused  by  "mutual  interest"  and  involved  a  sympathetic  identification  by  the 
individual  with  the  interests  of  others.  The  justice  of  exchange  was  confirmed  post  hoc 
by  the  disinterested  observations  of  the  spectator.  The  equivalence  "either  in  labour  or 
in  goods"  was  a  subjective  feature  of  what  "appears  conducive  to  our  mutual  interest". 126 
It  was  therefore  consistent  with  the  subject's  estimations  of  the  quantity  of  pain  and 
effort  expended  in  the  production  of  a  commodity  and  the  quality  of  goods  acquired 
through  exchange. 
In  the  passage  above,  Millar  was  discussing  contract.  It  followed  that  as  long  as 
there  had  been  "an  agreement  to  make  an  exchange"  caused  by  the  recognition  of 
subjectively  assessed  mutual  interest,  the  contract  was  a  "just  method  of  procuring" 
the  labour  or  the  "talents"  of  others  "in  my  favour".  The  justice  of  contractual 
exchange  could  be  confirmed  experimentally  in  the  experience  of  every  self-interested 
subject.  The  justice  of  contract,  according  to  Millar,  favoured  the  manufacturer,  who 
was  able  to  derive  part  of  his  profits  from  a  subjectively  assessed  equivalent  exchange 
with  a  labourer.  This  labourer  was  a  workman: 
11who 
...  will  have  a  full  equivalent  for  what  he  thus  resigns.  By  working  to  a  master 
he  is  sure  of  constant  employment,  is  saved  the  trouble  of  seeking  out  those  who  may 
have  occasion  for  his  labour,  and  avoids  the  anxiety  arising  from  tile  danger  of  being 
thrown  occasionally  idle.  In  return  for  these  advantages,  lie  willingly  relinquishes  to 
his  master  some  part  of  what  he  can  earn  while  employed"  (HV.  4,120). 
The  "full  equivalent"  Millar  described  is  expressed  purely  in  terms  of  the  subjective 
"advantages"  of  the  worker's  employment.  It  is  consistent  with  Millar's  theorisation  of 
voluntary  submission  to  the  will  of  a  master,  justified  by  Utility.  13  It  was  useful  to  the 
worker  to  be  in  work  because  he  was  saved  anxiety  and  worry.  He  therefore  consented 
to  give  up  to  his  "master  some  part  of  what  he  can  earn  while  employed"  in  return  for 
peace  of  mind.  The  worker  therefore  consented  to  his  master's  use  of  him  to  make  a 
profit. 
Because  Millar  tended  towards  adopting  a  subjective  theory  of  value  as  utility, 
11expedience"  or  "advantage",  he  ignored  Smith's  insights  both  into  the  possibility  that 
surpluses  are  acquired  through  an  unpaid  component  to  the  use  of  the  worker's  labour 
and  that  there  is  a  conflict  of  interest  between  employer  and  employee.  Millar,  rather, 
stressed  the  "mutual  interests"  between  employer  and  employee  and  the  mutual 
agreement  expressed  in  the  formal  nature  of  the  contractual  relationship  between  two 
equally  consenting  parties.  This  was  consistent  with  Millar's  theory  of  liberty  in  which 
employers  and  employees  had  a  mutual  interest  in  resisting  the  tendency  towards  a 
concentration  of  the  sovereign's  power.  14 
13SCC  chapter  tcn. 
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Chapter  Seven: 
Political  Economy 
7.1  The  Intellectual  Context 
Mention  was  made  in  the  preceding  chapter  of  Millar's  use  of  "economy".  I  argued 
that  Millar  used  this  term  to  refer  to  the  prudent  management  of  public  revenue  by 
sovereigns  such  as  Elizabeth  and  James  1.  By  the  eighteenth  century,  the  study  of  the 
sources  of  public  revenue  had  been  complemented  by  the  attempt  to  theorise  the 
origins  of  public  wealth.  The  concern  with  the  prudent  management  of  revenue  the 
sovereign  derived  from  the  taxation  of  subjects  was  complemented  by  the  advice  given 
by  salaried  or  favoured  officials  on  how  the  sovereign  might  legislate  to  secure  the 
enlargement  of  revenue  through  the  promotion  of  wealth  creating  activity  on  the  part 
of  his  or  her  subjects. 
The  birth  of  modern  economic  science,  therefore,  quite  properly  coincided  with  the 
rise  of  merchant  capital  as  a  source  both  of  private  wealth  and  public  revenue. 
Merchants  were  practical  men  who  sought  to  influence  the  policies  of  the  state  in  their 
favour  and  interest  by  writing  pamphlets.  '  These  were  initially  refutations  or 
recommendations  of  particular  state  measures.  They  emphasised  that  the  growth  of 
commerce  benefited  all  sections  of  the  population.  Thomas  Mun,  writing  in  the  first 
third  of  the  seventeenth  century,  clearly  expressed  the  wish  of  this  class  to  form  a 
strong  alliance  between  themselves  and  the  crown  which  would,  they  argued,  benefit 
the  whole  of  the  population  when  he  wrote: 
"A  king  who  desires  to  lay  up  much  mony  must  endeavour  by  all  good  means  to 
maintain  and  encrease  his  forraign  trade,  because  it  is  the  sole  way  not  only  to  lead 
him  to  his  own  ends,  but  also  to  enrich  his  subjects  to  his  further  benefit.  "2 
By  the  eighteenth  century,  the  perceived  harmony  of  interests  between  the  state 
and  merchant  capital  had  taken  a  different  path.  Theoretical  categories  had  developed 
through  the  critique  of  mercantilist  literature.  Moreover  a  section  of  the  bourgeoisie 
that  personified  the  interests  of  productive  capital  came  into  conflict  with  state  policies 
that  promoted  the  interests  of  merchant  capital.  It  is  at  this  period  that  the  doctrine  of 
the  freedom  of  trade  and  industry  from  state  interference  came  to  maturity.  The 
doctrirý--  was  conceived  of  as  in  accord  with  the  requirements  of  natural  law.  It 
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manifested  itself  both  in  the  writings  of  the  French  Physiocrats  and  at  almost  the  same 
time  in  the  moral  and  political  writings of  Hume,  Smith  and  Millar. 
The  interest  of  the  monarch  was  to  promote  the  wealth  of  subjects  in  order  to 
increase  the  amount  of  public  revenues  available  through  taxation.  This  coincided 
with  the  interests  of  mercantile,  agrarian  and  embryonic  industrial  sections  of  the 
bourgeoisie.  Reflection  on  these  interests  was  expressed  within  the  corresponding 
convergence  between  the  practical  language  of  merchants,  and  the  philosophical 
language  of  jurists  and  moralists.  The  meeting  point  of  these  languages  is  to  be  found 
in  the  union  of  the  terms  "economy"  with  that  of  "police".  The  latter  had  become  a 
branch  of  jurisprudence  that  examined  public  law  in  accord  with  the  principles  of 
natural  right.  It  attempted  to  make  positive  law  accord  with  the  eternal  and  immutable 
laws  of  reason  and  justice  laid  down  either  by  God  or  by  the  natural  world  He  had 
created. 
By  the  time  Smith  was  lecturing  to  his  students  on  jurisprudence  in  the  1760s  he 
was  able  to  contrast  the  meaning  of  "police"  as  used  by  the  ancient  Greeks  with  its 
contemporary  meaning  in  French.  Whereas  the  former  meant  "the  regulation  of  a 
government  in  generall"  (LJA),  vi.  1,33  1),  the  latter  was  defined  as  "the  regulation  of 
the  inferior  parts  of  it".  Smith  divided  this  into  three  parts,  the  third  of  which  was 
concerned  with  the  "source"  of  revenue  to  a  government  that  "must  lye  on  the 
industrious  part  of  the  people"  (LI(A),  i.  5,6)  because  "In  all  cases  therefore  the 
expenses  of  the  government  must  be  defrayed  by  the  people"  through  rent  on  crown 
lands,  tax  on  land  possessed  by  other  subjects  of  the  crown,  and  customs  raised  on 
"manufactures,  imports  and  such  like,  where  it  is immediately  levied  from  the  people" 
(ibiel).  One  of  the  aims  therefore  of  good  "police"  was  to  examine  the  "proper  means 
of  introducing  plenty  and  abundance  into  the  country,  that  is,  the  cheapness  of  goods 
of  all  sorts"  (LJ(A),  vi.  7,333). 
The  government's  prudent  management  of  revenue,  its  "economy",  was  therefore 
united  with  its  promotion  of  industry,  manufactures  and  "plenty  and  abundance"  of 
cheap  commodities  in  that  section  of  jurisprudence  called  "police".  The  term  "political 
economy"  a  union  of  "economy"  with  "police"  had  therefore  passed  into  the  language 
of  moral  philosophers  and  pamphleteers  by  the  time  of  the  mid-eighteenth  century.  As 
a  subject  of  inquiry  it  was  concerned  both  with  the  management  of  state  revenue  and 
with  the  conditions  that  gave  rise  to  industry,  manufactures,  trade  and  commerce.  An 
emerging  bourgeoisie  had  armed  the  inquiry  with  the  jurisprudential  and  philosophical 
doctrines  of  natural  law. 
At  the  heart  of  these  doctrines  lay  the  abstraction  of  the  individual  as  a  formally 
equal,  autonomous  juridical  subject.  The  formal  freedom  of  this  subject  articulated  the 
needs  of  the  bourgeoisie  as  a  whole,  gave  the  consciousness  of  this  class  the  force  to 
represent  itself  to  humanity  as  the  embodiment  of  a  universal  interest,  and  generated 129 
the  conceptual  frameworks  within  which  the  battle  between  social  science  and 
ideology  took  place.  The  Physiocrats  in  France  had  argued  that  the  modem  economýic 
defence  of  complete  freedom  of  trade  from  state  interference,  of  "laissez  faire",  was  an 
expression  of  the  natural  liberty  of  the  individual.  They  had  also  argued  that  "laissez 
faire"  was  the  best  means  to  stimulate  industry,  cheapness  and  plenty  of  commodities, 
and  the  best  means  to  guarantee  a  regular  and  plentiful  source  of  state  revenue.  They 
thought  this  policy  was  the  one  a  sovereign  power  would  be  best  interested  in 
adopting.  At  the  same  time,  in  the  process  of  attempting  to  persuade  goverment  to 
accommodate  itself  to  the  interests  of  the  bourgeoisie  presented  as  the  universal  public 
interest,  a  substantial  body  of  theoretical  literature  had  arisen  which  investigated  the 
causal  connections  between  economic  phenomena.  These  were  expressed  in  the 
language  of  economic  categories  such  as  the  commodity,  value,  wages,  prices,  rent, 
labour,  profit,  interest  and  capital. 
It  is  to  this  body  of  literature  that  Millar  referred  in  his  posthumous  essay  Yhe 
Advancement  of  Manufactures,  Commerce,  and  the  Arls,  since  the  Reign  of  William 
III;  and  the  Tendency  of  this  Adiancement  o  dif 
. 
Tuse  a  Spirit  of  Liberty  and 
Independence.  3  As  the  title  suggests,  Millar's  ultimate  focus  within  the  essay  was  to 
examine  the  effect  that  the  generalisation  of  commodity  production  and  exchange  had 
on  the  customs  and  manners  of  the  population  of  Britain  but  also  throughout  the  rest 
of  the  world.  This  entailed  a  theoretical  inquiry  that  demonstrated  the  causal  influence 
of  the  latter  upon  the  "opinions  and  sentiments  which  may  affect  the  nature  of 
government". 
The  essay  therefore  included  a  discussion  on  the  effect  of  economic  activity  upon 
the  distribution  of  property  and  the  means  of  subsistence.  This  elaborated  on  Millar's 
general  theory  of  the  nature  of  government  in  a  commercial  society.  Millar  had 
developed  this  theory  in  his  lectures  and  in  his  first  book  The  Origin  of  Ranks.  Millar 
thought  that  generalised  commodity  production  had  two  opposing  effects  on 
government.  Commodity  producers  and  exchangers  had  a  direct  interest  in  using  all 
their  time  in  peaceful  productive  activities.  They  were  therefore  less  inclined  to  go 
along  with  the  prerogatives  of  feudal  power  and  looked  to  the  sovereign  to  protect 
their  property.  Trade  and  manufactures  were  also  the  most  successful  means  of 
generating  a  large  state  revenue.  As  a  result,  the  sovereign  could  employ  a  large 
standing  army  sufficient  in  extent  to  suppress  any  group  of  people  that  opposed  the 
interest  of  the  crown.  Generalised  commodity  production  therefore  brought  into  being 
a  tendency  to  political  despotism  through  a  concentration  of  property  and  wealth  in 
the  hands  of  the  sovereign. 
3Chaptcr  three  of  Historical  View.  vol.  4.  ppIO  1  -137.  Rcprintcd  in  Lehmann.  Aliflar,  pp325-339. 130 
On  the  other  hand,  the  greater  facilities  for  exchange  also  entailed  a  rapid 
communication  of  ideas  and  opinions.  These  were  likely  to  be  opinions  unfavourable 
to  oppressive  legislation  favouring  the  crown  and  its  allies  in  government.  Moreover, 
the  concentration  of  commodity  producers  and  exchangers  in  towns  and  cities  enabled 
them  to  combine  and  resist  the  government  more  effectually  when  needed.  Finally 
when  landed  property  itself  became  an  alienable  commodity  and  fell  into  the  hands  of 
merchants,  the  latter  were  more  likely  to  encourage  their  tenants  to  exchange  the 
products  of  their  labour  on  the  market.  Generalised  commodity  production  therefore 
brought  into  being  a  tendency  to  political  equality  and  liberty  through  a  difflusion  or 
fluctuation  of  property  and  wealth  amongst  the  lower  ranks  of  society.  Much  of  the 
essay  is  therefore  concerned  with  the  political  effects  of  economic  activity  (AC,  128- 
1311AC(L),  336-338).  4 
The  categories  of  political  economy  that  Millar  chose  to  employ  in  the  essay  were 
therefore  being  used  to  explain  why  it  was  that  the  "spirit  of  liberty"  appeared  to  have 
become  increasingly  prevalent  during  the  period  he  covered;  to  explain  how  it  was  that 
a  greater  number  of  individuals  had  been  able  to  secure  a  "comfortable  subsistence";  to 
explain  the  relationship  between  individuals'  independence  from  previous  "habits  of 
submission"  and  deference  to  "proprietors"  as  they  had  become  more  affluent. 
Moreover,  although  there  were  no  precise  predictions  of  whether  or  not  this  progress 
would  continue  indefinitely,  Millar  made  statements  that  referred  to  the  future.  He 
remarked,  for  example,  that  there  was  a  tendency  within  a  commercial  society  for 
competition  to  produce  a  happy  situation  in  which  inequalities  between  rich  and  poor 
would  be  diminished  to  a  point  where  there  was  "no  chasm  from  the  top  to  the  bottom 
of  the  scale"  (AC,  129-1301AC(L),  336). 
The  content  of  the  essay  is  therefore  consistent  with  a  general  understanding  of 
political  economy  in  the  eighteenth  century.  Millar's  attempt  to  explain  the  general 
communication  of  "liberal  sentiments"  to  the  general  population  in  terms  of  the 
extension  of  the  market  to  every  sphere  in  which  people  are  striving  to  gain  a  "means 
of  subsistence"  reflected  the  contemporary  idea  that  political  economy  was  a  branch  of 
a  broader  discipline:  a  science  of  a  statesman  or  legislator,  or  a  science  of  historical 
law  and  politics.  Just  as  the  doctrines  later  to  be  elaborated  in  the  Wealth  of  Nations 
were  found  in  embryo  in  the  section  entitled  "Police"  in  his  Lectures  on  Jurisprudence, 
so  Millar  put  political  economy  to  use  to  explain  historical  and  social  developments  he 
observed  in  eighteenth  century  Britain.  5 
4SCC  chapter  eleven. 
5Winch  remarks  of  Smith's  work  that  his  concerns  were  much  wider  than  "an  instrumental  doctrine 
concerned  solely  with  the  efficient  allocation  of  economic  resources"  and  that  the  broader  issue  which 
includes  considerations  of  the  relationship  of  commerce  to  liberty,  virtue  andjustice  shared  by  Nfillar, 
"continues  to  prove  troublesome  to  economists  and  historians  of  economic  thought".  Sinith's  Politics, 
p257. 131 
To  explain  these  changes,  Millar  gave  a  survey  of  "commercial  policy"  since  the 
"infancy  of  commerce"  in  the  reigns  of  Elizabeth  and  James  1.  He  also  gave  an 
interpretation  of  the  doctrines  he  knew  of  through  a  study  of  Smith's  Wealth  of 
Natimis.  This  section  of  the  essay  attempts  to  make  an  original  theoretical  contribution 
to  political  economy.  I  discuss  the  essay  in  this  chapter  for  two  reasons.  The  first  is  to 
demonstrate  that  Millar  had  a  notion  of  economic  activity  as  generalised  commodity 
production  and  exchange.  The  second  is  to  demonstrate  how  far  his  understanding  of 
economic  phenomena  differed  from  that  of  both  Smith  and  Marx. 
Throughout  the  essay  Millar  recognised  the  power  and  influence  of  the  bourgeoisie 
on  governmental  policy.  This  was  not  only  through  the  power  of  their  ideas  and 
opinions  but  also  through  their  strength  as  a  self-conscious  collectivity.  Thus  he  wrote 
of  "this  great  mercantile  association"  (AC,  1361AC(L),  339)  which  had  constantly 
solicited  "the  aid  of  government"  to  promote  "general  measures  for  the  benefit  of  their 
trade"  and  was  "even  able  to  controul  and  direct  the  deliberations  of  the  national 
councils"  (AC,  1371AC(L),  339).  Political  economy  was  strongly  associated  with  the 
doctrine  of  free  trade  and  Millar  presented  the  writings of  Smith  and  the  Physiocrats  as 
the  most  important  intellectual  contribution  to  the  times  he  lived  in;  the  "universal 
approbation"  of  Smith's  The  Wealth  Of  Nations  by  the  "higher  classes  of  mercantile 
people",  being: 
"a  decisive  proof  of  the  high  advances  of  commercial  improvement,  and  of  the  enlarged 
views  of  political  economy,  by  which  the  present  age  has  become  so  eminently 
distinguished.  "  (AC,  II  IIAC(L),  329) 
These  "enlarged  views"  formed  the  foundation  for  his  later  discussion  of  the 
"distribution  of  property,  and  the  means  of  subsistence"  derived  from  the  three 
revenues  of  rent,  profits  and  wages.  The  three  revenues  corresponded  to  the  three 
"sources"  of  land,  capital  and  labour  and  the  threefold  classification  of  the  inhabitants 
of  a  commercial  country:  landlords,  capitalists  and  labourers.  The  threefold  distinction 
between  revenues,  factors  of  production  and  classes,  he  took  from  "the  phraseology  of 
late  writers  upon  political  economy"  (AC,  I  151AC(1,  ),  33  1). 
Millar's  discussion  of  the  mercantile  period  of  "commercial  policy"  was  an 
illustration  both  of  the  new  doctrine  of  free  trade  as  theorised  by  the  French  and 
Smith,  and  also  of  the  new  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  commodity  and  money 
as  exchangeable  products  of  labour. 
The  form  of  state  interference  in  trade  encouraged  in  the  mercantile  period 
promoted  monopoly  which  became  "inconvenient  and  pernicious"  when  "the  progress 
of  commercial  improvements  had  produced  large  capitals,  and  a  numerous  body  of 
merchants"  (AC,  1061AC(L),  327).  It  prevented  competition  "among  the  workmen 132 
engaged  in  producing  those  commodities  which  were  the  subject  of  monopoly  trade" 
(ibid).  Commodities  were  presented  here  as  the  products  of  the  labour  of  "workmen" 
which  were  later  exchanged  by  merchants  on  the  internal  and  external  markets.  State 
restriction  of  competition  had,  according  to  Millar,  affected  the  quantity  and  quality  of 
commodities,  "diminishing"  the  former  and  "degrading"  the  latter.  Monopolies  enabled 
monopolists  to  control  prices  "above  their  natural  rate"  (ibid). 
Millar  also  discussed  the  role  of  state  interference  and  regulation  of  markets  from 
the  political  perspective  of  generating  the  maximum  amount  of  state  revenue: 
"Politicians  have  conceived  that  individuals,  in  prosecuting  schemes  of  private  interest, 
were  it  not  for  the  watchful  inspection  and  controul  of  government,  might  be  tempted 
to  employ  their  labour,  and  their  capitals,  upon  such  branches  of  trade  as  are  less 
beneficial  to  the  public  than  others.  "  (AC,  107/AC(L).  328) 
Individuals  were,  according  to  Millar,  motivated  by  "schemes  of  private  interest". 
They  were  in  charge  of  the  conditions  of  production  as  employers  of  their  own  labour 
or  of  their  own  capitals.  That  they  had  a  natural  right  to  do  so  was  unquestioned  on 
the  foreign  as  well  as  the  home  markets.  The  justification  of  having  "schemes  of 
private  interest",  "restrained  and  diverted"  by  "taxes,  prohibitions  and  bounties",  was 
based,  according  to  Millar,  on  the  false  doctrine  of  the  mercantilists  -  the  "older 
writers  on  trade"  which  the  new  science  of  political  economy  had  "universally 
exploded".  The  mercantilists  saw  exchange  as  the  exchange  of  commodities  for 
money,  the  latter  being  thought  of  as  the  substance  of  social  wealth  which  could  be 
stored  up  and  used  as  public  revenues  to  fund  the  expense  of  the  state.  Their 
conception  of  the  exchange  process  as  limited  to  the  sale  of  a  commodity  for  money 
(C-M)  was  described  by  Millar  in  the  following  way: 
"Our  trade  with  every  foreign  country  was  regarded  as  profitable,  if  we  sent  to  it  more 
goods  than  we  received,  and,  consequently,  obtained  a  surplus  in  money.  Of  the 
contrary,  it  was  considered  as  unprofitable  and  harmful"  (AC,  108/AC(L),  328). 
The  aim  of  state  interference  during  the  mercantile  period  was  therefore  to  secure 
to  the  state  a  "surplus  in  money"  through  foreign  trade  -  profit  being  thought  of  as 
derived  from  the  alienation  of  commodities  for  money.  This  corresponded  to  the  form 
of  surplus  derived  from  merchant  capital,  whereby  merchants  grew  rich  by  buying 
producers'  commodities  below  their  value  and  selling  them  to  consumers  at  prices 133 
where  their  value  was  exceeded  (buying  cheap  to  sell  dear).  This  was  a  form  of  non- 
equivalent  exchange.  6 
The  accumulation  of  capital  by  this  means  could  succeed  only  as  long  as  one 
nation  was  enriched  at  the  expense  of  another.  Historically,  the  really  large  profits 
made  in  this  period  were  with  trade  with  colonies.  Slavery  (or  bonded  labour)  in  the 
West  Indies,  America  and  India  made  sure  that  the  value  of  commodities  such  as 
tobacco,  sugar  and  cotton  was  kept  low.  These  commodities  were  bought  cheap  on 
the  colonial  market  where  the  trading  companies  enjoyed  a  monopoly  and  were  sold 
dear  elsewhere,  thereby  ensuring  a  rapid  accumulation  of  capital.  The  effect  on  internal 
trade  was  only  in  so  far  as  this  capital  was  converted  from  merchant  capital  to 
productive  agrarian  and  industrial  capital. 
Millar's  response  to  the  mercantilist  doctrine  of  state  regulation  of  foreign  trade 
was  to  argue  that,  whether  the  capitalist  aimed  at  obtaining  a  surplus  of  money  or  a 
surplus  of  commodities  a  "real  value,  and  a  mercantile  profit"  was  obtained.  As  he 
explained: 
"if  our  consumption  be  not  greater  than  our  productions,  that  is,  if  we  are  industrious 
people;  the  balance  of  our  trade  with  all  the  world,  taken  complexly,  whatever  may  be 
the  case  with  particular  nations,  can  never  be  against  us,  and,  if  we  have  commodities 
for  which  there  is  a  general  demand,  we  can  seldom  remain  long  without  an 
opportunity  of  turning  them  into  money"  (AC,  1091AC(L),  328). 
Along  with  Smith,  Millar  thought  that  commodities  formed  the  basis  of  wealth, 
and  that  money  was  the  particular  commodity  most  useful  in  circulating  all  the  others. 
Millar  also  recognised  that  the  consumption  of  foreign  commodities  was  necessary  for 
the  production  of  domestic  commodities.  The  former  were  the  "useful  and  marketable 
commodities"  such  as  raw  materials  and  instruments  of  labour  which  assisted  the 
generation  of  a  "mercantile  profit"  at  home.  These  commodities  were  necessary  for  the 
conversion  of  merchant  capital  into  productive  agrarian  and  industrial  capital. 
Millar  here  followed  Smith  and  the  Physiocrats,  in  perceiving  exchange  as  the  unity 
of  the  acts  of  sale  and  purchase  through  the  medium  of  money  (C-M-C).  7  Both  money, 
as  a  means  of  circulation,  and  other  commodities  were  conceived  by  Millar  as  the 
products  of  labour.  Commodities  were  therefore  the  source  and  origin  of  all  forms  of 
wealth.  However,  unlike  Smith,  Millar  did  not  adopt  a  labour  theory  of  value.  As 
argued  in  the  previous  chapter  he  preferred  a  version  of  a  subjective  theory  of  value  as 
6Rubin,  Economic  Thought,  pp54-55. 
7Rubin,  Economic  Thought,  p183. 134 
utility,  profit  being  the  subjectively  assessed  advantage  gained  from  savings  of  labour 
time  and  monetary  expenditure. 
7.2  The  Threefold  Classification 
The  discussion  so  far  has  focused  on  Millar's  understanding  of  key  economic 
categories  and  his  knowledge  of  political  economy.  I  now  move  on  to  his  discussion  of 
profit,  rent  and  wages,  and  Millar's  theorisation  of  their  relationship  to  capital  (or 
"stock"),  land  and  labour.  I  shall  argue  that  this  had  elements  in  common  but  also 
important  differences  with  Smith's  theorisation. 
The  brief  section  of  the  essay  which  introduced  Millar's  discussion  of  profit,  fell 
within  the  wider  context  of  an  explanation  of  why  it  was  that  in  "commercial 
countries"  a  greater  number  of  people  tended  to  be  inclined  to  "liberal  sentiments". 
This  tendency  was  accounted  for  by  the  opportunities  that  generalised  commodity 
production  opened  up  for  every  individual  who  was  economically  active,  including 
even  the  poorest  labourer.  Millar  thought  that  generalised  commodity  production 
enabled  the  individual  subject  to  secure  both  a  means  of  subsistence  for  himself  and  his 
family,  and  also,  through  prudent  saving  and  investment  in  the  labour  of  others,  the 
chance  of  making  a  sufficiently  large  surplus  to  acquire  landed  property.  With  regard 
to  subsistence  and  the  acquisition  of  luxuries,  every  individual  subject  could  become 
personally  independent  from  the  will  of  a  particular  master. 
The  conditions  that  determined  how  far  a  society  had  advanced  towards  liberty 
consisted,  firstly,  of  the  "distribution  of  property  and  the  means  of  subsistence"  and, 
secondly,  of  the  case  with  which  large  numbers  of  people  were  able  to  combine  to 
advance  their  mutual  interests  against  oppressive  forms  of  government.  He  therefore 
divided  his  explanation  of  the  opportunities  for  personal  independence  into  two  parts. 
It  is  within  the  part  that  accounted  for  the  "the  condition  of  the  people  relative  to 
the  distribution  of  property  and  the  means  of  subsistence"  that  he  discussed  profits. 
From  the  beginning  of  this  section,  in  which  he  compared  the  position  of  labourers  in  a 
f1rude  society"  with  labourers  in  a  "commercial  society",  to  the  end,  where  he 
described  how  the  great  opulence  of  Britain  had  enabled  the  poor  to  acquire  "the 
means  of  accumulation",  he  was  attentive  to  circumstances  that  allowed  opportunities 
for  the  labourer  to  move  rapidly  upward  to  a  position  of  status  and  respect  based  upon 
the  acquisition  of  wealth.  Thus  every  individual  could  earn  a  "comfortable  subsistence" 
through  his  own  efforts,  and  the  observation  that  "crowds  of  people"  are  "continually 
rising  from  the  lower  ranks"  is  explained  by  wealth  derived  fron,  "the  different 
branches  of  revenue,  arising  from  the  wages  of  labour  and  from  the  employment  of 
stock  either  in  trade,  or  in  the  cultivation  of  the  earth"  (AC,  127/AC(L),  335).  The  effect 
of  these  improvements  had  been  "to  render  the  lower  classes  of  the  people  less 
dependent  upon  their  superiors". 135 
Millar's  explanation  of  these  changes  was  in  terms  derived  from  Smith's  political 
economy  but  it  was  clearly  subordinate  to  a  broader  political  purpose.  He  intended  to 
demonstrate  that  it  was  much  less  possible  for  a  government  to  be  tyrannical  once  the 
majority  of  people  had  independent  sources  of  revenue  or  means  of  subsistence:  when 
they  could  afford  to  be  indifferent  to  the  personal  favours  of  the  sovereign,  lord,  or 
master. 
It  is  during  the  course  of  this  explanation  that,  according  to  Lehmann,  mllar  made 
a  significant  contribution  to  economic  theory.  This  was  founded  upon  "his  conception 
of  and  strong  emphasis  upon,  the  role  of  capital  in  the  production  not  merely  of  goods, 
but  of  profit".  '  This  idea  was  developed  by  Lauderdale  in  his  Itiquity.  9  Both  Millar  and 
Lauderdale  were  considered  by  their  contemporary  Craig  to  be  "advancing 
...  upon 
the  position  of  Adam  Smith".  10 
I  therefore  now  turn  to  a  commentary  on  those  sections  of  the  text  that  are  framed 
within  the  categories  of  political  economy  taken  from  Smith's  The  Wealth  qfNatioiis. 
7.3  The  Distribution  of  Revenue 
Millar  started  the  section  with  a  reference  to  the  threefold  distribution  of  sources 
of  revenue  amongst  landlords,  capitalists,  and  labourers.  This  was  a  passage  clearly 
influenced  by  Smith  whom  he  indirectly  acknowledged  as  one  of  the  "late  writers  upon 
political  economy": 
8Lclimann,  Millar,  p127- 
9Maitland,  James,  the  Earl  of  Lauderdale,  (1804)  An  Inquirv  into  the  Nature  and  Origin  of  Public 
Wealth,  and  into  the  ineans  and  causes  of  its  increase.  Edinburgh.  Paglin  M.  (cd.  )  (1962)  reprint  of 
21id  edii,  New  York. 
10john  Craig  was  Millar's  nephew  and,  as  mentioned  in  chapter  two.  Millar's  biographer.  Lauderdale 
was  one  of  Millar's  pupils.  (Lchniann,  Millar,  p23n).  In  his  (1814)  Denients  of  Political  Science, 
Craig  acknowledged  both  Millar  and  Lauderdale  in  a  footnote  critical  of  Smith  (Vol.  2,  IV,  p7l)  Craig 
criticiscd  Smith  for  having  a  concept  of  capital  based  on  the  division  of  labour  and  the  employment  of 
machinery  alone.  The  footnote  is  attached  to  a  section  in  which  Craig  was  stressing  the  advantages 
and  profits  derived  from  capital  invested  in  machinery  "which  might  never  have  been  invented,  and 
certainly  could  never  have  been  procured,  by  workmen  destitute  of  capital.  "  (p.  70).  Machinery 
operating  within  the  technical  division  of  labour  in  the  factory  upon  raw  materials  boosted  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  goods  produced  in  the  same  time  that  was  previously  spent  on  production  by 
"unassisted  and  uncombined  labourers.  "  (p.  71).  The  "additional  produce"  was  the  consequence  of  the 
employment  of  capital  and  "remains  with"  the  capitalist  "as  the  profit  on  his  stock"  (ibid)  The 
footnote  refers  to  Millar's  essay  and  to  chapter  three  of  Lauderdale's  Inquirv.  At  first,  this  footnote 
appears  puzzling  given  that  Craig  has  mentioned  both  machinery  a6d  the  division  of  labour  as 
sources  of  profit.  It  b.  conics  clear  if  it  is  true  that  Craig  thought  that  the  "additional  produce"  formed 
a  profit  because  it  remains  with  the  capitalist  for  his  own  pcisonal  consumption.  Craig,  like  Nfillar, 
tended  to  disregard  the  social  form  that  capital  takes  as  a  quantity  of  value  and  stressed  the  handicraft 
motif  found  in  Smith.  He  conceived  of  capital  as  the  material  form  of  the  production  process,  in  this 
case  improved  by  the  application  of  machinery.  Capital  dicicibre  saved  the  capitalist  time  spent  in  the 
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"the  whole  property  of  such  a  country,  and  the  subsistence  of  all  the  inhabitants,  may, 
according  to  the  phraseology  of  late  writers  upon  political  economy,  be  derived  from 
three  different  sources;  from  the  rent  of  land  or  water.  from  the  profits  of  stock  or 
capital,  and  from  the  wages  of  labour;  and,  in  conformity  to  this  arrangement,  the 
inhabitants  may  be  divided  into  landlords,  capitalists,  and  labourers"  (AC, 
1151AC(L),  33  1). 
Millar  accepted  Smith's  threefold  classification  of  the  forms  of  revenue  that 
characterise  a  capitalist  economy,  but,  whereas  Smith  tended  to  keep  them  distinct, 
Millar,  as  I  shall  argue,  tended  to  conflate  and  confuse  profit  with  wages.  It  followed 
from  this  that,  firstly,  he  abandoned  the  distinctions  between  the  three  classes  in  favour 
of  what  he  called  "the  several  classes,  of  manufacturers,  tradesmen,  and  merchants" 
(AC,  I  181AC(L),  332),  and  secondly,  he  tended  to  lose  sight  of  profit  as  a  form  of 
revenue.  Profit  was  hardly  distinguishable  from  a  general  meaning  as  "advantage". 
Smith  was  careful  to  distinguish  profit,  as  an  unique  form  of  revenue  derived  from 
capital,  from  wages.  He  was  disinclined  to  allow  that  profit  might  mean  the  same  as  " 
the  wages  of  a  particular  sort  of  labour,  the  labour  of  inspection  and  direction" 
(WN,  I.  vi.  6,66).  He  argued  that  the  "profits  of  stock"  were  "regulated  by  quite  different 
principles"  than  the  "wages  of  labour"  (WNI.  vi.  6,67).  The  proportions  in  the  size  of 
profits  depended  upon  the  amount  of  capital  invested,  not  upon  the  amount  of  wages 
allocated  to  the  manager  who  oversees  the  production  and  value-creating  process. 
Smith  suggested  that  the  owner  of  the  capital  who  has  invested  his  capital  in  order  to 
derive  a  profit  "  is.  ..  discharged  of  almost  all  labour"  yet  "still  expects  that  his  profits 
should  bear  a  regular  proportion  to  his  capital".  Smith's  understanding  of  profit  is,  in 
this  account,  strictly  understood  as  a  form  of  revenue  derived  from  capital. 
Profit  was  further  distinguished  as  being  the  revenue  of  that  part  of  capital  which 
is  not  the  "portion  of  his  whole  stock"  that  "supplies  his  immediate  consumption" 
(WN,  II.  i.  2,279).  This  is  revealing  because  it  indicates  that  Smith  was  thinking  of  profit 
in  a  way  that  differentiated  the  category  from  the  means  of  subsistence  that  is  available 
to  the  capitalist.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  to  conceive  of  profit  as  a  form  of  surplus  out 
of  which  tile  capitalist  derived  his  subsistence  but  which  also  has  other  functions 
unrelated  to  his  personal  consumption. 
In  contrast,  Millar's  conception  of  revenue  is  never  distinguished  from  "means  of 
subsistence".  A  revenue  in  the  form  of  money  has  to  enter  into  circulation  if  it  is  to 
command  commodities  for  personal  consumption  whereas  "means  of  subsistence"  does 
not  have  to  take  a  monetary  form. 
Smith  conceived  of  profit  as  a  distinct  form  of  revenue  which  is  appropriated  by 
the  capitalist.  Conversely,  he  understood  wages  as  the  revenue  that  goes  to  those 
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independent  craftsman  who  Smith  remarked  is  "both  master  and  workman,  and  enjoys 
the  whole  produce  of  his  own  labour"  (JfWI.  viii.  9,83)  and  whose  revenue  consists  of 
both  wages  and  profits  is  not  typical.  "Such  cases  ...  are  not  very  frequent,  and  in 
every  part  of  Europe,  twenty  workmen  serve  under  a  master  for  one  that  is 
independent;  and  the  wages  of  labour  are  everywhere  understood  to  be,  what  they 
usually  are,  when  the  labourer  is  one  person,  and  the  owner  of  the  stock  which 
employs  him  another"  (WNI.  viii.  10,83). 
Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  included  within  the  notion  of  revenue  derived  from 
capital  not  only  profits  but  wages.  Both  forms  of  revenue  go  to,  or  are  drawn  by,  the 
"merchant  or  manufacturer".  "Mercantile  adventurers",  for  example,  drew  a  profit 
from  their  own  capital,  and  wages  from  "trading  with  the  capital  of  others".  These  are 
the  "wages  of  mercantile  exertion"  which  compensated  the  capitalist  for  any 
inconvenience  he  suffered  as  a  result  of  waiting  for  a  return  on  his  investment.  If  a 
capitalist  derives  a  revenue  from  lending  his  capital  out  at  an  interest,  then  he  deserves 
a  compensation  "for  his  own  efforts  in  putting  that  capital  in  motion"  and  this  is 
described  "with  propriety"  as  the  "rent  of  capital".  Revenue  derived  from  capital, 
according  to  Millar,  fell  into  three  different  branches,  -  "profits",  "wages"  and  "rent"  - 
and  all  three  different  branches  of  revenue  are  drawn  by  the  "several  classes"  of 
capitalists,  as  "manufacturer",  "tradesman",  "merchant"  or  "monied  men".  The 
"common  labourer"  is  mentioned  by  Millar,  in  this  context,  as  being  less  independent 
than  the  capitalist  because  his  revenue  was  not  as  large  as  theirs.  Given  that  the 
distinction  between  capitalist  and  labourer  was  based  upon  purely  quantitative  criteria 
(the  "extent"  of  the  revenue),  it  is  possible  to  suggest  that  Millar  might  have  thought 
that  the  labourer's  revenue  could  also  consist  of  "profits",  "wages"  and  "rent". 
it  might  be  argued  that  Millar,  by  distinguishing  the  revenue  derived  from  capital 
into  profit,  wages  and  rent,  was  trying  to  differentiate  the  boundaries  that  separate  the 
"several  classes"  of  manufacturers,  tradesmen  and  merchants:  that  each  of  the  different 
classes  drew  a  separate  revenue  appropriate  to  their  relationship  to  capital.  However, 
there  is  no  evidence  to  support  this  suggestion.  Profit,  wages  and  rent  go  to  both 
"merchant  or  manufacturer".  The  only  plausible  distinction  that  might  be  made  is  the 
one  he  made  between  "monied  men"  and  "mercantile  adventurers",  the  former  deriving 
interest  from  loans  (or  "rent"  from  their  capital);  the  latter  deriving  wages  and  profit 
from  trading  with  other  people's  or  their  own  capital.  For  example,  he  described  them 
as  two  different  "orders"  of  capitalists.  Yet  whether  one  was  a  manufacturer, 
tradesman  or  merchant,  one  could  still  be  either  a  "monied  man"  or  a  "mercantile 
adventurer".  The  latter  descriptions  did  not  help  differentiate  between  the  former 
classes  that  arise  spontaneously  from  a  social  division  of  labour  within  which  "the 
business  of  producing  and  disposing  of  commodities  becomes  more  extensive  and 
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When  Millar  discussed  revenue  derived  from  "the  cultivation  of  land",  he  included 
"the  ground"  within  the  category  of  capital  or  "agricultural  stock".  Rent  was  therefore 
a  revenue  derived  from  capital.  He  suggested  that  there  is  no  essential  difference 
between  rent  and  profit.  The  difference  is  merely  verbal.  Both  rent  and  profit  derived 
from  agriculture  "depend  upon  the  same  principles"  as  "mercantile  profit".  These  are 
that  capital,  in  whatever  form  it  takes,  permanent  or  circulating,  industrial  or 
agricultural,  functions  to  shorten  and  facilitate  labour.  Here  Millar's  understanding  of 
capital  is  clearly  stripped  of  any  recognition  of  its  social  form  as  value.  It  is  reduced  to 
the  material  elements  necessary  for  every  process  of  production  and  a  subjective 
estimation  of  utility  of  saving  money  and  time:  the  land  being  compared  to  a  loom  "or 
other  piece  of  machinery"  which  formed  a  subject  of  and  instrument  for  the  farmer's 
working  activity  (AS,  1251AS(L),  335). 
7.4  Labourers'  Wages  and  Craftsmen's  Revenue 
Millar's  reference  to  profit  as  a  means  of  subsistence  derived  from  capital  followed 
this  statement: 
"When  a  labourer  has  acquired  so  much  property  as  will  enable  him,  without  wages  to 
subsist  until  he  has  manufactured  a  particular  commodity,  he  may  then  gain,  upon  the 
sale  of  it,  a  profit  over  and  above  the  ordinary  value  of  his  labour.  " 
(AC,  I  171AC(L),  332) 
Millar  had  already  remarked  that  labourers  receive  high  wages  when  the  national 
economy  is  expanding  and  the  demand  for  labour  is  greater  than  the  supply.  The  above 
statement  implied  that  these  wages  are  not  only  used  to  purchase  those  commodities 
that  are  necessary  for  the  worker's  subsistence  (food,  clothes  and  housing),  but  also 
sufficient  to  purchase  instruments  of  labour  and  raw  materials  necessary  to  produce  a 
commodity  as  an  independent  craftsman  for  sale  on  the  market.  The  labourer  ceased  to 
be  dependent  on  the  wage,  and  became  an  independent  craftsman. 
The  key  phrase  in  the  above  passage  is  "a  profit  over  and  above  the  ordinary  value 
of  his  labour".  One  way  of  understanding  this  phrase  is  that  the  value  of  the 
commodity  the  craftsman  produced  was  greater  than  the  value  of  the  labour  power  the 
former  wage  labourer  sold  to  the  capitalist.  Given  Millar's  political  intentions  within 
the  essay,  it  is  possible  to  imagine  that  he  wanted  to  argue  that  the  average  revenue 
generated  by  an  individual  craftsman  was  greater  than  the  average  wage  of  a  labourer. 
The  labourer's  wage  was,  according  to  Millar,  dependent  upon  the  interests  of  one 
employer.  In  contrast,  tile  craftsman's  revenue  was  dependent  upon  a  multiplicity  of 
customers.  The  craftsman  would  therefore  be,  according  to  Millar,  more  independent 
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prosperous  than  the  wage  labourer,  then  the  labourer  would  be  motivated  to  save  his 
wages.  He  would  then  use  his  savings  as  a  means  of  subsistence  whilst  he  established 
himself  as  a  craftsman. 
Millar's  notion  of  the  relationship  of  value  to  labour  was  derived  from  Smith's,  and 
Smith's  notions  embodied  what  Rubin  calls  both  a  "handicraft"  and  a  "capitalist" 
motif  II  These  motifs  are  intertwined  with  one  another.  They  reflected  ideas  formed  in 
the  transition  from  a  society  within  which  the  forms  of  commodity  exchange  were 
confined  solely  to  artisan  production  (where  capital  is  limited  to  merchant's  capital),  to 
one  where  exchange  is  coming  to  dominate  all  forms  of  working  activity  (where  a 
surplus  is  extracted  through  the  exchange  of  labour  power  for  productive  capital). 
Smith's  search  for  a  measure  of  value  led  him  to  an  understanding  of  exchange  as 
the  acquisition  of  the  labour  of  other  people.  The  acquisition  of  the  labour  of  another 
person  in  a  product  in  which  their  labour  is  materialised  is  not,  however,  the  same 
thing  as  the  acquisition  of  the  living  labour  of  a  hired  worker.  This  distinction  is 
confused  in  Smith's  inquiry. 
For  example,  when  Smith  referred  to  the  power  that  a  person  of  fortune  has,  he 
stated  that  this  power  is: 
"the  power  of  purchasing;  a  certain  command  over  all  the  labour,  or  over  all  the 
produce  of  labour,  which  is  then  in  the  market.  His  fortune  is  greater  or  less,  precisely 
in  proportion  to  the  extent  of  this  power;  or  to  the  quantity  either  of  other  men's 
labour,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing  [my  emphasis]  of  the  produce  of  other  men's  labour, 
which  it  enables  him  to  purchase  or  command"  (WN.  I.  iii.  3.48). 
Smith  thought  that  the  purchase  of  labour  materialised  in  a  product  and  the 
purchase  of  living  labour  were  identical.  He  wrote  they  are  "the  same  thing". 
However,  living  labour  is  not  exchanged  directly  when  the  products  of  labour  are 
exchanged  as  commodities.  In  a  simple  exchange  of  one  commodity  for  another,  to 
state  that  the  two  commodities  consist  of  an  equal  quantity  of  labour,  means  the  same 
as  to  state  that  this  exchange  exerts  an  indirect  influence  upon  the  labouring  activities 
of  another  commodity  producer.  In  an  exchange  of  a  commodity  for  living  labour, 
however,  there  is  a  direct  influence  upon  and  control  over  the  worker's  activity.  In  a 
capitalist  society  this  exchange  represents  an  unequal  social  relationship. 
When  Smith  considered  exchange  within  a  pre-capitalist  society,  before  the 
"accumulation  of  stock"  and  before  the  "appropriation  of  land",  the  commodity 
producer  was  conceived  of  as  a  craflsman  whose  commodity  is  exchanged  for  a 
II  Value  as  the  libour  expended  on  a  commodity  expresses  the  forincr.  As  labour  (i.  e.  labour  power) 
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commodity  that  has  an  equal  amount  of  labour  expended  upon  it  (WNI.  vi.  1-4,65). 
When  he  turned  to  examining  exchange  within  a  capitalist  economy,  however,  he  was 
inclined  to  conceive  of  the  labour  purchased  rather  than  the  labour  expended  upon  the 
production  of  a  commodity.  This  is  the  living  labour  of  the  hired  workman,  where  the 
commodity's  value  expresses  a  quantity  greater  than  that  expended  in  production. 
Given  that  the  distinction  between  labour  expended  and  labour  purchased  was 
conflated  within  Srnith's  understanding  of  value,  it  is  unlikely  that  Millar,  whose 
concerns  were  to  use  political  economy  more  to  illustrate  historical  and  political 
changes  than  to  develop  its  categories,  was  going  to  be  any  clearer.  If  Millar  had  a 
conception  of  value  derived  from  Smith,  it  would  embody  the  confusions  between 
labour  expended  and  labour  purchased  and,  like  Smith,  he  would  have  no  awareness  of 
the  distinction  between  materialised  and  living  labour.  We  have  shown  above  that 
Millar  confused  profit,  rent  and  wages  as  distinct  forms  of  revenue.  It  is,  therefore, 
more  likely  that  he  understood  the  phrase  "a  profit  over  and  above  the  ordinary  value 
of  his  labour"  as  the  revenue  of  a  craftsman  which,  according  to  Smith,  consists  of  two 
components:  profit  and  wages. 
It  is  interesting  to  contrast  the  above  statement  of  Millar's  with  a  paragraph  of 
Smith's  in  which  he  commented  on  the  transition  from  labourer  to  craftsman: 
"It  sometimes  happens,  indeed,  that  a  single  independent  workman  has  stock  sufficient 
both  to  purchase  the  materials  of  his  work,  and  to  maintain  himself  till  it  be  completed. 
He  is  both  master  and  workman,  and  enjoys  the  whole  produce  of  his  own  labour,  or 
the  whole  value  which  it  adds  to  the  materials  upon  which  it  is  bestowed.  It  includes 
what  are  usually  two  distinct  revenues,  belonging  to  two  distinct  persons,  the  profits  of 
stock  and  the  wages  of  labour.  "  (WNI.  viii.  9,83) 
What  strikes  a  reader  if  they  compare  the  two  passages,  is  that,  whereas  the 
transition  from  labourer  to  craftsman  was  typical,  frequent  or  usual  for  Mllar,  it  was 
untypical,  infrequent  and  exceptional  for  Smith.  Smith's  recognition  was  that  profits 
belonged  to  the  master  and  wages  to  the  workman.  If  a  labourer  was  successful  in 
establishing  himself  as  an  independent  craftsman  then  he  was  exceptional.  As  I  have 
argued  above,  Millar  conflated  profits  and  wages.  He  thought  of  them  as  belonging  as 
much  to  master  as  to  a  workman.  In  contrast  to  Smith,  Millar  suggested  that  wages 
and  profit  belong  both  to  the  labourer,  the  manufacturer,  the  tradesman  and  the 
merchant.  He  thought  it  would  be  normal  for  the  labourer  to  establish  himself  as  a 
craftsman  (and  a  craftsman  to  establish  himself  as  a  capitalist),  if  savings  that  were 
profits  were  made  out  of  wages. 
What  is  clear,  therefore,  is  that  the  "handicraft  motif'  in  Millar  is  stronger  that  the 
"capitalist  motif'.  For  Smith  the  independent  craftsman  was  the  exception;  for  Nfillar, 141 
he  became  the  rule.  The  "value  of  the  labour"  of  the  labourer  turned  craftsman  was 
that  part  of  the  revenue  he  derived  from  the  sale  of  his  commodity  which  Millar  later 
called  the  "wages  of  mercantile  exertion".  The  "profit"  the  craftsman  gained  "over  and 
above"  these  "wages"  was,  on  the  one  hand,  the  advantage  that  any  person  gained  as  a 
commodity  exchanger  who  can  obtain  a  use-value  (in  this  case  the  means  of 
subsistence)  only  through  some  form  of  sale  and  purchase,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
form  of  surplus  produce  which  Millar  derived  from  "improvements"  in  the  process  of 
production  such  as  the  introduction  of  a  technical  division  of  labour  and  machinery.  If 
the  craftsman's  labour  was  the  motive  force  behind  the  generation  of  wealth,  then  the 
less  time  he  took  in  the  production  of  a  commodity  (through  the  introduction  of  the 
more  sophisticated  technology  he  has  invented  into  the  production  process),  then  the 
more  time  he  had  free  to  enjoy  and  consume  the  commodities  he  purchased  on  the 
market. 
The  metamorphosis  of  dependent  wage  labourer  into  independent  craftsman  was 
only  the  first  step  on  a  ladder  upwards.  Millar  stated  that: 
"In  proportion  to  the  enlargement  of  his  capital,  his  productions,  by  the  employment  of 
subordinate  hands  will  be  multiplied,  and  his  profits,  of  course  extended.  "  (AC,  117- 
81AC(L),  332) 
The  person  he  was  giving  an  account  of  was  still  the  "labourer",  but  it  was  the 
labourer  who  was  in  the  process  of  moving  from  dependence  upon  a  wage  to 
independent  craftsman  to  capitalist.  Capital  was  derived  historically  from  the 
conversion  of  dependent  wage  labour  into  independent  crafts  production.  That  this 
was  intended  to  be  a  historical  account  of  the  origins  of  commercial  society  is 
confirmed  by  the  final  sentence  of  this  paragraph: 
"Thus,  according  as  the  business  of  producing  and  disposing  of  commodities  becomes 
more  extensive  and  complicated,  it  is  gradually  subdivided  into  various  departments, 
and  gives  rise  to  the  several  classes,  of  manufacturers,  tradesmen  and  merchants.  " 
(A  C,  II  81A  C(L),  33  2) 
This  is  the  social  division  of  labour  brought  into  being  by  generalised  commodity 
production.  Smith  confused  this  social  division  of  labour  with  the  technical  division  of 
labour  in  the  manufactory.  12  The  social  division  of  labour  is  the  way  in  which  different 
12Marx  spells  out  the  logical  relationship  between  the  division  of  labour  and  commodity  production  in 
Capital,  VoLL  (p9).  Commodity  production  is  a  necessary  but  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  a  social 
division  of  labour.  The  lattcr,  for  example,  can  be  found  in  the  patriarchal  household.  However,  there 
can  be  no  form  of  commodity  production  without  a  social  division  of  labour.  In  contrast,  commodity 142 
branches  of  labour  in  a  national  or  world  economy  are  distributed  through  the 
historical  development  of  the  function  of  money  from  a  means  of  payment  and  a 
measure  of  value  into  capital.  This  social  division  of  labour  was  explained  by  Smith  as 
originating  from  a  natural  propensity  to  exchange  commodities  motivated  by  individual 
betterment  or  improvement. 
Millar  inferred  a  social  division  of  labour  in  the  form  of  the  "several  classes"  of 
capitalists  including  the  merchant,  manufacturer  and  tradesman  from  the  extension  of 
the  market  which  the  labourer-come-indcpendcnt  craftsman-come-original  capitalist 
created.  This  presupposed  what  it  attempted  to  explain.  It  was  therefore  a  circular 
account.  Millar  assumed  the  existence  of  a  fully  developed  "commercial  society" 
consisting  of  self-interested  individual  subjects  in  order  to  explain  its  origins.  Put 
differently,  he  assumed  a  society  within  which  every  individual's  working  activity  is 
exchangeable  (and  regulated  by  laws  of  contract)  to  explain  how  it  was  that  every 
individual's  working  activity  became  exchangeable. 
From  this  moment  on,  Millar's  account  took  on  certain  characteristic  features. 
Firstly,  he  disregarded  the  position  of  dependent  labourers  who  formed  the  majority  of 
the  population  within  the  production  and  valorisation  process.  They  figured  only  to  the 
extent  that  they  were  being  "daily  converted  into  artificers,  frequently  vending  their 
own  productions"  (AC,  1241AC(L),  334).  Secondly,  he  abandoned  Smith's  distinction  of 
classes  based  upon  the  objective  distribution  of  revenues  and  used  loose  distinctions 
derived  subjectively  from  his  observations  on  the  differing  status  given  to  "mercantile 
people",  and,  thirdly,  he  tended  to  think  of  the  labour  expended  on  commodities  as 
that  of  an  idcalised  craftsman  who  is  both  capitalist  and  worker. 
7.5  Fixed  and  Circulating  Capital 
Millar,  following  Smith,  distinguished  between  "circulating"  and  "permanent"  (or 
"fixed")  capital  in  order  to  demonstrate  how  these  forms  were  sources  of  profit: 
"To  discover  the  different  sources  of  mercantile  profit,  we  may  distinguish  two  sorts  of 
stock,  or  capital,  belonging  to  a  manufacturer  or  merchant-,  the  circulating,  and  the 
permanent  stock;  the  former  comprehending  the  goods  which  lie  brings  to  market;  the 
production  is  neither  a  necessary  nor  a  sufficient  condition  for  a  technical  division  of  labour.  It  is 
quite  possible  to  conceive  of  the  production  of  commodities  by  private  individuals  ii.  lie  absence  of  a 
technical  division  of  labour.  The  notion  of  simple  commodity  production  depends  on  this  abstr!,  --tion. 
it  is  also  possible  to  conceive  of  a  technical  division  of  labour  without  commodity  production.  Marx 
gives  the  example  of  the  absence  of  exchange  between  producers  in  a  factory.  The  technical  division 
of  labour  (like  machinery)  is  therefore  only  in  economic  category  in  the  specific  (and  historically 
contingent)  social  forms  it  takes  either  as  capital  or  within  bureaucratic  administrations  dependent 
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latter,  the  houses,  the  machinery,  and  the  various  accommodations  which  he  requires 
for  the  manufacture  or  sale  of  his  goods.  "  (AC,  I  181AC(I,  ),  332) 
This  distinction  followed  Smith's  own  division  of  the  forms  of  capital  into  "fixed" 
and  "circulating"  capital. 
Smith's  understanding  of  capital  was  dualistic.  On  the  one  hand,  following  from  his 
concern  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  a  labouring  and  an  exchanging  society, 
he  understood  capital  as  a  quantity  of  stored-up  value  out  of  which  the  capitalist 
purchases  machinery,  raw  materials  and  means  of  subsistence  for  the  workers.  On  the 
other  hand  he  presented  capital  as  a  quantity  of  accumulated  produce,  useful  materials, 
technique  and  finished  goods  to  be  consumed  in  production.  Millar's  tendency  was  to 
follow  the  latter  understanding. 
Smith's  definition  of  circulating  capital  was  that  it  was  that  sort  of  capital  which  "is 
continually  going  from  him  in  one  shape,  and  returning  to  him  in  another" 
(WN,  111.4,279).  It  followed  from  this  definition  that,  from  the  standpoint  of  material 
production,  circulating  capital  could  refer  to  raw  materials  which  in  their  natural  form 
are  changed  into  finished  products.  Smith  added  the  caveat  that  circulating  capital 
must  "change  masters"  as  well as  change  "shape".  This  caveat  makes  Smith's  definition 
compatible  with  a  movement  of  raw  materials  not  only  changing  form  into  finished 
products  within  a  technical  division  of  labour,  but  also  changing  value  when 
transferred  from  one  branch  of  production  to  another  within  the  social  division  of 
labour.  This  understanding  can  therefore  be  interpreted  dualistically  both  as  a 
movement  of  material  objects  and  also  as  a  transference  of  value.  The  change  in  the 
material  "shape"  of  the  product  of  labour  is  a  qualitative  change  of  the  natural  form 
and  substance  of  raw  material  into  worked  up  product.  An  example  might  be  iron  ore 
mined  from  the  earth.  This  changes  its  shape  into  steel  through  a  particular  process  of 
production.  On  the  other  hand,  the  change  of  "shape"  of  the  value  form  is  a 
quantitative  change  of  the  magnitude  of  the  commodity's  social  substance.  The 
quantity  of  abstract  labour  embodied  in  the  iron  ore  is  transferred  from  the  mining 
capitalist  to  the  steel-producing  capitalist.  This  quantity  is  preserved  within  the  value 
of  the  steel. 
When  the  form  of  the  exchangeability  of  human  working  activity  is  at  the  forefront 
of  his  mind,  Smith  presented  the  threefold  division  of  the  whole  of  society's  revenue 
into  wages,  profit  and  rent  as  a  derivation  from  value.  This  presupposed  an  essential 
connectiGn.  between  the  total  proportion  of  value  and  the  total  proportion  of  labour 
expended  or  puichased  within  society.  Smith,  therefore,  came  close  to  an 
understanding  that  wages,  profit  and  rent,  are  that  portion  of  value  which  remains  after 144 
the  amount  of  value  that  has  been  realised  as  fixed  and  circulating  capital  has  been 
deducted.  13 
The  notion  that  revenues  are  a  portion  of  value  deducted  from  the  total  amount  of 
value  that  labour  generates  was  a  feature  of  Smith's  account  of  capital.  Hs  idea  was 
that,  once  capital  has  been  accumulated,  profit  is  that  deduction  from  the  value  of  the 
produce  of  labour  which  the  capitalist  appropriates  for  himself  14 
This  does  not  mean  that  Smith  had  a  systematic  theory  of  exploitation.  Smith 
recognised  that  profit  can  be  conceived  as  the  appropriation  by  the  capitalist  of  a 
portion  of  value  generated  by  the  worker  which  is  greater  than  the  value  expressed  in 
the  worker's  labour.  Put  differently,  it  is  a  recognition  that  what  has  come  to  be 
understood  as  an  objective  form  of  exploitation  exists,  but  without  making  this  fact  the 
foundation  of  an  explanatory  system.  15  To  have  been  able  to  theorise  exploitation  in 
terms  of  the  appropriation  of  surplus  value  by  capital,  Smith  would  have  had  to  be  able 
to  distinguish  between  labour  expended  and  labour  purchased,  and  to  separate  out 
clearly  the  social  forms  of  capital  and  labour  as  value  from  their  material  aspects.  The 
best  that  can  be  argued  is  that  the  existence  of  surplus  value  is  recognised  by  Smith  as 
an  untheorised  element  of  his  investigation  into  the  derivation  of  profit.  In  other 
words,  the  embryo  of  a  later  theory  of  surplus  value  exists  in  those  passages  of  Smith 
that  recognise  that  new  value  is  created  by  the  worker  and  appropriated  by  the 
capitalist.  16 
13"The  gross  revenue  of  all  tile  inhabitants  of  a  great  country  comprehends  the  whole  annual  produce 
of  their  land  and  labour;  the  net  revenue,  what  remains  free  to  them  after  deducting  the  expense  of 
maintaining  -  first,  their  fixed,  and,  secondly,  their  circulating  capital:  or  what,  without  encroaching 
on  their  capital,  they  can  place  in  their  stock  reserved  for  immediate  consumption,  or  spend  upon 
their  subsistence,  conveniences,  and  amusements"  (11W,  11.  ii.  5.286).  Note  that  "the  whole  annual 
produce"  can  be  read  as  a  stock  of  use-values  as  well  as  a  quantity  of  value  and  that  a  "stock  reserved 
for  immediate  consumption"  can  also  be  read  in  this  dualistic  fashion.  This  is  typical  of  Smith. 
1411the  greater  part  of  the  workmen  stand  in  need  of  a  master  to  advance  them  the  materials  of  their 
work,  and  their  wages  and  maintenance  till  it  be  completed.  He  shares  in  the  produce  of  their  labour, 
or  in  the  value  which  it  adds  to  the  materials  upon  which  it  is  bestowed:  and  in  this  share  consists  his 
profit"  [my  emphasis]  (IVAII.  vii.  9,83).  Note  again  the  dualism:  "flie  produce  of  their  labour"  or  the 
value  added  by  the  workmen's  labour. 
15A  good  discussion  of  this  point  can  be  found  in  Engels'  Prcfhcc.  1885,  to  Capital  VOLII  (1896. 
London,  1986:  ppl-20).  Tile  passages  of  Smith  which  arc  relevant  arc  in  IVXl.  vi.  5,65-6  &  I.  viii.  6- 
8,83.  in  the  former  Smith  states  that  the  value  that  is  added  to  materials  by  the  worker  in  the  process 
of  production  "resolves  itself"  into  wages  and  profits.  In  the  laticr.  lie  rcfers  to  the  two  "deductions" 
from  the  produce  of  labour  created  by  tile  labourcr  oil  the  land  and  in  manufacturing  by  the  landlord 
and  the  capitalist.  Marx  picked  out  these  passages  in  order  to  show  that  Smith  had  recognised  the 
existence  of  the  source  of  surplus  value  without  being  able  to  theorise  it.  Engels  used  an  analogy  from 
tile  history  of  science  to  illustrate  this  (ppl6-17).  Just  as  Priestley  and  Schecle  produced  oxygen 
%vithout  being  able  to  theorise  it  because  they  were  "prisoners"  of  the  categories  based  on  "phlogistic 
chemistry"  bequeathed  to  them  from  the  past,  so  Smith  recognised  the  existence  of  surplus  value  as 
',  tile  product  of  the  labour  for  which  its  appropriator  had  not  given  any  equivalent".  Smith,  however, 
, ývas  trapped  within  categories  which  prevented  him  from  theorising  this  fact.  Smith  had  only 
rccognised  the  existence  of  the  possibility  of  exploitation.  He  had  no  theory  of  exploitation. 
16jf  tile  total  value  of  labour  is  conceived  to  be  the  total  amount  of  tile  wages  of  labour,  then  the 
deduction  from  value  that  the  capitalist's  profit  consists  of  means  that  the  capitalist  takes  a  profit  by 145 
In  contrast,  Millai's  definition  of  circulating  capital  was  "the  goods"  that  the 
"manufacturer  or  merchant"  brought  to  market.  This  definition  prevented  any  potential 
for  investigation  into  the  value  of  these  goods.  It  excluded  any  idea  that  circulating 
capital,  either  as  moveable  material  or  as  transferable  value,  might  form  a  part  of  the 
production  process.  Millar's  definition  did  not  even  entail  that  the  goods  were  sold  or 
purchased  as  commodities.  The  goods  did  not  have  to  "change  masters"  to  count  as 
circulating  capital.  The  "merchant  or  manufacturer"  could  take  his  goods  to  market 
and  bring  them  back  home  without  having  realised  a  sale.  AJI  that  counted  was  that 
they  could  be  moved  to  and  from  the  market,  unlike,  for  example,  buildings. 
Millar's  understanding  of  circulating  capital  was  consistent  with  any  commodity- 
producing  society,  not  necessarily  a  society  within  which  production  had  a 
characteristically  capitalist  form.  Thus  if  an  independent  craftsman  were  to  bring  his 
finished  product  to  market  with  the  intention  of  exchanging  it,  then  that  finished 
product  was,  by  his  definition,  a  circulating  capital,  whether  the  craftsman  lived  in 
ancient  Greece  or  had  a  stall  in  a  trade  fair in  late  twentieth  century  Hillhead. 
However,  given  that  Millar  stated  that  capital  belongs  to  the  merchant  as  well  as 
the  manufacturer,  his  definition  of  circulating  capital  might  be  understood  as  a  short- 
hand  version  of  Smith's  statement  that  the  capital  of  a  merchant  is  "altogether  a 
circulating  capital"  (WNIl.  i.  7,280).  If  his  definition  is  read  this  way,  then  it  is  clear 
that  both  Millar  and  Smith  disregarded  the  transference  of  value  within  the  productive 
and  valorising  process.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  circulating  capital  was  now 
conceived  of  solely  as  merchant's  capital  and  that  merchant's  capital  does  not  enter  into 
the  production  process,  If  it  does,  it  ceases  to  be  merchant's  capital  and  becomes  the 
productive  capital  of  the  industrial  capitalist. 
Within  a  commodity-capitalist  society,  merchant  capital  can  intervene  only  when 
productive  capital  has  taken  the  form  of  commodity  capital  and  is  destined  for 
circulation  so  that  the  commodity's  value  is  realised.  Merchant's  capital  is  therefore 
confined  purely  to  the  sphere  of  the  circulation  of  commodities.  It  is,  by  its  very 
nature,  excluded  from  the  sphere  of  the  production  of  commoditieS.  17 
The  conception  of  circulating  capital  which  Millar  and  Smith  have  as  merchant 
capital  is  again  consistent  with  societies  that  are  not  capitalist  -  within  those  historical 
societies  in  which  the  production  of  a  surplus  by  human  activity  is  not  universally 
dominated  by  the  social  form  of  value.  Circulating  capital  conceived  of  as  merchant 
capital  is  consistent  with  an  ancient  or  feudal  society  within  which  the  surplus  is 
extracted  in  the  non-value  forms  of  slavery  and  serfdom.  In  these  societies,  the  profit 
robbing  the  worker  of  part  of  his  wages.  Thus,  Lauderdale  commented  that  profit,  according  to  Smith, 
is  "only  a  transfer  from  the  pocket  of  the  labourcr  into  that  of  the  proprietor  of  stock"  (Inquiry,  p158) 
17Whcn  nicrcl,.  int  capital  penetrates  the  sphere  of  production,  as  it  did  historically,  then  its  nature  is 
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generated  by  merchant's  capital  was  based  upon  a  form  of  cheating  posed  by  the 
separation  of  the  acts  of  purchase  and  sale  in  the  circulation  process.  It  played  no  role 
in  the  production  of  commodities  by  the  independent  artisan. 
The  conception  of  circulating  capital  as  a  form  of  capital  that  exists  solely  within 
the  sphere  of  the  circulation  of  commodities  can  be  contrasted  to  the  form  that 
circulating  capital  takes  as  productive  capital  dependent  upon  the  purchase  and  sale  of 
labour  power.  These  are  two  different  entities  with  different  social  functions.  The 
value  of  circulating  capital  within  a  capitalist  production  process  (for  example,  that 
embodied  in  raw  materials)  has  to  be  replaced  in  totality  during  the  period  required  for 
the  production  of  a  commodity  and  when  transferred  does  not  increase  its  value.  18 
Millar's  definition  of  circulating  capital  as  the  goods  that  the  manufacturer  or 
merchant  brings  to  market  can  be  reduced  to  the  tautological  statement  that,  if  a 
commodity  is  to  realise  its  use-value  through  a  purchase  and  sale,  then  it  has  to  be 
exchanged  for  money  on  the  market.  "Circulating  capital"  therefore  means  the  same  as 
"commodity  to  be  exchanged".  If  the  latter  statement  is  true  then  it  has  implications  for 
his  conception  of  profit.  I  have  suggested  above  that  Millar  referred  to  profit  as 
"benefit"  or  "advantage".  Once  the  idea  of  profit  is  conceived  as  derived  independently 
from  a  revenue  derived  from  value,  and  value  is  conceived  independently  from  labour, 
then  profit  becomes  a  synonym  for  utility  or  need  and  is  associated  with  political 
economy  only  because  the  commodity  must  have  a  use-value.  19  Millar's  "mercantile 
profit"  meant  that  the  individual  self-interested  subject  derived  a  benefit  from  the 
exchange  of  commodities.  Within  Millar's  account,  these  benefits  were  primarily 
political.  Those  engaged  in  the  production  and  exchange  of  commodities  (whether 
they  be  labourers,  craftsmen,  agrarian  or  industrial  capitalists)  were  less  likely  to 
acquiesce  to  political  oppression  than  those  whose  livelihood  depended  upon  the 
revenue  of  the  state. 
To  summarise,  Smith's  dualism  consisted  of  the  fact  that  his  account  of  capital 
confused  the  social  form  with  the  material  technical  process  of  production.  In 
comparison,  Millar  disregarded  Smith's  investigation  into  the  relation  of  value  and 
labour,  yet  held  on  to  the  conception  of  commercial  society  as  a  society  within  which 
18The  distinction  Marx  makes  between  fixed  and  circulating  capital  depends  solely  upon  the  length  of 
time  that  value  is  transferred  during  different  periods  of  production.  Neither  circulating  nor  fixed 
capital  generates  any  additional  new  value.  The  distinction  has  nothing  to  with  whether  the  fixed  or 
circulating  capital  is  moveable  or  not.  New  value  is  generated  by  labour  power,  not  fixed  or 
circulating  capital.  See  Capital  1161.11,  pp215-217. 
19"Profit"  as  "use"  or  "need"  is  an  ordinary  conception.  "My  profit  is  ),  our  loss"  is  often  taken  to  mean 
"My  need  has  been  satisfied  but  yours  has  been  denied".  There  is  no  explanation  of  this  apparent 
opposition.  It  does,  of  course,  presuppose  social  relationships  dominated  by  competition.  But  the 
competition  can  bejust  as  much  on  the  sportsficid  as  in  the  iuarkct-placc.  Similarly  the  statement  that 
"it  is  profitable  for  people  to  live  in  houses"  does  not  necessarily  entail  that  "people"  gain  a  source  of 
revenue  from  living  in  houses  (although  they  might).  It  does  entail  that  people  find  living  in  houses 
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everyone  exchanges  the  products  of  their  labour.  Millar  tended,  however,  to  emphasise 
the  aspect  of  the  material  technical  side  to  the  exclusion  of  its  social  form  as  value. 
Value  consisted  of  the  general  utility  of  exchange  for  societies  within  which  there  is  an 
element  of  production  of  commodities.  Millar  did  not  conceive  of  value  in  the  form 
that  characterises  a  society  within  which  all  forms  of  human  working  activity  are  made 
equivalent  through  the  relationship  of  purchase  and  sale.  The  society  he  described  was 
therefore  not  a  characteristically  capitalist  society  within  which  the  social  surplus  takes 
the  form  of  value  and  the  capacity  to  labour  is  itself  exchangeable  and  both  generates 
value  as  well  as  having  a  value.  As  I  shall  argue  further  below,  Millar's  "commercial 
society"  was  a  society  in  which  individuals  acquired  commodities  for  subsistence  and 
accumulated  surpluses  of  commodities  for  exchange  through  savings  of  their  labour 
and  their  revenues. 
Millar  took  from  Smith  the  idea  that  capital  consisted  of  the  material  elements 
required  for  the  production  of  commodities.  It  was  but  a  short  step  from  this  one-sided 
understanding  of  capital,  to  making  capital  into  a  universal  and  necessary  feature  of 
any  labour  process  in  any  kind  of  society.  Capital  became  identified  with  tools, 
machinery  and  the  technical  division  of  labour.  This  step  was  taken  by  one  of  Millar's 
pupils,  Lauderdale,  in  his  Inquiry.  20 
7.6  The  Saving  of  Labour 
Once  the  labourer  had  become  an  independent  commodity  producer,  Millar  stated 
that  he  gained  advantages  from  those  "goods  which  he  brings  to  market": 
"To  a  manufacturer,  the  circulating  stock  affords  a  profit,  by  enabling  him  to  unite 
many  different  branches  of  labour  upon  the  same  commodity,  and,  consequently  to 
save  that  expense  of  carriage,  which  would  be  incurred  if  those  branches  were 
separately  performed  in  different  places,  and  the  amount  afterwards  collected.  " 
(AC,  I  18-91AC(L),  332) 
The  example  Millar  gave  is  of  the  capitalist's  power  to  centralise,  concentrate  and 
subordinate  the  various  branches  of  production  in  the  wool  industry  under  a  technical 
division  of  labour:  "in  the  same  neighbourhood".  Millar's  observations  of  the 
development  of  the  material  process  of  production  are  correct  on  two  points:  firstly, 
he  recognised  the  increased  productivity  generated  by  a  division  of  labour  that  the 
capitalist  consciously  plans  and  controls,  and,  secondly,  he  continued  to  hold  on  to 
20Laudcrdaic  argued  that  the  spades  and  ploughs  individuals  used  in  their  "first  employment"  were 
capital  invested  in  machinery.  These  tools  generated  a  profit  by  shortening  the  time  they  previously 
spent  cultivating  the  ground  with  their  hands.  This  entails  that  carly  lioniinids  were  the  first 
capitalists  (Inquiry,  p163). 148 
Smith's  conception  of  a  society  where  human  working  activity  is  dominated  by 
exchange.  On  the  other  hand,  he  ignored  Smith's  investigation  of  value  and  this  led  him 
to  conceive  the  accumulation  of  capital  as  a  process  of  hoarding  or  "saving"  -  in  other 
words  as  an  accumulated  stock  of  produce.  21 
The  idea  of  a  saving  of  expense  as  an  advantage  the  commodity  producer  or 
capitalist  gained  from  bringing  his  goods  to  market  was  also  associated  with  the  idea 
of  a  shortening  of  labour  and  a  saving  of  time.  Thus: 
"The  manufacturer,  therefore,  draws  a  return  for  his  capital,  inasmuch  as  it  has  been 
the  means  of  shortening  the  labour,  and  consequently  of  diminishing  the  expense  of  his 
manufacture.  "(AC,  1191AC(L),  332) 
The  labour  he  was  thinking  of  is  the  labour  involved  in  the  transportation  of  one 
commodity  from  one  branch  of  production  to  another  and: 
"It  is  unnecessary  to  observe  that  by  the  saving  of  carriage  there  is  also  a  saving  of 
fime,  [Millar's  emphasis]  which  is  no  less  valuable,  and  the  manufacturer  obtains  an 
additional  profit,  according  as,  with  the  same  labour,  he  can  sooner  bring  his  goods  to 
market.  "  (ibid) 
Millar  had  indicated  that  there  were  two  separate  sources  of  profit:  a  saving  of 
expense  and  a  saving  of  time,  and  that  both  sources  of  profit  are  derived  from  a 
shortening  of  labour  which  exchange  creates  by  concentrating  the  means  of  production 
in  one  locality. 
The  saving  of  expense  and  its  relationship  to  saving  of  time  and  the  shortening  of 
labour  is  unclear.  Considered  separately,  the  saving  of  expense  could  mean  either  a 
saving  in  the  amount  of  capital  laid  out  in  wages  for  the  hire  of  those  workers  who 
transported  commodities  from  one  branch  of  production  to  another:  taking  the  wool 
from  the  sheep  farmer  to  the  spinner  to  be  made  into  yarn  and  from  the  spinner  to  the 
weaver  to  be  made  into  cloth.  It  could  also  mean  the  saving  the  manufacturer  made  in 
that  amount  of  his  revenue  that  he  put  aside  for  his  own  means  of  subsistence  whilst  he 
was  involved  in  the  work  of  transporting  these  comnioditieS.  22 
217flic  former  point  call  be  illustrated  by  how  the  saving  of  the  "expense  of  carriage",  as  an  account  of 
how  a  revenue  is  derived  from  capital,  is  reminiscent  of  Smith's  doctrine  of  saving  based  upon  the 
prudential  and  self-sacrificing  virtue  of  parsimony.  This  doctrine  Nvas  adopted  by  Millar's  nephew, 
Craig.  Craig  thought  of  the  accumulation  of  capital  as  "altogether  the  fruits  of  former  economy,  or,  as 
it  is  sometimes  called,  of  former  privation.  "  ffleinenl.  v,  p65).  Lauderdale,  on  the  other  hand, 
abandoned  parsimony  and  took  up  Millar  (and  Criig's)  other  notion  of  capital  as  savings:  that 
improved  technique  enables  capital  to  accumulate  through  savings  ill  time  and  expense. 
22The  picture  Millar  paints  here  reflects  the  real  transition  undcnvay  in  the  eighteenth  century  from 
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The  saving  of  time,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  consequence  of  a  comparison 
between  the  quantity  of  labour  required  to  produce  a  particular  commodity  when  the 
branches  of  production  are  separated  geographically  with  that  required  to  produce  the 
same  commodity  concentrated  in  the  one  locality.  A  social  division  of  labour  was 
presupposed  in  the  former  and  a  technical  division  of  labour  in  the  latter. 
The  question  arises  of  the  nature  of  the  labour-time  "saved"  which  is  involved  in 
the  comparison.  Millar  was  thinking  that  the  labour  expended  is  as  much  that  of  the 
"  manufacturer",  as  capitalist  or  craftsman,  as  that  of  the  "manufacturer"  as  labourer. 
The  capitalist's  subjective  assessment  of  the  effort  involved  was  less  because  within  the 
time  he  once  spent  travelling  in  order  to  put  goods  out  and  collect  them  from  the 
separate  producers,  he  could  now  spend  supervising  a  manufactory  which  produced  a 
greater  quantity  of  finished  goods.  On  the  other  hand,  the  labour  expended  by  the 
"manufacturers"  -  labourers  concentrated  under  the  same  roof  -  was  more  productive 
than  that  of  separate  domestic  or cottage  labourers.  Thus  he  wrote: 
"As  by  collecting  many  hands  in  the  same  manufacture.  the  undertaker  saves  an  actual 
expense,  he  also  obtains  a  direct  advantage  by  having  it  in  his  power  to  divide 
minutely,  the  several  branches  of  labour  among  different  workmen,  so  that  each 
acquires  more  skill  and  dexterity  in  the  single  branch  allotted  to  him,  and  is  prevented 
from  idling  and  losing  time,  as  commonly  happens  in  passing  from  one  branch  to 
another.  The  prodigious  effect  of  this  division  of  labour.  by  increasing  the  quantity  of 
work  done  in  a  given  time,  as  well  as  by  improving  its  quality,  becomes  also,  like 
every  other  circumstance  tending  to  facilitate  labour.  a  separate  source  of  profit  to  the 
manufacturer.  "  (AC,  I  19-20/AC(L),  332-3) 
These  observations  on  the  technical  division  of  labour  are  unoriginal  and  can  be 
found  in  Smith's  account  of  the  pin-making  manufactory  in  the  first  chapter  of  The 
Wealth  of  Natiotis.  Smith  observed  that  a  division  of  labour  increases  productivity, 
firstly  by  the  increased  skill  and  dexterity  of  the  workmen  and,  secondly,  by  the 
speeding  up  of  the  process  of  production  when  the  time  spent  on  switching  from  one 
becoming  increasingly  subordinate  to  the  merchant  middleman.  Independent  handicrafts  gave  way 
gradually  to  the  cottage  system  where  the  cottage  labourers  were  dependent  upon  one  particular 
merchant  who  would  buy  their  output,  place  advance  orders,  and  supply  the  labourer  with  raw 
materials.  The  centralisation  of  production  in  inanufactories.  converted  these  labourers  into  hired 
workers  receiving  a  wage.  Rubin  remarks:  "By  bringing  the  workers  together  under  one  roof  the 
entrepreneur  rid  himself  of  the  unnecessary  expense  involved  in  distributing  the  materials  to  the 
individual  cottage  labourers  and  in  transferring  the  output  of  sonic  workers  to  other  others  for  further 
processing"  (Econontic  Thought,  p156).  The  cottage  system  co-cxistcd  with  manufactories  until  the 
"extensive  application  of  machinery"  in  the  industrial  revolution  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Millar  would  have  lived  to  see  both  systems  in  operation  side  by  side.  He  would  have  observed  the 
decay  of  the  cottage  system  under  the  impact  of  the  machinery  invested  in  the  new  factories. 150 
branch  of  production  to  another  is  eradicated.  Smith's  investigation  included  an 
attempt  to  understand  the  relationship  between  labour  and  value.  He  therefore  had 
insights  into  the  social  form  of  a  capitalist  society.  Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not 
adopt  a  labour  theory  of  value.  He  therefore  understood  the  advantages  of  changes  in 
the  technical  process  to  the  self-interested  subject  as  profit.  He  thought  of  capital  as  a 
stock  of  products,  and  of  labour-time  either  as  the  time  expended  in  production  by  a 
craftsman  in  the  production  of  a  commodity,  or  the  time  a  capitalist  spent  in 
supervising  the  productive  process  he  had  organised  within  a  technical  division  of 
labour.  Both  aspects  of  labour-time  were  estimated  according  to  the  requirements  of 
the  individual  subject  of  experience.  Thus  he  concluded: 
"the  benefit  resulting  from  every  species  of  trade  or  manufacture,  is  ultimately  derived 
from  labour  [his  emphasis];  and  that  the  profit  arising  from  every  branch  of  stock, 
whether  permanent  or  circulating,  is  derived  from  its  enabling  the  merchant,  or 
manufacturer,  to  produce  the  same  effect  with  less  labour,  and  consequently  with  less 
expense  than  would  otherwise  have  been  required.  "  (AC.  1221AC(L),  333) 
Millar  was  thinking  here  of  either  the  time  expended  by  the  "merchant  or 
manufacturer"  (the  capitalist  or  independent  craftsman),  or  in  the  saving  of  expense 
that  the  capitalist  made  in  the  amount  he  laid  out  in  wages  for  the  hire  of  labour  power 
of  his  workers.  As  has  been  argued  above,  it  reveals  a  confusion  of  the  kinds  of 
revenue  derived  from  independent  craft  production  with  those  derived  from  a  capitalist 
form  of  production.  Millar  conceived  of  profit  as  a  form  of  advantage  subjectively 
assessed  by  the  producer.  He  dropped  the  notion  that  was  a  revenue  derived  from 
capital.  Profit  as  advantage  logically  follows  from  Millar  conceiving  human  working 
activity  solely  from  the  standpoint  of  the  material  technical  process.  Accumulation  of 
wealth  is  conceived  purely  as  an  accumulation  of  the  products  of  labour  irrespective  of 
their  value-form.  In  reality,  the  advantage  or  usefulness  of  a  technical  division  of 
labour  to  the  capitalist  depends  on  the  accumulation  of  capital  as  surplus  value  not  on 
the  accumulation  of  goods  (which  may  or  may  not  realise  their  value  through 
23  exchange). 
The  savings  of  expense  and  time  were  advantages  and  therefore  the  cause  of 
profits.  The  former  were,  however,  observations  based  on  the  fact  that  a  technical 
division  of  labour  allowed  for  a  greater  quantity  of  work  to  be  done  within  a  shorter 
amount  of  time.  Millar  extended  the  idea  of  a  saving  of  time  or  a  shortening  of  11abour 
from  observations  based  upon  the  manufactory  and  applied  it  to  the  dissolution  of 
23The  theme  of  prorit  as  advantage  is  elaborated  in  the  footnote  attached  to  this  passage  discussed  in 
chapter  six  (AC,  1201AC(L),  333).  Millar  thought  of  wages  as  advantageous  to  both  the  worker  and  the 
capitalist.  Wages  were  therefore  profitable  to  both  the  capitalist  and  the  worker. 151 
those  branches  of  production  to  be  found  in  the  decaying  social  division  of  labour 
based  on  cottage  or  domestic  industry. 
Millar  tried  to  equate  "savings  of  time"  with  "savings  of  expense"  in  a  way  which 
suggested  that  the  labour-time  or  expense  that  was  saved  was  either  that  of  the 
capitalist's  labour,  which  he  thought  was  embodied  in  the  commodities  he  sold,  or  out 
of  the  fund  the  capitalist  laid  aside  for  the  hire  of  labour  power.  This  means  the  same 
thing  as  stating  that  the  introduction  of  improved  technical  methods  of  production  and 
machinery  reduced  his  wage  bill. 
Whichever  way  the  above  passage  is  read,  the  introduction  of  these  improved 
methods  and  machinery  were  to  the  advantage  of  both  the  capitalist  and  the  worker. 
Millar  recognised  that  improved  technique  reduced  the  amount  of  time  expended  in  the 
production  of  a  commodity  and  suggested  that  its  price  would  therefore  be  less, 
This  is  consistent  with  the  perspective  of  an  independent  craftsman  who  looks  at 
the  time  spent  at  work  on  a  particular  commodity  as  a  painful  effort.  A  "saving  of 
time"  for  the  craftsman  meant  that  if  the  value  is  determined  by  his  subjective 
estimation  of  the  effort  he  puts  into  a  day's  work,  and  he  is  able  to  produce  in  the  same 
time  a  greater  quantity  of  products,  then  he  is  saved  the  trouble  and  strain  of  having  to 
work  for  two  days  or  more  to  produce  the  same  quantity  of  products.  If  Millar  tended 
to  conceive  the  worker  as  craftsman  then  the  diminution  of  time  it  took  to  produce  a 
particular  commodity  caused  by  the  introduction  of  machinery  would  similarly  release 
the  worker  from  the  effort  and  strain  of  having  to  work  less  than  before. 
7.7  Conclusion 
In  this  section  I  have  argued  the  following.  Firstly,  through  a  comparison  with 
Smith,  I  have  shown  that  Millar  blurred  the  forms  of  revenue  characteristic  of  a 
capitalist  society  to  such  an  extent  that,  whilst  using  the  terminology  of  profits,  wages 
and  rent,  the  social  classes  to  which  they  fall  become  relatively  indistinguishable.  He 
therefore  fell  back  upon  the  idea  that  social  classes  are  those  types  of  occupation  that 
arise  within  a  social  division  of  labour.  24  This  existed  within  a  pre-capitalist  society. 
Merchants,  craftsmen  and  hired  labourers  are  found  in  all  historical  forms  of  society 
where  there  is  an  exchange  of  commodities.  This  meant  that  he  disregarded  the  role 
played  by  living  labour  in  a  capitalist  society.  This  is  a  source  not  only  of  capital  but  of 
the  revenues  derived  from  the  new  value  that  labour  power  adds  to  it.  However, 
Millar,  like  Smith,  still  wanted  to  characterise  commercial  society  as  a  society  in  which 
everyone  ,  ould  become  a  merchant  and  in  which  the  working  activity  of  individuals 
was  dominated  by  production  for  exchange.  He  therefore  tended  to  conceive  of  the 
labour  expended  in  commodity  production  as  the  labour  of  the  independent  craftsman 
24SCC  chaptcr  t%vclvc. 152 
who  brings  his  own  commodity  to  market.  Millar  took  from  Smith  the  confusion 
between  the  material  technical  process  and  the  social  form  that  capital  takes  as  value. 
Adopting  a  subjective  utility  theory  of  value,  he  disregarded  the  latter,  and  developed 
the  idea  that  capital  consists  of  an  accumulated  stock  of  produce  consumed  as  a  means 
of  subsistence  by  self-interested  individual  subjects.  His  account  of  how  this  stock 
accumulates  was  therefore  influenced  by  observations  of  how  the  material  process  had 
changed  so  that  a  greater  quantity  of  goods  could  be  produced.  Capital  conceived  in 
this  material  technical  sense  creates  its  own  surplus  by  reducing  the  amount  of  labour- 
time  necessary  for  the  production  of  a  particular  commodity.  Millar  conceived  of  the 
labour  expended  in  the  division  of  labour  as  belonging  to  the  craflsman.  It  followed 
that  the  advantages  of  capital  accumulation  went  equally  to  every  individual  in  society. 
Every  individual  was  not  only  wealthier  but  had  more  opportunity  to  enjoy  the 
advantages  of  the  time  that  had  been  saved. 0  Part  Four, 
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Chapter  Eight: 
Method 
8.1  The  Study  of  Method  in  Use 
It  was  Dugald  Stewart  who,  in  the  late  eighteenth  century,  coined  the  term 
"conjectural"  to  describe  Smith's  methodological  approach  to  history.  '  Stewart  stated 
that  "when  we  cannot  trace  the  process  by  which  an  event  has  been  produced,  it  is 
often  of  importance  to  be  able  to  show  how  it  may  have  been  produced  by  natural 
causes"  [his  emphasis].  2  I  shall  argue  in  this  chapter  that  "natural  causes"  are 
regularities  that  are  self  evident  within  the  experience  of  the  individual  subject. 
However,  before  I  delve  into  an  examination  of  the  textual  evidence,  I  shall  discuss  an 
interpretation  of  the  notion  of  "conjectural"  history  that  has  become  current  within  the 
literature  in  eighteenth  century  Scottish  historiography. 
This  is  the  notion  that  Millar,  and  his  contemporaries,  would  be  better 
characterised  as  having  anticipated  the  sociological  methods  of  Max  Weber  than  those 
of  Karl  Marx.  In  my  discussion  of  problems  that  had  arisen  for  scholars  arising  out  of 
the  assimilation  of  Millar's  and  Smith's  social  and  historical  theory  with  textbook 
sociological  models  derived  from  Soviet-inspired  readings  of  Marx's  Preface,  I  quoted 
from  an  article  by  H.  M.  Hopfl.  3  I  suggested  that  the  framework  of  stages  that  has 
become  so  popular  in  textbook  accounts  of  Marx  had  more  in  common  with  Hopffs 
ideal  or  typical  societies  than  with  the  empirical  reality  of  an  evolving  human  society. 
Here  I  shall  discuss  and  challenge  some  of  the  substantive  issues  raised  by  his  broader 
thesis. 
Hopfl  has  made  an  important  contribution  to  the  study  of  eighteenth  century  social 
and  historical  theory.  He  has  directed  students  to  examine  the  method  of  inquiry  that 
the  Scots  actually  used.  4  He  has  argued  that  the  historiography  of  the  period  can  be 
distinguished  both  from  "narrative,  document  based"  histories  and  also  from 
philosophe  histories,  such  as  those  of  Voltaire  and  Rousseau,  which  were  written  to 
illustrate  a  moral  purpose.  Given  Millar's  frequent  use  of  the  category  of  improvement, 
the  central  role  that  utility  played  in  his  method  and  the  notion  he  shared  with  Smith  of 
the  betterment  of  the  subject,  it  is  possible  to  emphasise  the  moral  content  of  his 
method.  However,  the  point  Hopfl  makes  is  useful  when  Millar's  own  self 
ISee  Stewart,  D.  (1793)  "An  Account  of  the  Life  and  Writings  of  Adam  Smith,  LLD",  reprinted  and 
edited  by  Wightman  W.  L.  D.  in  Adam  Smith's  Essays  on  Philosophical  Subjects  (Indianapo;  is,  1982) 
p.  293. 
2Stewart,  "Account",  ibid. 
3Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History".  See  chapter  five. 
4Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  21  &  23. 155 
consciousness  of  his  approach  to  history  is  born  in  mind.  Millar,  for  example,  criticised 
Rousseau  for  a  preoccupation  he  had  with  morality.  This  tended  to  enflame  the 
passions  thereby  distorting  knowledge  of  how  generalised  commodity  production  had 
caused  changes  in  subjects'  perceptions  of  morality.  5 
Hopfl  makes  statements  on  the  Scots'method  that  are  incontestable  and  true.  Their 
method  was  grounded  in  experience,  inductive  and  experimental.  6  This  method  led 
them  to  think  that  there  was  within  all  men  an  "appetite  for  society".  7  In  other  words, 
experience  and  experiment  led  them  to  think  that  humans  were  instinctively 
predisposed  to  forming  and  living  in  associations,  families  and  groups.  In  contrast, 
Hopfl  states  that  the  explanations  they  gave  of  historical  and  social  change  were 
"individualistic".  8  He  argued  that  the  Scots  presupposed  that  individuals  were 
compelled  to  change  their  environment  through  the  operation  of  motives,  interests  and 
passions.  The  operation  of  these  internal  mental  phenomena  was  evidenced  in  the 
actions  of  individuals  in  association  with  one  another.  Motives,  interests  and  passions 
were,  according  to  Hopfl,  the  Scots'  basic  "units"  of  explanation.  9  He  contrasts  this 
form  of  individualism  to  "the  postulate  of  the  isolated,  rational  calculator  of  his  own 
advantage".  This  notion  was,  he  suggests,  alien  to  the  Scots.  10 
This  supposition  is  contestable  as  are  other  statements  he  makes.  For  example, 
Hopfl  contends  that  the  starting  point  of  the  Scots'  inquiry  was  an  "initial  condition"  of 
humanity  as  "rude  and  savage".  He  argues  that  this  condition  was  unrelated  to  the 
documentary  evidence  of  any  actually  existing  society.  Such  histories  were  absent  in 
the  intellectual  world  of  an  eighteenth  century.  The  Scots  were  therefore  the  first 
historians  to  give  the  histories  of  tribal  peoples  any  serious  attention.  What  they  did 
was  to  convert  "the  traditional  state  of  nature"  as  theorised  by  Hobbes,  Locke  and 
Rousseau  into  a  "postulated  first  stage  in  a  postulated  progress  of  an  ideal  society".  " 
it  was  this  ideal  society  that  was  the  subject  of  their  inquiry,  not  any  particular  society 
or  "(still  less)  the  human  race".  According  to  Hopfl,  therefore,  the  essence  of  Scottish 
"conjectural  history"  was  the  imagining  of  an  ideal  original  society  which  had  a  typical 
historical  progress.  This  had  no  necessary  correspondence  to  the  actual  empirical 
histories  of  the  particular  societies  they  studied. 
5  Millar  referred  to  Rousseau  as  one  of  those  moral  and  religious  writers  who  "in  declaiming  against 
the  vices  of  their  own  times,  have  been  led  to  exalt  the  merit  of  distant  ages"  (BV,  4,174).  He 
contrasted  Rousseau's  approach  with  his  own  comparative  explanatory  method  (B'V,  4,175). 
6Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  26  &  40. 
7Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  27. 
8Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  35. 
9Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  ibid. 
101  shall  argue  against  this  supposition  in  chapter  nine. 
11  Hopfl,  "Conjectural  History",  25. 156 
In  the  following  chapters,  I  shall  follow  Hopfl's  injunction  to  study  Hume's,  Smith's 
and  Millar's  method  in  use.  I  shall,  however,  present  an  alternative  perspective  on  the 
nature  of  this  method,  arguing  that  the  object  of  Millar's  inquiry  is  the  human  species 
or  "race"  at  a  certain  stage  of  its  historical  and  social  evolution.  This  is  the  stage  when 
the  needs  and  interests  of  a  particular  class,  the  class  of  individuals  who  personify 
capital  in  its  various  merchant,  agrarian  and  industrial  forms,  coincided  with  the  needs 
and  interests  of  those  of  the  proletariat  and  therefore  with  the  whole  of  humanity. 
I  shall  argue  that  the  starting  point  of  Millar's  inquiry  is  the  civilised  rather  than  the 
"rude  and  savage"  condition  of  society.  This  civilised  condition  is  one  in  which 
commodity  production  and  exchange  is  generalised  to  every  social  relation;  there  is  a 
rapid  expansion  of  the  productive  forces  observable  in  the  growth  of  science, 
technology,  the  organisation  of  labour  and  the  communication  of  ideas,  opinions  and 
knowledge.  There  is  also  the  emergence  of  political  and  juridical  institutions  that  both 
assist  and  promote  the  accumulation  of  productive  capital  and  also  the  conversion  of 
previously  dependent  living  labour  into  independent  wage  labour. 
Millar's  inquiry  therefore  gave  considerable  attention  to  the  detail  of  the  actual 
history  of  those  polities  about  which  there  was  a  large  body  of  documentary  evidence. 
Thus  he  selected  historical  evidence  on  Sparta,  Athens,  Rome,  Germany,  France, 
Scotland  and  England  for  examination  according  to  the  conjectural  method  he  used.  I 
shall  argue  that  this  method  was  the  product  of  the  philosophical  inquiry  into  the  moral 
and  natural  sciences  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  At  the  heart  of  this 
inquiry  was  the  category  of  the  juridical  subject  who  possessed  the  natural  right  to 
alienate  property  freely,  was  autonomous  and  formally  equal  in  the  sight  of  God  or  the 
natural  world  that  God  had  created.  This  subject  was  either  an  actual  or  potential 
commodity  owner  whose  experience  was  fixed  within  the  limits  of  a  valorising 
material-technical  process.  The  individual's  experience  of  natural  rights  was  therefore 
deeply  influenced  by  the  requirement  that  governments  should  enforce  the  law  of 
contract.  Moreover  individuals'  perception  of  social  life  was  also  fixed  within  an 
everyday  experience  of  a  multiplicity  of  purchases  and  sales  which  predisposed  them 
to  conceive  of  social  relations  as  regulated  either  by  contract  or  by  the  assertion  of  the 
private  and  public  needs  and  interests  satisfied  through  the  production  and  exchange  of 
commodities. 
I  shall  argue  that  Millar  adopted  this  general  perspective  in  his  social  and  historical 
method.  Hopfl  is  correct  to  mention  that  the  Scots  abandoned  the  conjecture  that  the 
hypothetical  state  of  nature  required  for  contractarian  explanations  of  political 
obligation  was  also  the  original  historical  condition  of  humanity.  However,  I  shall 
suggest  that,  once  Hume  had  argued  against  the  notion  that  the  historical  origins  of 
human  society  were  based  on  a  social  contract  between  isolated  individuals,  and  had 
replaced  it  with  the  hypothesis  that  society  had  arisen  out  of  the  needs  and  interests  of 157 
individuals  socialised  within  the  patriarchal  household,  there  was  no  corresponding 
adoption  by  Smith  and  Millar  of  the  state  of  nature  as  an  ideal  type  of  society  within 
which  to  characterise  the  "rude  and  savage"  condition. 
To  confirm  Hume's  hypothesis,  Millar  turned  rather  to  the  empirical  inquiry  of  the 
needs  and  interests  of  individuals  within  tribal  peoples  such  as  the  Highland  Gaels,  the 
Irish  and  Native  Americans.  It  was  possible  to  disprove  this  hypothesis  conclusively 
only  if  the  workings  of  the  minds  of  individual  members  of  tribal  peoples  were 
completely  different  from  and  opposed  to  the  workings  of  the  minds  of 
commercialised  peoples.  This  step  was  inconceivable  if  they  were  human  beings.  He 
therefore  turned  to  a  comparison  of  the  literary  and  verbal  accounts  of  these  peoples 
with  those  of  historical  peoples  with  similar  customs,  manners  and  laws  recorded  in 
the  Bible  and  the  classics.  Following  rules  of  inference  established  in  the  assessment  of 
juridical  testimony  and  the  natural  sciences,  Millar  concluded  that  it  was  probable  that 
original  society  was  similar  in  character  to  tribal  society. 
It  was  evident  to  every  eighteenth  century  subject  that  tribal  peoples  did  not  have 
private  property  and  therefore  no  form  of  law  or government  to  protect  and  safeguard 
property  rights.  Nor  did  they  have  a  social  division  of  labour  based  upon  commodity 
production  and  exchange.  If  the  customs,  manners  and  laws  of  such  peoples  were 
probably  original,  then  two  questions  arose.  First,  how  was  it  that  the  political  and 
juridical  institutions  of  the  civilised  polities  of  Europe  had  come  to  guarantee  the 
natural  rights  of  the  subject;  and  secondly,  how  was  it  that  the  customs,  manners  and 
laws  of  uncivilised  polities  had  managed  to  deviate  so  far  from  the  requirements  of 
natural  justice?  The  answer  to  both  questions  depended  upon  an  explanation  which 
gave  a  central  role  to  the  emergence  of  generalised  commodity  production  and 
exchange. 
In  the  process  of  answering  these  questions,  Millar  constructed  conjectural 
hypotheses  concerning  possible  causal  relations  between  the  natural  and  the  social 
environments  that  confronted  the  experience  of  the  subject.  If  the  subject  were  put  in  a 
situation  of  absolute  natural  scarcity,  what  effects  would  this  have  on  the  workings  of 
the  mind?  Would  individuals  be  able  to  make  rational  judgements  of  practical  utility  or 
would  they  be  driven  by  their  appetites  and  instincts?  What  knowledge  would  be 
necessary  for  the  subject  to  subsist  and  prosper? 
The  experience  of  social  and  economic  scarcities  was  a  familiar  one  to  every 
eighteenth  century  subject  who  was'or  had  been  a  poor  labourer.  If  the  workings  of 
the  mind  of  the  subject  were  uniform  and  had  universal  applicability,  then  he  would  be 
conscious  of  the  need  to  subsist  and  to  acquire  the  knowledge  necessary  for  generating 
surpluses  that  would  enable  him  and  his  family  to  subsist  were  accidental 
circumstances  such  as  famine,  war  or  political  or  economic  oppression  to  intervene. 158 
Moreover  he  would  be  conscious  of  the  need  for  a  system  ofjustice  that  would  protect 
any  property  he  acquired. 
Millar  therefore  supposed  that  the  needs  and  interests  of  the  subject  in  a  civilised 
society  would  be  the  same  as  those  in  an  uncivilised  society.  If  individuals  realised  that 
the  best  means  to  realising  their  needs  and  interests  in  a  civilised  society  was  to  engage 
in  commodity  production  and  exchange,  then  they  would  also  come  to  realise  that  this 
was  also  the  best  means  in  a  tribal  or  an  original  society.  If  the  subject  realised  that  the 
best  means  of  securing  his  natural  rights  to  alienate  his  property  freely  were  to  submit 
to  the  authority  of  a  sympathetic  magistrate,  then  it  would  be  in  his  interests  to  support 
the  latter's  judgements  if  these  judgements  challenged  the  arbitrary  or  custom-based 
patterns  of  submission  to  a  sovereign  power. 
I  describe  Millar's  method  in  what  follows  as  "conjectural"  for  three  reasons.  The 
first  is  that  Millar  was  a  follower  of  Hume.  Hume  referred  to  inferences  of  probability 
as  reasonings  from  conjecture.  12  The  second  is  that  his  method  relied  on  the  faculty  of 
the  imagination  of  the  subject  and  whether  or  not  circumstances  permitted  the  self- 
interested  subject  the  leisure  and  opportunity  for  entering  into  the  feelings  and 
opinions  of  others.  The  third,  which  follows  from  the  second,  is  that  Millar  was  as 
much  a  follower  of  Smith  as  he  was  of  Hume.  As  method  therefore  relied  on  the 
capacity  of  the  subject  to  take  on  the  role  of  a  disinterested  spectator  of  the  workings 
of  his  own  mind  and  the  effects  of  these  upon  the  minds  of  others.  It  follows  from 
Millar's  method  that  the  subject  as  spectator  is  able  to  make  judgements  of  utility 
about  the  forms  of  activity  that  are  most  advantageous  to  the  private  and  public 
welfare  of  associated  individuals  only  on  the  basis  of  knowledge  given  to  him  from  his 
experience  of  his  immediate  circumstances. 
8.2  Experiment,  Comparison  and  Conjecture 
8.2.1  The  Subservience  of  History  to  Jurisprudence 
Millar  adopted  an  empiricist method  of  inquiry  into  national  character  that  was 
developed  within  the  jurisprudential  tradition  by  Locke,  Montesquieu,  Hume,  Kames13 
and  Smith.  This  was  method  was  experimental,  comparative  and  conjectural. 
In  the  Preface  to  the  first  edition  of  The  Origitz  ofRanks,  Millar  wrote: 
12,,  probability  or  reasoning  from  conjecture  may  be  divided  into  two  kinds,  viz.  that  which  is founded 
on  chance,  and  that  which  arises  from  causes.  "  [Hume's  emphasis]  (THN,  111,  )G,  124-125). 
131  do  not  discuss  the  nature  of  Kames'  influence  on  Millar  here.  Nfillar's  own  appreciation  of  Karnes 
was  that  lie  had  an  "acute  and  original  genius  ...  employed  in  uniting  law  with  philosophy,  and  in 
extending  the  views  of  a  gainful  profession  to  the  liberal  pursuits  of  rational  entertainment.  " 
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"Man  is  every  where  the  same;  and  we  must  necessarily  conclude,  that  the  untutored 
Indian  and  the  civilized  European  have  acted  upon  the  same  principles. 
"Tbus,  by  real  experiments,  not  by  abstracted  metaphysical  theories,  human  nature  is 
unfolded;  the  general  laws  of  our  constitution  are  laid  open;  and  history  is  rendered 
subservient  to  moral  philosophy  and  jurisprudence.  "  14 
Millar  therefore  recommended  an  experimental  approach  to  the  study  of  the  varied 
customs  and  manners  of  peoples  of  different  countries  at  different  historical  periods. 
This  assumed  two  hypotheses.  First,  that  the  workings  of  the  minds  of  primitive  and 
civilised  human  individuals  were  the  same  but  that  the  circumstances  upon  which  their 
rnýinds  worked  were  different.  Second  that  nature  determýined  the  operating  principles 
of  the  mind,  and  artifice  determined  the  circumstances  upon  which  they  worked.  The 
theoretical  investigation  of  the  reciprocal  interaction  between  nature  and  artifice  was 
the  province  of  a  moral  philosophy  and  jurisprudence.  The  evidence  of  this  reciprocal 
action  was  grounded  within  the  sensory  experience  of  the  abstract  individual  subject. 
Moral  philosophy  and  jurisprudence  showed  that  the  subject  of  experience  was 
theoretically  atomised  from  others  within  an  isolated  prison  of  impressions  and  ideas. 
Nonetheless,  through  the  mechanisms  of  imagination  and  sympathy,  the  individual  was 
capable  of  both  communicating  and  influencing  others  and  being  communicated  to  and 
influenced  by  others.  15Both  the  "civilised  European"  and  the  "untutored  Indian"  were 
capable  of  communicating  and  influencing  one  another.  However  the  European  had 
some  grasp  of  moral  philosophy  and  jurisprudence.  He  was  likely  to  have  developed 
this  capacity  to  a  superior  level.  Literature  recording  observations  about  the  manners 
and  customs  of  individuals  associated  in  different  families  or  tribes,  and,  where 
relevant,  the  laws  of  different  governments  to  which  individuals  acquiesced,  therefore 
provided  evidence  with  the  potential  to  confirm  or  disprove  the  truth  of  these 
hypotheses. 
Hume  had  shown  that  there  were  similarities  and  differences  between  experiments 
in  natural  and  moral  philosophy.  If  the  individual  wanted  to  test,  a  hypothesis  about  the 
natural  world  all  he  had  to  do  was  to  think  up  an  experiment  that  enabled  him  to 
observe  the  effects  of  one  object  upon  another  and  to  repeat  it.  In  the  moral  sphere, 
however,  the  observer  was  both  the  experimenter  and  the  person  experimented  upon. 
Although  subjects  could  observe  the  contents  and  operations  of  their  own  minds  and 
conjecture  that  the  contents  of  others'  minds  operated  in  the  same  way,  the  isolated 
14prefaCe,  piii.  The  first  edition  of  1771  is  titled  Observations  Concerning  the  Distinction  ofRanks  in 
Society,  London.  Lelimann  remarks  that  the  revised  title  of  the  third  edition  was  probably  inspired  by 
Smith's  heading,  "Of  the  Origin  of  Ambition  and  of  the  Distinction  of  Ranks",  (TMS.  I.  iii.  2).  See 
Lelimann,  Millar,  p  167. 
15These  assumptions  about  the  individual  are  discussed  further  in  chapter  nine. 160 
individual's  experiments  on  himself  would  be  inconclusive  without  confirmation  that 
others  had  conducted  similar  experiments.  The  subject  of  experience  had  no  recourse 
but  to  rely  on  his  observation  of  the  behaviour  of  others  in  order  to  confirm  the  truth 
of  experiments  carried  out  on  himself  Hume  therefore  recommended  that  experiments 
in  moral  philosophy  be  based  on  hypotheses  confirmed  by  the  collection  and 
comparison  of  the  behaviour  of  people  "in  company,  in  affairs,  and  in  their 
pleasures".  16  It  is  clear  that  Millar  followed  Hume's  methodological  instructions.  In 
order  to  understand  the  deviations  of  actual  ideas  of  justice  from  the  civilised  subject's 
perceptions  of  natural  justice,  he  wrote  that: 
"It  is  therefore  by  a  comparison  only  of  the  ideas  and  the  practice  of  different  nations, 
that  can  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  those  rules  of  conduct,  which,  independent  of  all 
positive  institution,  are  consistent  with  propriety,  and  agreeable  to  the  sense  of 
jUStiCe.  1117 
Following  the  agenda  set  by  Bacon,  Enlightenment  thinkers  described  this  method 
of  collection  and  comparison  of  observations  as  "natural  history".  Locke  had  used  the 
method  in  his  Essay,  which  was  full  of  anthropological  and  historical  detail.  18  Hume 
acknowledged  it  in  his  Treatise,  drawing  more  upon  observations  of  the  behaviour  of 
men  in  a  commercial  society.  Applied  to  jurisprudence,  Stephen  Buckle  has  argued 
that  Locke,  following  Grotius  and  Pufendorf,  had  a  historical  conception  of  "the 
development,  or  progressive  uncovering,  of  natural  law".  19  This  historical  conception 
was  necessary  if  Locke's  empiricist  assumptions  of  how  individuals  acquire  knowledge 
of  natural  law  as  "the  result  of  rational  reflection  on  sense-experience"  were  true.  For 
Locke,  an  account  of  the  historical  development  of  society  was  required  because 
"sense-experience  occurs  over  time;  not  merely  in  the  lifetimes  of  individuals,  but  also 
in  the  much  larger  time  span  of  the  history  of  human  society".  20  Locke  had  a  "two 
stages"  conception  of  social  history:  "primitive  simplicity  followed  by  developed 
society  (the  latter  distinguished  by  a  money  economy)".  These  two  stages  were,  of 
course,  reiterated  in  the  distinction  that  Millar  made  above  between  "the  untutored 
Indian  and  the  civilized  European".  The  outcome  of  a  comparison  between  the 
historical  testimony  of  the  ancients  and  contemporary  travellers'  accounts  of  "rude" 
peoples  gave  Millar,  and  other  Enlightenment  thinkers,  inductive  confirmation  of 
Locke's  and  Hobbes'  hypothetical  conjectures  that  the  original  state  of  humanity  might 
16Sec  introduction  to  THN,  pxxiii. 
17pref,,,  Ce  to  Ist  edn  of  OR,  piv. 
18  SccWood,  N.  (1983)  The  Politics  ofLock-e's  Philosophy.  California:  pp65-93. 
19Buckle,  Natural  Law,  p  147. 
20  Buckle,  Natural  Lmv,  pp  147-148. 161 
be  similar  to  that  of  Native  Americans.  21  On  the  other  hand,  this  was  not  a  simple 
conversion  of  the  state  of  nature  into  an  initial  condition  of  humanity.  Testimony  and 
observation  of  peoples  who  had  no  social  division  of  labour  based  on  generalised 
commodity  production  disproved  conjectures  that  the  uncivilised  individual  was 
originally  isolated  from  every  other,  and  that  associations  of  individuals  had  arisen 
primarily  through  contractual  agreements.  On  the  contrary,  testimony  proved  that 
individuals  always  lived  in  families.  This  confirmed  Pufendorfs  conjecture  that 
individuals  possessed  a  God-given  or  natural  propensity  to  associate. 
The  results  of  Millar's  "experiments"  were  derived  from  a  comparative  and 
hypothetical  method  adopted  by  most  of  his  empiricist  and  natural  jurisprudential 
predecessors.  Empiricist  accounts  of  natural  law  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  necessarily  entailed  an  investigation  into  the  historical  origins  of  law, 
government,  and  juridical  and  political  ideas.  As  I  have  argued  in  chapter  two,  Millar 
was  conscious  of  being  the  sole  remaining  representative  and  embodiment  of  a  school 
of  thought  at  Glasgow  University  that  had  its  immediate  predecessors  in  Smith's, 
Hume's,  Hutcheson's  and  Gershom  Carmichael's  work  on  moral  philosophy  and 
jurisprudence.  Its  roots  were  in  a  Lockian  interpretation  of  Pufendorf  and  GrotiuS.  22 
8.2.2  Empiricist  Jurisprudence 
What  distinguished  this  school  was  its  application  of  uniformly  operating  principles 
of  the  mind,  the  truth  of  which  was  confirmed  within  the  sensory  experience  of  a  well- 
informed,  disinterested  observer  or  "spectator".  These  principles  were  used  to  explain 
the  origins  ofjurisprudential  ideas  and  institutions.  They  were  also  used  to  explain  the 
deviations  of  legal  and  customary  practices  from  natural  law  found  in  commercial  and 
non-commercial  societies  -  natural  rights,  especially  the  right  to  private  property,  being 
approved  by  such  an  observer.  These  principles  were  coupled  with  testable  hypotheses 
concerning  the  probable  causal  connections  between  the  economic  activity  of  the 
locivilised  European"  and  political  and  juridical  institutions  and  ideas. 
Millar's  own  account  of  this  school  is  given  in  the  first  seven  lectures  of  the  second 
course  of  his  Lecim-es  on  Justinian.  23  This  assumed  that  the  capacity  of  moral  and 
21SMith  and  Millar's  "four  stages"  in  the  progress  of  the  improvement  of  the  arts  are  therefore 
comparable  to  Locke's  binary  opposition.  Hunting,  pasturage  and  agriculture  are  comparable  to 
Locke's  "primitive  simplicity".  Commerce  and  manufactures  are  comparable  to  a  society  in  which  a 
,  'money  economy"  dominates  all  forms  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  including  those  observed  in  tribal 
societies. 
22According  to  Moore  J.  and  Silverthorne  M.  (1983),  it  was  Carmichael's  use  of  Locke's  Second 
Treatise  to  interpret  Pufendorf  s  natural  jurisprudence  that  "recast  Locke's  ideas  in  ways  that  would 
stimulate  inquiry  in  new  directions  among  later  Scottish  thinkers"  (p8l).  See  "Gershom  Carmichael 
and  the  natural  jurisprudence  tradition  in  cighteenth-century  Scotland".  In  Hont  &  Ignatieff  (eds) 
JPealth  and  Virtue,  pp73-87. 
23LJI  789,  vol.  1,  lectures  1-7,101-136.  Reprinted  as  appendix  three  in  this  dissertation. 162 
juridical  feelings  to  operate  on  circumstances  was  universal  to  the  human  mind.  Millar 
also  assumed  that  there  was  a  progress,  from  ancient  to  modem  society,  of  the 
knowledge  of  individuals'  attempts  to  reason  about  these  feelings.  In  order  to  give  an 
full  account  of  the  origins  and  progress  of  various  fights,  Millar  found  it  necessary  to 
demonstrate  that  natural  law  was  based  on  the  universal  experience  of  natural  feelings. 
He  described  these  as  "the  feelings  of  humanity".  These  were  the  feelings  that  every 
disinterested  impartial  spectator  Would  have  when  faced  with  acts  of  injustice.  Natural 
justice  was  also  subject  to  a  reasoning  process  on  and  about  these  feelings.  Reasoning 
about  feelings  took  the  form  of  post-reflective  and  calculative  utility  -  the  recognition 
that  it  was  in  the  interests  of  both  the  self  and  others  to  abide  by  the  decisions,  rules 
and  regulations  made  by  those  actual  spectators  who  had  the  power  to  take  the  side 
with  the  transgressed  and  to  punish  transgressors.  Millar  was  therefore  concerned  to 
demonstrate  the  uniform  operations  of  the  workings  of  the  human  mind  in  every 
possible  circumstance. 
This  entailed  a  historical  account  of  how  humans  had  arrived  at  the  knowledge  of 
the  workings  of  their  minds.  Millar  assumed  that  Hume  and  Smith  had  developed  this 
knowledge  into  a  science  of  morality  and  law.  This  science  not  only  retained  within  it 
the  rational  elements  of  the  ethical  and  juridical  theories  of  their  predecessors  but  was 
also  capable  of  explaining  how  they  had  arisen.  The  subject  matter  of  Hume  and 
Smith's  science  was  derived  from  the  experience  of  the  feelings  and  judgements  that 
spectators  made  within  civilised  and  commercial  societies.  The  science,  however,  also 
entailed  that  spectators  in  uncivilised  and  non-commercial  societies  would  have  the 
same  feelings  and  make  the  same  judgements.  If  the  testimony  of  history  and  of  the 
experience  of  contemporary  "rude"  societies  such  as  the  ancient  Germans,  Native 
Americans  and  Scottish  Gaels  appeared  to  contradict  this  hypothesis,  then 
supplementary  information  was  required  that  could  explain  how  spectators  would  feel 
and  would  make  judgements  if  they  happened  to  be  members  of  such  societies. 
Spectators  therefore  needed  to  have  knowledge  of  the  customs  and  manners,  forms  of 
government,  means  of  production  and  subsistence  of  these  societies.  This  knowledge 
was  taken  from  a  variety  of  different  literary  sources  including  the  Bible,  ancient  and 
modern  histories,  legal  and  political  texts  and  travellers'  memoirs.  What  we  might  now 
tend  to  think  of  as  a  empiricist  theory  of  law  and  morality  that  depended  upon 
psychological,  and  introspectively  derived,  assumptions  about  human  nature  was 
therefore  at  the  same  time  an  empiricist  theory  of  history  depending  upon  political, 
economic  and  ideologically  derived  assumptions  about  society  and  the  individual. 
Millar  made  a  sharp  distinction  between  justice  and  the  other  moral  virtucs.  Justice 
was  enforceable  but  generosity  or  gratitude,  for  example,  was  not.  Following  Smith, 
Millar  compared  injustice  to  imprudence,  intemperance  and  meanness  firstly  by  the 
resentful  feelings  injustice  evoked  in  the  mind  of  a  spectator;  secondly  by  the 163 
"disposition  to  punish"  that  these  feelings  produced;  and  thirdly  by  the  rules  that 
governed  punishment  (LJ]789,1,5,120-121).  These  differences  between  justice  and  all 
other  virtues  enabled  him  to  structure  his  discussion  -  first,  around  the  historical 
growth  of  reasoning  on  morality  and  secondly  on  the  historical  growth  of  reasoning  on 
law. 
Reasoning  on  morality,  according  to  Millar,  first  started  with  the  discovery 
through  observation  of  a  distinction  between  virtue  and  vice  by  individuals  in 
uncivilised  societies.  It  concluded  with  Hume  and  Smith's  explanation  of  the  sources  of 
approval  and  disapproval  of  moral  action  in  the  mind  of  the  spectator  in  civilised 
societies  (LJ]789,1,1-5,101-119).  Between  these  two  points  of  time,  Millar  reviewed, 
firstly,  Pythagoras's  classification  of  virtues  into  self  and  other  regarding;  secondly, 
Plato,  Aristotle  and  Zeno's  inquiry  into  the  difference  between  virtue  and  vice;  thirdly, 
the  Epicurean  and  Stoic  inquiry  into  the  relation  of  selfish  and  benevolent  feelings  to 
virtue;  and,  finally,  Malebranche,  Cudworth,  Clarke,  Hutcheson  and  Butler's  analysis 
of  the  sources  of  disapproval  and  approval.  24 
Millar  found  it  necessary  to  summarise  Hume  and  Smith's  explanation  of  the 
sources  of  approval  and  disapproval  in  order  to  distinguish  justice  from  the  other 
virtues.  He  attributed  to  Hume  the  "system"  that  explained  moral  approval  and 
disapproval  by  the  emotional  reactions  and  judgements  of  disinterested  spectators 
(LI]789,1,3,116).  He  presented  Smith's  doctrine  as  a  development  of  Hume's.  Smith, 
for  example,  emphasised  the  propriety  or  impropriety  of  the  consequences  of  actions. 
He  made  "the  sentiments  of  the  cool  spectator"  the  standard  by  which  these 
judgements  were  made  (LJ]789,1,4,118).  When  Millar  arrived  at  the  point  of  giving 
his  students  a  short  history  of  the  growth  of  jurisprudential  reasoning,  he  was  in  a 
position  to  argue  that  it  was  judgements  informed  by  the  feelings  of  actual  "cool 
spectators"  that  brought  into  being  moral  maxims  and  laws.  Moreover,  he  could  also 
argue  from  the  perspective  of  a  spectator-based  ethics  that  the  nature  of  laws  differed 
from  moral  maxims. 
Both  moral  maxims  and  laws  were  evidence  of  the  propriety  and  impropriety  of 
particular  forms  of  action.  Judgements  of  propriety  were  always  informed  by 
spectators'  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  within  which  agents  acted  and  the 
consequences  of  these  actions  to  themselves  and  others.  Both  were  also  evidence  of 
the  universality  of  the  feelings  of  every  spectator  who  had  this  knowledge.  However, 
moral  maxims  recommended  actions  promoting  the  well-being  and  happiness  of  the 
self  and  others.  They  were  evidence  of  universal  dispositions  to  approve  or  disapprove 
caused  by  the  feelings  of  someone  observing  self-interested  or  generous  acts. 
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Laws,  on  the  other  hand,  proscribed  restraints  on  actions  causing  harm  and 
suffering.  They  were  evidence  of  a  universal  disposition  to  punish  caused  by  the 
feelings  of  someone  observing  acts  of  injustice.  Laws  consisted  in  the  enforceable  rules 
created  by  the  decisions  of  people  placed  in  the  role  of  "cool  spectators"  of  injustice. 
These  were  individuals  in  authority  who  became  known  as  arbiters  or  judges.  It 
followed  that  laws  would  differ  according  to  the  actual  knowledge  of  the 
circumstances  motivating  acts  of  injustice.  The  particularities  of  this  knowledge  would 
also  be  limited  by  the  overall  level  of  the  development  of  society  in  a  country  at  a 
historical  period  of  time  (LJ]789,1,5,119-121). 
Having,  therefore,  given  a  short  history  of  ethics  culminating  in  Hume's  and 
Smith's  theories,  and  having  distinguished  morality  and  law  according  to  these 
theories,  Millar  then  turned  to  give  a  similar  historical  account  of  jurisprudence. 
Jurisprudence  was  a  modern  inquiry  according  to  Millar.  The  ancients  were  able  to 
make  some  progress  in  speculating  on  the  nature  ofjustice  but  lacked  the  experience 
of  a  multiplicity  of  different  legal  systems  necessary  for  a  scientific  understanding  of 
jurisprudence  (LI]789,1,5,122-123). 
Millar  thought  that  modern  jurisprudence  began  with  Grotius,  and  was  developed 
by  Pufendorf  and  Cumberland.  It  was  distinguished  for  the  use  it  made  of  the 
comparative,  experimental  method  and  arose  out  of  the  desire  to  perfect  the 
deficiencies  thinkers  found  in  their  own  national  systems.  In  order  to  do  this, 
philosophers  compared  their  own  laws  with  those  of  other  nations,  especially  the 
Roman  Law.  The  different  systems  of  different  nations  were  compared  in  order  to 
judge  which  were  "more  agreeable  to  justice  and  more  beneficial  to  society  than 
others"  (LJ]789,1,5,122).  Like  the  ancients,  they  also  made  theoretical  inquiries  into 
the  general  principles  ofjustice.  Millar  criticised  his  predecessors  for  confusing  ethics 
with  jurisprudence  and  spending  too  much  time  theorising  the  principles  of  natural  law 
(LJ]789,1,5,123).  They  should  have  spent  more  time  examining  the  empirical  details 
of  the  variations  of  laws  between  countries.  However,  the  search  for  principles 
necessarily  forced  philosophers  to  speculate  on  the  causes  of  deviations  from  natural 
law  found  in  the  legal  systems  of  particular  countries. 
8.2.3  Deviations  from  Natural  Law 
8.2.3.1  The  Hypothesis  of  Great  Legislators 
Their  first  hypothesis  was  that  the  "genius  and  character  of  early  legislators"  such 
as  Solon,  Lycurgus  and  Alfred  the  Great  explained  the  deviations  found  in  the  legal 
systems  of  the  ancient  Greeks  and  English.  Millar  rejected  this  hypothesis  on  the 
grounds  that  legal  institutions  could  not  be  out  ofstep  with  the  customs  and  manners 
of  a  particular  nation  and  that  the  written  codes  of  law  attributed  to  particular  "great 165 
men"  were  probably  no  more  than  "the  customs  of  the  country  a  little  methodized" 
(LJJ  789,1,6,124). 
Millar's  arguments  rejecting  the  hypothesis  that  the  acts  of  great  legislators 
explained  deviations  of  legal  systems  from  natural  law  were  sceptical.  A  lengthier 
discussion  of  this  position  can  be  found  in  the  introduction  to  the  third  edition  of  The 
Origiii  of  Ranks.  Here  Millar  never  denied  that  the  individual  legislator  had  some  role 
to  play  in  influencing  the  particular  detail  and  scope  of  legal  and  political  institutions. 
This  would  have  been  absurd.  What  he  was  at  pains  to  stress  was  that  historians  had 
exaggerated  and  overemphasised  the  role  of  individual  legislators  in  history.  He 
preferred  to  point  out  that  the  "greater  part  of  the  political  system  of  any  country  be 
derived  from  the  combined  influence  of  the  whole  people"  (OR,  5).  He  did  not  deny 
therefore  that  "a  variety  of  peculiar  institutions  will  sometimes  take  their  origin  from 
the  casual  interposition  of  particular  persons,  who  happen  to  be  placed  at  the  head  of  a 
community,  and  to  be  possessed  of  singular  abilities,  and  views  of  Policy"  (ibia). 
However  the  actions  of  particular  legislators  were  limited  by  the  opinions  of  a 
multitude  of  people.  Millar,  for  example,  had  a  well  developed  notion  of  a  collectivity 
of  interest  sympathetically  bound  together  in  a  combination  of  individuals'  shared 
motives  and  reasons. 
Millar's  scepticism  concerned  the  undue  emphasis  given  by  historians  to  the  role  of 
the  law-maker  in  making  "great  political  changes".  Thus:  "their  labours  have  been 
exaggerated  and  misrepresented"  and  most  probably  "they  confined  themselves  to  such 
moderate  improvements  as,  by  deviating  from  the  former  usage,  were  in  some  measure 
supported  by  experience  and  coincided  with  the  prevailing  opinions  of  the  country" 
(OR,  7). 
Millar's  historical  explanations,  therefore,  did  not  give  the  actions  of  particular 
monarchs  or  law-givers  any  special  role.  These  actions  were  "accidental  causes"  rather 
than  "general  causes"  of  political  orjuridical  change.  In  contrast  to  those  writers  who 
had  not  made  history  subservient  to  jurisprudence,  the  influence  of  legislators  on  the 
development  of  differing  legal  systems  required  explanations  that  referred  to  "the 
situation  of  society".  It  followed  that  there  were  limits  to  the  operation  of  the  free  will 
of  individuals  and  these  limits  were  socially  and  historically  determined.  Put  differently, 
Millar  gave  explanations  that  were  general  or  universal  rather  than  particular  or 
individual.  Social  and  historical  change  arose  through  the  unintended  social 
consequences  of  the  actions  of  a  multiplicity  of  individuals.  These  actions  were  limited 
by  subjects'  experience  of  a  particular  environment.  The  nature  of  this  environment 
required  explanation  by  reference  to  "general  causes"  and  these  rested  on  common 
human  interests  observable  in  every  society. 166 
This  does  not  entail  that  Millar  had  no  concept  of  free  will.  I-Es  notion  of  the  will 
of  individuals  limited  by  their  perception  of  circumstanced  interests  is  important  to  the 
concept  of  consent  or acquiescence  to  government  that  Millar  took  from  Hume.  25 
8.2.3.2  The  Hypothesis  of  Climate 
If  the  causes  of  deviations  in  law  were  to  be  found  in  the  different  customs  and 
manners  of  different  nations,  then  an  explanation  was  required  of  how  it  was  that 
customs  and  manners  had  national  differences.  Millar  thus  turned  to  the  hypothesis 
that  the  latter  were  caused  by  "the  climate  and  other  physical  circumstances". 
Following  Hume,  Smith  and  Karnes,  he  rejected  this  in  favour  of  the  "prevailing 
opinion  that  the  chief  differences  in  the  public  and  private  law  of  different  nations  may 
be  deduced  from  the  advancement  of  the  people  in  the  common  arts  of  life.  " 
(LJJ  789,1,7,126).  26 
In  a  lengthy  footnote,  Millar  critically  examined  and  rejected  arguments  supporting 
the  hypothesis  that  climate  and  diet  determined  differences  in  manners,  customs  and 
laws  (LJ]789,1,7,125).  Interestingly,  Millar  mentioned  Montesquieu  as  the  first 
jurisprudential  writer  to  have  explained  positive  deviations  from  natural  law  using  the 
level  of  tile  development  of  the  arts  in  particular  countries  to  "deduce"  differences  in 
customs  and  manners  and  forms  of  government.  He  could  easily  have  mentioned  him 
as  a  proponent  of  the  climatic  hypothesis,  but  refrained  from  doing  so.  Millar 
mentioned  Karnes  and  Smith  as  having  adopted  the  "prevailing  opinion"  and  it  was 
clear  from  all  aspects  of  his  work  that  it  is  one  that  Millar  himself  fully  embraced 
(LJ1  789,1,7,126). 
Millar's  scepticism,  closely  followed  Hume's  own  as  evidenced  in  his  essay  Of 
Natimial  Charactel-S.  27  This  criticised  claims  to  knowledge  of  the  "physical  causes"  of 
individual  behaviour.  Hume  preferred  the  more  frequently  observed,  and 
sympathetically  experienced  operation  of  "moral  causes"  (NC,  198).  28  Thus,  when 
Millar  referred  to  causal  principles  operating  on  the  character  of  individuals,  he  stated 
that  their  diversity  proceeded  "from  no  fixed  causes  that  are  capable  of  being 
25This  will  be  discussed  in  chapter  tcn. 
26Millar's  use  of  "deduction"  did  not  mean  that  he  thought  these  relations  were  determined  by  the 
rules  of  inference  of  formal  logic.  As  John  Loscc  (1980)  has  pointed  out,  Newton  used  "deduced 
from"  to  mean  "that  there  was  very  strong  inductive  evidence"  for  the  truth  of  establishing  relations 
within  theories.  This  suggests  that  there  was  a  fairly  loose  distinction  of  meaning  between 
"deduction"  and  "induction"  in  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century  discourses  on  science.  See  Losee  J. 
(1980)An  Historical  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  ofScience,  Oxford:  p.  91. 
27Millar  gives  almost  the  same  examples  of  differences  in  national  character  to  contradict 
Montcsquicu's  theory  as  Hume.  Compare  (OR,  11)  with  (MC,  204-205). 
28"By  moral  causes,  I  mean  all  circumstances,  which  are  fitted  to  work  on  the  mind  as  motives  and 
reasons.  "  (NC,  198).  "By  physical  causes  I  mean  those  qualities  of  the  air  and  climate,  which  are 
supposed  to  work  insensibly  on  the  tempter,  by  altering  the  tone  and  habit  of  the  body"  (ibid).  [His 
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ascertained"  (OR,  5).  He  made  it  clear  that  he  was  referring  to  the  difficulty  of  gaining 
knowledge  about  the  effect  of  physical  causation  by  rehearsing  similar  objections  to 
materialist  philosophers  that  Hume  had  raised  in  his  criticisms  of  Montesquieu.  29 
Millar  discussed  the  opinions  of  those  philosophers  who  held  the  opinion  that  national 
and  personal  aspects  of  character  such  as  personal  courage  could  be  explained  by  the 
effect  that  climactic  differences  of  heat  or cold  had  on  the  body,  ideas  and  feelings.  His 
scepticism  concerned  the  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  influence  of  climate  on  the  nerves, 
muscle  and  brains,  and  of  the  relationship  between  changes  in  bodily  states  and 
changes  in  mental  states.  He  remarked  that  it  was  difficult  to  determýine  whether  these 
conjectures  had  any  "real  foundation"  (OR,  10). 
Here  he  showed  himself  to  be  a  zealous  follower  of  Hume.  Hume  had  written  on 
this  question  that:  "It  is  a  maxim  in  all  philosophy,  that  causes  which  do  not  appear, 
are  to  be  considered  as  not  existing"  (OR,  10).  Physical  causes  were  conceived  as 
operating  "insensibly"  (NC,  198).  The  hypothesis  that  differences  in  air  and  climate 
caused  differences  in  customs  and  manners  depended  on  causes  that  the  subject  of 
experience  could  neither  observe  nor  experiment  upon.  Millar,  therefore,  like  Hume, 
was  sceptical  about  whether  there  was  any  causal  relationship  between  hot  and  cold 
climates  on  national  characteristics.  They  were  sceptical  not  only  because  a  hypothesis 
or  "conjecture"  of  the  kind  they  discussed  such  as  "All  individuals  inclined  to 
drunkenness  are  natives  of  countries  with  cold  climates"  was  falsified  by  the  truth  of 
testimony  that  many  individuals  inclined  to  drunkenness  were  natives  of  hot  countries, 
but  also  because  there  was  no  experimental  confirmation  of  the  physical  hypotheses 
essential  to  Montesquieu's  climatic  explanation  of  the  extent  of  drunkenness  in 
different  nations. 
These  physical-cause  hypotheses  included  the  following:  that  heat  applied  to  the 
body  always  relaxes  muscles,  sinews  and  brains;  that  cold  always  tenses  muscles, 
sinews  and  brains;  that  the  consumption  of  large  quantities  of  alcoholic  beverages 
always  relaxes  muscles,  sinews  and  brains;  and  that  certain  passions  of  a  moral  nature 
such  as  vanity,  avarice  or  benevolence  were  always  (or  invariably)  associated,  through 
private  introspection  or  through  the  public  evidence  of  testimony,  with  a  tensing  or 
relaxing  of  the  muscles,  sinews  and  brains.  This  did  not,  of  course,  entail  that,  if  there 
were  repeated  evidence  of  this  association,  they  would  have  rejected  it.  Nor  did  it  rule 
out  that  there  might  be  evidence  of  the  occasional  experience  of  an  association 
between  particular  passions  and  physical  tension  or  relaxation.  In  the  absence  of 
further  experimental  confirmation,  the  unusual  occurrence  of  these  associations  would 
incline  them  to  think  that  they  were  accidental. 
29Montesquicu's  discussion  of  the  matter  is in  part  3,  books  14-19  of  The  Spirit  of  the  Laws.  Trans.  & 
eds  Colder,  Miller,  &  Stone,  Cambridge,  1989:  pp231-333.  See  also  discussion  in  chapter  three. 168 
It  was  the  complicated  nature  of  untested  physical-cause  hypotheses,  especially 
any  evidence  of  an  association  between  a  contraction  of  physical  tissues,  such  as  the 
brain  conceived  analogously  to  a  muscle  or  sinew,  with  subjectively  experienced 
feelings,  that  made  Hume  and  Millar  the  most  sceptical.  Until  considerable  repeated 
testing  had  established  regular  connections  in  sensory  experience  between,  for 
example,  physical  tension  and  the  passions,  such  hypotheses  relied  on  "secret"  and 
therefore,  as  yet,  unknown  phenomena  (OR,  10).  30  Unlike  the  experiments  that  Hume 
conducted  within  the  limited  scope  of  the  everyday  experience  of  the  non- 
philosophical  eighteenth  century  individual,  physical-cause  experiments  were  difficult 
to  construct  and  or  even  imagine.  They  were  therefore  esoteric. 
Both  Hume  and  Millar  argued  that  there  was  a  more  regular  association  (both  in 
the  private  sensory  experience  of  the  atomised  individual  and  in  the  public  testimony  of 
other  individuals)  between,  for  example,  the  passion  of  vanity  with  the  possession  of 
wealth.  This  would  have  enabled  them  to  have  induced  a  causal  connection  between 
the  ideas  of  vanity  and  of  wealth.  Thus  they  argued  that  they  could  give  simpler 
explanations  of  commonalities  and  differences  in  national  character  according  to 
"moral"  rather  than  "physical"  causes. 
The  fact  that  the  operation  of  physical  causes  on  the  individual  were  not  "fixed" 
entailed  that  there  was  no  constant  or  regular  conjunction  of  an  association  of  ideas 
corresponding  to  mental  and  physical  phenomena.  Nonetheless,  the  absence  of  fixity 
did  not  thereby  entail  that  there  was  no  form  of  succession  of  causes  appeanng 
regularly  within  consciousness  of  the  individual  subject  of  experience.  31  Millar  directed 
his  readers'  attention  to  those  other  causes  "the  existence  of  which  is  capable  of  being 
more  clearly  ascertained"  (OR,  10).  These  other  causes  were  those  "circumstances" 
that  "work  on  the  mind  as  motives  or  reasons",  of  which  the  acquisition  of  wealth 
through  the  private  ownership  of  property  was  "fixed"  in  the  consciousness  of  the 
eighteenth  century  subject  of  experience.  It  could  therefore  be  sympathetically  inferred 
that  the  workings  of  the  mind  of  this  particular  subject  were  universally  operative 
wherever  humans  were  found  in  the  world.  This  hypothesis  could  be  verified 
irrespective  of  whether  particular  individuals  or  associations  of  individuals  had  the 
notion  of  freely  alienable  property.  The  economic  and  juridical  means  for  the  security 
of  anticipated  or  continued  expectation  of  enjoyment  could  be  universally  connected 
with  the  individual  subject's  desire  and  need  for  admiration,  respect  and  attention. 
3011in  the  history  of  the  world,  we  see  no  regular  marks  of  that  secret  influence  which  has  been 
ascribed  to  the  air  and  climate"  (my  emphasis]  (OR,  10). 
3111,  explaining  the  diversity  of  the  "character  and  gcnius"  of  individuals  there  are  no  "fixed  causes 
that  are  capable  of  being  asertained"  (OR  5). 169 
8.2.3.3The  Hypothesis  of  the  Arts 
On  the  explanation  of  deviations  of  positive  from  natural  law,  Nfillar  followed 
Bacon's  prescriptions  on  scientific  method  more  closely  than  had  Montesquieu.  Bacon 
had  written  in  Novitni  01-ganum  : 
"Again,  let  a  man  only  consider  what  a  difference  there  is  between  the  life  of  men  in 
the  most  civilised  province  in  Europe,  and  in  the  wildest  and  most  barbarous  districts 
of  New  India;  he  will  feel  it  be  great  enough  to  justify  the  saying  that  'man  is  god  to 
man',  not  only  in  regard  of  aid  and  benefit,  but  also  by  comparison  of  condition.  And 
this  difference  comes  not  from  soil,  not  from  climate,  not  from  race,  but  from  the 
ar-ts.  1132 
Bacon's  hypothesis  was  that  the  observable  differences  in  "civilisation"  and 
"condition"  between  Europeans  and  "barbarians"  could  be  explained  by  differences  in 
their  knowledge  of  "the  arts"  rather  than  "soil",  "climate"  or  "race".  The  inquiry  into 
the  truth  of  this  hypothesis  and  the  use  of  comparative  "experiments"  to  determine 
whether  or  not  it  could  be  falsified  dominated  Hume's  debate  with  Montesquieu  on 
national  character  and  Mllar  affirmed  the  conclusions  of  this  debate  in  his  introduction 
to  The  Orighi  of  Ranks.  Bacon's  hypothesis  can  also  be  compared  with  Millar's 
assessment  of  Smith's  contribution  to  jurisprudence.  According  to  Milar,  Smith  had 
pointed  out:  "the  effects  of  those  arts  which  contribute  to  subsistence,  and  to  the 
accumulation  of  property,  in  producing  correspondent  improvements  or  alterations  in 
law  and  government.  '133 
Of  note  is  Millar's  affirmation  of  Smith's  hypothesis  that  it  was  the  arts  that 
contribute  to  the  "accumulation  of  property"  which  required  inductive  confirmation  of 
their  effects  on  law  and  government.  This  is  important  for  three  reasons.  The  first  is 
that  property  is  a  juridical  notion  and  therefore  conceptually  related  to  the  idea  of  law. 
The  second  is  that  both  Smith  and  Millar  considered  economic  activity  as  the  "art"  that 
is  most  likely  to  contribute  to  the  accumulation  of  property  in  its  most  developed 
conceptual  form.  The  sovereign  right  of  juridical  subjects  to  alienate  freely  what  they 
possessed  coincided  both  logically  and  genetically  with  their  activity  as  commodity 
producers  and  exchangers.  It  follows  that  the  universal  characteristics  of  the  subject 
therefore  coincided  with  the  particular  subjectivity  of  a  bourgeois  manufacturer  and 
merchant.  The  third  is  that  comparisons  between  commercial  and  non-commercial 
nations  were  used  to  demonstrate  that  individuals  who  subsisted  in  the  latter  had 
32Quotcd  by  Wood,  Locke,  p129. 
33Stewart,  "Account",  1,19:  pp274-275. 170 
neither  a  knowledge  of  economic  activity,  nor  a  knowledge  of  alienable  private 
property,  nor  any  laws  distinguishable  from  customs. 
Jeffrey  had  written  of  Millar  that  his  "chief  excellence"  Jay  in: 
"tracing  the  connexion  of  those  steps  by  which  men  advance  from  a  barbarous  to  a 
civilized  state  of  society,  and  in  pointing  out  the  circumstances  that  originally 
suggested  or  compelled  the  adoption  of  particular  institutions.  $134 
Put  crudely,  the  "steps"  that  Jeffrey  referred  to  were  in  the  acquisition  of  arts, 
which  Millar  observed  were  associated  with  corresponding  changes  in  the  conception 
and  distribution  of  property  and  therefore  changes  in  juridical  and  political  forms  of 
rule  by  the  rich  over  the  poor.  Millar  thought  that  as  these  correlations  were  observed 
in  every  known  association  of  individuals  united  by  commerce  and  trade  -  associations 
that  extended  further  than  a  geographically  confined  family,  tribe  or  nation  -  he  could 
therefore  infer  through  inductive  reasoning  that  a  causal  connection  between  the 
extent  of  knowledge  of  the  arts  and  the  extent  of  knowledge  of  law  and  government 
would  be  present  within  any  particular  association. 
8.2.4  The  Comparison  of  Customs,  Manners  and  Laws 
Following  Bacon,  both  Millar  and  Hume  were  therefore  sceptical  of  Montesquieu's 
materialist  theory  of  the  influence  of  climate  and  diet  on  customs,  manners  and  laws. 
They  chose  rather  to  compare  customs  and  manners  either  with  forms  of  government 
or  with  a  knowledge  of  the  arts  (or  both).  Hume  began  his  History  of  England  with  a 
statement  of  this  approach.  35  Following  Hume,  and  "Pesprit  philosophique",  Millar 
applied  the  method  to  the  assessment  of  testimony.  36  Confronted  by  a  plethora  of 
travellers'  reports  of  "the  state  of  manners  in  the  rude  parts  of  the  world",  Millar 
remarked  that  the  large  number  of  such  accounts  allowed  the  reader  the  "opportunity 
of  comparing  their  several  descriptions".  Comparisons  of  agreements  and 
disagreements  was  a  "method  of  judging"  free  from  the  biases  of  the  particular 
observer.  Millar  had  access  to  a  variety  and  wide  range  of  historical  testimony,  These 
authors  promoted  opposing  religious  and  political  views.  Some,  like  Tacitus  and  the 
biblical  prophets  were  ancient.  Others,  like  Charlevoix  and  Byron  were 
34jeffrey,  Review,  p  16  1. 
35"The  only  certain  means  by  which  nations  can  indulge  their  curiosity  in  rcscarcnes  conferning  their 
rcrnotc  origin,  is  to  consider  the  language,  manners  and  customs  of  their  ancestors,  and  *,,  coniparc 
them  with  those  of  the  ncighbouring  nations"  Hume,  History,  p  I. 
36Scc  Faure  M.  (1992)  "John  Millar  and  the  Enlightenment:  ToNvard  the  Construction  of  Diderot's 
'Science  dc  Phoinnic  public"'.  In  Eighteenth-Century  Scotland:  Newsletter  of  the  Eighteenth-Century 
Scottish  Studies  Society,  6:  8-11. 171 
contemporary.  37  Yet  other  sources,  such  as  comparisons  between  the  "barbaric" 
customs,  manners  and  laws  of  Highland  Gaels  and  the  "civilisedli  Lowland  Scots  did 
not  require  literary  confirmation.  The  immediate  experience  of  Millar,  his  peers  and 
students  testified  to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  these  sources.  38  This  placed  the  Scottish 
spectator  in  a  privileged  experimental  position.  When  the  content  of  testimony  agreed 
then  "in  proportion  to  the  singularity  of  any  event,  it  is  the  more  improbable  that 
different  persons,  who  design  to  impose  upon  the  world,  but  who  have  no  concert 
with  each  other,  should  agree  in  relating  it"  (OR,  13). 
The  purpose  of  comparison  was  to  discover  regularities  capable  of  explaining 
uniformities  and  differences  in  national  character.  Hume  discovered  regularities  chiefly 
in  the  nature  of  the  government.  National  character  was  formed  by  the  union  of  men 
"into  one  political  body"  (NC,  202).  Customs  and  manners  changed  if  the  government 
changed.  Changes  in  government  happened  either  afler  conquest  or  through  cornmerce 
with  other  nations.  A  long-established  government  produced  a  similarity  of  customs 
and  manners.  The  nature  of  government  also  had  uniform  effects  on  the  development 
of  the  arts  and  sciences.  A  large  government  tended  towards  despotism  -a  small 
government  to  freedom.  The  arts  and  sciences  were  retarded  in  the  former  and 
flourished  in  the  latter  (AS,  119  &  124-125).  39 
Hume's  attention  tended  to  be  focused  more  on  the  effect  government  had  on 
customs,  manners  and  the  progress  of  the  arts.  Millar  emphasised  the  effect  the 
progress  of  the  arts  had  upon  government.  Comparison  of  knowledge  of  the  arts 
people  acquired  revealed  regularities  in  laws,  customs  and  manners.  These  were 
associated  with  the  acquisition,  distribution  and  ideas  of  property.  The  mediating 
category  between  the  arts  and  government  was  the  developing  idea  of  the  individual's 
natural  rights  to  alienate  property  freely.  40 
37Dc  Charlevoix,  P.  -F.  -X.  (1744)  Histoire  et  description  generale  de  la  Nouvelle  France,  avec  le 
Journal  historique  dun  voyagefait  par  Pordre  du  Roi  dans  lAnierique  septentrionnale,  3  vols.,  Paris, 
and  Byron  J.  (1780)Ararrative  of  the  Hon.  John  Byron,  containing  an  Account  of  the  Great  Distresses 
suffered  by  hinisetr  and  his  companions  on  the  Coast  of  Patagonia  froin  the  Year  1740  until  their 
Arrival  in  England  1746,  London. 
38Millar  observed  differences  between  the  state  of  manners  in  the  Highlands  and  the  Lowlands.  He 
argued  that  there  was  an  absence  of  any  notion  of  justice  amongst  rude  peoples  in  a  long  footnote 
which  recalls  how  "before  property  comes  to  be  established",  the  Highlanders  did  not  consider  it  a 
crime  to  steal  from  Lowlandcrs  (LG]771,33n).  Millar's  mention  of  a  recent  "famous"  example  of  this 
"in  the  year  1745  -a  Highlander  who  notwithstanding  of  all  the  promised  rewards  kept  the  Pretender 
concealed  in  his  house  -  was  soon  aftcr  taken  up  for  stealing  a  horse.  "  is  repeated  in  a  different 
wording  (informing  the  reader  that  he  was  tried  and  sentenced  to  capital  punishment  in  Inverness) 
(HV,  4,240).  Millar  used  these  examples  to  illustrate  the  effects  of  commerce  on  government.  and 
the  eff(;,.  ts  of  commercial  governments  on  the  virtues  of  honesty  and  justice.  Honesty  and  justice  were 
improved.  Convcrý:  jy,  gcncrosity  and  fidelity  were  impaired. 
39Hume  D.  (1742)  "Of  the  Rise  and  Progress  of  the  Arts  and  Sciences".  In  Miller  E.  F.  (ed.  )  Essays, 
Indianapolis,  1987:  ppl  11-137. 
40"by  taking  a  view  therefore  of  the  different  states  of  men  and  periods  of  the  world  with  regard  to 
property  we  sliall  have  the  best  idea  of  government"  (Lu  1771,6).  David  Wootton  (1993)  attributes 172 
Millar  classified  individuals  into  hunters  and  fishers,  shepherds,  husbandmen,  and 
manufacturers  and  merchants.  Hume  observed  that  different  occupations  gave 
individuals  a  uniform  character  regardless  of  time  and  space.  41  Millar  combined 
Hutcheson's  and  Smith's  speculations  on  the  division  of  labour  with  Hume's  insight. 
Hunting  and  fishing,  pasturage,  agriculture  and  commerce  were  the  occupations  that 
most  probably  determined  individuals'  characters,  customs,  manners,  laws  and  ideas  of 
property.  The  sequence  of  change  from  one  occupation  to  another  was  neither 
inevitable  nor  were  men  "found  living  perfectly  in  either  of  these  states,  yet  we  may 
reason  comparatively"  (LG1771,8).  A  simple  framework  based  on  the  occupations 
men  used  to  gain  subsistence  and  surpluses  guided  his  historical  inquiries.  These 
produced  the  circumstances  within  which  ideas  of  property  right  originated  and 
evolved.  These  ideas  were  necessary  for  law  and  government  to  arise. 
8.2.5  Conjectural  Reasoning 
A  comparative  method  entailed  "reasoning  from  conjecture".  As  I  noted  in  the  first 
section  of  this  chapter,  Hume  had  used  the  term  "conjecture"  in  his  discussion  of 
probability  in  the  Treatise.  -  Conjectural  reasoning,  in  this  sense,  was  the  means  by 
which  particulars  could  be  inferred  from  observed  regularities.  It  was  similar  in  nature 
to  what  is  now  known  as  inductive  logic.  Hume  and  Millar  were  not  the  first  to  apply 
it  to  history,  although  Millar  recognised  Montesquieu  as  the  first  to  apply  it  to  law.  42 
Hume  referred  to  the  image  of  dice  to  illustrate  probability  in  the  Enquiry.  An 
unbiased  die  revealed  all  its  sides  equally  in  numerous  throws  over  time  "and  this  is  the 
very  nature  of  chance,  to  render  all  the  particular  events,  comprehended  in  it  entirely 
equal"  (EHU,  57).  If,  after  many  throws,  more  of  one  side  kept  falling  up  than  any 
other,  then  it  was  proper  to  infer  the  existence  of  a  bias  in  the  die.  Through  an 
association  of  ideas,  the  mind  was  led  to  think  of  a  cause  for  an  unequal  distribution  of 
results.  Hume  used  the  throwing  of  dice  to  illustrate  the  operation  of  regular  causes 
both  in  the  study  of  nature  and  of  society.  The  image  reappeared  in  his  essay  Yhe  Rise 
and  Progress  of  the  Arts  and  Sciences.  Probabilistic  regularity  of  this  kind  was  one  of 
this  idea  to  Hume.  He  calls  it  "coiiinicrcialiscd  Harringtonianism.  "  See  his  "David  Hume,  'the 
historian...  in  Norton  D.  F.  (cd,  )The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Hume,  p.  293.  See  also  chapter  eleven. 
41  "A  soldier  and  a  priest  arc  different  characters,  in  all  nations,  and  all  agcs;  and  this  difference  is 
founded  on  circumstances,  whose  operation  is  eternal  and  unalterable"  [Hume's  emphasis]  (MC,  198). 
42SCC  Wootton,  "Hume",  p286.  He  attributes  the  method  to  Arnauld  &  Nicole  (1660)  Grammaire 
generale  et  raisonnee  de  Port-Royal,  Paris.  Arnauld's  rules  are  almost  idcndcal  to  Millar's.  See  also 
Craig  Walton  (1990)  "Hume's  England  as  a  Natural  History  of  Morals"  in  Capaldi  &  Livingston, 
Liberty  in  Hume's  History  of  England,  pp25-52.  Walton,  citing  Cohen,  L.  1  (1977)  The  Probable 
and  the  Provable,  Oxford,  attributes  the  method  to  Francis  Bacon.  This  confirms  the  point  that 
"natural  history"  (the  term  used  by  Millar)  and  "conjcctural  history"  (the  term  used  later  by  Dugald 
Stewart)  referred  to  the  same  historical  approach. 173 
the  "natural  reasons"  why  "What  arises  from  a  great  number,  may  often  be  accounted 
for  by  determinate  and  known  causes"  (AS,  112). 
Millar  used  similar  illustrations  of  conjectural  reasoning  in  the  introduction  to  The 
oi-ighj  ofRatiks.  He  stressed  that  national  character  could  be  "considered  as  nearly  the 
same  with  that  of  every  other  in  similar  circumstances"  (OR,  5)  and  that  the  political 
system  "of  any  country"  is  "derived  from  the  combined  influence  of  the  whole  people". 
He  compared  the  influence  of  particular  individuals  to  the  uncertainty  of  "one  or  two 
throws  of  a  single  die".  The  combined  influence  of  many  individuals  operating  together 
was  similar  to  results  achieved  when  a  "multitude  of  dice"  are  "thrown  together  at 
random".  43 
Through  the  observation  of  repeated  similarities  of  behaviour  in  a  large  number  of 
individuals,  he  induced  causal  influences.  Observed  regularities  of  behaviour  enabled 
the  philosopher  to  infer  the  existence  of  "determinate  and  known  causes".  These 
operated  uniformly  in  the  present  and  the  past.  The  idea  of  causal  influence  did  not 
depend  on  constantly  conjoined  events.  Millar  admitted  exceptions  and  there  were 
irregularities.  He  explained  irregularities  by  accidents.  These  included  favourable  or 
unfavourable  geographical  locations,  climate  and  the  unique  character  traits  of 
individuals.  According  to  Hume,  the  latter  were  the  product  of  unknown,  as  yet, 
"secret"  causes. 
Hume  and  Millar  called  induced  regularities  "general  causes".  Millar  identified  two 
broad  classes  of  general  causes.  The  first  was  knowledge  of  the  arts  and  sciences.  The 
second  was  the  influence  of  manners,  customs  and  private  law.  Within  the  first  class 
he  included  "useful  arts",  such  as  hunting,  pasturing,  agriculture,  commerce  and 
manufactures,  and  "refined  arts",  such  as  poetry,  plays,  paintings  and  sculpture.  The 
art  of  government  was  one  such  cause.  The  interaction  of  general  causes  upon  each 
other  were  interspersed  with  accidents  such  as  geography,  climate,  conquest,  or  the 
occasional  influence  of  powerful  personalities.  Taken  together  these  explained  the 
peculiarities  of  national  character. 
8.3  Conjectural  Reasoning  and  the  Four  Stages 
8.3.1  Inferences  from  Observed  Regularities 
Conjectural  reasoning,  as  I  have  stated,  was  the  means  by  which  particulars  could 
be  inferred  from  observed  regularities.  The  eighteenth  century  subject  of  experience 
was  immediately  confronted  with  regularities  in  his  observations  of  the  customs  and 
manners  of  his  own  life  that  were  associated  with  economic  activity.  As  argued  in 
chapter  seven,  Millar  conceived  of  economic  activity  as  a  material-technical  process 
43See  Bcrry  C.  J.  .  1997)  Social  Theory  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment,  Edinburgh:  p56. 174 
motivated  by  individuals'  subjective  assessment  of  their  wants  and  desires.  Thus  he 
observed  that  "the  combined  influence"  of  a  people  who  were  improving  their 
productive  techniques  through  the  application  of  scientific  knowledge  of  nature  and 
society  had  noticeable  effects  on  legislation  and  government.  44  Hume  had  noted  the 
effect  that  government  had  on  encouraging  the  arts  and  sciences,  especially  those  that 
were  applied  to  commerce  and  manufactures.  It  was  Smith,  however,  in  his  lectures  on 
jurisprudence  who,  following  Montesquieu's  method  of  collection  and  comparison  of 
laws  in  commercial  societies,  was  to  infer  from  the  effects  economic  activity  had  on 
forms  of  government  in  England  and  France  that  there  might  be  a  strong  causal 
connection  between  productive  activity,  ideas  of  property,  legislation  and  forms  of 
government. 
8.3.2  Smith's  First  Hypothesis 
8.3.2.  Me  coiyeclure  of  stages 
Smith's  first  use  of  historical  stages  was  a  conjecture,  the  content  of  which  was 
drawn  from  observation  and  the  testimony  of  historians  and  travellers.  Smith  used  the 
hypothesis  to  establish  a  causal  correlation  between  productive  activity  and  ideas  of 
property.  Thus  Smith  classified  individuals  into  four  occupational  groups  according  to 
their  means  of  subsistence  or  mode  of  acquisition  of  property.  He  introduced  hunting, 
pasturage,  agriculture  and  commerce  in  his  lectures  on  private  law,  to  account  for 
deviations  in  ideas  of  property  from  natural  law.  They  were  presented  as  "stages"  or 
t1steps"  in  the  subject's  acquisition  of  the  knowledge  of  his  natural  rights.  Millar  was  to 
follow  this  method  when  he  came  to  lecture  on  private  law. 
The  hypothesis  was  that  the  workings  of  the  mind  experienced  in  a  commercial 
society  in  which  the  subject's  right  to  alienable  property  was  well  established,  would, 
by  inductive  inference,  operate  as  equally  in  a  non-commercial  society  where  the  right 
was  unknown.  In  the  absence  of  government,  the  only  possible  causal  influence  that 
would  limit  these  principles  could  therefore  be  the  effects  the  arts  useful  for 
subsistence  and  accumulation  had  on  the  human  mind.  Tribal  individuals  therefore 
shared  the  same  capacity  to  understand  natural  rights  as  commercial  peoples. 
in  his  lectures,  Smith  introduced  the  four  stages  as  a  hypothesis  of  how  individuals 
would  behave  if  they  were  isolated  from  civilisation.  This  was  a  kind  of  thought 
experiment.  He  asked  his  students  to  imagine  what  a  small  group  of  individuals  would 
do  if  they  found  themselves  isolated  on  an  "uninhabited  island"  (LJ(A),  i.  27,14).  They 
would,  at  first,  gather  fruit  and  hunt  animals,  then  discover  how  to  tame  animals 
cultivate  the  ground  and  plant  seeds  for  crops.  Over  time,  they  would  develop  skills, 
44Entails,  which  Millar  discussed  at  length  in  his  lectures  on  private  law,  is  the  most  obvious 
example.  See  my  discussion  below. 175 
and  devote  more  time  to  their  favourite  occupation.  In  this  way,  a  division  of  labour 
would  come  into  being,  and  out  of  this  division  of  labour  individuals  would  exchange 
the  products  of  their  labour  with  those  of  others. 
Smith  adopted  this  hypothesis  as  the  most  likely  course  of  the  actual  historical 
progress  of  the  discovery  of  the  arts  for  three  reasons.  First,  he  assumed  that  every 
individual's  desires,  wants  and  faculties  were  the  same.  Second,  he  assumed  that 
through  observation  and  experience  there  would  be  a  uniform  progress  of  knowledge 
from  simple  ideas  of  the  acquisition  of  the  means  of  subsistence  to  more  complex 
ideas.  Finally,  to  confirm  the  truth  of  the  hypothesis,  he  made  probabilistic  inferences 
from  the  testimony  of  observers  recorded  in  literature  written  about  the  customs  and 
manners  of  uncivilised  peoples. 
The  purpose  of  this  conjecture  was  twofold:  firstly,  to  compare  individuals' 
knowledge  of  productive  activity  with  their  ideas  of  property,  and  secondly  to 
demonstrate  that  the  principles  of  the  mind  operated  uniformly  relative  to 
circumstances.  For  example,  were  an  eighteenth  century  subject's  experience  limited  to 
subsisting  by  hunting,  or  gathering,  or  pasturage,  they  would  have  the  same  ideas  of 
possession  and  property  as  a  savage  or  barbarian. 
8.3.2.2  The  Cotyecture  of  Scarcity 
The  experience  of  a  scarcity  of  the  means  of  subsistence  was  a  crucial  assumption 
in  Smith's  and  Millar's  account  of  the  origins  of  property.  After  posing  the  conjectural 
hypothesis  of  the  four  different  types  of  arts  that  contribute  to  the  acquisition  of  the 
means  of  subsistence  and  the  production  of  surpluses,  Smith  attempted  to  explain  how 
occupation  established  the  right  of  exclusive  possession  by  telling  a  story.  This  was  the 
story  of  what  he  thought  would  be  likely  to  happen  were  a  savage  to  snatch  an  apple 
away  from  another  savage  who  had  just  plucked  it  from  a  tree  to  eat.  The  first 
possessor  was  the  savage  who  picked  the  apple.  The  second  possessor  was  the  savage 
who  snatched  it  away.  The  first  possessor's  expectation  of  the  pleasure  he  would  get 
from  eating  the  apple  would  be  frustrated.  He  would  feel  angry,  resentful  and 
disappointed.  He  would  therefore  attempt  to  get  the  apple  back  into  his  possession. 
Smith  then  introduced  a  third  person  into  the  story.  He  variously  called  the  third 
person  a  "spectator"  or  "bystander"  (LJ(A),  i.  42-43,19)  or  "beholder"  (LI(A),  i.  44,20). 
observing  the  theft,  the  spectator's  feelings  would  co-incide  with  those  of  the  first 
possessor.  He  would  sYmpathise  with  the  first  possessor  because  he  could  imagine 
how  he  would  feel  if  he  were  in  the  same  position.  He  would  experience  feelings  of 
anger,  resentment  and  disappointment  that  corresponded  to  those  of  the  first 
possessor.  The  spectator  therefore  supported  the  efforts  of  the  first  possessor  to  get 
the  apple  back  into  his  possession.  Thus  the  fight  of  exclusive  possession  was 
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It  is  clear  that  Smith  intended  this  story  not  only  to  illustrate  how  the  right  was 
established  at  a  far  point  in  human  history  but  to  explain  how  the  right  would  be 
confirmed  by  universal  disinterested  human  sentiments  in  all  times  and  places. 
Considerations  of  public  utility  did  not  yet  enter  into  his  account.  Utility  could  operate 
only  once  the  right  was  established  in  custom  and  law  and  a  few  individuals  were 
sufficiently  free  from  necessity  to  reflect  on  their  passions.  It  was  the  universality  of 
the  identification  of  the  feelings  of  the  spectator  with  the  first  possessor,  and  the 
repeated  operation  of  them  in  similar  circumstances,  that  justified  Millar  describing  the 
mechanism  as  a  principle  of  "humanity"  -a  principle  that  had  the  status  of  a  universal 
law  of  human  nature.  That  Smith  intended  the  story  to  have  this  effect  is  demonstrated 
by  his  use  of  the  notion  of  the  spectator  not  only  to  refer  to  imagined  savages  as 
agents  but  to  himself  and,  by  identification  with  himself,  with  the  subjectivity  of  his 
students.  The  actual  savage  spectator  corresponded  to  the  impartial  spectator  who 
made  judgements  that  would  gain  universal  approval.  This  approval  was  shared  by  the 
both  uncivilised  and  civilised  individual  and  would  operate  in  every  possible  imagined 
circumstance:  past,  present  and  future.  Throughout  the  story  Smith  identified  the 
savage  individual  with  himself  by  using  the  first  person  "I".  This  implied  a  unity  of 
experience  between  uncivilised  and  civilised  individuals,  a  universal  ego  and  a 
transhistorical  subjectivity.  Putting  himself  sympathetically  in  the  place  of  the  savage 
first  possessor  in  the  apple  story,  Smith  wrote: 
"But  if  he  had  violently  or  theftuously  taken  from  me  what  I  had  actually  in  my 
possession,  this  would  evidently  be  an  atrocious  transgression  of  the  right  of  property 
such  as  might  justify,  in  the  eyes  of  the  beholder,  my  endeavours  to  recover  what  I  had 
been  so  wrongfully  deprived  of.  In  this  age  of  society  therefore  property  would  extend 
no  further  than  possession"  (LJ(A),  i.  44,19-20). 
Smith's  use  of  the  first  person  served  to  identify  Smith  as  a  spectator  whose 
feelings  corresponded  to  those  of  the  first  possessor.  It  also  preserved  the  hypothetical 
nature  of  the  thought  experiment,  by  expressing  what  every  individual  would  feel  in 
similar  circumstances.  It  was  therefore  testable.  Any  individual  capable  of  imagining 
themselves  into  the  roles  of  first  possessor  and  "beholder"  would  experience  the  same 
feelings,  confirm  the  justice  of  the  same  actions,  and  arrive  at  the  same  ideas  of  rights. 
This  identification  of  the  contemporary  subject  with  the  subjectivity  of  the  imagined 
savage  was  necessary  for  Smith's  theory  to  work.  Without  it  there  was  no  possibility 
of  theorising  natural  rights  within  the  framework  of  knowledge  derived  from  an 
examination  of  the  contents  of  sensory  experience. 
There  are  both  historical  and  theoretical  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  Smith's 
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scarcity  that  Hume  made  in  his  account  of  justice.  Scarcity  prompted  individuals  to 
compete  for  a  limited  means  of  subsistence.  Although  self-interest  was  a  reflective 
capacity  of  the  mind  of  the  subject  of  experience  on  the  violent,  resentful  and 
disappointed  passions  caused  by  a  scarcity  in  the  means  of  subsistence,  the 
identification  of  the  spectator  with  the  feelings  of  the  first  possessor  presupposed  that 
the  feelings  were  causally  related  to  appetites,  such  as  hunger,  necessary  for  self- 
preservation.  They  were  selfish  passions  when  directed  to  the  preservation  of  the 
individual  and  "social"  when  directed  to  the  preservation  of  his  or  her  dependants. 
Millar  reiterated  this  in  his  own  account  of  the  origins  of  property.  Millar  wrote: 
"If  we  suppose  the  Country  to  be  so  fertile  as  to  produce  abundance  of  every  thing  to 
supply  the  wants  of  all  the  inhabitants,  there  would  probably  be  no  idea  of 
appropriation.  T'here  could  in  no  case  be  any  competition  of  Interest.  Everybody  would 
enjoy  whatever  lie  wanted  without  being  sensible  of  any  right  to  do  so.  Mankind 
however  never  can  be  in  such  a  situation.  "  (LIJ  789,2,18,48) 
Mllar  agreed  with  Smith  that  the  idea  of  property  right  originated  out  of  the 
judgements  spectators  made  on  disputes  caused  by  "self  love"  and  "a  struggle  for  pre- 
eminence  in  the  enjoyment  of  those  things  which  all  cannot  possess  in  common" 
(L/1789,2,18,48).  "Humanity  must  accordingly  dispose  the  bulk  of  mankind  to 
support  the  first  possessor  in  maintaining  his  possession,  and  in  restraining  the  violence 
or  fraud  of  the  other  party,  by  whom  the  possession  is  invaded"  (LJ]789,2,18,50).  The 
principle  of  humanity  was  intended  to  explain  the  historical  origin  of  the  idea  in  a 
society  of  natural  scarcity  and  the  mind's  continued  attachment  to  it  in  a  society  of 
social  scarcity.  However,  unlike  Smith,  he  added  "considerations  of  utility"  as  an 
additional  reason  why  mankind  supported  "the  right  of  the  first  possessor".  The 
assumptions  Smith  and  Millar  made  about  the  mind  of  savages  meant  that  utility  could 
not  explain  the  historical  origin  of  the  idea.  It  did,  however,  help  justify  the  right  and 
consolidate  the  "most  distinct  and  convenient  rule"  of  exclusive  possession  in  societies 
in  which  most  individuals  were  "exerting  labour  &  industry"  for  the  purpose  of 
enjoying  the  products  of  the  labour  and  industry  of  other  individuals.  Put  differently, 
post-reflective  judgements  of  the  utility  of  an  actual  or  potential  commodity  producing 
and  exchanging  society  led  spectators  to  approve  of  the  right  of  exclusive  possession. 
The  rights  of  first  possession  were  a  necessary  condition  for  individuals  to  maintain  a 
"mutual  assistance"  for  one  another.  Without  it  co-operation  between  self-interested 
competitive  individuals  was  impossible. 
Although  he  never  stated  it,  Smith's  apple  story  assumed  that  his  savages  suffered 
from  a  scarcity  of  the  means  of  subsistence.  Socialised  within  family  units,  they  were 
isolated  as  individual  heads  of  patriarchal  households  from  each  other  in  a  competitive 178 
struggle  for  the  preservation  of  themselves  and  their  dependants.  Apart  from  the 
occasional  exceptions  like  Captain  Cooles  Tahitians,  it  was  observed  that  savages 
tended  to  live  wretched  and  miserable  lives.  The  historical  conclusion  was  that,  on  all 
the  evidence  available,  the  original  condition  of  humanity  was  probably  one  of  natural 
scarcity.  Scarcity  first  stimulated  individuals  to  labour  and  produce  the  arts  and 
sciences.  There  was  little  evidence  of  civilised  arts  and  sciences  amongst  Tahitians. 
The  competitive  struggle  between  individuals,  families  and  tribes  over  scarce  resources 
also  created  the  conditions  for  the  feelings  that  established  the  idea  of  the  right  to 
property.  The  behaviour  of  the  thief  and  the  feelings  of  resentment  of  the  first 
possessor  were  conditioned  by  a  world  in  which  both  first  possessor  and  thief  were 
actually  or  potentially  hungry  (or  had  family  dependants  who  were  actually  or 
potentially  hungry).  The  feelings  of  resentment  in  the  first  possessor  that  the  spectator 
sympathetically  identified  with,  had  their  origin  in  the  fear  of  starvation  or  death  for 
themselves  or  their  dependants.  These  were  universal  feelings.  They  were  natural 
because  individuals  experienced  scarcities  in  the  means  of  subsistence  in  commercial 
societies,  and  because  it  was  impossible  for  the  eighteenth  century  subject  to  imagine  a 
world  of  abundance  for  all.  As  Millar  stated:  "Mankind 
...  can  never  be  in  such  a 
situation.  " 
The  theoretical  conclusion  was  that,  because  the  principles  of  the  mind  operated 
universally,  uncivilised  individuals  whose  circumstances  were  determined  by  natural 
scarcities  would  necessarily  share  these  feelings  with  civilised  individuals.  Conversely 
just  as  civilised  individuals  were  atomised  and  isolated  from  one  another  in  a 
competitive  struggle  for  capital  and  the  means  of  subsistence  secured  by  waged  labour, 
so  too  were  uncivilised  individual  heads  of  households.  The  assumption  made  by 
eighteenth  century  empiricists,  such  as  Hume,  Smith  and  Millar,  was  that  social 
scarcities  of  goods  were  caused  by  natural  scarcities  and  that  the  market  was  the  only 
way  to  avoid  both.  The  feelings  of  resentment  of  the  civilised  individual  subject  were 
therefore  identical  to  those  of  the  uncivilised  subject.  For  example,  the  feeling  of 
resentment  a  labourer  might  have  when  he  was  unable  to  consume  apples  because  he 
could  not  find  a  market  for  the  exchange  of  his  labour  power  would  have  been  similar 
to  that  of  the  savage  who  had  his  apple  taken  away  from  him.  He  would  feel  angry, 
resentful  and  disappointed.  He  would  be  fearful  for  his  and  his  family's  continued 
subsistence.  According  to  Smith,  the  disappointment  of  gaining  a  reward  for  labour- 
time  expended  on  acquiring  objects  of  consumption  was  one  aspect  of  the  experience 
of  both  the  worker  and  the  savage.  This  justified  and  explained  the  notion  of  exclusive 
right  for  I  have  gone  already  and  bestowed  my  time  and  pains  in  procuring  the  fruit" 
(LJ(A),  i.  37,17).  This  disappointment  of  expectation  would  therefore  be  the  same  for 
civilised  labourers  as  for  uncivilised  savages.  However,  the  circumstances  causing  the 
resentment  of  the  worker  would  be  a  social  scarcity  of  that  portion  of  productive 179 
capital  put  aside  as  variable  capital  for  wages.  The  feelings  were  not  caused  by  a 
natural  scarcity  of  apples.  Both  the  worker  and  the  savage  had  identical  natural  fears 
of  death  or  starvation  but  the  former's  fears  were  caused  by  a  socio-economic  system, 
whereas  the  latter's  were  by  nature.  The  distinction  between  socially  and  naturally 
determined  scarcities  was  not,  of  course,  one  that  Smith  and  Millar  were  capable  of 
making. 
The  eighteenth  century  imagination  conceived  of  a  society  in  which  social 
abundance  was  limited  to  the  propertied  few.  Despite  a  growth  in  the  standard  of 
living  of  workers,  social  scarcity  was,  as  it  is  today,  the  experience  of  the  propertyless 
majority.  As  Millar  had  stated,  individuals  could  never  experience  generalised 
abundance  and  therefore  were  forced  to  compete  for  scarce  resources.  Scarcity  was  a 
natural,  universal  and  eternal  condition  for  society.  Both  Smith  and  Millar  were  aware 
that  property  laws  were  necessary  to  regulate  competition  and  prevent  the  poor  from 
appropriating  the  wealth  of  the  rich.  The  best  justification  for  these  laws  was 
utilitarian.  It  was  therefore  impossible  for  Smith  to  conceive  of  a  society  without  some 
notion  of  property  rights,  laws  to  regulate  privately  interested  disputes,  and  a  state  to 
enforce  these  laws. 
The  implausibility  of  Smith's  attempt  to  theorise  a  natural  right  to  property  on  the 
foundation  of  what  were  assumed  to  be  natural,  universal  feelings  becomes  clear  by 
using  his  method  against  him  and  imagining  what  ideas  would  be  generated  by 
individuals  in  a  society  of  a  relative  abundance  of  labour-products  and  labour-time.  If 
there  were  plenty  of  apples  available,  no-one  went  hungry  (or  out  of  business  because 
apples  did  not  find  a  market),  and  no-one  had  to  go  to  a  forest  to  get  an  apple  (or  if 
they  chose  to  do  so,  they  had  plenty  of  time  to  get  there  and  it  was  an  enjoyable 
journey),  then  if  a  person  snatched  the  apple  someone  else  had  chosen  to  consume  at 
their  pleasure  out  of  their  hands,  one  could  imagine  the  first  possessor  feeling  surprise 
and  puzzlement.  She  would  be  surprised  and  puzzled  because  she  would  fail  to 
understand  the  motive  of  the  person  who  had  snatched  the  apple  away  from  her.  It  is 
unlikely  she  would  feel  resentment  or  disappointment.  Moreover  if  she  did  have  such 
feelings  and  acted  on  them  thereby  using  violence  to  recover  the  apple  from  the 
snatcher,  then  a  spectator  would  be  more  likely  to  intervene  on  the  side  of  the  second 
possessor  than  the  first.  An  impartial  spectator  might  also  offer  the  first  possessor 
counselling  or  therapy  to  help  her  deal  with  her  resentful  feelings.  It  is  obviously  not 
possible  to  derive  a  universal  right  of  exclusive  possession  from  this  kind  of  thought- 
experiment  today.  The  twentieth  century  subject  of  experience  exercises  his  or  her 
imagination  upon  a  world  in  which  the  productive  forces  have  advanced  far  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  knowledge  of  the  labour-saving  technology  and 
the  labour-time  wasted  in  a  declining  commodity  capitalist  society  poses  the  real 
possibility  of  a  society  of  social  abundance.  The  limited  development  of  the  productive 180 
forces  meant  that  this  possibility  was  inconceivable  to  an  eighteenth  century  subject. 
The  existence  of  social  scarcities  of,  for  example,  labour  power  or  the  products  of 
labour,  were  therefore  conceived  as  natural  and  therefore  eternal.  Smith's  and  Millar's 
theorisation  of  commodity  production  and  exchange  as  an  cffect  of  the  universally 
experienced  operations  of  the  individual's  mind  were  obviously  limited  both  by  the 
scope  of  eighteenth  century  science,  and  also  by  the  immature  development  of 
eighteenth  century  productive  forces. 
8.3.3  Millar's  Hypothesis 
8.3.3.1  Prol)erty  Right 
Millar's  lectures  demonstrate  that  lie  thought  that  there  was  a  strong  causal 
relationship  between  economic  activity  and  notions  of  property.  In  a  chapter  titled  "Of 
the  diflerent  ideas  concerning  the  right  of  property  in  different  ages"  (L11789,2,20- 
23,59-72),  lie  focused  on  three  "different  species"  of  property  right:  first,  "the  right  to 
full  and  exclusive  use  of  a  subject";  second,  "that  of  recovering  the  subject  from  every 
possessor";  and  third,  "that  of  transferring  the  property  to  another  person" 
(L/1789,2,20,58-9).  Millar  therefore  analysed  the  complex  idea  of  a  natural  right  to 
property  into  three  simple  ideas  of  exclusive  possession,  recovery  and  transference.  By 
analysing  property  right  in  this  way,  lie  was  able  to  explain  how  the  simpler  ideas 
diffcred  in  diflerent  social  circumstances  and  how  far  they  conformed  to  the  more 
complex  idea. 
Millar  classified  the  social  circumstances  according  to  differing  knowledge  of  the 
arts  within  a  developing  division  of  labour.  lie  adopted  the  fourfold  classification  of 
individuals  engaged  in  difl'cring  occupations  capable  of  satisfying  subsistence  and 
surplus-accumulating  interests.  These  werc  taken  from  Smith  and  consisted  of 
associations  of  hunters  and  fishers;  of  shepherds;  of  husbandmen;  and  "the  commercial 
state".  The  latter  was  a  condition  within  which  all  the  three  preceding  occupations 
could  become  exchange  oriented.  Illustrating  his  discussion  with  copious  examples 
from  history  and  travellers'  accounts,  lie  then  reviewed  each  of  the  rights  in  turn 
according  to  each  state  of  society. 
Millar's  conjecture  was  that  hunters  would  have  an  idea  of  exclusive  right  but  no 
idea  of  recovery.  Transference  was  "little  perceived"  because  there  was  "no  arts  & 
consequently  no  exchange  of  commodities"  (LI1789,2,21,62).  A  knowledge  of  a 
natural  right  to  transfer  property  could  therefore  flourish  only  within  a  society  in  which 
all  products  of  labour  had  the  potential  to  be  exchangeable  commodities  and  most 
individuals  were  connected  through  an  exchange-oriented  social  division  of  labour. 
This  kno%viedge  would  be  absent  in  societies  in  which  individuals  had  no  knowledge  of 
production  for  exchange.  However,  shepherds  would  develop  an  understanding  of 181 
exclusive  right  because  they  would  experience  a  "considerable  improvement  in  the 
social  feelings"  (LI]789,2,21,63).  The  more  shepherds  spent  "in  Society  with  one 
another",  the  more  they  would  develop  a  sense  of  humanity  and  "a  strong  idea  of 
utility".  However,  like  hunters,  the  right  of  recovery  would  be  unknown  and  therefore 
they  would  have  "no  notion  of  property  independent  of  possession"  (LJ1789,2,21,64). 
Although  they  had  begun  to  alienate  property,  "there  is  still  no  division  of  labour 
which  can  occasion  a  regular  exchange  of  commodities".  Their  notion  of  transference 
rights  would  therefore  be  minimal. 
With  husbandnien,  the  idea  of  exclusive  right  of  immovable  land  would  be 
generated  through  an  analogy  with  the  idea  of  rights  established  over  moveable 
objects.  Appropriation  of  the  land  would  bring  into  being  the  right  of  recovery, 
because  the  long  time  spent  working  on  a  piece  of  land  would  have  the  effect  on 
individuals'  minds  of  establishing  a  greater  expectation  of  future  enjoyment  and  use. 
Thus  "men  come  to  entertain  the  idea  that  a  right  of  property  of  land  may  remain  after 
possession  is  lost"  (I-JI789,2,22,69).  The  idea  of  a  right  of  recovery  would  then  be 
"extended  to  moveables".  But  if  land  was  not  moveable,  there  would  be  "little 
advancement"  in  the  notion  of  the  right  to  transfer  or alienate.  The  "commercial  state" 
in  which  there  was  a  "new  species  of  property"  in  the  form  of  the  "frequent  exchange 
of  commodities"  not  only  improved  the  ideas  of  exclusive  right  and  recovery  but 
extended  the  notion  of  a  right  of  transference  or  alienation  from  manufactured 
commodities  to  land  (IJ1789,2,23,72).  The  "commercial  state"  therefore 
corresponded  to  a  society  in  which  individuals  had  a  well  developed  notion  of  natural 
rights. 
8.3.3.2  E  nkfils 
The  causal  relation  Millar  theorised  between  economic  activity  and  ideas  of 
property  right  is  also  evidenced  in  Millar's  discussion  of  entails.  The  latter  depended  on 
his  account  of  testamentary  succession.  Ideas  of  the  latter  would  be  unknown  in  "rude 
ages".  The  notion  of  testamentary  succession  came  into  being  through  the  practice  of 
adopting  strangers  and  fathers  preferring  their  adopted  to  their  natural  children.  It 
became  established  when  the  "gradual  improvement  of  manufactures"  caused  land  to 
be  bought  and  sold.  The  idea  that  fathers  had  the  right  to  sell  their  land  outside  their 
family  afler  their  death  would  depend  upon  the  prior  recognition  of  the  idea  of  a  right 
to  alienate  or  transfer  landed  property.  The  law  of  entails  could  not  be  understood 
without  a  comprehension  of  this  evolution  of  a  growing  tendency  to  alienate  land  on 
the  market  -  proprietors  preferring  to  sell  their  land  to  strangers  rather  than  securing  it 
for  their  progeny. 
Millar  discussed  first  the  origin  of  entails  and  then  their  effect  on  society. 
Testarnemary  succession  outwith  the  family  threatened  the  expectation  families  had  of 182 
an  inheritance.  The  feelings  of  disappointment  caused  by  frustrated  expectations 
brought  into  being  entails.  The  establishment  of  entails  coincided  with  a  growing 
tendency  to  alienate  estates.  The  effects  of  the  law  were  that  land  was  withdrawn  from 
being  a  potential  object  of  commerce.  Entails  served  as  a  disincentive  to  industry  by 
prohibiting  "any  merchant  from  acquiring  the  rank  of  a  gentleman"  (LJ]789,2,32,135). 
Entails  also  served  to  maintain  the  power  of  a  landed  aristocracy.  Millar  concluded 
with  political  arguments  against  those  who  defended  entails  as  "essential  to  the  British 
constitution".  fie  agreed  that  a  "superior  order  of  citizens"  was  needed  to  maintain 
"good  order"  but  argued  on  utilitarian  grounds  that  "good  order"  was  best  secured  by 
laws  that  admitted  "the  greatest  degree  of  equality  among  the  people".  Both  equality 
and  superiority,  and  therefore  good  order,  were  best  secured  without  the  "artificial 
regulation"  of  entails  for  "while  the  country  remains  in  a  flourishing  condition,  the 
number  of  people  acquiring  great  estates,  will  always  be  equal,  at  least  to  that  of  the 
people,  who  are  dissipating  their  fortunes"  (LJ]789,2,32,135).  Here  Millar  made  an 
indirect  reference  to  the  process  lie  described  elsewhere  as  the  "fluctuation  of 
property"  -a  consequence  of  the  extensive  marketisation  of  society.  This  played  an 
important  role  in  his  theory  of  government  and  his  discussion  whether  or  not  the 
market  led  to  greater  political  fireedo,  11.45  These  passages  demonstrate  that  Millar 
thought  that  there  was  a  causal  connection  between  economic  activity,  ideas  of 
property  and  the  distribution  of  property. 
8.3.3.3  Contract 
Finally,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  causal  correlations  that  Millar  thought  existed 
between  economic  activity  and  the  notion  of  contract.  This  is  hardly  surprising  given 
that  this  form  of  juridical  relationship  is  brought  into  being  by  the  requirements  of 
commodity  circulation.  The  nature  of  the  commodity  form  entails  that  not  every  sale  is 
a  successful  purchase.  Millar  assumed  that  contract  arose  out  of  the  experience  of 
mutually  self-interested  individuals  who  wanted  to  acquire  the  property  or  labour  of 
other  individuals  for  their  own  use.  Exchange  -  "offering  an  equivalent,  either  in  labour 
or  in  goods,  upon  what  I  wish  to  acquire"  (LB789,3,35,1-2)  -  would  therefore  have 
arisen  as  a  means  of  securing  consent  or  agreement.  Simultaneous  exchange  of  goods 
required  no  contractual  form.  Contracts  therefore  came  into  being  when  there  was  a 
time-lag  between  the  exchange  of  one  good  for  another.  This  gave  rise  to  promises  for 
"future  perforniaricc"  between  exchangers:  "The  various  circumstances  of  parties,  may 
either  render  it  convenient  that  there  should  be  a  performance  on  one  side,  &a 
promise  on  the  other,  or  that  there  should  be  no  immediate  performance  or  either  side, 
but  a  promise  on  both"  (LJ1789,3,35,2).  Millar  therefore  defined  contract  as  an 
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"obligation  arising  from  a  promise".  Given  tile  assumption  that  production  was 
originally  privatised  within  the  patriarchal  household,  Millar  found  it  inconceivable  that 
individuals  could  subsist  in  comrort  without  forms  of  exchange.  Given  that,  for  acts  of 
exchange  to  be  successful,  Millar  thought  that  individuals  required  the  reassurance  of 
promises  of  performance,  spectators  would  have  feelings  that  corresponded  with  those 
of  an  individual  disappointed  by  the  failure  to  perform.  Millar  therefore  attempted  to 
theorise  the  features  of  contractual  legislation  that  held  successful  exchanges  together 
as  the  inevitable  outcome  of  tile  operations  of  feelings  and  needs  experienced  by  every 
human  individual  in  every  conceivable  society. 
Millar  also  explained  flow  economic  advances  brought  into  being  a  greater  use  of 
contractual  law.  This  was  a  species  of  theoretical  history  drawn  from  a  variety  of 
sources,  the  more  general  aspects  of  which  are  indebted  to  Smith's  Lectures  Of 
110fiCe.  46  Millar  paid  special  attention  to  tile  invention  of  money  as  a  means  of 
exchange  and  referred  to  both  ancient  and  contemporary  sources  in  his  account.  Thus 
tile  ancients  Suidas,  Livy,  Pliny  and  Herodotus  were  mentioned  as  authorities  on  the 
Greek  and  Roman  inventions  of  metals  as  specie  (LI1789,3,35,1  1).  On  the  use  of 
other  commodities,  such  as  cattle,  hides,  shells,  salt,  beads,  fish  and  cloth,  as  money, 
Millar  cited  (along  with  Suidas)  the  contemporary  authorities  of  Bossuet's  "Modern 
Universal  History",  Banks'  African  travel  memoirs  (LI1789,3,35,9),  Busching's 
"Geography",  Anderson's  "History  of  Commerce" 
,  and  Smith's  "Wealth  of  Nations" 
(LI]789.3,35,10).  On  tile  prohibition  of  usury,  lie  referred  to  Jewish,  Islamic  and 
Roman  Catholic  Canon  Law  (LJ1789,3,35,13).  Millar  attempted  to  show  that 
contractual  relationships  arose  out  of  tile  division  of  labour  and  the  development  of 
exchanges  of  surpluses  of  "either  labour,  or  the  product  of  their  labour"  between 
individual  heads  of  families  (L]1789,3,35,16).  Barter  failed  to  generate  contracts 
because  there  was  "an  immediate  delivery  on  both  sides,  so  that  neither  party  has 
occasion  to  trust  the  promise  of  another"  (LI1789,3,35,7).  Without  the  need  for  a 
promise  of  future  performance,  there  could  be  no  contract.  Tile  only  form  of 
customary  regulation  in  non-monetary  societies  was  over  borrowing  and  lending. 
Millar  argued  that  the  arrival  of  money  as  a  means  of  exchange  co-incided  both  with 
the  emergence  of  merchants  and  with  the  need  for  contract.  Millar  defined  money  as  a 
commodity  "for  which  there  is  a  general  demand  in  Society"  (L11789,3,35,8)  but  for 
which  the  exchanging  individual  has  no  particular  demand.  Millar  thought  that  it  was 
in  the  interest  of  the  seller  to  exchange  his  commodity  for  money  in  order  that  at  a 
later  time  lie  might  exchange  the  money  for  the  commodity  he  wanted:  "Thus  if  I  have 
grain  to  dispose  of,  for  which  I  wish  to  procure  cloth,  I  may  take  in  exchange  my 
neighboues  cattle,  because  I  know  that  will  aflerwards  enable  me  to  purchase  the 
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cloth,  which  I  have  occasion  for"  (LH789,3,35,8).  The  use  of  money  created  a  time- 
lag  between  the  demands  of  commodity  owners  in  their  role  as  sellers  and  as  buyers. 
Millar  was  thinking  of  the  role  of  money  as  a  means  of  exchange  in  an  economy  based 
on  simple  commodity  production.  Thus  Millar  referred  to  trade  at  a  distance  facilitated 
by  merchants  who  acquired  money  to  buy  a  stock  of  goods  in  one  part  of  a  country  to 
sell  to  customers  for  more  money  in  another  part.  This  was  a  further  example  of  the 
time-lag  between  sale  and  purchase.  It  was  the  time-lag  in  the  realisation  of  demand 
brought  into  being  by  money  that  Millar  thought  required  contracts  of  sale.  Millar 
attempted  to  explain  other  forms  of  contract  such  as  pledge  and  sureties  covering  the 
security  of  loans  (LI1789,3,35,12);  contracts  covering  the  hire  of  labour 
(LI1789,3,35,14);  and  commissions  (LJ]789,3,35,15)  by  the  effect  that  the  use  of 
money  had  on  exchange.  He  also  made  reference  to  prohibitions  on  interest  acquired 
through  the  practice  of  usury  (LI1789,3,35,13).  According  to  Millar,  these  were 
applied  for  two  reasons:  firstly  because  of  tile  strong  disapproval  of  making  profits  out 
of  lending  money  "to  such  as  were  in  distress";  and  secondly  because  of  "the  danger  of 
extortion".  Millar  thought  such  prohibitions  had  been  removed  in  "mercantile  states" 
and  "civilised  nations"  because  the  borrowers  were  richer  than  the  lenders,  and 
because  the  "market  rate  of  interest  is  easily  known",  thus  removing  the  threat  of 
extortion. 
The  final  section  combined  the  outcomes  of  the  inquiries  of  the  first  two  by 
explaining  the  differences  in  the  law  of  contract  both  by  the  operations  of  the  workings 
of  tile  mind  and  by  the  differing  economic  circumstances  that  the  mind  had  to  work  on. 
In  societies  where  exchange  was  either  unknown  or  confined  to  barter,  Millar  argued 
both  that  there  would  be  few  opportunities  for  people  to  feel  disappointed  when 
promises  were  broken,  and  also  that  spectators  would  have  insufficient  experience  of 
breaches  to  reason  whether  or  not  promise-keeping  was  in  anyone's  private  or  public 
interests  to  enforce.  This  meant  that  the  few  contracts  known  of  in  uncivilised  societies 
would  take  the  form  of  witnessed  oaths  or  other  "forms  &  solemnities" 
(1,  JI789,3,36,16).  These  included  participation  of  tile  contracting  parties  in  religious 
rituals  or  other  symbolic  acts  witnessed  publicly.  Millar  gave  a  list  of  examples  drawn 
from  ancient  (e.  g.  licrodotus)  and  contemporary  sources  (e.  g.  Bossuct).  The  list 
included  the  parties  breaking  straws  together,  sucking  each  other's  blood,  eating 
ceremonial  meals  together,  smoking  a  pipe  of  tobacco  together,  and  eating  a  rare  plant 
out  of  each  others'  hands.  Millar  attributed  the  modern  custom  of  shaking  hands  as  a 
residual  form  of  this  kind  of  primitive  agreement  symbolising  that  a  promise  had  been 
made.  Millar  explained  aspects  of  the  Roman  law  of  contract  such  as  stipulatio  and 
conlrachis  innoinhiali  in  this  way.  However,  when  economic  activity  became  more 
common  and  tile  exchange  of  commodities  therefore  more  frequent,  Millar  stated  that 
there  were  two  consequences.  Tile  first  was  that  exchangers  found  oaths  and  symbolic 185 
rituals  "burdensome"  (I.  J]789,3,36,20).  The  second  was  that  they  were  both  more 
often  exposed  to  tile  hurtful  and  disappointed  feelings  of  having  promises  broken.  This 
rneant  they  were  also  capable  of  recognising  the  utility  of  enforcing  contracts.  Thus 
"from  the  frequent  use  of  contracts,  men  became  more  &  more  sensible  of  the  hardship 
sustained  by  individuals  from  the  breach  of  promise  &  of  the  interest  of  society  in 
rendering  promises  effectual"  (LI]789,3,36,20).  It  followed  that  contractual  legislation 
was  simplified  in  civiliscd  countries.  This  became  clearer  when  contracts  were 
specified  in  writing. 
Millaes  discussion  of  the  causal  correlation  between  economic  activity  and 
contract  entailed  that  a  society  in  which  labour  and  goods  had  become  commodities 
tended  to  guarantee  that  individuals'  contractual  rights  were  likely  to  conform  more  to 
the  conception  of  natural  right  lie  took  from  Hume  and  Smith.  There  is  a  strong 
correlation  in  all  of  Millar's  discussions  of  private  rights  between  the  derivation  of 
natural  right  from  the  feelings  and  judgements  of  an  impartial  spectator  and  the 
influence  on  the  spectatoes  feelings  and  judgements  of  a  society  of  economic  relations 
between  commodity  owners.  A  commercial  society  was  conceived  of  as  a  society  with 
civilised  laws,  refined  manners  and  humanc  sentiments.  Thus,  not  only  were  contracts 
more  secure  and  individuals'  rights  to  alienate  their  property  more  likely  to  be 
recognised,  but  a  fully  informed  spectator  would  be  more  likely  to  approve  of  tile 
extension  or  these  rights  to  every  person  who  had  the  capacity  to  acquire  property 
through  tile  alienation  of  "either  labour  or  the  product  of  their  labour".  A  spectator 
was  therefore  more  likely  to  approve  of  wage  labour  than  slavery  and  to  argue,  on 
grounds  of  both  utility  and  humanity,  that  laws  upholding  slavery  were  naturally 
unjust.  47 
8.3.4  Smith's  Second  Hypothesis 
Smith's  second  use  of  historical  stages  was  an  attempt  to  establish  the  hypothesis 
that  a  causal  correlation  existed  between  productive  activity  and  forms  of  government. 
This  was  easy  to  do  once  the  correlation  between  productive  activity  and  notions  of 
property  had  already  been  established.  If  the  sole  purpose  of  governments  was  to 
guarantee  individuals'  property  fights  then  the  form  a  government  took  would  reflect 
individuals'  knowledge  of  and  opinions  about  their  rights  -  whether  or  not  they 
deviated  from  laws  that  would  meet  the  natural  approval  of  a  fully  informed 
disinterested  spectator.  Thus,  in  his  lectures  on  public  law,  Smith's  aim  was  once  again 
to  affirm  that  the  principles  of  the  mind  operated  uniformly  relative  to  their 
circumstances.  He  thererbre  used  the  conjecture  of  the  "four  stages"  or  "ages"  to 
compare  and  contrast  different  types  or  "forms  of  government"  according  to  the  ideas 
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of  property  that  were  likely  to  have  arisen  in  the  minds  of  individuals  at  different 
periods  of  history. 
Smith  followed  Locke  by  quoting  from  his  Treatise  on  Government  that 
"Government  has  no  other  end  but  the  preservation  of  property" 
(LJ(A)Jv.  2l,  208,  n59).  Without  a  notion  of  property,  there  could  therefore  be  no  laws 
or  government.  If  the  pre-commercial  arts  were  incapable  of  generating  the  idea  of 
freely  alienable  property,  then  there  could  be  no  laws  or  goverm-nent.  Thus  there  was 
no  government  amongst  hunters  "property  not  extending  at  this  time  beyond 
possession"  (LJ(A),  iv.  19,207).  To  illustrate  this  point,  Smith  relied  on  the  discussion 
of  property  according  to  the  four  stages  in  the  section  on  private  law.  This 
demonstrated  that  the  idea  of  property  amongst  hunters  "would  extend  no  farther  than 
possession"  (LJ(A),  i.  44,20).  Government  could  come  into  being  only  after  a  few 
competitive  and  industrious  self-interested  individuals  had  acquired  a  surplus  sufficient 
to  support  dependants  who,  in  a  situation  of  natural  scarcity,  had  lost  out  and  been 
unable  to  acquire  any  means  of  subsistence  through  their  own  activity.  Laws  and 
government  therefore  came  into  being  with  the  distinction  between  rich  and  poor  - 
with  an  unequal  distribution  of  property.  48 
Smith  assumed  that  the  acquisition  of  wealth  by  a  few  individuals  tended  to  be  the 
result  of  their  own  industry  or  luck.  This  is  in  contrast  to  Rousseau,  who  thought  a 
rich  minority  acquired  wealth  as  a  result  of  their  deception  of  or  violent  appropriation 
of  the  labour  and  property  of  the  poor  majority.  Smith's  explanation  of  the  origins  of 
public  law  and  government  therefore  took  place  within  the  framework  of  the 
spectator's  approval  of  the  subject's  acquisition  of  surpluses  through  their  own  labour. 
This  is  also  adopted  by  Millar. 
8.3.5  Causal  Connections  in  Smith's  Lectures 
Smith  continued  to  use  a  hypothetical  or  conditional  form  of  reasoning  (marked  by 
his  frequent  use  of  "would")  closely  related  to  methods  he  used  in  his  discussions  of 
private  law.  This  is  evident  in  LJ(A)  but  not  in  LJ(B).  LJ(B),  like  Millar's  lectures, 
reads  more  as  a  set  of  established  conclusions  than  probable  conjectures).  In  LJ(A), 
Smith's  inferences  concerning  the  nature  of  the  forms  of  authority  and  government 
were  not  solely  derived  from  the  testimony  of  history  and  of  travellers  and 
missionaries.  Smith  used  the  latter  as  inductive  confirmation  of  the  fundamental 
48"Laws  and  government  may  be  considered  in  this  and  indeed  in  every  case  as  a  combination  of  the 
rich  to  oppress  the  poor,  and  preserve  to  themselves  the  inequality  of  the  goods  which  would 
otherwise  be  soon  destroyed  by  the  attacks  of  the  poor,  who  if  not  hindered  by  the  governmc.,  t  would 
soon  reduce  the  others  to  an  equality  with  themselves  by  open  violence.  The  government  and  laws 
hinder  the  poor  from  ever  acquiring  the  wealth  by  violence  which  they  would  otherwise  exert  on  the 
rich;  they  tell  them  they  must  either  continue  poor  or  acquire  wealth  in  the  same  manner  as  they  have 
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hypothesis  that  there  could  be  no  government  without  property.  When  individuals' 
knowledge  of  the  arts  was  restricted  to  hunting  and  gathering,  the  subject  could 
acquire  only  the  notion  of  possession.  Through  the  mechanism  of  sympathy, 
individuals  who  hunted  were  therefore  connected  in  the  imagination  of  the  eighteenth 
century  subject  with  individuals  who  had  an  undeveloped  notion  of  property  right  or 
no  notion  at  all.  The  kind  of  societies  that  Smith  imagined  hunters  and  gathers  creating 
were  societies  in  which  notions  of  testamentary  succession,  or  the  right  to  alienate  land 
as  a  commodity,  essential  to  the  full  notion  of  property  right  were  absent.  The 
explanations  Smith  gave  of  how  this  notion  came  into  being  in  his  lectures  on  private 
law  supplemented  or  gave  additional  weight  to  his  hypotheses  on  the  type  of 
government  he  supposed  tended  to  coexist  with  different  levels  of  knowledge  of  the 
arts. 
Thus  the  second  stage,  pasturage,  was  the  first  in  which  the  idea  of  property  as 
exclusive  possession  was  properly  understood,  but  without  "any  written  or  regular 
law"(LI(B),  iv.  35,213).  Individuals  had  for  the  first  time  acquired  sufficient  surpluses 
through  domesticating  animals  that  they  were  able  to  support  dependants  unable  to 
subsist  without  submitting  to  the  wishes  of  their  superiors.  The  resulting  disputes 
between  rich  and  poor  brought  into  being  both  embryonic  ideas  of  property,  such  as 
testamentary  succession,  and  the  operation  of  an  important  principle  of  the  mind: 
authority  based  on  wealth.  The  power  of  rich  individuals  to  arbitrate  in  such  disputes 
was  therefore  consolidated,  leading,  once  land  was  appropriated  through  agriculture 
and  the  extension  of  property  rights  from  moveable  to  immovable  objects,  to 
aristocratic  and  democratic  forms  of  republican  government. 
Smith  classified  forms  of  government  according  to  two  basic  types:  monarchy  and 
republics.  Republics  were  further  subdivided  into  aristocracies  in  which  sovereignty  lay 
in  the  hands  of  "the  nobles"  or  "men  of  rank";  and  democracies  in  which  sovereignty 
lay  in  the  hands  of  the  "whole  body  of  the  people"  (LJ(A)Jv.  1,200).  It  was  only  after 
he  had  made  these  distinctions  that  he  attempted  to  explain  the  origins  of  government 
according  to  the  knowledge  of  property  right  likely  to  have  arisen  in  different  stages  of 
the  acquisition  of  wealth.  Smith  gave  particular  examples  of  the  relationship  between 
the  stages  and  forms  of  government  drawn  from  historical  and  contemporary 
testimony  in  order  to  compare  and  confirm  the  hypothesis.  These  examples  of 
correlations  between  the  arts  and  forms  of  government  were  interspersed  throughout  a 
general  discussion  structured  around  the  four  stages. 
Smith  argued  that  in  the  first  two  stages  -  of  hunters  and  shepherds  -  the  form  of 
government,  (if  "government"  was  the  appropriate  term)  would  be  "in  general" 
democratic  (LJ(B),  30,408).  The  democratic  nature  of  primitive  forms  of  government 
was  an  important  element  of  the  way  in  which  he  characterised  allodial  government  - 
the  type  of  government  imposed  by  barbarians  ititer  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire. 189 
"The  whole  of  the  government"  of  hunters  "as  far  as  there  is  any,  is  democraticall" 
(LJ(A)Jv.  6,202).  Smith  compared  the  superior  influence  of  individual  hunters  with  the 
members  of  a  social  club  in  which  "the  whole  members  are  on  an  equal  footing"  but  in 
which  some  individuals'  advice  is  taken  more  seriously  than  others  because  of  their 
personal  qualities.  In  the  absence  of  an  unequal  distribution  of  wealth  based  on 
property,  and  a  dependence  of  the  poor  upon  the  rich  for  subsistence,  there  could  be 
no  operation  of  the  principle  of  authority  on  the  basis  of  wealth.  Moreover,  disputes 
that  would  generate  the  notion  of  private  property  would  be  absent. 
Smith  held  that  republics  could  not  come  into  being  until  tribes  were  congregated 
in  towns  or  cities  for  defensive  Purposes.  Interestingly,  unlike  Millar,  he  did  not 
explain  the  change  from  an  aristocratic  form  of  government  in  ancient  republics  to  a 
democratic  form  by  any  reference  to  changes  in  individuals'  knowledge  of  the  arts  on 
government.  Both  forms  arose  with  pasturage  and  agriculture.  In  contrast  to  Millar, 
Smith  correctly  observed  that  ancient  democracy  could  not  have  come  into  being 
without  slavery.  Slaves  freed  citizens  from  spending  time  on  "the  mechanick  arts" 
(LI(A),  iv.  69,226)  and  enabled  them  to  participate  in  the  election  of  their  officials. 
Moreover,  as  citizens  became  more  wealthy,  they  became  more  jealous  of  the  power 
of  the  nobility.  Thus  Smith  distinguished  between  aristocratic  republics  (including 
modern  republics  such  as  Venice,  Milan  and  Genoa)  as  republics  without  slaves,  and 
democratic  republics  as  republics  with  slaves.  Given,  however,  that  slaves  were  a  form 
of  property,  the  distinction  between  the  two  forms  of  republics  was  consistent  with  an 
account  that  explained  changes  in  forms  of  government  with  changes  in  the 
understanding  of  property  right  -  in  this  case  the  extension  of  the  notion  of  exclusive 
possession  to  slaves.  Smith  did  not  conceive  of  slavery  as  a  stage  in  the  development 
of  individuals'  knowledge  of  the  arts  and  thus  a  historical  "age".  It  co-existed  with 
every  age,  including  his  own.  Smith  thought  of  slavery  as  a  private  right  between 
individuals  within  the  family,  not  as  an  innovative  means  by  which  individuals  could 
through  their  own  activity  subsist  and  acquire  property.  Whilst  recognising  the 
advantages  and  profits  that  masters  derived  from  slaves,  Smith  described  the  condition 
of  slaves  as  one  of  absolute  dependence  on  their  masters  for  subsistence  and  a 
complete  inability  to  acquire  property.  Slaves  were  those  who  had  completely  lost  out 
in  the  competition  for  scarce  natural  resources  and  were  incapable  of  subsisting 
independently  of  their  masters'  will.  Slavery  was  as  much  a  feature  of  modem 
commercial  as  of  ancient  tribal  societies. 
Throughout  his  subsequent  discussion  of  the  collapse  of  ancient  republics,  the  rise 
of  what  he  called  a  "military  monarchy",  the  despotic  form  based  on  standing  armies, 
the  establishment  of  allodial,  and  feudal  governments  and  the  emergence  of  modern 
absolute  monarchies,  Smith  kept  the  threefold  classification  of  monarchy,  aristocratic 
republic  and  democratic  republic  at  the  forefront  of  his  students'  attention.  Smith  had 189 
stated  that  "all  the  different  forms  of  government  may  be  reduced  to  one  or  other  of 
these"  (LJ(A),  iv.  3,201).  Thus  he  classified  allodial  government  as  having  both 
democratic  and  aristocratic  elements  derived  from  the  primitive  distribution  of 
property  found  amongst  people  who  were  knowledgeable  only  of  pasturage.  Feudal 
government  on  the  other  hand  was  wholly  aristocratic.  This  was  because  landed 
property  came  to  be  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  few  nobles,  small  proprietors  being 
reduced  to  the  status  of  dependants.  The  feudal  distribution  of  property  and  its 
aristocratic  form  of  government  became,  in  Millar's  writings,  an  important  means  of 
classifying  types  of  government.  It  can  be  attributed  to  this  observation  of  Smith's.  The 
only  reason  a  monarchial  element  was  retained  in  allodial  and  feudal  governments  was 
because  the  territory  covered  by  these  governments  was  larger  than  a  city  state.  This 
made  it  difficult  for  citizens  to  assemble  regularly  to  decide  on  political  and  juridical 
matters. 
Smith's  account  of  the  emergence  of  "military"  monarchies  of  the  Roman  Empire 
(including  within  this  category  Cromwell's  regime),  and  his  account  of  the  rise  of 
modern  absolute  monarchy  out  of  feudal  aristocracies,  are  similar  in  that  changes  in 
the  form  of  government  are  explained  by  changes  in  the  knowledge  of  the  arts.  They 
both  stress  the  effect  that  economic  activity  had  on  the  revenue  and  powers  of  the 
monarch.  When  the  majority  of  citizens  of  ancient  republics  were  engaged  in 
commerce  or  manufactures,  they  were  less  inclined  or  willing  to  bear  arms  in  defence 
of  their  property.  They  therefore  agreed  to  give  over  a  part  of  their  wealth  to  the 
monarch  in  the  form  of  taxes.  This  was  used  to  employ  a  mercenary  or  standing  army. 
Mercenaries  followed  the  direction  of  whoever  paid  them  most.  Generals  could  use 
this  power  base  to  establish  themselves  as  monarchs  or  emperors.  A  commercialised 
people  corrupted  by  luxury  would  be  unable  to  resist  their  usurpation  of  power. 
Likewise,  the  increasing  engagement  of  individuals  in  economic  activity  under  a 
feudal  aristocracy  generated  luxuries  the  nobility  wanted  to  acquire.  The  aristocracy's 
power  over  their  dependants  was  diminished  as  they  raised  rents  to  try  to  increase  a 
revenue  used  for  the  consumption  of  luxuries.  In  return  for  higher  rents  they  gave  their 
tenants  greater  rights.  This  weakened  the  base  of  their  military  power  in  the  feudal 
militias.  At  the  same  time,  the  monarch's  revenue  increased  through  taxation  enabling 
her  or  him  to  acquire  more  dependants,  a  mercenary  army  and  the  support  of 
disaffected  tenants.  This  led  to  the  fall  of  the  nobility  and  "everywhere  gave  occasion 
to  the  absolute  power  of  the  king"  (LJ(A),  iv.  164,264).  The  exception,  of  course,  was 
England  where  the  accidental  circumstance  of  an  island  kingdom  meant  that  standing 
armies  were  rarely  required  for  the  defence  of  the  nation  and  therefore  could  not  be 
used  as  frequently  to  oppress  the  people.  Moreover,  in  England,  a  democratic  element 
in  the  system  of  justice  had  been  retained  from  the  days  of  the  allodial  Anglo-Saxon 
government.  Nonetheless,  Smith,  unlike  Millar,  was  prepared  to  agree  with  a 190 
prevailing  consensus,  shared  with  Hume  in  his  History  of  England,  that  the  English 
Tudor  monarchs  were  "absolute  princes"  whose  power  was  unlimited  by  law. 
Smith's  explanations  of  changes  in  forms  of  government  occurred  within  the  story 
he  told  of  the  progress  of  government  from  ancient  Greece,  through  the  rise  and  fall  of 
the  Roman  Empire,  feudal  Europe,  the  establishment  of  the  English  parliament,  the  rise 
of  absolute  monarchy  in  England,  to  the  restoration  of  the  liberty  of  the  English 
parliament  through  its  control  over  the  public  revenue,  and  the  independence  of  the 
judiciary  from  the  Crown.  Although  this  might  appear  to  have  a  narrow  Euro-  and 
Anglo-centric  focus,  in  order  to  account  for  the  many  changes  of  forms,  Smith 
introduced  non-European  and  un-English  examples  of  nations  with  similar  forms  of 
government  and  levels  of  knowledge  of  property  and  the  arts.  These  comparisons  were 
essential  inductive  confirmations  of  his  hypothesis  that  there  was  causal  relation 
between  the  arts,  ideas  and  distribution  of  property  and  changes  in  governmental  form. 
Thus  the  government  of  the  ancient  Greeks  and  Romans  was  compared  to  that  of  the 
Tartars  and  Arabs.  Smith  thought  of  the  "Tartarian"  government  as  typical  of  a  nation 
in  which  knowledge  of  the  arts  was  confined  to  hunting  and  pasturage,  notions  of 
property  confined  to  possession,  and  forms  of  government  that  were  democratic  or 
aristocratic.  He  would  therefore  also  compare  the  Germans,  Franks  and  Anglo-Saxons 
with  Tartars,  and  the  differences  in  form  of  "military  monarchy"  of  the  Roman 
Emperors  with  that  of  Turkish  or  Chinese  Emperors  who  "were  all  established  by 
Tartarian  or  Arabian  chiefs"  (LJ(A),  iv.  108,242).  The  allodial/feudal  distinction 
established  throughout  Western  Europe  after  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  was  one 
already  made  by  Montesquieu  in  his  discussion  of  the  Frankish  government.  49  Smith 
also  compared  the  rise  and  fall  of  absolute  monarchy  in  England  with  similar  processes 
in  France,  Spain,  Germany  and  Scotland.  This  was  necessary  to  show  how  peculiar  the 
English  government  was  with  its  residual  democratic  juridical  institutions  (left-overs 
from  the  "Tartarian"  influence  of  the  Anglo-Saxons).  Smith  needed  to  show  how  the 
growth  of  economic  activity  in  England  had,  unlike  in  France  or  Prussia,  failed  to 
consolidate  the  power  of  the  monarch  through  the  use  of  a  regular  standing  army  not 
only  to  destroy  the  influence  of  the  nobility  but  also  to  hold  back  the  political  and 
economic  interests  of  merchants  and  manufacturers. 
8.3.6  Causal  Connections  in  Millar's  Lectures 
in  his  lectures  on  private  law,  Millar  followed  Smith  in  using  conjectural  reasoning 
to  infer  from  the  regular  workings  of  the  minds  of  "civilised"  Europeans  that  the 
irregular  workings  of  the  minds  of  "untutored"  savages  and  barbarians  could  be 
accounted  for  by  their  productive  activity.  Unlike  Smith,  however,  Millar  introduced 
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the  four  stages  at  the  start  of  his  discussions  of  government  or  public  law.  He 
described  them  as  steps  in  the  acquisition  of  different  forms  of  property.  For  both 
thinkers,  the  accumulation  and  distribution  of  property  was  the  mediating  concept 
between  the  arts  and  government.  However,  Millar  gave  a  general  theoretical  history 
of  the  arts,  property  and  government  before  discussing  examples  of  its  application  to 
particular  governments.  This  structuring  of  the  material  emphasised  the  salience  of  the 
causal  connection  between  the  arts,  ideas  of  property,  and  forms  of  government  more 
systematically  than  Smith.  Moreover,  by  making  the  classification  of  forms  of 
government  a  conclusion  of  his  inquiry  rather  than,  like  Smith,  his  starting  point, 
Millar  adopted  a  new  threefold  classificatory  scheme:  feudal  aristocracy,  feudal 
monarchy,  and  commercial  governments  -  the  latter  containing  opposite  tendencies 
towards  both  despotism  and  democracy.  This  threefold  classification  was  to  determine 
the  later  structure  of  the  first  three  volumes  of  HiSjoriCal  VieW.  50 
8.4  Conclusion 
Craig  commenting  on  Millar's  method,  wrote: 
"The  different  conditions  in  which  mankind  have  been  discovered,  Mr.  Millar,  with 
other  authors,  divided  into  four;  the  state  of  Hunters  and  Fishers;  the  Pastoral  state; 
the  Agricultural;  and  the  Commercial.  He  was  far  from  meaning  to  assert,  that  every 
nation,  which  has  arrived  at  a  high  state  of  improvement,  must  have  passed, 
successively,  through  all  these  conditions...  But  he  adopted  the  ordinary  division  as 
the  most  convenient  for  suggesting  and  introducing  the  various  changes  recorded  on 
human  institutions  and  manners;  and,  while  the  progress  which  it  assumed  had  the 
advantage  of  leading  from  the  simple  to  the  more  complex  views  of  human  society,  he 
considered  it,  though  not  universal,  as  probably  the  most  general  course  of 
improvement  which  could  be  traced  in  history.  "  (ORxlv-xlvi) 
Millar's  focus  was  on  "the  various  changes  recorded  on  human  institutions  and 
manners".  These  institutions  were  political  and  juridical,  the  most  important  being  the 
juridical  institution  of  property.  Without  an  explanation  of  how  individuals'  notions  of 
property  had  changed  to  one  that  conformed  to  the  rules  of  natural  justice,  there  could 
be  no  explanation  of  the  distribution  of  property  and  therefore  no  explanation  of  the 
different  forms  of  positive  law  and  government.  From  the  documentary  evidence 
available  of  historical  and  existing  customs,  manners  and  laws,  coupled  with  a  theory 
of  the  workings  of  the  subject's  mind,  Millar  was  able  to  construct  conjectural 
hypotheses  of  the  most  probable  causal  connections  between  the  subject's  knowledge 
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of  law  and  government  and  his  knowledge  of  productive  and  economic  activity.  Millar 
knew  that  it  might  be  possible  for  individuals  to  come  to  a  knowledge  of  property  as 
freely  alienable  before  they  had  come  to  a  knowledge  of  agriculture.  He  thought  that 
the  Athenians'  knowledge  of  trade  and  commerce  explained  the  exception  of  a  nation 
that  had  arrived  at  a  "high  state  of  improvement"  before  Athenians  had  a  knowledge  of 
agriculture.  However,  it  was  the  empirical  study  of  the  arts,  laws,  customs  and 
manners  of  actual  societies,  not  the  postulate  of  an  ideal  state  of  nature,  that  inclined 
him  to  accept  the  probable  truth  of  the  hypothesis  that  in  most  societies,  hunting  had 
preceded  pasturage,  pasturage  agriculture  and  agriculture  commerce. 193 
Chapter  Nine: 
Individualism 
9.1  Problems  of  Interpretation 
In  chapter  one,  I  asserted  that  the  truth  or  falsity  of  Meek's  statement  that  Millar's 
account  of  social  and  historical  change  conformed  to  materialist  sociological  models 
depended  on  readers'  understanding  of  the  notion  of  a  determining  economic  factor.  If, 
as  I  argued  in  chapter  four,  the  concept  of  a  determining  factor  has  the  character  of  a 
hypostasis,  then  it  has  no  bearing  on  or  relevance  to  either  Marx's  or  Millar's  theory  of 
history.  Following  Plekhanov's  critique  of  nineteenth  century  misunderstandings  of 
Marx,  I  suggested  that  theoretical  models  using  such  hypostases  substitute  factors  for 
the  study  of  the  actual  movement  of  the  determining  elements  of  social  relations.  This 
in  turn  leads  to  a  reductionist  or  epiphenomenal  conception  of  the  role  of  individual 
and  collective  consciousness  in  historical  and  social  causation. 
The  other  prevailing  understanding  of  a  determining  economic  factor  is 
individualistic  and  forms  one  of  the  fundamental  assumptions  of  certain  orthodox 
twentieth  century  liberal  economic  doctrines.  This  is  the  notion  that  individuals'  actions 
are  determined  solely  or  predominantly  by  economic  motives.  An  economic  motive  is 
the  subjectively  experienced  desire  for  money  or  commodities  in  exchange  for  money. 
These  desires  are  self-interested  and  supposed  to  be  universal  characteristics  of  human 
nature.  The  determining  factor  of  human  social  existence  is  therefore  conceived  of  as  a 
pecuniary  form  of  private  self-interest.  Put  differently,  in  a  world  of  eternal  scarcity  the 
only  way  individuals  can  act  rationally  is  by  making  constant  monetary  calculations 
guided  by  considerations  of  subjective  utility  or  personal  advantage.  If  self-interested 
desires  implanted  by  nature  determine  individuals'  behaviour,  then  there  can  be  no 
distinction  between  economic  and  rational  activity.  In  chapter  five,  I  used  von  Mises  as 
a  twentieth  century  example  of  this  perspective.  Von  Mises  states  that  there  is  a 
conceptual  link  between  rationality  and  monetary  calculation.  It  follows  that  von  Mises 
finds  it  impossible  to  conceive  of  a  rational  society  not  based  on  generalised 
commodity  production  and  exchange  and  not  consisting  of  privately  self-interested 
individuals. 
In  reaction  to  the  latter  perspective,  certain  recent  accounts  of  Smith  have 
attempted  to  distance  his  theory  of  motivation  from  orthodox  liberal  accounts 
emphasising  the  role  of  the  economically  self-interested  individual.  I  quoted  Winch's 
corrective  in  chaptpr  four.  This  was  that  Smith's  concept  of  self-interest  was  broader 
than  the  notion  of  a  pecuniary  motive  directed  towards  economic  ends  and  embraced 
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gain.  Moreover,  in  the  previous  chapter  I  made  reference  to  the  moral  content  of 
Millar's  method  and  how  Hopfl  had  interpreted  the  Scots  as  giving  individualistic 
explanations  of  social  change  based  on  motives,  interests  and  passions  without 
postulating  the  notion  of  the  individual  as  an  isolated,  rational  calculator  of  his  own 
advantage. 
Whether  or  not  the  Scots  are  conunitted  to  this  notion  is  a  now  a  matter  of 
controversy.  For  example,  David  Miller,  arguing  against  the  applicability  of 
Macpherson's  model  of  "possessive  individualism"  to  Hume,  has  stated  something 
similar  to  Hopfl  and  Winch.  Miller  writes  of  Hume  that  his  attitude  to  the  desire  for 
wealth  and  commodities  "expressed  not  so  much  an  individualistic  conception  of  man 
as  consumer  of  utilities  as  a  view  of  man  as  a  social  creature  seeking  wealth  to  fulfil  his 
obligations  to  those  around  him  and  to  maintain  or  better  his  place  in  the  social 
hierarchy.  "'  This  can  be  contrasted  with  the  work  of  Albert  Hirschman  and  Stephen 
Holmes.  2  Holmes  develops  Hirschman's  thesis  that  calculating  self-interest  conceived 
of  as  a  "mild  passion  for  money  making"  was  morally  endorsed  by  Hume,  Smith  and 
Millar.  3  He  states  that  the  calculating  pursuit  of  private  advantage  became  "the 
cornerstone  of  bourgeois  or  liberal  ideology"  in  the  eighteenth  century.  4 
Holmes  gives  a  two-fold  explanation  of  the  confusion  surrounding  the  Scots' 
individualistic  theory  of  motivation.  The  first  is  that  there  was  a  latent  tendency  in 
Smith's  and  Millar's  thought  to  suggest  that  all  individual  actions  are  motivated  by 
self-interest.  The  second  is  that,  in  the  hands  of  later  liberal  economists,  this 
universal  isation  of  self-interest  became  what  Holmes  calls  "motivational  reductionism". 
He  defines  the  latter  as  "imperialistic  attempts  to  explain  all  behaviour  by  invoking  the 
rational  pursuit  of  personal  advantage"  [his  emphasis].  5  Liberal  economists' 
interpretations  of  Smith  have  therefore  been  one  sided  and  distorted.  I  therefore 
understand  Hopffs,  Miller's  and  Winch's  implied  rejection  of  the  postulate  that  Millar's 
individualism  entails  the  notion  of  the  subject  as  motivated  by  economic  self-interest  as 
an  equally  one-sided  reaction  to  these  interpretations.  This  reaction  affirms  a  truth 
about  the  moral  sense  school  of  Hutcheson,  Hume,  Smith  and  Millar.  This  is  that  they 
affirmed  the  subject's  experience  of  disinterested  passions  such  as  benevolence  and 
generosity,  against  the  self-interested  theories  of  morality  of  Mandeville  and  Hobbes. 
In  other  words  their  moral  theories  of  individual  motivation  rejected  the  "motivational 
IMillcr  D.  (1980)  "Hume  and  Possessive  Individualism",  History  ofPolitical  Thought,  1 
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reductionism"  of  Mandeville's  postulate  that  all  motives  are  selfish  or  interested, 
including  those  that  are  directed  to  the  welfare  of  others  and  would  normally  be  called 
"disinterested  ".  6 
Hirschman  and  Holmes  are  therefore  correct  to  point  out  that  the  contrast  in  the 
Scots'  understanding  of  individual  motivation  was  between  interested  and  disinterested 
passions  and  that  the  former  involved  reflective  calculation  whereas  the  latter  did  not. 
I  would  also  suggest  that  the  focus  on  the  dichotomy  between  the  ethical  doctrines  of 
egoism  and  altruism  is  an  unhelpful  way  of  understanding  Hume,  Smith  and  Millar's 
individualism.  For  example,  it  does  not  follow  from  the  fact  that  an  examination  of  the 
experience  of  the  individual  subject  demonstrated  that  individuals  were  spontaneously 
motivated  by  disinterested  passions  of  generosity  and  kindness  towards  their  family 
and  friends,  that  their  understanding  of  justice  was  uninformed  by  a  calculative 
reflection  on  their  interested  passions  of  vanity  and  avarice.  Nor  did  it  follow  from  the 
subject's  experience  of  a  sympathetic  identification  with  the  disinterested  feelings  of 
resentment  or  disappointment  of  an  injured  possessor,  that  he  did  not  also  approve  of 
the  enforcement  of  the  rules  of  property  and  contract  on  the  grounds  that  every 
subject  expected  to  enjoy  the  commodities  they  produced  and  exchanged.  The  latter 
were,  after  all,  the  only  means  by  which  the  imagined  ends  of  self-interested  passions 
such  as  vanity,  honour,  social  esteem,  love  of  ease  and  domination  could  be  realised  by 
a  triumphant  bourgeoisie  and  their  allies  in  the  working  class,  the  peasantry  and  the 
landed  gentry. 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  therefore  to  demonstrate  that  the  origins  of  Millar's 
account  of  human  nature  is  soundly  grounded  within  the  abstraction  of  the  individual 
subject  of  experience.  Through  a  review  of  apparently  opposing  positions  in  the 
contemporary  literature,  I  shall  attempt  to  show  that  Millar's  conception  of  the 
individual  is  both  self-interested  and  pre-disposed  to  association  with  others. 
Moreover,  Millar's  use  of  this  abstraction  had  a  foundation  within  the  actual  social 
experience  of  real  eighteenth  century  individuals,  and,  unlike  later  liberal  or  positivist 
theories  of  the  individual  (which  become  increasingly  apologetic  and  intellectually 
impoverished),  also  had  the  capacity  of  giving  original,  if  ideologically  limited, 
explanations  of  the  origins  of  a  modern  civil  society.  This  society  is  characterised  by 
generalised  commodity  production  and  the  division  of  labour;  an  expansion  of  the 
totality  of  productive  forces  (including  science,  technology  and  the  organisation  of 
social  labour);  social  inequality  and  hierarchy;  and  the  subordination  of  the  institutions 
of  law  and  government  to  the  process  of  the  accumulation  of  capital.  Millar's 
theorisation  of  the  latter  feature  of  a  modern  commodity-capitalist  society  will  be 
developed  in  subsequent  chapters. 
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9.2  Individualism  and  Sympathy 
In  a  seminal  early  twentieth  century  discussion  of  Hume's  and  Smith's 
individualism,  Glenn  Morrow  argued  that  their  moral  and  social  theories  were  radical 
exceptions  to  the  prevailing  individualism  of  most  eighteenth  century  thinkers.  The 
individualism  that  prevailed  assumed  that  the  moral  and  social  order  was  "nothing  but 
a  more  or  less  complex  derivative  of  the  elements  already  found  in  the  individual.  "7 
Morrow  argued  that  the  principle  of  sympathy  was  inconsistent  with  Hume's  sceptical 
method  as  applied  to  causality  and  the  unity  of  the  self.  Hume's  use  of  sympathy  was 
so  radically  inconsistent  with  his  sceptical  method  that  it  led  him  to  conceive  of  society 
as  a  "moral  and  spiritual  unity".  This  unity  was  organic.  Hume  thought  that  every 
social  organism  had  "an  individuality  of  its  own".  " 
Much  work  has  been  done  since  then  on  Hume's  scepticism.  For  example,  Galen 
Strawson  has  argued  that  the  function  of  the  sceptical  method  was  to  demonstrate  the 
limits  of  human  understanding.  Hume  wanted  to  show  that  people  were  more  ignorant 
about  the  nature  of  causal  powers  and  the  unity  of  the  self  than  most  philosophers 
assumed  they  were.  9  The  wider  point  of  Hume's  scepticism  was  to  show  that  the 
passions  governed  the  life  of  the  subject,  not  reason.  Reason  played  a  subordinate  role 
to  the  operation  of  the  passions  on  the  mind,  and  it  was  a  mistake  for  philosophers  to 
make  bold  claims  for  the  powers  of  reason. 
I  have  argued  in  chapters  three  and  eight  that  Millar's  scepticism  regarding  the 
influence  of  physical  causes  on  customs  and  manners  closely  followed  Hume's. 
Moreover,  regarding  moral  causes  and  human  motivation,  Millar  also  followed  Hume. 
As  I  shall  illustrate  in  the  following  chapter,  Millar  rejected  the  notion  that  it  was 
reason  that  ensured  the  reproduction  of  the  species  or  the  social  order.  It  was  the 
perception  of  the  operation  of  passions  rather  than  abstract  philosophical  principles 
that  kept  human  life  going.  However,  in  contrast  to  Morrow,  I  would  contend  that 
Millar  did  not  think  of  political  society  as  an  organism  but  rather  as  a  machine  worked 
by  combinations  of  mutually  self  interested  individuals  brought  together  through  a 
sympathetic  communication  of  ideas,  impressions,  feelings  and  opinions.  As  I  shall 
discuss  below,  Millar  used  the  metaphors  of  organic  growth  rarely,  and,  when 
referring  to  society  as  a  whole  preferred  the  metaphor  of  the  machine.  Thus  he  warned 
politicians  against  interfering  with  the  "commercial  machine"  (HV,  4,110)  and  advised 
legislators  to  adopt  a  scientific  approach  to  the  study  of  law  in  the  following  terms: 
7N4orro%v  G.  R.  (1923)  "The  Significance  of  the  Doctrine  of  Sympathy  in  Hume  and  Smitlit,  The 
PIdlosophical  Review,  vol.  XXXII,  1:  60-78.  (60). 
8Morrow,  "Sympathy",  68. 
9Strawson  G.  (1989)  The  secret  connexion,  Oxford:  p213. 197 
"As  it  is  dangerous  to  tamper  with  the  machine,  unless  we  are  previously  acquainted 
with  the  several  wheels  and  springs  of  which  it  is  composed;  so  there  is  reason  to  fear, 
that  the  violent  alteration  of  any  single  part  may  destroy  the  regularity  of  its 
movements,  and  produce  the  utmost  disorder  and  confusion.  "  (Preface  to  Ist  edn  of 
OR,  v-vi) 
The  mechanism  that  enabled  the  individual  subject  to  gain  knowledge  of  others' 
passions,  interests,  ideas  and  opinions  and  compare  them  with  his  own  was  sympathy. 
As  T.  D.  Campbell  has  argued,  sympathy  was  not  a  passion.  For  Hume  and  Hutcheson, 
it  was  a  process  by  which  the  "feelings  of  one  person  are  transferred  to  another".  10 
Hume  and  Hutcheson  described  this  process  as  contagious  -a  medical  analogy.  As 
evidenced  below,  Millar  also  used  the  language  of  a  "contagion  of  sympathetic 
feelings"  to  explain  how  the  poor  were  inclined  to  submit  to  the  rich.  For  Smith, 
however,  sympathy  was  "the  agreement,  coincidence  or  harmony  of  sentiments".  " 
Sympathetic  feeling,  according  to  Campbell,  is  "any  feeling  which  arises  from  any 
imagined  change  of  situation  with  another  person".  12 
Millar's  conjectural  method  is  individualistic  not  only  because  his  starting  point  is 
the  contents  of  the  minds  of  individual  subjects  of  experience  -  their  interested  and 
disinterested  passions  -  but  because  the  consciousness  of  the  coincidence  of  these 
passions  with  those  of  other  subjects  entailed  an  imaginative  change  of  situation,  such 
as  imagining  oneself  to  be  rich  or  poor.  This  imaginative  change  of  situation,  however, 
took  place  within  the  mind  of  the  subject.  It  was  a  mental  operation  internal  to  the 
mind  of  the  subject  that  enabled  individuals  to  become  aware  that  they  had  a  mutual  or 
common  interest  with  others. 
Sympathy  was  neither  a  passion  nor  a  rational  calculative  principle.  It  was 
something  like  an  instinct,  something  like  Newtonian  gravity.  However,  it  enabled  the 
subject  to  have  an  understanding  of  the  rational  calculations  of  others.  It  would  be  self 
evident  to  every  individual  engaged  in  the  production  and  exchange  of  commodities 
that  sellers  were  also  buyers,  and  just  as  the  seller  had  an  interest  in  acquiring  money 
through  exchange,  so  a  buyer  also  had  an  interest  in  the  utility  of  the  commodity  for 
consumption.  The  acquisition  of  money  entailed  that  the  seller  had  a  long-term  interest 
in  using  that  money  to  acquire  utilities  in  the  future,  and  the  buyer  a  short  term  interest 
in  acquiring  the  commodity  as  it  passed  hands  for  money  in  the  present. 
The  mutual  interest  of  commodity  owners  in  successful  purchases  and  sales,  and 
the  actual  change  of  position  between  seller and  purchaser,  is  brought  about  by  a 
IOCampbell  T.  D.  (1971)  Adam  Sinith's  Science  ofMorals,  London:  p95. 
II  Campbell,  Science  OfMorals,  p94. 
12Canipbell,  (198  1)  "Adarn  Smith:  The  Social  System"  in  Seven  Theories  of  Society,  Oxford:  pp92- 
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reciprocal  relationship  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  form  of  the  commodity  itself 
Any  particular  commodity  must  express  its  value  in  the  universal  equivalent  of  money 
and  the  latter  has  the  power  to  command  the  use  value  of  every  other  particular 
commodity.  Every  seller  is  therefore  a  potential  purchaser. 
However,  within  Hume  and  Smith's  empiricist  theory  of  the  operations  of  the 
mind,  the  reciprocal  relationship  of  seller  and  buyer  was  determined  not  by  the  form  of 
the  commodity  but  by  an  internal  mental  act  of  imagining  a  change  of  position  of 
individuals.  This  imagined  change  of  position  was  supposed  to  enable  the  subject  to 
gain  knowledge  of  the  passionate  content  of  the  minds  of  another  interested  individual. 
The  mental  capacity  of  the  individual  subject  to  change  position  with  another  subject 
took  the  form  of  a  hypothetical  experiment.  This  internal  operation  of  the  rnind 
enabled  the  subject  to  judge,  by  comparison,  whether  the  passions  experienced  in  the 
new  position  were  the  same  as  or  different  from  original  feelings.  According  to  the 
theory,  this  brought  into  being  the  consciousness  of  a  mutual  interest  and  therefore  the 
exchange  of  commodities. 
The  operation  of  sympathy  as  a  principle  of  the  mind  that  enabled  individuals  to 
change  positions  with  one  another  did  not  therefore  contradict  the  basic  assumptions 
that  an  empiricist  theory  had  about  the  individual  as  a  subject  of  experience.  This 
experience  continued  to  be  internal  to  the  minds  of  particular  individuals.  As  such  it 
had  the  potential  to  open  the  door  to  sceptical  arguments  about  whether  it  was 
possible  to  have  knowledge  of  other  minds.  These  arguments  would  lead  inexorably  to 
solipsism,  a  form  of  absolute  isolation. 
Morrow  only  hinted  at  this  problem.  Why  did  Hume  not  direct  his  sceptical 
method  at  the  principle  of  sympathy  itself?  This  would  require  a  dissertation  in  itself.  I 
can  only  speculate  that  Hume  did  not  question  what  appeared  to  be  the  self-evident 
operation  of  sympathy  for  philosophical  and  non-philosophical  reasons. 
A  philosophical  reason  might  have  been  that  sympathy  was  not  a  rational  principle. 
Thus,  although  in  the  Treatise  Hume  tried  to  explain  sympathy  according  to  his 
doctrine  of  the  association  of  ideas,  offering  readers  sets  of  experiments  for  them  to 
try  out  on  themselves,  the  tests  they  were  asked  to  complete  were  arduous  and 
complicated.  Readers  had  to  think  of  an  idea  of  themselves,  an  idea  of  another  person 
related  to  them,  an  idea  of  the  other  person's  passion,  the  idea  of  another's  passion 
being  converted  into  an  impression,  and  the  impression  of  the  other  person's  passion 
being  converted  into  a  passion  of  the  reader's  own  (THNII.  xi.  317-321).  The 
spontaneous  nature  of  sympathy  was  lost  in  this  exposition.  In  the  Enquiry,  Hume 
dropped  any  attempt  to  explain  the  mechanism.  Sympathy  was  something  so  self- 
evident  to  the  subject  that  the  "sympathetic  movement  of  pleasure  and  uneasiness"  was 
communicated  between  individuals  "as  it  were  magic"  (EPMV.  ii.  180,221).  Although 
it  was  not  a  passion,  "sympathy"  or  "sympathetic"  was  used  by  Hume,  as  Millar  used 199 
it,  to  suggest  the  concept  of  passions  such  as  benevolence  and  generosity.  It  became 
indistinguishable  from  a  principle  of  humanity  (EPMIX.  i.  221,272). 
A  non-Philosophical  reason  might  have  been  that,  at  the  time  Hume  was  writing, 
there  was  no  obvious  conflict  of  interest  between  and  within  classes  concerning  the 
civilising  influence  of  economic  activity.  The  break-up  of  the  consensus  that  the 
progress  of  commercial  society  was  beneficial  to  the  whole  of  humanity  began  only  at 
the  end  of  the  century  under  the  impact  of  the  industrial  and  French  Revolutions.  13 
Nonetheless,  it  is  not  obvious  that  the  salience  of  the  operation  of  sympathy  on  the 
mind  of  the  individual  subject  made  Hume's,  Smith's  and  Millar's  social  theory 
necessarily  non-individualistic  and  holistic.  Sympathy  was  one  of  the  self-evident 
elements  of  the  individual  subject's  experience  of  the  workings  of  his  mind.  Moreover, 
the  assumption  that  the  individual  possessed  a  natural  propensity  to  be  sociable  and 
that  commerce  facilitated  this  propensity  by  connecting  isolated  patriarchal 
households,  had  been  taken  for  granted  within  natural  jurisprudential  thought  since 
Pufendorf.  14  In  this  sense,  the  Scots'  individualism  was  neither  exceptional  nor  radical. 
It  was  sufficient  for  Smith  to  remind  readers  of  Rousseau  that  experience  confirmed 
the  truth  of  the  proposition  that  individuals  were  instinctively  predisposed  to  seek  the 
company  of  others.  15 
If  Holmes  is  correct,  nineteenth  and  twentieth  century  liberal  economists  followed 
a  tendency  found  in  Smith's  The  Wealth  of  Nations  to  reduce  the  operation  of  the 
passions  to  self-interest.  This  reduction  came  to  dominate  later  perceptions  of 
individualism.  As  I  have  shown  in  chapter  five,  von  Mises  crudely  reduced  society  to 
an  instrumental  means  to  the  end  of  the  satisfaction  of  individuals'  subjective  desires 
and  wants.  This  perception  of  the  household  and  other  social  groups  as  a  means  of 
satisfying  individuals'  interested  passions  was  present  in  Millar's  thinking  but  it  was 
restricted  to  the  post  hoc  reflection  of  the  subject's  judgements  of  the  utility  of  such 
associations.  Judgements  of  utility  presupposed  associations  of  individuals  such  as  the 
family,  tribes  and  nations  that  were  formed  historically  out  of  a  combination  of 
universally  experienced  sociable  predispositions  in  circumstances  of  scarcity  and  a 
competition  of  interest.  Individuals  associated  because  they  could  not  help  doing  so 
and  because  they  shared  mutually  recognised  interests.  The  later  reduction  might 
DAccording  to  Bentham,  the  principle  of  sympathy  was  used  by  the  contemporary  political  clite  to 
justify  arbitrary  punishment.  He  attacked  it  as  despotic,  subjective  and  unscientific.  Bentham  J.  (1789) 
"Introduction  to  the  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation  (chapters  IN)".  In  Warnock  M.  (ed.  )  (1968) 
Utilitarianism.  John  Stuart  Mill,  London  &  Glasgow:  pp45-55. 
14See  Hont's  "Sociability  and  Commerce",  Pagden  (cd.  )  (1987).  Hont  argues  that  Smith  adopted  the 
same  model  of  sociability  as  Pufendorf  and  that  this  model  was  based  on  individualistic  preniises. 
15SCC  Smith's  letter  to  the  Edinburgh  Review  of  1755-56.  Smith  argued  that  Rousseau's  perception  of 
the  savage  was  the  mirror  image  of  Mandeville's.  He  wrote  that  both  "suppose  that  there  is  in  man  no 
powerful  instinct  which  necessarily  determines  him  to  seek  society  for  its  own  sake.  "  In  Essays  on 
Philosophical  Subjects,  Wightman  (ed.  )  Indianapolis,  1982:  11,  p250. 200 
explain  why  in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries,  it  was  Christians,  socialists  and 
sociologists  who  upheld  the  notion  that  there  was  an  inherent  human  predisposition  to 
co-operation,  altruism  and  sociality.  In  the  1920s,  Morrow's  rediscovery  of  Hume's 
and  Smith's  principle  of  sympathy  might  have  appeared  to  contradict  received  opinions 
of  the  nature  of  the  relationship  of  self-interest  to  individualism  and  given  comfort  to 
sociological  holists.  A  thorough  investigation  of  Morrow's  thesis  would  be  required  to 
confirm  these  speculations.  Such  an  investigation,  however,  goes  beyond  the  scope  of 
this  dissertation. 
9.3  The  Origins  of  Political  Society 
It  follows  from  the  application  of  a  conjectural  method  to  the  operations  of  the 
mind  in  a  situation  of  scarcity  that  the  same  self-interested  passions  that  impelled  the 
individual  into  economic  activity,  also  brought  natural  sympathies  into  play  with 
strangers.  Without  a  calculating  interested  reflection  upon  the  passions  of  fame, 
distinction  or  vanity  that  motivated  individuals  to  produce  and  exchange  commodities, 
they  would  be  confined  to  a  relatively  asocial  state.  The  disinterested  operation  of  their 
social  passions,  instincts  and  appetites  would  operate  within  small  circles  of  family, 
close  friends  and  acquaintances. 
In  the  period  before  improvements  such  as  the  division  of  labour  and  craft 
commodity  production,  Millar  argued  that  the  only  motive  that  individuals  had  for 
associating  in  any  groups  larger  than  families  was  their  interest  in  protecting  their 
persons  and  possessions  from  the  invasion  of  others.  This  was  based  on  his 
observations  and  conjectures  concerning  "rude"  societies,  such  as  the  Rghland  Gaels 
and  Native  Americans. 
In  contrast  to  Hopfl's  assertion  that  Millar  simply  presented  the  rude  condition  as 
a  historicised  version  of  the  hypothetical  state  of  nature,  the  empiricist  theory  of  the 
workings  of  the  mind  adopted  by  Millar,  entailed  that  the  subject's  disinterested 
passions  had  always  operated  amongst  individuals  associated  within  the  patriarchal 
household.  This  was  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  historians  and  the  observations  of 
travellers  and  missionaries.  Millar  explained  observations  of  matriarchal  societies, 
recorded  by  Herodotus  and  French  Jesuit  missionaries  such  as  Gobien,  Tachard  and 
Charlevoix,  according  to  the  standards  of  propriety  influencing  the  subject's  experience 
of  lone  parents  in  the  eighteenth  century.  Thus  he  conjectured  that  the  reason  women 
had  a  greater  authority  over  their  children  in  certain  tribal  societies  was  because  their 
male  sexual  partners  lived  a  long  way  from  their  children.  Men  had  not  yet  discovered 
the  advantages  of  the  institution  of  marriage,  and  Millar  reasoned  conjecturally  týat: 201 
"the  same  ideas  which  obtain  in  a  polished  nation,  with  regard  to  bastards,  will,  in 
those  primitive  times,  be  extended  to  all,  or  the  greater  part  of  the  children  produced  in 
the  country.  "  (OR,  48) 
The  subject's  experience  of  scarcity  of  the  means  of  subsistence,  and  of  a 
competition  between  capitals  and  amongst  labourers,  had  deleterious  effects  on  family 
life  and  friendships  in  a  commercial  society.  Millar  therefore  inferred  that  in  the 
absence  of  ideas  of  private  property  and  contract  the  subject's  experience  of  the 
operations  of  his  mind  would  have  two  important  consequences.  The  first  was  that 
friendships  between  men  within  families  and  tribes  would  be  deeper  and  stronger. 
Benevolent  disinterested  passions  would  dominate  their  personal  relations.  The  second 
was  that  relations  between  alien  families  and  tribes  would  be  hostile  and  antagonistic. 
Malevolent  disinterested  passions  would  dominate  relations  between  these  families  and 
tribes. 
Thus,  on  the  one  hand,  he  wrote  of  the  common  interest  that  families  and  tribes 
had  of  uniting  for  military  purposes  to  defend  their  persons  and  possessions  and  on  the 
other  hand  of  how  individuals  "are  often  strongly  united  in  the  bonds  of  friendship  and 
affection,  by  mutual  exertions  of  benevolence,  or  accidental  habits  of  sympathy" 
(HV,  4,248).  This  could  be  contrasted  favourably  with  the  subject's  experience  of  the 
violent  passions  evoked  through  the  competition  of  interests  generated  through 
commodity  production  and  exchange.  Amongst  friends,  this  had  the  effect  of 
emphasising  the  "famous  prudential  maxim,  of  constantly  behaving  to  him  as  if  he  were 
one  day  to  become  your  enemy"  (HV,  4,260). 
On  the  other  hand,  Millar  taught  his  students  that  tribes  and  villages  were  formed 
only  because  families  are  "in  a  state  of  dissidence  being  at  war  with  every  other  family" 
(LG,  1771,12).  These  "little  societies  maintained  a  constant  rivalship  with  each  other, 
and  were  frequently  engaged  in  actual  hostilities"  (OR,  68).  This  meant  that,  although 
they  developed  the  habit  of  living  together  in  order  to  defend  themselves,  when  the 
need  for  defence  ceased,  vicious  passions  unrestrained  by  considerations  of  self 
interest  caused  them  to  fall  apart  in  internal  dissension  and  strife.  This  was  an  anti- 
social  form  of  sociality  in  which  "In  every  community,  the  great  object  is  defence"  and 
in  which  a  military  leader  arose  with  power  only  "in  the  day  of  Battle"  and  who 
"afterwards  returns  to  the  condition  of  a  private  man"  (LG,  1771,14).  Households  were 
isolated  by  the  free  play  of  the  vicious  and  violent  passions  and  appetites  of  their 
patriarchal  leaders.  Millar  thought  these  passions  would  operate  normally  on  the  mind 
of  the  subject  in  ýý  state  of  scarcity.  Until  the  impoverished  savage  learnt  that  it  was  in 
his  long-term  interests  to  submit  to  the  governance  of  his  propertied  superiors,  he  was 
"a  stranger  to  all  those  considerations  of  utility,  by  which,  in  a  polished  nation,  men  are 
t, 202 
commonly  induced  to  restrain  their  appetites,  and  to  abstain  from  violating  the 
possessions  of  each  other"  (OR,  141). 
The  subject's  mind  was  yet  to  be  habituated  to  the  calming  influence  of  calculating 
self  interest  accompanying  commodity  production  and  exchange.  He  could  not 
therefore  appreciate  how  the  restraint  of  his  passions  might  be  to  his  advantage.  Rude 
people  "were  too  little  acquainted  with  the  dictates  of  prudence  and  sober  reflection, 
to  be  capable  of  restraining  the  irregular  sallies  of  passion"  (HV,  1,53). 
The  social  passions  of  humanity  and  benevolence  communicated  through  the 
mechanism  of  sympathy  manifested  themselves  either  through  shared  military 
endeavours,  or  through  the  subject's  experience  of  a  shared  single  occupation,  such  as 
hunting  or  the  pasturage  of  animals.  This  meant  that  even  the  interested  passion  of 
avarice  had  little  operation  on  the  mind.  Millar  thought  that  the  civilised  subject, 
engaged  in  a  competitive  struggle  for  wealth  and  status,  was  driven  to  industry.  The 
subject  in  a  condition  of  scarcity  would  therefore  be  lazy  as  well  as  vicious.  Thus  he 
wrote  of  rude  people  that: 
"their  military  life,  which  was  incompatible  with  industry,  prevented  the  growth  of 
avarice,  the  usual  attendant  of  constant  labour  and  application  in  every  lucrative 
profession.  71"heir  employments  were  such  as  united  them  by  a  common  tie,  instead  of 
suggesting  the  idea  of  separate  interest,  or  engaging  them  in  that  struggle  for  riches,  by 
which  the  pursuits  of  every  man  are,  in  some  measure,  opposed  to  those  of  his 
neighbour.  "  (HV,  1,55) 
Moreover,  although  benevolent  disinterested  passions  might  unite  men  in  a 
common  employment  and  a  common  struggle  to  defend  their  persons  and  possessions, 
Millar  conjectured  that,  in  a  state  of  scarcity,  they  would  have  little  opportunity  or 
time  to  indulge  their  feelings  with  women: 
"Natives  who  have  so  little  regard  to  property  as  to  live  in  the  continual  exercise  of 
theft  and  rapine;  who  are  so  destitute  of  humanity,  as,  in  cold  blood,  to  put  their 
captives  to  death  with  the  most  excruciating  tortures;  who  have  the  shocking  barbarity 
to  feed  upon  their  fellow-creatures,  a  practice  rarely  to  be  found  among  the  fiercest 
and  most  rapacious  of  the  brute  animals;  such  natives,  it  is  evident,  would  entirely 
depart  from  their  ordinary  habits  and  principles  of  action,  were  they  to  display  much 
tenderness  or  benevolence,  in  consequence  of  that  blind  appetite  which  unites  the 
sexes.  "  (OR,  45) 203 
I  do  not  want  to  comment  on  the  accuracy  of  Millar's  opinion  that  cannibalism  was 
prevalent  amongst  early  humans.  16  Nonetheless,  whether  or  not  his  conjectures  had 
any  basis  in  fact,  they  rested  on  the  testimony  of  established  authorities.  This  may  or 
may  not  have  been  contaminated  by  political  or  religious  prejudice.  Testimony  alleged 
that  cannibalism  occurred  amongst  people  living  in  a  condition  of  absolute  scarcity. 
Millar's  conjectures  also  rested  upon  the  inferred  effects  that  scarcity  would  have  upon 
the  operations  of  the  mind  of  the  subject  of  experience.  17 
The  self-interested  goals  of  "avarice"  and  the  "pursuit  of  riches",  the  "sober 
reflection"  on  a  "separate  interest"  constituting  "considerations  of  utility"  and  the 
"dictates  of  prudence"  that  "restrains  men's  appetites"  and  their  "irregular  sallies  of 
passion"  were  all  necessary  for  individuals  to  be  socialised  beyond  the  confines  of  the 
family.  Only  when  they  had  learrit  to  be  avaricious,  sober  and  prudent  could  they 
extend  their  natural  sociable  feelings  of  humanity  towards  others  not  limited  by  the 
"common  tie"  of  a  single  form  of  subsistence  employment  or  the  requirement  for 
perpetual  defence  of  person  and  possessions.  Millar  thought  that  it  was  the  individual 
subject's  economic  activity  as  producer  and  exchanger  of  commodities  that  promoted 
such  sociality  and  a  perception  of  the  public  interest.  Extended  sociability  was  derived 
from  the  sympathetic  reflection  on  reciprocal  interests  of  those  individuals  who  had 
learnt  to  produce  for  exchange.  Thus: 
"in  that  simple  age,  in  which  labour  is  not  yet  divided  among  separate  artificers  and 
which  the  exchange  of  commodities  is  in  a  great  measure  unknown,  individuals,  who 
reside  at  a  distance  from  one  another,  have  no  occasion  to  maintain  an  intimate 
correspondence,  and  are  not  apt  to  entertain  the  idea  of  establishing  a  political 
connection.  The  inhabitants  of  a  large  country  are  then  usually  parcelled  out  into 
separate  families  or  tribes,  the  numbers  of  which  have  been  led,  by  necessity,  to 
contract  habits  of  living  together,  and  been  reduced  under  the  authority  of  that  leader 
who  is  capable  of  protecting  them.  These  little  communities  are  naturally  independent, 
as  well  as  jealous  of  one  another,  and  though,  from  the  dread  of  a  common  enemy, 
they  are  sometimes  obliged  to  combine  in  a  league  for  mutual  defence,  yet  such 
combinations  are  generally  too  casual  and  fluctuating  to  be  the  foundation  of  a 
comprehensive  and  permanent  union.  "  (HV,  1,95) 
16The  postulate  that  gencralised  cannibalism  was  practised  during  a  historical  stage  of  human 
evolution  called  savagery  is  made  by  Reed  E.,  (1975)  Women's  Evolution:  from  matriarchal  clan  to 
patriarchalfandly,  New  York:  pp23-42. 
17Testimony  that  people  suffering  poverty  and  extreme  political  oppression  lived  "little  better  than 
cannibals"  can  be  found  in  Sir  John  Davies  (1612)  A  Discovery  of  the  True  Causes  Why  Ireland  Was 
Never  Entirely  Subdued  Nor  Brought  under  Obedience  of  the  Crown  of  England,  London,  1747. 
Reprinted  from  1612  edn  for  A.  Millar:  p168.  Recent  incidences  of  cannibalism  have  been  alleged 
during  famiries  such  as  that  caused  by  Stalin's  forced  collectivisation  of  the  Ukraine  in  the  1930s.  See 
Ammendc  E.  (1936)  Human  Life  in  Russia,  London:  p66 204 
Economic  activity  and  the  corresponding  appreciation  of  the  advantages  of  rules  of 
justice  were  therefore  necessary  conditions  for  a  political  union  of  isolated  families  to 
come  into  being.  Political  society  with  forms  of  government  regulated  by  laws  had  the 
authority  to  check  the  short-term  interested  passions  of  sovereign  powers.  Political 
society  arose  out  of  the  labour  of  "separate  artificers"  and  the  knowledge  of  "the 
exchange  of  commodities".  This  established  a  social  connection  between  "separate 
families  and  tribes"  which  were  previously  isolated  from  each  other  through  the  effect 
of  wars  caused  by  the  unrestrained  violent  passions.  Thus  Millar  wrote  in  his  lectures 
on  government: 
"I.  Commerce,  Manufactures  and  the  Arts,  have  a  tendency  to  introduce  regular 
government.  1.  The  different  tribes  of  the  rude  nation  are  associated  merely  for  the 
sake  of  defence  against  a  common  enemy.  Such  associations  are  extremely  limited  and 
easily  interrupted.  When  the  fear  of  a  common  enemy  is  removed,  the  members  of  the 
same  nation  are  apt  to  quarrel  with  one  another.  This  more  remarkably  the  case  when 
a  nation  is  extensive,  and  composed  of  tribes  spread  over  a  wide  country.  Such  was  the 
state  of  feudal  nations.  2.  But  when  trade  and  manufactures  have  made  some  progress 
in  a  country,  the  inhabitants  are  led  to  maintain  a  more  intimate  correspondence.  Tle 
ground  of  their  political  union  is  extended  to  Peace  as  well  as  to  War.  They  have 
occasion  to  carry  on  a  multiplicity  of  transactions  by  which  their  common  good  is 
promoted.  If  one  man  has  an  interest  to  buy,  another  has  an  interest  to  sell,  and  every 
artificer  or  merchant  finds  the  benefit  of  dealing  with  others,  and  of  living  upon  good 
terms  with  his  neighbours.  Thus  the  same  circumstances  which  render  mankind 
Selfish,  and  which  excite  envy  and  jealousy  among  individuals,  strengthen  the  bonds  of 
Political  Society.  "  (LG,  1792,10  1) 
Thus  until  men  were  economically  active,  a  circumstance  that  promoted  both 
selfish  passions  such  as  avarice  and  unsocial  passions  such  as  envy  and  jealousy,  there 
could  be  no  "intimate  correspondence"  between  individuals.  There  could  be  no 
recognition  of  a  "common  good"  beyond  that  of  "defence  against  the  common  enemy". 
Put  differently,  unless  individuals  were  engaged  in  economic  activity  through  their 
mutual  interests  as  sellers  and  buyers,  there  was  little  opportunity  for  the  sympathetic 
agreement  of  sentiments  to  occur  in  the  minds  of  individuals  from  alien  families,  tribes 
or  nations. 
opposed  to  the  association  of  individuals  within  the  family  caused  by  the  sexual 
appetite,  and  opposed  to  the  association  of  families  in  a  tribe  or  village  caused  by  the 
need  for  defence,  was  Millar's  conception  of  political  society.  This  was  an  association 
of  individuals  connected  by  production,  exchange  and  mutual  self  interest  within  which 205 
the  poor  submitted  to  the  rich,  the  natural  rights  to  alienate  property  were  protected 
and  individuals  recognised  that  submission  to  government  and  law  was  both  in  their 
own  private  interests  and  in  the  interests  of  others.  The  clearest  Millar  put  the 
economic  causes  of  this  conception  of  world  society  is  in  the  following: 
"Of  old  nations  had  but  little  intercourse  with  one  another.  Their  only  union  was 
sometimes  when  they  formed  temporary  elites  for  defence.  The  introduction  of 
commerce  however  occasions  a  constant  and  permanent  intercourse  of  nations.  In  a 
rude  state  every  man  works  for  himself  in  everything  that  he  wants  so  that  all  are  upon 
a  similar  footing,  but  when  arts  come  to  be  introduced  each  by  applying  to  a  separate 
branch  comes  to  have  superfluities  in  that  branch  which  he  must  exchange  again  for 
the  superfluities  of  others  which  he  again  stands  in  need  of.  Thus  an  intercourse  is 
established.  This  first  connects  families,  then  tribes,  and  being  carried  a  little  further 
connects  nations  also.  "  (LG]771,264) 
9.4  Passions,  Interests  and  Juridical  Relations 
Hume,  Smith  and  Millar  all  conceived  of  the  individual  subject's  motive  for 
producing  and  exchanging  commodities  as  self-interest.  This  is  clearest  in  their 
accounts  of  contract  -  the  juridical  form  required  by  the  exchange  of  commodities. 
Hume,  warning  moralists  and  politicians  to  abstain  from  any  attempts  to  interfere  in 
"the  usual  course  of  our  actions",  wrote  of  the  exchange  of  "services  and  actions" 
determined  by  the  inalterable  passions  of  human  nature  that  went  to  make  up  self- 
interest  (THN,  520-521).  As  I  showed  in  chapter  six,  Millar  remarked  that  when  the 
commodity-owning  subject  offered  an  "equivalent,  either  in  labour  or  in  goods,  "  it  was 
conducive  to  the  mutual  interest  of  the  exchanging  parties  (LJ,  1789,3,35,1-2).  The  use 
of  the  first  and  second  person  pronouns  "I"  and  "you"  marked  the  presence  of  the  self- 
interested  subject.  This  method  of  presentation  is  strikingly  similar  to  Smith's  well 
known  explanation  of  the  origins  of  the  division  of  labour.  Smith's  "Give  me  that 
which  I  want,  and  you  shall  have  this  which  you  want"  (WNI.  ii.  2,26)  is  comparable 
with  Hume's  "Your  corn  is  ripe  today;  mine  will  be  so  tomorrow.  'Tis  profitable  for  us 
both,  that  I  should  labour  with  you  today,  and  that  you  should  aid  me  tomorrow" 
(THN,  520).  Both  clearly  identified  the  presence  of  the  self-interested  subject  of 
experience.  As  I  showed  in  chapters  six  and  eight,  Millar,  too,  followed  this  method 
when  explaining  the  origins  of  money:  "Thus  if  I  have  grain  to  dispose  of,  for  which  I 
wish  to  procure  cloth,  I  may  take  in  exchange  my  nelighbour's  cattle,  because  I  know 
that  will  afterwards  enable  me  to  purchase  the  cloth"  (LJ  1789,3,8). 
Millar  thought  that  self-interest  not  only  brought  into  being  commodity  production 
and  the  division  of  labour  but  also  the  forms  of  law  that  regulated  economic  activity. 
The  improvement  of  commerce  and  manufactures  had  a  "tendency  to  improve  the 206 
virtue  of  justice  in  all  its  branches"  (HV,  4,245).  Millar  correctly  observed  a  causal 
relationship  between  the  generalisation  of  commodity  production  and  exchange,  and 
changes  in  juridical  relations. 
Millar  thought  that  it  was  the  operation  of  the  interested  passions  on  the  subject's 
mind  that  compelled  the  individual  to  be  just  whilst  he  was  bettering  himself  through 
economic  activity.  Generosity  was  a  positive  virtue  motivated  by  a  disinterested 
passion.  The  subject  as  spectator  could  not  help  but  express  the  warmest  approval  for 
and  heap  praise  upon  acts  of  spontaneous  kindness  or  benevolence.  However, 
generosity  without  justice  was  "of  less  consequence  to  the  prosperity  and  good  order 
of  society,  than  the  latter,  though  without  any  considerable  share  of  the  former" 
(HV,  4,255). 
Compared  to  generosity,  justice  was  a  negative  virtue.  It  was  negative  because,  in 
order  to  gain  the  approval  of  a  spectator,  it  required  the  subject  not  to  engage  in 
certain  activities.  These  were  to  refrain  from  acting  on  passions  that  led  to  the  distress 
or  suffering  of  others.  "Justice  requires  no  more  than  that  I  should  abstain  from  hurting 
my  neighbour,  in  his  person,  his  property,  or  his  reputation"  (HV,  4,267).  The  rules  of 
justice  that  became  laws  were  derived  from  the  subject's  experience  of  disputes 
between  individuals  (HV,  4,277).  As  I  have  argued  in  chapter  eight,  Millar  thought  it 
was  the  subject's  experience  of  scarcity  that  led  to  disputes  over  utilities  acquired 
through  the  individual's  labour,  and,  as  I  have  mentioned  above,  labour  was  motivated 
by  interested  passions  such  as  avarice  or  vanity.  Justice  therefore  "proceeds  chiefly 
from  considerations  of  interest"  (HV,  4,260).  Individuals  either  decided  to  comply  with 
or  unconsciously  conformed  to  rules  of  justice.  Conformity  to  the  general  rules  of 
justice  were  "the  effect  of  artificial  discipline"  and  Millar  described  how  children  were 
educated  into  this  conformity  from  an  early  age  (HV,  4,237-238).  Respect  for  justice 
tended  "to  restrain  and  controul  the  feelings  of  avarice"  (HV,  4,261),  which  in  "opulent 
and  luxurious  nations"  had  become  "the  ruling  principle".  Millar  was  clear  that  the 
subject's  reflection  on  his  economic  or  "pecuniary"  interest  (HV,  4,245)  was  sufficient 
in  most  cases  to  determine  respect  for  the  virtue  of  justice.  The  subject  would 
recognise  money  or  capital  as  a  means  to  the  end  of  gratifying  his  vanity  and  avarice. 
Both  private  and  public  interests  were  served  by  the  rule  of  law. 
The  contrast  Millar  made  here  was  between  the  restraint  a  sense  of  justice 
exercised  internally  over  the  unsocial  effects  of  immediate  passions  such  as  avarice, 
vanity,  ambition  and  fame,  and  restraint  experienced  externally  as  an  enforced  norms. 
Justice  and  the  rule  of  law  were,  for  Millar,  derived  more  from  the  individual  subject's 
own  calculation  of  long  term  interest  than  his  reflection  on  their  general  benefits.  The 
public  utility  of  rules  of  justice  were  more  likely  to  be  considered  by  the  philosophical 
few  than  the  vulgar  many.  The  attention  of  the  many  was  restricted  by  the  dulling 
effects  of  a  division  of  labour.  Their  minds  were  engrossed  by  money-making  or  the 207 
consumption  of  commodities.  The  subject  recognised  the  virtue  of  justice  in  himself 
and  others  when  his  long-term  calculations  of  profit  and  advantage  put  a  brake  on 
short-term  interests  prompted  by  his  passions.  Thus  "Justice  is  the  result  of  a 
deliberate  purpose  to  reject  an  incidental  advantage  for  obtaining  an  ultimate,  and 
much  greater  profit"  (HV,  4,245-6). 
As  Albert  Hirschman  has  pointed  out,  in  order  for  capitalist  social  relations  to 
supersede  pre-capitalist  relations,  there  had  to  be  a  corresponding  change  in 
subjectivity  that  would  assist  the  transition  from  the  one  to  the  other.  Hirschman  notes 
that  in  the  ancient  and  medieval  worlds  "money-making  pursuits"  were  "condemned  or 
despised  as  greed,  love  of  lucre,  and  avarice".  18  By  the  eighteenth  century  this  had  all 
changed.  Money-making  had  become  "an  honoured  occupation".  19  The  subject's 
reflection  on  his  interest  checked  the  free  operation  of  his  selfish  passions. 
Hirschman  contends  that  during  the  transitional  period  from  feudalism  to 
capitalism  the  internal  and  external  order  of  society  was  thought  to  be  threatened  by 
"the  unfettered  pursuit  of  private  gain".  20  Responses  to  this  fear  were  to  pose  that  the 
interests  of  men  restrained  their  passions.  The  interests  were  not  conceived  in  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  as  a  limited  concern  with  economic  advantage,  but 
"comprised  the  totality  of  human  aspirations"  and  "denoted  an  element  of  reflection 
and  calculation  with  respect  to  the  manner  in  which  the  aspirations  were  to  be 
pursued".  21 
Machiavelli  was  the  first  to  state  clearly  the  thesis  that  the  subject's  interested 
pursuits  had  the  potential  to  restrain  his  vicious  passions.  A  "disciplined  understanding 
of  what  it  takes  to  advance  one's  power,  influence  and  wealth"  was  necessary  to 
reassure  those  in  charge  of  political  society.  22  This  discipline  was  recommended  to  the 
sovereign  at  first,  but  was  quickly  extended  to  groups  amongst  the  ruled  in  the 
seventeenth  century.  It  was  not  exclusively  applied  to  a  concern  with  wealth  but  also 
to  honour,  glory,  conscience,  and  health.  According  to  Hirschman,  what  happened 
gradually  was  the  emergence  of  the  notion  that: 
flone  set  of  passions,  hitherto  known  variously  as  greed,  avarice  or  love  of  lucre, 
could  be  usefidly  employed  to  oppose  and  bridle  such  other  passions  as  ambition, 
lustforpower,  or  sexual  lust"  [his  emphasis].  23 
"Hirschman,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p9. 
19Hirscliman,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p129. 
2OHirscliman,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p69. 
2  lHirschman,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p32. 
22Hirschmin,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p3  8. 
23Hirschman,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p4  1. 208 
The  concept  of  interest  therefore  became  "narrowed  to  material  advantage".  24  In 
the  eighteenth  century,  money-making  came  to  be  considered  as  an  innocent  and 
calming  passion  that  had  the  capacity  to  restrain  wild  or  violent  passions.  Hutcheson, 
for  example,  thought  of  the  desire  for  wealth  as  a  calm  passion  because,  according  to 
I-Erschman,  it  "acts  with  calculation  and  rationality,  and  is  therefore  exactly  equivalent 
to  what  in  the  seventeenth  century  was  understood  by  interest.  1125 
Essential  to  this  account,  is  the  notion  that  interests  are  conceived  as  involving 
calculation.  This  activity  is  associated  with  mathematical  or  arithmetical  exercises.  The 
image  that  comes  to  mind  is  the  keeping  of  books  necessary  for  any  successful 
business  venture.  One  can  imagine  the  statesman  in  charge  of  the  sovereign's  revenue 
having  his  attention  taken  away  from  violent  feelings  he  has  towards  his  rivals  for 
power  and  glory  when  he  spends  time  thinking  about  the  proportions  of  the  revenue  to 
be  allocated  to  this  or  that  aspect  of  policy.  Similarly,  one  can  imagine  the  merchant 
having  his  attention  taken  away  from  the  violent  feelings  he  has  towards  his 
competitors,  when  he  reviews  and  adjusts  the  proportions  of  commodities  he  has  sold 
and  the  money  he  has  acquired  through  the  trading  week.  Both  sets  of  violent  feelings 
could  be  soothed  through  the  arithmetical  or  mathematical  calculations  necessary  for 
achieving  the  subject's  goal  of  honour,  or  glory,  or  the  esteem  he  imagined  followed 
from  the  acquisition  of  wealth.  Yet  the  passions  that  prompted  the  statesman  and 
merchant  to  calculate  were  the  same  as  those  that  prompted  him  to  feel  violent  to  his 
rivals  or  competitors:  avarice,  the  desire  of  power,  vanity,  etc. 
Hirschman  alleges  that  Smith  took  a  "reductionist  step"  when  he  made  the  drive 
for  economic  advantage  "a  mere  vehicle  for  the  desire  for  consideration".  The  reason 
for  this  reduction  was  that,  in  The  Wealth  ofNations,  Smith  was  more  concerned  with 
observations  concerning  the  forces  that  motivated  "the  great  mob  of  mankind"  or  the 
populous  majority  of  the  ruled  than  those  that  motivated  a  limited  minority  of  rulers. 
The  labour  that  the  multitude  of  people  engaged  in,  so  I-Erschman  suggests,  was 
motivated  both  by  the  accumulation  of  property  for  its  own  sake  and  as  a  means  to  the 
end  of  social  recognition.  It  follows,  according  to  Hirschman,  that  Smith  thought  that 
"ambition,  the  lust  for  power,  and  the  desire  for  respect  can  all  be  satisfied  by 
economic  improvement".  Smith  therefore  undercut  the  previous  conceptual  opposition 
between  the  passions  and  the  interests.  Thus  Smith  is  quoted  as  using  the  concepts  of 
passion  and  interest  as  synonyms  when  a  century  and  a  half  previously  they  had  been 
antonyms.  Smith's  work  in  The  Wealth  of  Nations  therefore  marked  the  end  of  "the 
speculations  about  the  effects  of  interest-motivated  on  passionate  bebsviour".  26 
24Hirscliman,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p48. 
25Hirscliman,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p65. 
26Hirscliman,  Passions  and  the  Interests,  p  112. 209 
The  example  that  would  confirm  the  notion  that  Millar  considered  "interest"  and 
"passion"  to  be  synonymous  is  when  he  writes  of  "those  opposite  and  jarring  passions 
which  arise  amid  the  active  pursuits  of  a  commercial  life"  (HV,  4,248)  and  the 
"opposition  of  interest"  that  caused  "dissensions  among  persons  of  the  same  trade  or 
professions"  (HV,  4,249).  At  first  sight,  it  is  difficult  to  see  any  difference  of  meaning 
between  the  two  terms.  Both  occur  in  a  section  that  discussed  market-generated 
competition.  I  would  argue,  however,  that  Millar  used  the  terms  precisely  because  they 
were  not  synonymous.  For  example,  Millar  can  be  read  as  suggesting  that  each 
individual  had  competing  interests  in  "the  pursuit  of  riches"  and  that  these  competing 
interests  caused  him  to  feel  "envy,  resentment,  and  other  malignant  passions"  (ibid).  In 
this  case  the  meanings  of  "interest"  and  "passion"  are  clearly  distinct.  It  was  competing 
calculating  interests  typical  of  a  commodity  capitalist  society  that  caused  the  subject  to 
experience  violent  passions  of  envy  and  resentment  towards  his  economic  rivals. 
The  contrast  is,  however,  different  from  the  one  Hirschman  has  identified.  In  this 
case,  the  competition  of  interests  did  not  restrain  or  calm  passions;  rather  it  promoted 
and  inflamed  them.  Nonetheless,  Hirschman's  major  thesis  is  not  contradicted  by  this 
example.  The  reason  is  that  envy  and  resentment  are  disinterested  passions  that, 
according  to  empiricist  theories  of  the  workings  of  the  mind,  could  cause  hann  not 
only  to  others  but,  if  acted  upon  without  calculative  reflection,  to  the  self.  27  It  would 
be  possible  to  imagine  that  the  sub  ect  was  acting  in  a  self-interested  manner  that  j 
restrained  actions  motivated  by  interested  passions  such  as  avarice  and  vanity,  at  the 
same  time  as  experiencing  a  competition  between  capitals  or  workers  that  generated 
vicious  disinterested  passions.  In  this  case,  the  subject  as  spectator  would  recommend 
the  cultivation  of  habits  of  restraint  or  self-command  over  the  vicious  passions.  The 
subject's  command  over  feelings  of  envy  and  resentment  would  be  the  proper  means  of 
gaining  approval  of  others,  and,  if  the  latter  were  unforthcoming,  the  subject  would 
still  gain  the  abstract  approval  of  his  conscience.  According  to  Craig,  Millar 
recognised  that  in  certain  situations,  the  subject's  restraint  of  malignant  passions 
caused  by  competitive  interests  required  "the  utmost  effort  of  self-command" 
(OR,  xxx). 
However,  the  context  of  Millar's  use  of  the  notion  of  opposing  interests  and 
opposing  passions  is  crucial.  The  conclusion  Millar  drew  from  his  observations  of  the 
opposing  passions  caused  by  an  opposition  of  interests  was  the  following:  if 
individuals  followed  the  rules  of  justice  then  they  would  most  likely  "enjoy,  all  that 
securitv,  ease,  and  tranquility,  all  that  comfort  and  satisfaction  which  can  reasonable  be 
desired"  WA254).  Millar's  vivid  description  of  the  atomýisation  of  social  life  within  a 
271-lolmes  gives  a  long  list  of  disinterested  passions  that.  if  acted  on,  would  gain  the  disapproval  of  a 
spectator  ("Self-Interest":  pp57-58). 210 
commodity  capitalist  society,  covering  many  of  the  deleterious  effects  that  atomisation 
has  on  the  personality  of  the  subject,  including  his  alienation  from  his  own  humanity, 
was  a  necessary  prelude  to  Millar's  major  thesis.  This  was  that,  if  the  subject  prioritised 
his  long-term  interests  over  short-term  advantages  in  his  personal  as  well  as  his 
economic  life,  he  would  be  happy.  In  other  words,  it  was  in  his  interests  to  submit  to  a 
state  that  enforces  contracts  and  assisted  him  in  his  pursuit  of  long  term  gain.  28 
Submission  to  the  state  was  the  only  way  that  the  subject  could  be  sure  that  actions 
harmful  to  his  property  and  reputation  caused  by  the  malignant  passions  of  his 
competitors  could  be  punished. 
Millar's  reference  to  the  "opposite  passions"  of  the  "love  of  money"  and  the  "love 
of  pleasure",  when  discussing  the  differences  between  "the  avarice  of  a  frugal  and  that 
of  a  luxurious  age"  (HV,  4,252),  is  further  confirmation  of  Hirschman's  thesis  that 
Millar  continued  to  distinguish  between  two  variants  of  the  passion  of  avarice  -  one 
that  included  the  calculation  of  long-term  advantage  and  the  other  that  motivated 
short-term  gain.  The  first  was  a  "covetous"  form  of  avarice  characteristic  of  the  miser 
who  was  "afraid  to  lend  out  his  money  at  interest".  The  second  was  a  "profuse"  form 
of  avarice  characteristic  of  the  "modern  usurer"  who  "hoards  that  he  may  spend  to  the 
best  advantage"  (HV,  4,252).  Millar  called  this  the  "avarice  of  sensual  gratification". 
The  modem  usurer  was  just  as  "rapacious"  and  "absorbed  in  the  pursuit  of  gain"  as  the 
ancient  miser,  but  the  former  made  long-term  calculations  on  the  expectation  of  the 
pleasure  he  would  get  from  spending  his  money.  He  therefore  kept  his  money  in 
circulation  never  "hugging  his  treasure  in  secret,  or  by  hiding  it  in  the  ground".  The 
latter,  however,  made  calculations  on  the  basis  of  the  fear  he  had  of  losing  his  money 
in  circulation.  He  therefore  kept  his  money  out  of  circulation  "concealing  it  in  the 
earth"  as  a  hoard. 
Nonetheless,  there  is  also  strong  evidence  in  Millar's  work  of  the  process  of  what 
Holmes  calls  motivational  reductionism.  When  Nfillar  reasoned  conjecturally  about  the 
subject's  experience  in  pre-commercial  society,  he  was  happy  to  use  "interests"  as  a 
synonym  for  the  interested  passions.  I  shall  give  this  some  attention  in  the  next 
chapter.  For  the  moment  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  Nfillar  used  the  language  of 
interests  to  describe  the  competition  between  individuals  for  scarce  resources  in  the 
rude  condition  of  society,  and  to  note  that  "in  a  rude  age,  where  there  is  little  industry, 
or  desire  of  accumulation,  neighbouring  societies  are  apt  to  rob  and  plunder  each 
other"  (HV,  4.248).  They  therefore  had  a  "common  interest"  in  uniting  for  protection 
281gnatieff  is  therefore  incorrect  to  interpret  this  passage  as  evidence  of  Millar's  pessimism  about  the 
advantages  of  commercial  society  ("Millar":  Hont  &  Ignaticff,  eds,  1983:  p340).  IgnatieTs  mistake  is 
to  interpret  Essay  VI  of  HV  as  a  peculiar  response  to  the  language  of  corruption  in  civic  humanism.  A 
different  interpretation  would  examine  it  as  an  illustration  of  the  attempt  to  give  a  scientific  account  of 
contemporary  perceptions  of  morality  according  to  empiricist  principles. 211 
and  defence.  It  was  a  recognition  of  this  interest  that  assisted  the  operations  of 
disinterested  passions  such  as  friendship,  benevolence  and  sympathy  between  tribes,  or 
nations  (ibid). 
For  Nfillar,  therefore,  an  understanding  of  economic  self  interest  was  all  that  was 
needed  to  persuade  the  subject  to  respect  the  law.  The  sub  ect  experienced  a  need  to  j 
sacrifice  short-term  interests  for  long-term  ones.  As  I  shall  argue  further  in  the  next 
chapter,  his  perception  of  long  term  interest  required  that  he  acquiesce  or  submit  to 
government  and  law. 
9.5  Betterment  and  Submission 
Hume  thought  that  "inalterable  passions"  determined  the  subject's  activity  in  all 
societies  and  all  times.  In  the  Enquiry  he  wrote: 
"Ambition,  avarice,  self-love,  vanity,  friendship,  generosity,  public  spirit:  these 
passions,  mixed  in  various  degrees,  and  distributed  through  society,  have  been,  from 
the  beginning  of  the  world,  and  still  are,  the  source  of  all  the  actions  and  enterprises, 
which  have  ever  been  observed  among  mankind"  (EHUI.  VIII.  65,83). 
The  first  four  of  these  passions,  ambition,  avarice,  self-love  and  vanity,  were 
interested.  The  last  three,  friendship,  generosity  and  public  spirit,  were  disinterested. 
Hume  had  also  written  that  the  subject  needed  only  to  consult  his  own  "common 
experience"  to  know  that  his  generosity  was  limited  to  the  members  of  his  family, 
friends  and  acquaintances.  Generosity  was  insufficient  to  bring  into  being  larger  forms 
of  association  that  included  strangers  and  enemies  (THN,  487).  Hume's  observation  of 
a  "universal  passion"  for  "fame  and  distinction"  was  also  testable  within  the  experience 
of  the  individual  subject.  It  was  experienced  in  competition  with  others  and  was,  along 
with  other  interested  passions,  a  cause  of  economic  activity.  Indirectly  this  interested 
passion  caused  social  connections  between  strangers  to  arise  and,  through  the 
generalisation  of  commodity  production  and  exchange,  a  world-wide  association  of 
self-interested  individuals.  The  passion  for  fame  and  distinction  was  thought  to  be  a 
natural,  universal  aspect  of  the  workings  of  the  human  mind  in  a  situation  of  scarcity. 
The  experience  of  a  scarcity  of  the  time  available  for  the  attentive  praise  and 
admiration  of  self  and  others  determined  the  strength  of  the  passion's  influence.  For 
example,  the  scarcity  of  time  available  to  the  savage  to  realise  his  needs  for  and 
interests  in  the  attention  of  the  opposite  sex  played  this  role  in  Millar's  explanation  of 
the  subordination  of  women  in  The  Origitz  of  Ranks.  29  Within  the  society  that 
29"He  has  no  time  for  cultivating  a  correspondence  with  the  other  sex,  nor  for  attending  to  those 
enjoyments  which  result  from  it"  (OR,  15).  "Having  little  attention  paid  them,  ..  they  [women]  are 212 
confronted  the  eighteenth  century  subject  of  experience,  this  scarce  time  was  unequally 
distributed  between  rich  and  poor.  The  rich  possessed  a  relative  abundance  of  it,  the 
poor  almost  an  absolute  scarcity.  Smith  was  to  give  examples  of  this  from  his 
observation  of  life  within  an  emerging  capitalist  society  to  confirm  the  truth  of  the 
assumption. 
In  his  Yheory  ofMoral  Sentimej& 
) 
30  Smith  made  a  significant  contribution  to  the 
development  of  the  human  sciences.  He  recognised  that  humans  have  needs  for 
attention  and  praise  which  could  not  be  realised  fully  within  a  class-divided  society. 
Thus  he  observed  that  these  needs  were  denied  to  the  majority  of  the  poor.  "The  poor 
man  goes  out  and  comes  in  unheeded,  and  when  in  the  midst  of  a  crowd  is  in  the  same 
obscurity  as  if  shut  up  in  his  hovel"  (MISI.  iii.  2.1,51).  The  rich,  however,  were 
successful  in  satisfying  their  need  for  attention  and  approval:  "the  man  of  rank  and 
distinction,  on  the  contrary,  is  observed  by  all  the  world".  He  was  the  "object  of  the 
observation  and  fellow-feeling  of  everybody  around  him". 
Smith's  explanation  of  the  individual's  motive  for  engaging  in  economic  activity 
depended  on  the  assumption  that  the  time  available  to  satisfy  the  above  human  needs 
was  naturally  limited  to  the  propertied  few.  This  was  a  reflection  of  the  effects  that  an 
emerging  capitalist  society  had  on  the  minds  of  the  labouring  poor.  The  typical  poor 
labourer  of  Smith's  day  worked  in  a  manufactory  subordinated  to  a  technical  division 
of  labour  that  demanded  little  of  his  skills  or  knowledge.  The  repetitive  work  he  had  to 
do  damaged  his  intellectual  faculties.  He  was  therefore  unlikely  to  get  any  good 
attention  for  his  distresses  and  hurts  from  other  poor  people  for  they,  too,  shared 
similarly  oppressive  circumstances. 
On  the  other  hand,  Smith  observed  that  the  labourer  was  relatively  well  off.  He 
made  enough  in  his  wages  to  afford  "food  and  clothing,  the  comfort  of  a  house,  and  of 
a  family"  (TAEJ.  iii.  2.1,50).  This  observation  was  contingent  upon  the  general  rise  in 
the  standard  of  living  of  the  workers  of  Smith's  times.  This  observation  applies  mostly 
to  the  skilled  workers  of  an  advancing  capitalism.  It  is  not  typical  of  the  position  of  the 
majority  of  the  world's  workers  in  the  declining  capitalism  of  the  twentieth  century, 
and  was  probably  out  of  date  within  fifty  years  of  Smith's  observations.  The  deskilling 
process  of  the  industrial  revolution  was  only  beginning  to  be  noticed  and  worried 
about.  However,  whilst  the  demand  for  labour  power  outstripped  its  supply,  the 
emergence  of  an  industrial  reserve  army  of  labour  and  a  mass  population  surplus  to 
capital's  requirements  would  not  have  been  an  object  of  Smith's  experience,  concern  or 
degraded  below  the  other  sex,  and  reduced  under  that  authority  which  the  strong  acquire  over  the 
weak"  (OR,  34). 
. 
30110f  the  origin  of  Ambition,  and  of  the  distinction  of  Ranks"  (TMSI.  iii.  2,50-61).  Also  "Of  the  beauty 
which  the  appearance  of  utility  bestows  upon  all  the  productions  of  art,  and  of  the  extensive  influence 
of  this  species  of  Beauty"  (TMSIV.  i.  179-187).  These  sections  influenced  Millar's  account  of  respect 
and  esteem  for  the  rich  as  a  source  of  their  authority. 213 
thinking.  31  Given  that  the  eighteenth  century  worker's  wages  were  sufficient  to  buy 
commodities  and  pay  rent  that  relieved  him  and  his  family  from  the  fear  of  starvation, 
malnutrition,  hypothermia  and  homelessness,  Smith  thought  that  the  only  motive  he 
had  to  rise  from  the  position  of  labourer  to  artisan  and  thence  to  capitalist  was  the 
interest  he  had  in  gaining  good  attention  from  others. 
Respectful  attention  was  something  he  observed  that  the  poor,  incapable  of  giving 
to  each  other,  gave  to  the  rich  in  abundance.  Smith  stated  that  "too  be  observed,  to  be 
attended  to,  to  be  taken  notice  of  with  sympathy,  complacency,  and  approbation" 
(ibid)  were  advantages.  It  was  therefore  in  the  self-interest  of  a  poor  labourer  to  work 
hard  and  take  a  prudent  course  of  action  in  order  to  achieve  these  advantages.  The 
poor  man  observed  the  attention  that  the  rich  man  got,  and  as  he  sympathetically 
imagined  what  it  must  be  like  to  get  this  attention,  experienced  "agreeable  emotions". 
The  poor  man  thought  that  these  emotions  corresponded  to  those  experienced  by  the 
rich.  The  "great  purpose  of  human  life  which  we  call  bettering  our  condition"(ibid)  - 
the  conjectured  cause  of  every  kind  of  human  improvement  from  the  division  of 
labour,  to  men's  attentive  behaviour  to  women  -  was  nothing  more  than  an  observation 
drawn  from  the  subject's  experience  of  the  opportunities  for  upward  social  mobility  in 
a  maturing  capitalism. 
Smith  assumed  the  labour  of  the  simple  commodity  producer  as  the  typical  form  of 
economic  activity.  The  categories  he  used  to  explain  betterment  were,  however,  those 
of  the  self-interested  passions,  such  as  vanity,  and  the  disinterested  operation  of  the 
spectator's  sympathetic  imagination.  In  order  to  achieve  wealth  as  a  means  to  the  end 
of  favourable  attention  from  others,  the  individual  must  work  hard,  save  up  sufficient 
money  to  "acquire  dependants",  pay  these  dependants  out  of  "the  labour  of  his  body, 
and  the  activity  of  his  mind"  and  "acquire  superior  knowledge  in  his  profession,  and 
superior  knowledge  in  the  exercise  of  it"  (YMSI.  iii.  2.5,55).  The  economic  activity  of 
the  prudent  individual  necessarily  gained  the  approval  of  the  spectator.  The  process 
Smith  described  as  bettering  one's  condition  implied  that  the  subject  recognise  that 
economic  activity  and  the  acquisition  of  skills  were  the  best  means  for  the  realisation 
of  the  goal  of  being  the  object  of  others'  admiration,  respect  and  esteem.  Betterment 
was  an  accurate  reflection  of  the  upward  social  mobility  of  the  small  commodity 
producer  in  the  eighteenth  century  -a  social  and  economic  position  to  which  most 
wage  labourers  aspired  and  many  achieved.  It  also  reflected  the  higher  status  of  the 
merchant,  who  by  making  his  capital  productive  of  value,  acquired  landed  estates. 
According  to  Smith,  the  immediate  efficient  cause  of  the  work  required  for  the 
poor  to  gain  some  recognition  and  appreciation  from  others  was  the  effect  of  an  act  of 
31Sce  Horne  T.  A.  (1990)  Property  Rights  and  Poverty,  North  Carolina.  In  Smith's  view:  "there  was 
work  for  all  to  do,  and  in  its  doing  all  would  be  improved"  (pl22).  If  true,  this  suggests  that  Smith 
thought  that  capitalism  would  guarantee  full  employment. 214 
the  imagination.  By  imagining  the  pleasurable  feelings  arising  from  attention  given  to 
the  wealthy,  the  poor  worked  hard,  got  skills  and  employed  others.  The  individual  was 
thus  subjectively  driven  by  his  imagination  to  use  his  own  labour  to  work  hard  and  be 
successful.  He  was  not  driven  by  any  objective  social  relations  such  as  money  or 
capital  but  by  his  own  internal  feelings  and  sensations  and  his  sympathetic 
understanding  of  the  feelings  and  sensations  of  others. 
Smith  generalised  from  the  subject's  internal  experience  of  an  interested  passion 
such  as  vanity  to  principles  of  the  mind  with  a  universal  application.  The  assumption  of 
scarcity  informed  his  belief  that  social  inequalities  between  rich  and  poor  were 
universal  aspects  of  the  human  condition.  Thus  he  attempted  to  explain  the  political 
and  economic  power  of  the  rich  over  the  poor  according  to  internal  mental  processes, 
especially  the  workings  of  the  imagination.  He  identified  two  such  processes.  The  first 
was  the  effect  that  "the  world's"  attention  had  upon  the  rich  man  (7MSI.  iii.  2.1,51). 
This  favourable  attention  caused  a  feeling  of  pleasure  in  the  rich  man's  mind.  The 
second  was  the  poor  man's  perception  of  the  rich  man's  state  of  mind.  Despite  the 
appreciative  attention  the  rich  man  got,  his  actual  state  of  mind  was  relatively 
miserable.  Competition  made  the  rich  insecure  and  they  were  constantly  worried  that 
they  might  lose  their  wealth  and  fall  into  poverty.  The  actual  experience  of  the  rich 
was  known  to  the  knowledgeable,  philosophical  few  who  could  distinguish  between 
praise  for  merited  virtue  and  flattery.  This  experience  was  beyond  the  capacities  of  the 
restricted  minds  of  the  vulgar  many.  The  poor  man's  mind  was  more  preoccupied  with 
the  mundane  business  of  working  for  a  living  than  the  philosopher's,  and  his 
imagination  made  it  seem  that  the  condition  of  rich  man  "was  almost  the  abstract  idea 
of  the  perfect  and  happy  state"  (7MS,  I.  iii.  2.2,5  1).  Through  this  sympathetic  act  of  the 
imagination,  the  poor  man  got  a  corresponding  sensation  of  happiness  when 
contemplating  the  pleasures  in  the  minds  of  the  rich.  This  was  a  false  and  distorted 
picture,  but  nonetheless  sufficient  for  it  to  pre-occupy  the  poor  maivs  mind  in  his 
"waking  dreams  and  idle  reveries"  (7MSI.  iii.  2.2,52).  These  "prejudices  of  the 
imagination"  caused  him  to  behave  in  certain  ways  towards  the  rich.  It  caused  him  to 
"favour  all  their  inclinations,  and  forward  all  their  wishes"  Qbid). 
It  is  at  this  point  in  Smith's  explanation  that  he  observed  an  association  between 
the  attention  and  respect  that  the  rich  acquired  and  the  attitudes  of  deference  and 
submission  they  commanded  from  the  poor.  The  latter  was  not,  according  to  Smith, 
caused  by  "any  private  expectations  of  benefit  from  their  good  will"  but  from  "our 
admiration  for  the  advantages  of  their  situation"  (7MSI.  iii.  2.3,52).  This  contrast 
between  the  private  utility  of  submission  and  the  advantages  of  attention  the  rich  are 
imagined  to  have  was  one  that  Millar  also  adopted  and  used  in  his  lectures  and 
publications  to  explain  the  submission  of  the  poor  to  the  rich.  The  difference  being, 
however,  that  Millar  (unlike  Smith  who  denied  that  "private  expectations  of  benefit" 215 
played  much  of  a  role  in  explaining  submission)  was  to  affirm  private  utility  in  his  own 
account  of  the  origin  of  ranks.  For  Millar  these  expectations  were  not  solely  the 
imagined  advantages  of  good  attention,  but  also  the  actual  advantages  of  a  means  of 
subsistence  and  protection  of  the  individual's  person  and  property.  The  differences 
between  Millar  and  Smith  on  this  point  will  be  discussed  further  in  the  next  chapter. 
For  Smith,  the  association  of  deference  and  submission  with  attention  and  respect 
was  confirmed  by  his  observations  and  experience  of  the  behaviour  of  the  poor 
towards  the  rich  throughout  history  and  society.  However  to  be  consistent  with  an 
empiricist  method  that  informed  his  general  theoretical  approach  to  morality  and 
society,  the  origin  of  ranks  had  to  be  explained  as  an  effect  of  the  mental  operations  of 
the  sympathetic  imagination.  They  had  their  foundations  in  the  mind's  operation  upon 
the  unequal  political,  economic  and  social  circumstances  he  assumed  to  be  universal  to 
the  condition  of  humankind. 
A  poor  man's  tendency  to  tremble,  bow  and  scrape  before  a  rich  man,  his  tendency 
to  submit  to  his  every  desire  was,  for  Smith,  a  natural  disposition.  It  was  natural  for 
three  reasons.  The  first  was  that  the  existence  of  feelings  accompanying  acts  of 
defence  to  the  rich  were  experimentally  verifiable  within  the  contemporary  subject's 
own  mind.  The  second  was  that  it  was  conjectured  that  these  feelings  would  operate 
within  the  mind  of  every  subject  if  they  were  to  imagine  being  brought  face  to  face 
with  the  wealthy.  The  third  was  the  assumption  that  historical  testimony  confirmed  a 
constant  conjunction  between  pleasure  derived  from  feelings  of  identification  with  the 
rich  and  acts  of  obsequiousness.  Given  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  it  was 
impossible  for  the  subject  to  imagine  that  these  feelings  would  not  produce  the  effects 
of  submissive  behaviour.  Thus:  "Nature  would  teach  us  to  submit  to  them  for  their 
own  sake,  to  tremble  and  bow  down  before  their  exalted  situation"  (YMSI.  iii.  2.4,53). 
"Upon  this  disposition  of  mankind,  to  go  along  with  passions  of  the  rich  and  the 
powerful,  is  founded  the  distinction  of  ranks,  and  the  order  of  society" 
(TMS,  I.  iii.  2.3,52). 
The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  Smith's  reasoning  was  that  it  was  impossible  for 
the  subject  to  better  himself  without  a  pre-existing  social  hierarchy  based  on 
inequalities  between  rich  and  poor. 
Millar's  acknowledgement  of  Smith's  contribution  in  Yhe  Theory  of  Moral 
Sentiments  to  an  understanding  of  the  explanation  of  submission  is  to  be  found  in 
Essay  VII,  vol.  4,  of  Historical  View.  In  this  passage,  Millar  stated  that  the  acquisition 
of  property  "whether  derived  from  occupancy  and  labour  in  conformity  to  the  rules  of 
justice,  or  from  robbery  and  oppression"  (HV,  4,288)  was  a  necessary  condition  for 
submission  to  authority  to  work.  The  account  Millar  gave  was  individualistic  and 
heavily  indebted  to  Smith's.  The  poor  man  treated  the  rich  man  with  admiration  and 
respect,  because  he  derived  pleasure  from  imagining  how  happy  the  rich  man  must  be 216 
with  his  wealth.  The  pleasure  derived  from  these  fancies  were  communicated  amongst 
other  poor  individuals  through  the  mechanism  of  sympathy.  It  prompted  them  to  act 
individually  and  collectively  according  to  the  desires  of  the  rich.  The  poor  were  unable 
to  discriminate  between  the  rich  individual  who  deserved  respect  and  the  one  who  did 
not.  They  were  prepared  to  do  what  every  wealthy  individual  asked  them  to  do 
regardless  of  his  moral  qualities.  "Impressions  of  awe  and  reverence"  caused  the  poor 
embarrassment,  even  "abasement  and  stupidity"  when  brought  into  personal  contact 
with  a  rich  man  (HV,  4,289).  NEllar  credited  Smith  with  this  explanation  of  the 
operation  of  the  principle  of  authority  in  the  following  footnoted  reference  to  Smith's 
Theory  ofMoral  Sentiments: 
"Wealth,  however  improperly  in  the  eye  of  a  strict  moralist,  seldom  fails  to  procure  a 
degree  of  admiration  and  respect.  The  poor  are  attracted  and  dazzled  by  the  apparent 
happiness  and  splendour  of  the  rich;  and  they  regard  a  man  of  fortune  with  a  sort  of 
wonder,  and  partial  prepossession,  which  disposes  them  to  magnify  and  overrate  all  his 
advantages.  If  they  are  so  far  beneath  him  as  not  to  be  soured  by  the  malignity  of  envy, 
they  behold  with  pleasure  and  satisfaction  the  sumptuousness  of  his  table,  the 
magnificence  of  his  equipage,  the  facility  and  quickness  with  which  he  is  whirled  from 
place  to  place,  the  number  of  his  attendants,  the  readiness  with  which  they  observe  all 
his  movements,  and  run  to  promote  his  wishes.  Delighted  with  a  situation  which 
appears  to  them  so  agreeable,  and  catching,  from  each  other  to  contagion  of 
sympathetic  feelings,  they  are  often  prompted  by  an  enthusiastic  fervour,  to  exalt  his 
dignity,  to  promote  his  enjoyment,  and  to  favour  his  pursuits.  Without  distinguishing 
the  objects  which  figure  in  their  imagination,  they  transfer  to  his  person,  that 
superiority  which  belongs  properly  to  his  condition,  and  are  struck  with  those 
accomplishments,  and  modes  of  behaviour,  which  his  education  has  taught  him  to 
acquire,  and  which  his  rank  and  circumstances  have  rendered  habitual  to  him.  They 
are  of  course  embarrassed  in  his  presence  by  impressions  of  awe  and  reverence,  and 
losing  sometimes  the  exercise  of  their  natural  powers  are  sunk  in  abasement  and 
stupidity.  "  (Footnoted  reference  to  TMS.  RV,  4,288-289) 
Millar  offered  here  the  responses  of  the  poor  to  the  rich  in  eighteenth  century 
society  as  an  explanation  of  social  inequality  in  all  societies.  It  was  obviously  highly 
specific  to  the  society  Millar  inhabited.  Given  that  the  market  in  the  nineteenth  and 
twentieth  centuries  has  been  able  to  offer  cheap  versions  of  the  "sunrtuousness  of  the 
tables  of  the  rich"  in  restaurants,  and  offer  cheap  versions  of  "the  magnifice.  -.,;  e  of  his 
equipage"  in  department  stores,  and  through  the  use  of  trains,  cars,  bikes  and  planes 
"the  facility  and  quickness  with  which  he  is  whirled  from  place  to  place",  it  is  difficult 
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"impressions  of  awe  and  reverence"  in  the  same  way  that  the  poor  were  described  as 
feeling  in  the  eighteenth  century. 
As  I  have  shown  above,  Millar  adopted  Smith's  explanation  of  betterment  and 
submission.  I  shall  argue  in  the  following  chapter,  that  he  found  it  a  sufficiently 
incomplete  explanation  of  the  historical  origin  of  ranks  that  he  felt  the  need  to 
emphasise  the  role  of  "private  expectations  of  benefit".  A  clue  to  why  he  might  have 
been  led  in  this  direction  can  be  found  in  a  revealing  passage  of  Smith's  book 
(YMS,  IV.  1.8-10,181-4).  This  was  a  crucial  exception  to  Smith's  general  position  that 
deference  and  submission  were  invariably  caused  by  admiration  of  the  rich  and  had 
little  relation  to  private  utility.  In  this  passage,  Smith  told  the  famous  story  of  the  poor 
man's  son  who  wanted  to  get  rich.  The  story  illustrated  the  power  of  the  workings  of 
the  sympathetic  imagination  upon  ambition.  The  poor  man  works  day  and  night  in 
order  to  become  rich: 
"With  the  most  unrelenting  industry  he  labours  night  and  day  to  acquire  talents 
superior  to  all  his  competitors.  He  endeavours  next  to  bring  those  talents  into  public 
view,  and  with  equal  assiduity  solicits  every  opportunity  of  employment.  For  this 
purpose  he  makes  his  court  to  all  mankind;  he  serves  those  whom  he  hates,  and  is 
obsequious  to  those  whom  he  despises.  "  (TMSW.  1.8,181) 
"All  mankind",  of  course,  included  both  rich  and  poor.  It  is  therefore  arguable  that 
Smith  intended  "those  whom  he  hates"  and  "those  whom  he  despises"  to  refer  only  to 
the  poor.  However,  if  this  passage  is  taken  literally,  then  "those  whom  he  hates"  and 
"those  whom  he  despises"  covers  both  rich  and  poor.  The  small  independent 
commodity  producer  sells  the  products  of  his  labour  indiscriminately  to  whoever  has 
the  money  to  buy  them.  Those  who  were  most  likely  to  employ  his  skills  on  a 
contractual  basis  were  the  rich.  If  the  rich  included  "those  whom  he  hates"  and  "those 
whom  he  despises"  the  kind  of  deferential  and  obsequious  attitudes  the  artisan 
exhibited  towards  his  employer  was  not  founded  on  any  admiration,  respect  or  esteem 
he  held  his  employer  in.  The  motive  for  deferring  to  his  employer  was  private  utility.  It 
was  useful  for  him  to  adopt  an  attitude  of  deference  and  servility  in  order  that  he  found 
and  kept  customers.  Smith  concluded  the  story  with  the  upwardly  mobile  poor  marfs 
son  becoming  rich  and  realising  that  the  happiness  he  imagined  the  rich  experiencing 
was  an  illusion.  The  point  of  the  story  was  to  show  how  industry  was  kept  going  by 
the  faii1ty  effects  of  a  natural  imaginative  identification  of  the  poor  with  the  rich. 
Nonetheless,  in  this  case,  the  poor  man's  deferential  and  servile  attitudes  were  not 
caused  by  any  natural  dispositions  to  sympathise  with  the  rich.  On  the  contrary,  they 
were  caused  by  well  thought  out  calculations  of  self-interest  within  a  competitive 
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Hume,  Smith  and  Millar  explained  the  individual's  motives  to  engage  in  economic 
activity  through  reference  to  interested  passions,  such  as  vanity,  installed  in  individuals 
by  nature.  Moreover,  Smith  had  tried  to  explain  the  submission  of  the  poor  to  the  rich 
through  reference  to  the  disinterested  operations  of  the  sympathetic  imagination.  The 
objects  of  these  passions  and  interests  were,  however,  dependent  upon  the  immediate 
experience  of  the  subject.  Immediate  experience  revealed  two  natural  properties  of 
human  beings  -a  sense  of  sociability  and  a  self-interested  concern.  Sympathy  with  the 
rich  and  powerfW,  and  private  and  public  utility  were  the  foundations  both  of  property 
right  and  of  authority.  As  I  shall  argue  in  the  following  chapter,  these  fitted  the 
requirements  of  a  science  of  the  history  of  government  nicely.  Sympathy  with  the 
powerful  and  rich  had  a  history  in  Tory  doctrine,  public  and  private  utility  in  Whig 
doctrine. 
More  significantly,  the  theory  reflected  the  reality  of  every  social  grouping's  self- 
consciousness  during  the  mid-to-late  eighteenth  century.  Even  those  dispossessed  from 
the  land  and  their  instruments  of  labour  were  quickly  sucked  into  a  relatively  high 
wage  labour  market  in  Britain  or  America.  Whether  the  particular  subject  was  a 
landowner  benefiting  from  selling  land  and  higher  rents,  a  merchant  deriving  profit 
from  a  higher  productivity,  or  a  poor  labourer  who,  through  hard  work  and  prudent 
saving,  had  a  chance  of  becoming  an  independent  craflsman  -  all  could  find  themselves 
within  the  abstraction  of  the  sociable,  sympathetic,  self-interested  subject.  This  subject 
experienced  the  usefulness  of  a  market  in  land,  the  products  of  labour,  and  labour 
power,  not  only  to  himself  but  to  every  other.  He  found  not  only  laws  protecting 
property  and  enforcing  contracts  useful  but  also,  given  the  extent  of  patronage  in  the 
century,  sympathy  with  the  rich  and  powerful  similarly  to  his  advantage.  A  developing 
market  society  world-wide  had  shaped  this  experience.  What  was  a  socially 
determined  feature  of  the  actual  experience  of  the  eighteenth  century  subject,  became 
true  for  all  societies  past,  present  and  future.  32 
Thus,  the  authority  of  the  rich  and  powerful  over  the  poor  and  weak  was  explained 
by  Millar,  following  Smith,  by  the  undeviating  nature  of  this  abstract  individual,  who 
was  predisposed  by  natural  sympathetic  feelings  to  subMit.  33  Submission,  however, 
32Marx  K.  (1854-5)  Grundrissc,  translated  by  Nicolaus  M.  (Penguin,  1973)  "private  interest  is  itself 
already  a  socially  determined  interest  and  can  be  attained  only  within  the  conditions  laid  down  by 
society  and  with  the  means  provided  by  society,  and  is  therefore  tied  to  the  reproduction  of  these 
conditions  and  means"  (p94). 
33Authority  based  on  natural  "sympathetic  feelings"  is  a  clear  example  of  what  Rubin  calls  Smith's 
individualist  method.  Thus:  "Smith  explains  the  origin  of  the  most  important  social  institutions 
... 
by 
the  undeviating  nature  of  the  abstract  individual  -  his  personal  interest  and  conscious  striving  for  the 
greatest  gain.  He  thereby  attributes  to  abstract  man  motives  and  aspirations  ...  that  are  in  fact  the 
result  of  the  influence  exercised  on  the  individual  by  these  same  social  institutions 
...  over  long 
periods  of  time  -  influences  which  he  then  adduces  as  a  means  of  explaining  these  institutions.  Sn-tith 
deduces  the  basic  socio-economic  institutions  that  characterise  the  commodity-capitalist  economy  from 219 
was  the  result  of  the  influence  of  a  government  that  safeguarded  the  rights  of  a 
capitalist  class  whilst  pumping  out  a  surplus  from  the  proletariat.  Nonetheless,  Millar, 
unlike  Smith,  was  capable  of  perceiving  that  "the  impressions  of  awe  and  reverence"  of 
the  poor  and  "the  readiness  with  which  they  observe  all  his  movements  and  run  to 
promote  his  wishes"  were  also  caused  by  the  fear  wage  labourers  had  of  dismissal  by 
their  employers.  In  a  significant  footnote  discussed  in  chapter  six,  Millar  had 
recognised  that  workers  submitted  to  the  authority  of  their  employers  out  of  the 
advantage  of  avoiding  "the  anxiety  arising  from  the  danger  of  being  thrown 
occasionally  idle"  (HV,  4,120).  Observations  such  as  these  may  have  inclined  Millar  to 
give  private  expectation  of  advantage  a  role  in  his  account  of  submission  rejected  by 
Smith. 
Smith's  explanation  of  submission  did,  however,  reflect  the  fear  that  a  member  of 
the  lower  classes  might  have  had  of  punishment  if  he  or  she  did  not  behave  in  the 
appropriate  deferential,  sycophantic  or  submissive  fashion  to  a  powerful  functionary  of 
the  state.  In  days  when  the  state  was  administered  by  the  landed  section  of  the 
bourgeoisie,  this  would  inevitably  be  a  rich  man.  There  was  therefore  a  real  connection 
between  feelings  of  deference  and  submissive  behaviour  whether  or  not  they  involved 
a  sympathetic  identification  of  the  poor  with  the  imagined  happiness  of  the  rich. 
However,  what  Smith  and  Millar  took  as  the  universal  workings  of  the  mind  were 
a  socially  and  economically  determined  feature  of  the  actual  behaviour  of  eighteenth 
century  individuals.  Smith  recognised  correctly  that  there  was  a  universal  human  need 
for  praise  and  esteem.  He  also  realised  that  this  was  denied  to  the  poor  because  of  the 
effects  on  the  mind  of  scarcity  and  the  tasks  repeated  within  the  technical  division  of 
labour.  However,  he  identified  this  universal  need  with  the  particular  needs  of  an 
exploiting  class  to  secure  the  appropriate  submissive  behaviour  of  members  of  an 
exploited  class.  The  motives  and  aspirations  of  the  subject  were  inductively  generalised 
from  the  particular  aspirations  of  eighteenth  century  individuals  conditioned  by  an 
emerging  commodity-capitalist  society.  These  motives  and  aspirations  were  then 
transferred  by  an  act  of  the  sympathetic  imagination  to  every  individual  in  every  social 
setting.  By  this  means,  Smith  and  Millar  were  able  to  justify  the  social  institutions  of 
private  property,  law  and  government  as  universal  and  eternal  aspects  of  human 
nature. 
the  nature  -.  f  man;  what  he  takes  as  human  nature,  however,  is  the  determinate  nature  of  man  as  it 
takes  shape  under  the  influence  of  the  commodity-capitalist  economy.  "  (Economic  Thought:  p171) 220 
9.6  Improvement  and  the  Growth  of  Knowledge 
When  Millar  compared  the  operation  of  the  disinterested  passion  of  benevolence  in 
the  minds  of  the  eighteenth  century  subject  with  his  conjectured  imagining  of  its 
operation  in  the  mind  of  a  savage  subject  of  experience,  he  wrote: 
"It  ought,  at  the  same  time  to  be  remembered,  that,  how  poor  and  wretched  soever  the 
aspect  of  human  nature  in  this  early  state,  it  contains  the  seeds  of  improvement,  which, 
by  long  care  and  culture,  are  capable  of  being  brought  to  maturity.  "  (OR,  4546) 
This  was  an  observation  informed  by  his  readers'  knowledge  of  the  effects  of 
poverty  on  the  operations  of  the  minds  of  subjects  who  had  the  experience  of  social 
scarcities  in  the  Highlands  or  Ireland  -  the  experience  of  being  deprived  of  a  means  of 
subsistence  and  of  being  driven  by  appetites  and  instincts.  It  was  coupled  with  the 
hypothesis  that  if  the  subject  experienced  scarcity  as  dehumanising  in  the  present,  then 
it  was  most  probable  that  other  subjects  would  have  had  similar  experiences  in  the 
past. 
However,  Millar  also  used  an  organic  metaphor  to  record  this  observation  when  he 
compared  the  improvement  of  the  passions  with  a  plant,  the  seeds  of  which  grew 
within  the  breast  of  humankind.  The  metaphors  of  the  growth  and  cultivation  of  plants 
associated  with  the  notion  of  improvement  can  be  found  in  Millar's  work. 
occasionally,  he  would  link  growth  together  with  nature  and  refer  to  "natural  growth 
and  development"  (HV,  2,  I)  or  "a  kind  of  natural  growth"  (HV,  1,375).  It  would  be 
easy  to  fall  into  thinking  that  Millar's  use  of  the  organic  analogy  of  seeds  growing  into 
mature  growths  or  children  growing  into  mature  adults  was  at  the  forefront  of  his 
mind.  However,  Millar  used  these  analogies  infrequently.  Where  they  occur,  they  are 
clearly  literary  or  stylistic  embellishments  -a  metaphorical  short-hand  for  the 
description  of  the  unintended  outcomes  of  a  multiplicity  of  individual  actions.  Despite 
the  caricature  of  the  Scots  being  obsessed  with  the  language  of  child  development  and 
their  use  of  "infancy"  to  describe  the  conjectured  rude  condition  of  humankind,  Millar 
did  not  use  analogies  drawn  from  child  development.  34  The  picture  he  painted  of  the 
savage  was  not  one  of  the  child  but  of  the  indigent  poor  struggling  to  survive  in  a 
miserable  and  harsh  environment. 
The  modern  understanding  of  improve  retains  within  it  the  notion  of  profit  or 
advantage.  In  Millar's  time,  however,  it  is  likely  not  only  that  an  improvement  was  an 
34The  Rev.  Dr.  Folliolt.  -  Tray,  Mr.  Mac  Quedy,  how  is  it  that  all  gentlemen  of  your  nation  begin 
everything  they  write  with  the  'infancy  of  society'?  "  From  Thomas  Love  Peacock's  (1831)  Crotchet 
Castle,  Oxford,  1924:  p177.  Quoted  by  Hopfl  in  "Conjectural  History",  19.1  know  of  only  one  instance 
of  this  phrase  in  Millar's  work:  "they  have  in  the  infancy  ofsociely,  [my  emphasis]  no  other  method  of 
terminating  any  difference 
...  than  either  by  fighting,  or  by  referring  it  to  the  decision  of  a  common 
arbiter"  (HY,  4,276). 221 
abstract  advantage  from  the  perspective  of  the  subject,  but  that  the  profit  derived  from 
improvement  was  a  form  of  revenue.  This  form  of  pecuniary  profit  arose  out  of  the 
capitalising  of  land.  The  etymology  of  "improve"  shows  that  the  word  was  originally 
the  Anglo-French  "emprower".  This  meant  to  enclose  land  for  a  profit.  35  Millar  used 
improvement  in  this  sense. 
Land  enclosure  in  Millar's  day  was  important  for  the  accumulation  of  capital. 
Enclosed  land  was  land  rented  to  the  agrarian  capitalist  who  invested  in  machinery  as 
constant  capital  and  labour  power  as  variable  capital.  36  Enclosing  land  dispossessed 
the  previous  subsistence  farmers  unable  to  pay  the  higher  rents  the  capitalist  farmer 
could  afford.  Freed  from  their  dependence  upon  land  as  a  means  of  subsistence,  they 
were  transformed  into  a  surplus  population  and  an  industrial  reserve  army  of  labour. 
The  misery  of  this  population  regulated  the  wages  of  labour  power  drawn  into  the 
manufactories  and  the  later  machine  dominated  factories.  This  was  Millar's  "labouring 
poor  ...  a  class  of  men,  by  whose  painful  exertions  the  prosperity  of  every  state  is 
principally  supported"  (HV,  4,209). 
If  it  were  the  case  that  land  enclosure  both  generated  profit  to  the  agrarian 
capitalist  and  also  assisted  the  generation  of  profit  to  the  manufacturing  capitalist,  it 
would  not  be  surprising  to  find  Millar  using  improvement  as  the  concept  that  best 
captured  this  process  in  his  own  thinking.  Thus  he  referred  to  "the  more  improvable 
parts  of  Scotland"  (HV,  4,127).  He  also  wrote  about  the  invention  of  leases  to  secure 
the  farmer  against  dispossession  by  a  landowner  "after  he  had  been  at  pains  to  improve 
the  soil"  and  before  the  farmer  had  time  to  sell  the  product  of  his  industry  and  pay  his 
rent  (OR,  270).  In  a  similar  vein,  Millar  explained  the  independence  of  the  capitalising 
farmer  according  to  the  unintended  outcome  of  a  mutual  interest  between  farmer  and 
landlord.  The  farmer  enlarged  his  capital  investment  in  the  land  and  "as  he  lays  out 
greater  expence  in  improvement,  he  must  obtain  a  longer  lease  to  afford  him  the 
prospect  of  a  return  on  the  lands"  (HV,  4,127).  When  his  lease  had  expired,  and  he  had 
gained  a  profit  over  and  above  his  initial  investment  and  his  payment  of  rent,  then  "he 
finds  that  it  is  not  more  his  object  to  obtain  a  good  farm,  than  it  is  the  interest  of  every 
landlord  to  obtain  a  good  tenant"  (ibid).  In  other  words  the  longer  lease  enabled  the 
tenant  to  afford  to  pay  a  higher  rent  to  the  landlord,  and  to  acquire  a  large  enough 
surplus  to  buy  the  land  off  the  proprietor  when  the  lease  expired.  Both  tenant  and 
landlord  thereby  benefited  from  leases. 
35Thc  earliest  use  of  improvement  to  refcr  to  land  enclosure  is  in  the  thirteenth  century  (0ED,  2b, 
p750). 
36After  1746,  land  enclosure  became  rapid  and  general.  This  favoured  the  few  tenants  who  possessed 
capital,  thereby  allowing  landowners  to  raise  rents.  Subsistence  farmers  unable  to  pay  the  higher  rents 
wcre  forcibly  evicted  from  the  land.  See  Hobsbawrn  E.  J.  (1980)  "Scottish  Reformers  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century  and  Capitalist  Agriculture.  "  In  Hobsbawrn  (cd.  )  Peasants  in  History.,  Essays  in  honour  of 
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Moreover,  Millar  explained  both  the  change  in  the  status  of  slaves  and  the 
privileges  given  to  feudal  peasants  in  Europe  according  to  similar  principles:  "as  soon 
as  the  inhabitants  become  attentive  to  the  improvement  of  their  estates",  master  and 
villein  entered  into  a  "sort  of  copartnership",  the  landlord  stocking  the  farm,  and  the 
peasant  retaining  a  portion  of  the  product  for  subsistence.  Both  master  and  villein 
"having  always  a  prospect  of  gain"  were  therefore  made  more  comfortable  and  affluent 
(OR,  268).  The  greater  independence  of  peasants  was  therefore  an  unintended  outcome 
of  the  mutual  interests  of  villein  and  master. 
Improvement  was  nonetheless  a  broader  category  than  the  enclosure  of  land  for 
profit.  Knowledge  was  one  of  many  things  that  Millar  described  as  improvable.  The 
subject's  knowledge  of  the  workings  of  his  mind  and  the  application  of  this  knowledge 
to  the  arts  and  sciences  was,  according  to  Millar,  something  capable  of  improvement. 
It  was  therefore  capable  of  being  profitable,  advantageous,  beneficial  or  useful. 
Although  I  stated  that  Millar  used  organic  analogies  infrequently,  there  is  one  aspect 
of  child  development  or  human  growth  that  is  important  to  note  in  Millar's 
understanding  of  improvement.  Millar,  an  empiricist  theorist  of  jurisprudence,  was 
influenced  by  Locke.  Locke  had  used  the  language  of  improvement  when  writing  of 
the  mind  of  a  child  in  his  Essay.  Locke  concluded  of  the  workings  of  the  mind  that: 
"And  so  we  may  observe  how  the  mind  by  degrees  improves  in  these  [ideas  the  senses 
convey  to  it];  and  advances  to  the  exercise  of  those  other  faculties  of  enlarging, 
compounding,  and  abstracting  its  ideas,  and  of  reasoning  about  them,  and  reflecting 
upon  all  these.  "  [My  emphasis  here  and  below].  37 
Thus,  when  Millar  wrote  of  the  improvement  of  knowledge,  it  would  be  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  he  thought  of  a  growth  of  ideas  derived  from  perceptions  or  sensations 
in  the  minds  of  subjects  of  experience.  The  actions  of  the  individual  subject's  mind 
such  as  reasoning  or  reflecting  upon  sensory  experience  would  suggest,  by  analogy,  a 
growth  of  knowledge  among  associated  individuals.  Locke  had  observed  such  a 
growth  in  the  movement  from  a  position  of  ignorance  to  knowledge  from  child  to 
adult.  Thus  Millar  could  infer  that  the  large  number  of  ideas  in  the  minds  of  the 
subjects  of  his  own  civilised  society  were  caused  both  by  the  large  number  of 
commodities  available  for  sale  and  purchase,  and  also  the  large  number  of  occupations 
caused  by  a  social  division  of  labour.  He  could  then  reason  conjecturally  that,  if  there 
was  no  division  of  labour  or  commodity  production  or  exchange,  then  there  would  be 
37Locke  J.  (1689)  An  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding  edited  and  with  an  introduction  by 
Woozley  A.  D.  (197  1)  London  &  Glasgow:  p97. 223 
a  small  number  of  ideas  in  the  minds  of  subjects  of  uncivilised  societies.  Thus  Millar 
wrote  of  the  ancient  Germans: 
"As  in  the  carnivorous  brute  animals,  obliged  very  often  to  fight  for  their  food,  and 
exposed  to  continual  strife  and  contention  in  the  pursuit  of  mere  necessaries,  their 
passions,  though  excited  byfew  objects,  were  strong  and  violent.  "  (HV,  1,44-5) 
When  describing  differences  in  forms  of  government,  he  stated  that: 
"The  attention  of  a  rude  people  is  confined  to  few  objects;  and  the  precautions  which 
occur  to  them  for  preventing  injustice,  and  for  maintaining  good  order  and  tranquillity, 
are  simple  and  uniform.  "(HV,  3,2) 
Moreover  when  discussing  sobriety  and  temperance,  he  wrote: 
"The  poor  savage,  upon  whose  mind  there  are  few  traces  of  thought  beyond  what 
impress  his  external  senses"  (HV,  4,206). 
Millar  wrote  that  one  of  the  most  remarkable  differences  between  a  man  and  an 
animal  was  the  "wonderful  capacity  for  the  improvement  of  his  faculties"  (OR,  87). 
"Never  satisfied  with  any  particular  attainment,  he  is  continually  impelled  by  his  desires 
from  the  pursuit  of  one  object  to  another"  (ibid).  These  desires  pushed  the  subject  into 
activity.  The  subject's  activity  was  productive.  He  developed  the  techniques  and 
knowledge  of  agriculture  and  how  to  Make  commodities  and  exchange  them.  Once 
having  provided  for  himself  a  means  of  subsistence,  he  then  turned  his  attention  to  the 
production  of  surpluses.  The  fine  arts,  science  and  literature  followed  on  from  the 
leisure  that  surpluses  give  to  the  subject. 
Individuals'  pursuit  of  wealth  as  a  means  of  subsistence  and  a  mode  of  acquisition 
of  property  not  only  stimulated  them  to  industry  through  emulation  and  imitation  but 
improved  their  customs  and  manners  generally.  Their  faculties,  tastes,  sentiments  and 
tastes  were  changed  for  the  better  by  the  enlargement  of  the  varieties  and  kinds  of 
commodities  they  had  for  consumption.  This  enlargement  of  objects  produced  for 
consumption  had  a  causal  effect  on  the  sensory  experience  of  the  subject.  It  increased 
the  number  of  corresponding  ideas  in  the  mind.  Thus  individuals'  opinions  changed  as 
well  as  their  manners  and  customs.  Millar  conceived  of  the  subject's  wealth-creating 
activities  coinciding  with  those  of  industrious  artificers,  manufacturers  and  tradesmen. 
The  latter  were  involved  in  the  production  of  commodities  for  exchange.  They  were 
dependent  not  on  one  person  for  their  subsistence  but  upon  many.  Their  ideas  were 
therefore  likely  to  be  more  liberal.  As  self-interested  subjects  of  experience,  they  were 224 
therefore  more  inclined  to  use  utility  as  a  moral  principle  than  appealing  to  authority. 
Changes  in  government  and  law  coincided  with  these  changes  in  customs,  manners  and 
opinions.  It  was  the  changes  in  government  and  law  that  formed  the  substance  of 
Millar's  historical  work. 
Moreover  Millar  thought  that  natural  science  was  both  the  product  of  the  activities 
of  individuals  engaged  in  econornic  activity  and  also  subservient  to  the  needs  of  the 
expansion  of  the  forces  of  production.  He  wrote: 
"The  exercise  of  the  practical  arts  can  hardly  fail  to  suggest  an  investigation  of  the 
general  principles  upon  which  they  are  founded,  and  to  produce  discoveries  which  may 
be  useful,  in  facilitating  the  different  kinds  of  labour,  or  in  penetrating  the  secret 
operations  of  nature.  It  seems  reasonable  to  suppose,  therefore,  that  such 
improvements  as  take  their  origin  from  the  higher  class  of  artizans,  or  from 
professional  men  who  have  had  the  advantage  of  a  liberal  education,  would  meet  with 
the  greatest  encouragement  in  Britain,  where  manufactures  have,  for  a  century  past, 
been  more  successfully  cultivated  than  in  any  other  part  of  Europe,  and  where,  of 
course,  a  more  extensive  market  has  been  provided  for  every  profitable  invention" 
(HV,  4,169). 
The  question,  however,  remains  whether  improvement  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind 
had  any  theoretical  role  to  play  in  Millar's  thought  or  whether  it  was  some  kind  of 
shorthand  for  theoretical  assumptions  derived  from  Hume  and  Smith.  The  prospect  of 
gain  and  the  impulsion  of  desires  mentioned  above  are  clues  to  the  nature  of  these 
assumptions  and  the  connection  between  them  and  Millar's  conjectural  method.  A 
follower  of  Hume,  Millar  was  familiar  with  Hume's  essay  on  the  Rise  and  Progress  of 
the  Arts.  Hume  had  argued  there  that,  of  all  the  arts,  the  rise  and  progress  of 
commerce  was  the  easiest  to  study.  Whereas  the  love  of  knowledge  varied  widely 
amongst  individuals  and  depended  upon  inconstant  variables,  "Avarice,  or  the  desire  of 
gain,  is  an  universal  passion,  which  operates  at  all  times,  in  all  places,  and  upon  all 
persons"  (AS,  113). 
Avarice  was  an  interested  passion,  the  operation  of  which  did  not  always  gain  the 
approval  of  the  subject  as  a  disinterested  spectator.  Nonetheless  if  it  operated 
"innocently",  benefiting  the  subject  and  not  harming  any  other,  then  it  would  be 
approved.  I  shall  explain  the  distinction  between  innocent  and  vicious  self  interest  in 
the  following  chapter.  However,  Smith,  as  discussed  above,  thougl,  ý  that  the  impulse 
of  the  passion  of  avarice  was  an  insufficient  explanation  of  the  subject's  betterment. 
Vanity,  another  interested  passion,  was  required  to  explain  why  the  subject  was 
motivated  to  better  himself  through  the  production  and  exchange  of  commodities. 
Millar  connected  betterment  with  improvement  in  the  following  statement: 225 
"That  original  disposition  to  better  their  circumstances,  implanted  by  nature  in 
mankind,  excited  them  to  prosecute  those  different  employments  which  procure  the 
comforts  of  life,  and  give  rise  to  various  and  successive  improvements.  This  progress 
was  more  or  less  accelerated  in  different  countries,  according  as  their  situation  was 
more  or  less  favourable  to  navigation  and  conunerce;  the  first  attention  of  every  people 
being  usually  turned  to  the  arts  most  essential  to  subsistence,  and  in  proportion  to  the 
advancement  of  these,  being  followed  by  such  as  are  subservient  to  conveniency  or  to 
luxury  and  amusement"  (HV,  2,187). 
According  to  Millar,  betterment  was  an  original  disposition  "implanted  by  nature" 
in  the  mind  of  the  individual.  It  was  the  cause  of  improvements  such  as  a  division  of 
labour,  commerce  and  manufactures.  As  I  argued  above,  the  concept  of  individual 
betterment  was  a  socially  and  economically  determýined  feature  of  the  actual  experience 
of  real  eighteenth  century  individuals.  Smith's  examples  of  individual  betterment  were 
drawn  from  observations  peculiar  to  a  non-antagonistic  stage  of  the  development  of 
generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange  -  the  rnýid  to  late  eighteenth  century 
being  characterised  by  a  harmony  of  interests  between  social  classes.  Srnýith's 
observations  on  the  abundance  of  respectful  attention  given  to  the  rich  and  the  scarcity 
of  it  for  the  poor;  the  relatively  comfortable  standard  of  living  of  workers;  the  rapid 
upward  socially  mobility  of  the  merchant,  artisan  or  independent  commodity  producer; 
and  the  hovel-like  living  conditions  of  the  dispossessed  peasant  could  be  taken  for 
granted  as  self-evident,  uncontroversial  moments  in  the  experience  of  every  subject 
who  attentively  perceived  the  effects  of  a  commercial  society  on  the  minds  of 
individuals. 
An  inductive  conjectural  method  enabled  thinkers  to  generalise  from  historically 
specific  characteristics  of  the  subject's  experience  of  a  commercialised  society  to  the 
imagined  experience  of  individuals  in  societies  without  a  division  of  labour  or  the  idea 
of  freely  alienable  private  property.  Thus  "bettering  one's  circumstances",  an  effect  of 
the  social  division  of  labour,  could  be  conjectured  as  a  universal  and  therefore  natural 
and  original  operation  of  individuals'  minds  in  every  possible  situation  of  assumed 
scarcity.  One  possible  situation  included  individuals  living  in  indigenous  societies 
recorded  in  the  contemporary  literature  of  travellers  and  the  classical  literature  of  the 
ancients.  An  empiricist  theory  of  the  mind  proposed  that  the  motive  for  betterment 
was  th-ý  real  or  imagined  satisfaction  of  pleasures  and  the  avoidance  of  pains.  These 
moved  the  individual  to  be,  as  Millar  put  it,  "continually  impelled  by  his  desires  from 
the  pursuit  of  one  object  to  another".  These  desires  were  the  immediate  efficient 
causes  of  productive  activity.  As  appetites,  instincts,  propensities  or  disinterested 
passions,  such  desires  were  non-reflective  and  spontaneous.  However,  as  interested 226 
passions,  they  entailed  conscious  calculations  of  advantage  or profit  to  the  self  and,  for 
the  philosophically  or  morally  inclined,  calculations  of  advantage  or  profit  to  others. 
As  I  have  argued  above,  Millar  thought  that  individuals  pushed  into  activity  by  the 
interested  passions  brought  into  being  a  division  of  labour,  the  exchange  of 
commodities,  science,  technology,  the  arts,  and  a  growth  of  knowledge  of  the  utility  of 
these  improvements.  Conversely,  interested  passions  were  clearly  causally  connected 
with  disinterested  passions.  Whether  the  latter  were  benevolent  or  jealous,  benign  or 
malicious,  disinterested  passions  were  spontaneously  triggered  by  the  operation  of  the 
sympathetic  imagination  within  the  mind  of  every  spectator  who  attentively  observed 
the  interested  actions  of  others.  The  combined  operation  of  both  interested  and 
disinterested  passions  was  responsible  for  rules  of  justice,  the  notion  of  the  subject's 
right  to  freely  alienate  his  property,  ranks,  political  society  and  the  growth  of 
knowledge  of  the  expediency  of  these  improvements.  Individuals'  pursuit  of  their  own 
betterment  therefore  led  to  social  improvements  and  both  were  perceived  to  be  the 
outcomes  of  natural  processes  inherent  within  every  imaginable  conception  of  possible 
human  experience. 
9.7  Conclusion 
I  have  argued,  against  Morrow,  that  Millar's  individualism  was  unexceptional.  Like 
other  eighteenth  century  thinkers,  he  conceived  of  the  moral  and  social  order  as  a 
derivative  of  elements  found  within  the  individual.  These  elements  consisted  of 
interested  and  disinterested  passions.  These  were  communicated  between  individuals 
as  ideas  and  impressions  convertible  into  corresponding  passions  through  the 
mechanism  of  the  sympathetic  imagination.  I  have  also  argued,  against  Hopfl,  that 
Millar's  abstraction  of  the  individual  as  subject  of  experience  entailed  that  the 
individual  was  both  isolated  and  a  rational  calculator  of  his  own  advantage.  An 
empiricist  theory  of  the  workings  of  the  human  mind  entails  that  subjects  are  isolated 
from  one  another  by  an  barrier  of  ideas  and  impressions.  This  can  only  be  overcome  by 
an  imaginative  change  of  position  with  other  individuals.  This  perspective  on  the 
isolation  of  individual  experience  is  different  from  that  usually  argued  against  in  the 
literature.  The  latter  supposes  that  individuals  associate  solely  for  contractual  or 
privately  self-interested  reasons.  It  is  true  that  Millar  followed  standard  arguments 
against  this  position.  These  arguments  will  be  considered  in  the  following  chapter. 
Nonetheless,  the  observations  that  a  propensity  to  sociability  was  evident  in 
individuals'  experience  of  disinterested  passions  such  as  benevolence,  fliendship  and 
generosity,  and  that  individuals  were  observed  to  be  always  associated  in  families, 
tribes  or  defensive  alliances,  do  not  contradict  the  supposition  that  Millar  thought  of 
individuals  as  episternically  isolated  from  each  other.  Nor  do  they  contradict  Millar's 
assumptions  that  commodity  production,  government  and  law  had  come  into  being  as 227 
the  result  of  individual  calculations  of  profit  and  advantage  to  themselves  and  others 
and  that,  without  privately  self  interested  reasons,  as  heads  of  patriarchal  households, 
individuals  would  have  remained  forever  isolated  from  each  other  by  vicious 
disinterested  passions. 
I  stated  in  the  previous  chapter  that  Millar's  conjectural  method  relied  on  the 
hypothesis  that  society  had  arisen  out  of  the  needs  and  interests  of  individuals 
socialised  within  the  patriarchal  household.  1  argued  that  the  starting  point  of  Millar's 
inquiry  was  the  civilised  form  of  society  that  confronted  the  eighteenth  century  subject 
of  experience.  This  subject  was  ideally  a  father,  husband  and  prudent  manager  of  his 
domestic  affairs.  I  suggested  that  it  was  the  experience  of  economic  life  outside  the 
domestic  sphere  that  predisposed  the  subject  to  think  of  social  relations  to  be  regulated 
either  by  contract  or  by  private  and  public  interests.  In  the  inquiry  into  the  nature  of 
the  "rude  and  savage"  condition,  and  the  explanations  Millar  and  Smith  gave  of  the 
most  probable  development  of  technical  knowledge  that  would  account  for  the 
absence  of  the  notion  freely  alienable  property,  I  argued  that  they  assumed  that  the 
experience  of  scarcity  had  certain  definite  effects  on  the  workings  of  the  subject's 
mind.  For  example,  until  the  head  of  the  household  had  either  produced  an 
exchangeable  surplus  over  above  immediate  subsistence  for  himself  and  his  family  or 
had  his  needs  for  subsistence  and  protection  met  through  dependence  upon  an 
immediate  superior,  he  was  unlikely  to  possess  the  notion  of  an  interest  separate  from 
others.  This  notion  could  only  arise  when  the  belly  was  full  and  the  immediate  threat  of 
death  from  starvation  or  war  was  postponed.  Millar  conjectured  that  both  the  elements 
of  a  moral  and  social  order  and  the  notion  of  the  individual's  natural  right  to  the 
exclusive  possession  of  the  product  of  his  labour  were  absent  in  the  rude  and  savage 
condition  of  humankind.  It  was  the  sympathetic  contagion  of  disinterested  feelings  of 
resentment  that  brought  individuals  together  to  fight  in  tribes  against  other  invading 
tribes  in  a  competition  for  scarce  resources.  However,  once  associated,  individuals 
privately  interested  passions  of  honour,  vanity  and  avarice  found  expression  in  war, 
robbery  and  plunder. 
Finally,  the  question  of  whether  Millar  was  committed  to  a  notion  of  an  economic 
motive  needs  to  be  answered.  Winch's  corrective  that  Smith's  concept  of  self-interest 
was  broader  than  that  of  a  pecuniary  motive  is  also  applicable  to  Millar.  However,  this 
corrective  needs  to  be  balanced  against  Hirschman's  and  Holmes'  arguments  that  by 
the  time  of  Smith's  and  Millar's  use  of  the  category,  the  self-interested  desire  for 
consideration  -  the  passion  of  vanity,  social  esteem,  or  respectful  attention  from  others 
-  had  become  subordinated  as  an  end  to  the  means  of  the  possession  of  money  in  the 
form  of  wages,  rent  or  capital.  According  to  Millar,  the  vast  vulgar  majority  of 
individuals  in  a  civilised  society  were  both  economically  motivated  and  predisposed  to 
accept  the  rule  of  law  and  a  social  hierarchy  that  upheld  it.  The  trigger  for  this  motive 228 
might  be  the  miserly  acquisition  of  money  in  a  hoard  for  its  own  sake  or  the 
sympathetic  identification  of  the  poor  with  the  imagined  happiness  of  the  rich.  Only  the 
philosophical  few  capable  of  taking  the  enlightened  perspective  of  an  impartial 
spectator  could  judge  whether  this  motive  was  innocent  or  vicious,  proper  or 
improper.  Such  judgements  entailed  the  complex  calculation  of  the  intended  and 
unintended  consequences  of  the  economically  self-interested  actions  of  a  multiplicity 
of  individuals. Part  Five. 
Poli"tl'*cal  Aspects 230 
Chapter  Ten: 
Political  Theory 
10.1  Introduction 
Millar's  theory  of  government,  as  I  shall  discuss  below,  relied  heavily  upon  the 
relationship  between  judgements  of  utility  and  knowledge  of  interests.  The  natural 
disposition  that  Millar  and  Smith  thought  the  poor  had  to  submit  to  the  rich  was  only 
one  of  the  ways  the  subject's  mind  operated  to  establish  the  authority  of  government. 
As  I  shall  argue  in  this  chapter,  utility  was  a  conscious  reflection  on  the  relationship 
between  individual  interests  and  the  common  good,  and  Millar  used  it  to  justify  the 
poor's  submission  to  and  dependence  on  the  rich  and  the  weak's  submission  to  and 
dependence  upon  the  strong. 
Utility  was  an  important  concept  in  Millar's  jurisprudence  and  his  political  theory. 
In  his  jurisprudence  it  was  contrasted  with  "the  feelings  of  humanity"  -a  phrase  used 
to  indicate  the  operation  of  the  principle  of  sympathy  in  the  minds  of  subjects.  Feelings 
of  humanity  enabled  the  subject  as  spectator  to  empathise  with  the  resentment  and 
disappointment  of  an  injured  party.  In  contrast  to  these  shared  feelings,  utility  was  a 
rational  principle  that  enabled  the  subject  to  judge  whether  the  juridical  ideas,  norms, 
rules  and  institutions  conformed  to  the  interests  of  the  subject. 
in  his  political  theory,  Millar  contrasted  utility  with  the  principle  of  authority.  As 
discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  authority  had  been  theorised  by  Smith  as  grounded 
upon  a  disposition  he  thought  the  subject  had  in  admiring  and  deferring  to  the  interests 
of  the  strong  and  rich.  This  disposition  was  contingent  upon  the  subject's  experience  of 
the  scarcity  of  time  available  in  a  commercial  society  for  the  poor's  needs  for  respectful 
attention  to  be  met.  Smith  thought  that  utility  played  an  important  role  in  confirming 
the  social  inequalities  and  political  and  economic  order  of  a  commercial  society,  but 
that  the  only  form  of  judgement  the  subject  used  to  reason  about  government  was  that 
of  public  utility.  This  form  of  reasoning  was  sustained  by  the  delight  the  subject  felt 
when  he  considered  the  economic  advantages  strong  government  and  laws  gave  to  the 
majority  of  the  population.  As  I  showed  in  the  previous  chapter,  Smith  thought  that 
judgements  based  on  the  private  expectation  of  benefit  to  the  individual  played  no  role 
in  confirming  orjustifying  submission  to  government. 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  show  that  Millar  adopted  an  understanding  of  utility  that  was 
conceptually  closely  related  to  judgements  based  in  the  subject's  experience  of  what 
Hutcheson  called  an  "innocent"  form  self-interest  -a  form  of  self-interest  that,  pursued 
in  competition  with  others  for  scarce  resources,  neither  hurt  nor  harmed  the  subject, 
his  dependants  or  rivals.  If  this  private  pursuit  o-r  personal  advantage  had  the 231 
unintended  consequence  of  benefiting  others,  the  mind  of  the  subject  as  spectator 
could  not  help  but  approve  of  it.  However,  if  it  benefited  only  the  individual  subject 
and  neither  hurt  or  harmed  any  other,  then  the  spectator  would  feel  indifferent  to  it. 
I  shall  then  discuss  the  role  of  utility  in  the  political  theory  of  Smith  and  Millar, 
comparing  similarities  and  differences  in  their  responses  to  prevailing  Whig  arguments 
for  submission  to  government  on  the  basis  of  consent  conceived  as  a  social  contract.  I 
shall  argue  that  the  major  difference  between  the  two  thinkers  is  the  role  that  Millar 
thought  utility  had  as  a  post  hoc  reflection  by  the  subject  on  the  private  advantages  he 
had  in  submitting  to  the  authority  of  those  with  superior  wealth,  property,  power  or 
intelligence.  Millar  never  made  any  criticisms  of  Smith  on  this  matter;  however,  the 
difference  between  the  two  thinkers  is  evident  in  Millar's  lectures  on  government  as 
early  as  1771,  only  a  few  years  after  Smith  had  finished  lecturing  on  the  same  subject. 
Millar  reiterated  this  point  in  subsequent  teachings  and  writings. 
I  shall  suggest  that  Millar's  differences  with  Smith  can  be  explained  in  two  ways. 
The  first  is  with  reference  to  an  inconsistency  in  Smith's  account  of  betterment  and 
submission  in  his  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments.  This  appears  in  Smith's  story  of  how 
the  poor  young  man  became  rich  (YMSIV.  1.8-10,181-184).  In  the  previous  chapter,  I 
gave  an  interpretation  of  a  passage  from  this  story  which  suggested  that  Smith 
acknowledged  that  calculative  considerations  of  private  advantage  influenced  the  mind 
of  the  subject  as  independent  commodity  producer  to  hide  his  feelings  of  contempt  for 
his  wealthy  customers.  He  therefore  pretended  to  act  in  a  deferential  manner  to  his 
superiors.  It  is  possible  to  object  that  this  example  is  so  exceptional  to  Smith's  general 
disposition  to  defer  to  the  wealthy  and  powerful  that  it  is  trivial.  Nonetheless  I  would 
suggest  that  Smith's  observation  limited  his  explanation  of  the  principle  of  authority  to 
the  workings  of  the  subject's  mind  in  pre-commercial  societies.  If  true,  this  would  have 
been  contrary  to  Smith's  intentions. 
The  second  explanation  I  offer  for  the  difference  is  that  Hume's  influence  on  Millar 
was  greater  than  Smith's.  I  therefore  compare  Hume's  account  of  acquiescence  in  his 
essay  Of  the  Original  Contract  with  Millar's  in  his  lectures  and  essays.  I  suggest  that 
Hume's  understanding  of  acquiescence  was  a  relation  between  the  subjectively 
perceived  needs  and  interests  of  individuals.  This  understanding  enabled  Millar, 
following  Smith's  teachings  on  the  topic,  to  theorise  the  relation  as  mediated  by 
individual's  reflections  on  both  the  private  advantages  they  gained  from  the  admiration 
and  deference  of  the  poor  and  weak,  and  also  the  advantages  of  subsistence  and 
protection  they  gained  from  submission  to  the  rich  and  powerful.  I  go  on  to  argue  that 
this  gave  Millar's  account  of  submission  a  quasi-contractual  quality.  This  was  in  the 
sense  that  consent  could  be  withdrawn  from  government  not  only  if  individuals 
reasoned  a  withdrawal  of  acquiescence  was  for  the  good  of  the  whole  of  society,  but 232 
also  if  they  were  able  to  reason  that  continued  acquiescence  was  opposed  to  their  own 
private  interests  in  acquiring  a  means  of  subsistence  and  accumulating  wealth. 
In  conclusion,  I  make  some  remarks  on  the  relationship  between  Millar's  political 
theory  and  Craig's  political  economy.  These  further  contradict  the  notion  that  he 
simply  postulated  the  rude  condition  as  a  historicised  version  of  the  state  of  nature. 
Consistent  with  the  empiricist  doctrine  that  the  inquiry  into  natural  law  was  an  inquiry 
into  human  nature,  Nfillar  thought  that  the  subject's  experience  of  the  political  and 
juridical  conditions  necessary  for  the  accumulation  of  capital  in  a  civilised  society  was 
theoretically  transferable  to  the  experience  of  every  subject  living  in  a  situation  of 
scarcity. 
10.2  Utility  and  Varieties  of  Interest 
Nlillar  commented  that  during  the  eighteenth  century: 
"The  blind  respect  and  reverence  paid  to  ancient  institutions  has  given  place  to  a  desire 
of  examining  their  uses,  of  criticising  their  defects,  and  of  appreciating  their  true 
merits.  The  fashion  of  scrutinising  public  measures  according  to  the  standard  of  their 
utility  has  now  become  very  universal"  (HV,  4,305). 
Millar  defined  utility  in  this  passage  as  a  "desire  of  examining"  the  usefulness  of 
past  forms  of  government  and  law  that  had  become  fashionable  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  As  I  shall  argue  below,  Millar  attributed  this  fashion  to  the  political  opinions 
of  the  Whigs  in  general  and  the  political  thinking  of  Locke  in  particular. 
in  another  passage,  Millar  contrasted  utility  to  the  passions: 
"Nature  has  wisely  provided  that  the  education  and  even  the  maintenance  of  human 
offspring  should  not  depend  on  general  philanthropy  or  benevolence  deduced  from 
abstract  philosophical  principles;  but  upon  peculiar  passions  and  feelings 
...  and 
when  these  passions  are  weakened,  these  feelings  destroyed,  we  shall  in  vain  expect 
their  place  to  be  supplied  by  general  views  of  utility  to  mankind,  or  particular 
interpositions  of  the  legislature.  "  (HV,  4,234) 
Utility  was  therefore  a  product  of  the  rational  reflection  upon  the  passions.  It  was 
an  abstract  philosophical  principle  from  which  "general  philanthropy  or  benevolence" 
could  be  deduced.  It  was  the  passions  and  feelings  that  secured  the  reproduction  of  the 
species  rather  than  "general  views  of  utility".  This  suggested  that  the  subject's 
experience  confirmed  Hutcheson,  Hume  and  Smith's  opinions  against  Hobbes  and 
Mandeville.  Generosity  and  benevolence  were  disinterested  passions  irreducible  to  self 
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others  rather  than  to  the  self  These  passions  included  what  Mllar  called  the  "feelings 
of  humanity"  and,  as  discussed  in  chapters  eight  and  nine,  Millar  and  Srnýith  thought 
that  the  operation  of  these  passions  on  the  rnýind  could  explain  the  origins  of  the  idea  of 
property,  and  submission  to  the  rich  and  powerful. 
On  the  other  hand,  Millar's  use  of  utility  is  closely  matched  by  his  use  of  "interest". 
They  are  different  concepts  in  the  sense  that,  for  subjects  to  recognise  their  interested 
or  disinterested  actions  as  useful,  they  must  have  knowledge  through  the  faculty  of  the 
moral  sense  of  the  consequences  of  these  actions  -  whether,  for  example,  these 
consequences  were  pleasurable  to  the  self  or  others  and,  if  so,  whether  they  deserved 
approval.  This  did  not  entail  that  subjects  invariably  experienced  pleasure  when  they 
made  a  judgement  of  utility.  However,  it  did  entail  that  they  knew  what  it  was  like  to 
experience  pleasure  or  pain  as  a  result  of  the  kind  of  interested  or  disinterested  action 
they  perceived.  Moreover,  precisely  because  they  had  experienced  the  pleasure  of  the 
operation  of  his  social  passions  on  others,  they  knew  of  the  capacity  of  feeling  good 
when  their  own  or  others'  actions  were  useful  both  to  themselves  or  to  others.  Millar 
therefore  often  described  judgements  on  what  was  useful  to  others  as  judgements 
about  the  interests  of  others.  They  were  judgements  about  the  common  or  public 
interest  that  might  or  might  not  coincide  with  the  interests  of  the  self. 
Conversely  he  described  judgements  that  were  useful  to  the  self  as  being 
judgements  about  self-interest.  They  were  judgements  about  a  private  interest  that  may 
or  may  not  coincide  with  the  interests  of  others.  The  subject's  knowledge  of  self- 
interest  was  derived  introspectively  upon  the  operation  of  passions  that  motivated  him 
or  her  to  action.  This  process  of  reflection  may  or may  not  cause  a  pleasurable  feeling. 
Conversely,  knowledge  of  the  interests  of  others  depended  on  the  opportunity  for  the 
exercise  of  a  sympathetic  identification  with  their  feelings.  The  subject's  perception  of 
the  increased  happiness  of  others  could  not  happen  without  some  feeling  of  good  will. 
This  feeling  was  inherently  pleasurable.  Millar  shared  this  understanding  of  the 
operation  of  the  moral  sense  with  Hutcheson.  I 
Millar's  understanding  of  "interest"  in  his  theory  of  government  was,  I  would 
suggest,  consistent  with  a  distinction  Hutcheson  made  between  self-interested  action 
that  was  both  indifferently  innocent  and  virtuous. 
Hutcheson  had  distinguished  between  two  kinds  of  self-love.  The  first  was  self- 
love  that  is  consistent  with  the  good  of  the  whole.  He  described  this  as  indifferent  or 
virtuous  self-love.  The  second  was  vicious  self-love.  The  latter  was  detrimental  to 
IMillar  described  Hutcheson  as  the  first  person  to  call  the  natural  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  virtue 
was  distinguished  from  vice,  the  "moral  sense".  He  told  his  students  that  "the  establishing  of  this 
great  point  which  is  now  admitted  by  the  greater  part  of  the  writers  on  Ethics  may  be  looked  upon  as 
aconsiderableste  in  this  inquiry"  (LI]789,1,3,114).  Millar  mentioned  Hume  and  Smith  as  thinkers  p 
who  had  contributed  to  the  "analysis  of  the  moral  sense"  (LTI789,1,3,114-8).  See  appendix  three. 234 
others  and  the  good  of  the  whole.  2  Hutcheson  thought  that  the  first  kind  of  self- 
interest  was  consistent  with  the  pleasure  the  subject  experienced  when  perceiving  the 
happiness  of  others  and  therefore  with  public  utility.  This  kind  of  self-interest  was 
agreeable  with  a  recognition  of  the  self-interest  of  others:  a  common  or  public  interest 
that  was  advantageous  to  the  whole  of  society. 
The  rational  element  here  was  the  calculation  of  the  consequences  of  the  selfs 
interested  action  on  others:  how  far  it  advanced  and  promoted  the  interests  of  others. 
The  outcome  of  this  calculation  was  inherently  pleasurable.  Moreover  any  such 
calculation  was  informed  by  disinterested  benevolence.  This  calculative  activity  fits 
Hirschman's  requirements  for  a  form  of  self-interest  that  restrains  the  passions. 
Hutcheson's  distinction  between  self-interested  actions  that  promoted  both  the  good  of 
the  self  as  well  as  that  of  others  restrained,  through  the  calculation  of  general  utility, 
the  short  sighted  self-interested  actions  detrimental  or  harmful  to  others.  The 
calculation  of  utility  gave  pleasure  to  the  self  through  the  operations  of  the  moral 
sense.  It  also  had  a  calming  effect  on  the  mind. 
The  three  types  of  self-interest  depended  upon  the  consequences  and  intentions  of 
the  actor.  Indifferent  self-interest  had  no  other  consequences  than  the  good  of  the  self 
but  it  had  "no  hurtful  effects  upon  others".  3  Reason  showed  that  these  actions  were 
limited  by  the  effect  they  had  on  others.  If  they  neither  promoted  nor  retarded  the 
good  of  others  they  were  neither  approved  nor  disapproved  by  others.  They  were 
viewed  with  indifference  by  the  moral  sense. 
The  whole  of  society  consisted  of  the  outcome  of  the  activity  of  such  self- 
interested  individuals.  Indifferent  self-interest  was  therefore  "absolutely  necessary  for 
the  good  of  the  whole;  and  the  want  of  such  self-love  would  be  universally 
pernicious.  114  Once  reason  made  the  step  of  considering  the  effects  of  self-interest  on 
the  good  of  others,  then  the  moral  sense  started  working:  "benevolence  concurs  with 
self-love  to  excite  him  to  the  action.  "5  This  was  virtuous  self-interest.  Indifferent  self- 
interest  became  virtuous  when  it  coincided  with  actors'  consideration  of  the 
consequences  their  actions  had  for  the  good  of  others.  The  intention  of  working  out 
the  beneficial  consequences  of  self-interested  action  to  others,  as  well  as  the  self, 
would  inevitably  attract  moral  approval.  Vicious  self  interest,  on  the  other  hand,  "leads 
us  into  actions  detrimental  to  others,  and  to  the  whole.  "6  It  was  therefore  morally 
disapproved. 
2Hutcheson  F.  (3rd  edn  1729)  An  Inquiry  into  the  Original  of  our  Ideas  ofBeauty  and  Virtue,  pp174- 
177. 
3Hutcheson,  Inquiry,  p  174. 
4Hutclieson,  Inquiry,  p175. 
5ibid. 
6ibid. 235 
Indifferent  and  virtuous  self-interest  were  in  Hutchsods  terms  "innocent".  Both 
were  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  whole  of  society.  The  "preservation  of  the  system 
requires  everyone  to  be  innocently  solicitous  about  himself.  "7  A  man  who  acted 
benevolently,  and  harmed  himself,  had  made  a  mistaken  judgement  about  the 
consequences  of  his  actions;  "a  Man  who  reasoned  justly"  would  never  make  such  a 
mistake.  "  Faced  with  a  competitor  of  equal  abilities,  the  wise  man  would  prefer  the 
action  that  promoted  his  own  good  rather  than  that  of  the  other  without  any 
"weakness  of  benevolence".  9  Competition  between  equals  and  the  preference  of  self- 
interest  over  the  interests  of  others,  according  to  Hutcheson,  was  no  indicator  of 
vicious  self-interest,  it  was  innocent.  Hutcheson  argued  that  it  was  no  different  from 
the  spectator  preferring  one  competitor  to  another  in  a  competition  of  equals.  10 
It  would  therefore  be  a  mistake  to  interpret  Millar's  commitment  to  a  notion  of  the 
self-interested  subject  of  experience  in  competition  with  others  as  anything  other  than 
innocently  engaging  in  economic  activity.  Subjects  recognised  the  need  for  a  regular 
system  of  law  and  government  either  when  they  were  victims  of  the  vicious  self- 
interest  of  others,  or  when  they  were  the  victim  of  vicious  passions  caused  by  the 
innocent  self-interest  of  others  in  competition  with  their  own  innocent  self-interest. 
Innocent  self-interest  involving  competition  for  wealth  and  status  through  commodity 
production  and  exchange  was  morally  approved.  It  was  only  a  matter  for  moral 
disapproval  if  a  competitor  acted  upon  the  vicious  passions  innocent  self-interest 
caused. 
If  innocent  self-interest  not  only  resulted  in  a  greater  opportunity  to  derive 
pleasure  from  the  consumption  of  "natural  goods"  for  the  particular  individual  subject 
but  also,  through  production  and  exchange,  greater  pleasure  for  every  individual 
subject,  then  the  moral  sense  of  the  disinterested  spectator  would  necessarily  approve 
of  it.  Aware  of  a  feeling  of  pleasure,  derived  from  contemplating  an  economic  and 
political  system  that  encouraged  every  individual  to  be  industrious  and  therefore 
happy,  the  subject  as  spectator  would  make  judgements  that  promoted  the  system  on 
grounds  of  its  public  utility  -  its  propensity  to  give  everyone  the  means  of  gratifying 
their  needs  for  subsistence,  praise  and  esteem. 
Moreover,  I  shall  argue  below,  the  spectator  would  approve  of  the  poor's 
submission  to  the  rich  and  the  weak's  submission  to  the  strong  if  such  submission  was 
innocently  self-interested.  When  the  poor  gained  subsistence  and  protection  from  the 
rich  and  the  rich  gained  admiration  from  the  poor,  both  sets  of  interests  were  realised. 
The  utility  that  justified  the  weak's  submission  to  the  strong  was  necessary  for  the 
7Hutcheson,  Inquiry,  p  176. 
8ibid. 
9Hutcheson,  Inquiry,  p  177. 
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weaker  individual's  self-preservation.  Assuming  scarcity  and  competition,  an 
agreement  that  satisfied  the  strong's  need  for  vanity  and  the  weales  need  for 
subsistence  or  protection  neither  hurt  nor  harmed  either.  Both  weak  and  strong,  rich 
and  poor  gained  from  it.  A  disinterested  spectator  would  therefore  view  this 
4  submission  with  approval.  It  was  completely  innocent  from  a  moral  point  of  view 
because  it  was  beneficial  to  the  poor  to  submit  to  the  rich. 
10.3  Authority  and  Utility:  the  Influence  of  Smith 
Smith  and  Millar  offered  the  general  principles  of  authority  and  utility  to  their 
students  as  way  of  explaining  how,  as  Craig  put  it,  "powers  and  privileges  are 
committed  to  particular  persons"  (ORxii).  Without  powers  committed  to  the  rich  and 
powerful  there  could  be  no  government  or  enforceable  law.  Nfillar's  lectures  on 
government  started  with  a  discussion  of  the  principles  (LG,  1771,1-6/LGI792,1-2,  I- 
3  1).  Smith  also  started  the  section  on  public  law  with  a  discussion  of  the  principles  in 
his  1766  lectures  (LI(B),  12-15,401-3).  11  Both  thinkers  used  authority  to  account  for 
the  Tory  doctrine  of  divine  right,  and  both  used  utility  to  account  for  the  Whig 
doctrine  of  the  original  contract.  The  principles  appealed  to  the  experience  of  the 
eighteenth  century  subject  in  order  to  make  generalisations  about  the  experience  of 
individuals  in  every  known  society.  Thus  Smith  used  the  first  person  singular  "I"  and 
the  plural  "we"  to  give  examples  of  the  principles'  operations.  This,  I  would  suggest, 
was  not  just  a  rhetorical  device.  It  also  recommended  that  every  listening  subject 
compare  their  own  experience  with  that  of  the  speaker.  For  example,  Smith  spoke  of 
utility  as  a  principle  of  universal  applicability  that  could  be  tested  experimentally  within 
the  perceptual  experience  of  every  thinking  subject: 
"It  is  the  sense  of  public  utility,  more  than  of  private,  which  influences  men  to 
obedience.  It  may  sometimes  be  for  my  interest  to  dissobey,  and  to  wish  government 
overturned.  But  I  am  sensible  that  other  men  are  of  a  different  opinion  from  me  and 
would  not  assist  me  in  the  enterprize.  I  therefore  submit  to  its  decision  for  the  good  of 
the  wbole.  "  (LJ(B),  14,402) 
Smith  stated  that  it  was  "very  difficult  to  define  what  authority  is,  but  everyone  has 
an  idea  of  it  in  his  mind"  (LI(A),  v.  129,321).  He  referred  his  students  to  the  explanation 
of  how  the  idea  of  authority  has  arrived  in  the  mind  of  the  subject  in  his  Theory  of 
Moral  Seidimeids,  "where  it  is  shewn  that  it  arises  from  our  sympathy  with  our 
superiours  being  greater  than  that  with  our  equals  or  inferiors:  we  admýire  their  happy 
IlIn  the  earlier  1762-3  lectures,  Smith  left  the  discussion  to  the  end  of  the  section  on  public  law 
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situation,  enter  into  it  with  pleasure,  and  endeavour  to  promote  it"  (LJ(B),  12-13,40  1). 
I  discussed  this  explanation  in  the  previous  chapter. 
As  I  have  already  observed,  Millar  acknowledged  Smith's  explanation  of  the 
principle  of  authority  in  his  second  book  (HV,  4,288-289).  He  also  referred  to  it  in  Yhe 
Origin  of  Ranks,  in  a  footnote  to  a  passage  that  reasoned  conjecturally  about  the 
origins  of  the  dependence  of  the  poor  upon  the  rich. 
After  the  subject  had  discovered  the  pasturage  of  animals  as  a  mode  of  the 
acquisition  of  property,  and  this  property  had  been  concentrated,  through  good  luck  or 
hard  work,  in  his  possession,  the  richest  man  was  "exalted  to  a  higher  rank,  lives  in 
greater  magnificence,  and  keeps  a  more  numerous  train  of  servants  and  retainers,  who, 
in  return  for  that  maintenance  and  protection  which  they  receive  from  him,  are 
accustomed  in  all  cases  to  support  his  power  and  dignity"  (OR,  152). 
Of  immediate  relevance  to  the  development  of  my  argument  that  utility  had  a 
different  role  to  play  in  Millar's  than  in  Smith's  political  theory  is  Millar's  use  of  "in 
return".  This  phrase  implies  an  agreement,  or  form  of  consensual  exchange,  that  made 
the  servants'  and  retainers'  support  of  the  rich  man's  power  and  dignity  conditional  or 
dependent  upon  his  ability  to  give  them  maintenance  and  protection. 
The  footnote  Millar  gave  to  this  passage  is  as  follows: 
"The  admiration  and  respect  derived  from  the  possession  of  superior  fortune,  is  very 
fully  and  beautiffilly  illustrated  by  the  eloquent  and  ingenious  author  of  the  'Theory  of 
Moral  Sentiments'.  "  (OR,  152) 
As  will  become  clear,  Smith's  own  interpretation  of  the  operations  of  the  principles 
of  authority  and  utility  on  the  mind  of  the  subject  differed  from  Millar's.  Smith  stated 
that  every  consideration  of  the  utility  of  social  order  to  the  subject's  interests  in  the 
accumulation  of  wealth  presupposed  a  preceding  disposition  to  admire  and  respect  the 
powerful  and  wealthy.  Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  supposed  that  the  poor  subject's 
customary  or  habitual  deference  to  the  rich  was  conditional  on  his  judgements  of  the 
utility  of  securing  a  means  of  subsistence  and  protection. 
Smith  listed  four  sources  of  the  idea  of  authority:  age  and  wisdom,  bodily  strength, 
fortune,  and  antiquity.  Millar  re-classified  these  four  sources  into  two:  personal 
qualities  and  wealth.  He  classified  Smith's  age,  wisdom  and  physical  strength  as 
species  of  personal  qualities;  and  Smith's  fortune  as  a  species  of  wealth.  He  understood 
Smith's  antiquity  as  the  effect  of  custom  on  wealth.  As  I  showed  in  th--  previous 
chapter,  Smith  had  stated  that  "superior  wealth"  as  a  source  of  authority  was  nut 
derived  from  "any  dependence  that  the  poor  have  upon  the  rich,  for  in  general  the  poor 
are  independent,  and  support  themselves  by  their  labour,  yet  tho'  they  expect  no 
benefit  from  them  they  have  a  strong  propensity  to  pay  them  respect"  (LI(B),  12,401). 238 
This  is  an  important  point  of  difference  between  Millar's  conception  of  authority  and 
Smith's.  Smith's  observation  was  clearly  a  contemporary  one.  He  was  thinking  of  the 
relative  independence  of  the  poor  labourer  in  a  commercial  society  who  sold  either  the 
product  of  his  labour  or  his  labour  power  as  commodities.  Here,  Smith's  notion  of  the 
independence  of  labourer  in  a  commercial  society  is  sirnilar  to  Millar's  description  of 
the  "artificer"  or  "tradesman  who  sells  his  goods  in  a  common  market"  and  therefore 
"considers  himself  as  his  own  master.  He  says  that  he  is  obliged  to  his  employers,  or 
his  customers,  and  he  treats  them  with  civility;  but  he  does  not  feel  himself  greatly 
dependent  upon  them"  (HV,  3,10  1).  As  I  argued  in  chapter  seven,  Millar  conceived  of 
the  labour  of  the  "artificer"  or  craftsman  as  commodity  producer  and  exchanger  as  the 
source  of  wages  and  capital.  These  revenues  were  conceived  of  subjectively  as  profit 
or  advantage.  Millar  could  compare  the  feelings  independence  of  the  commodity 
producer  and  exchanger  favourably  with  the  feelings  of  dependence  a  villein  had  on  his 
lord  in  a  feudal  society,  secure  in  the  knowledge  that  the  former's  interests  and  lights 
were  protected  by  the  law  and  government,  whereas  the  lattei's  were  constantly 
violated. 
In  contrast  to  Smith,  Millar  used  the  principles  of  authority  and  utility  to  account 
for  submission  to  the  "powers  and  privileges  of  particular  persons"  in  feudal  and  pre- 
feudal  society  -  to  fathers,  as  well  as  chiefs;  to  feudal  nobles  as  well  as  monarchs  -  and 
to  any  "particular  persons"  who  possessed  property.  As  I  shall  attempt  to  prove,  he 
emphasised  the  role  of  a  sense  of  "private"  utility,  in  other  words,  the  innocent  self- 
interested  concern  of  superiors  for  the  admiration  and  respect  of  their  dependants,  and 
the  latter's  innocent  self  interested  concern  for  subsistence  and  protection.  Utility  was 
a  principle  of  the  mind  that,  operating  on  personal  qualities  and  wealth,  conferred 
authority  on  "superiors".  For  Millar,  an  important  source  of  authority  of  the  rich  and 
powerful  was  the  recognition  by  the  poor  and  weak  that  their  personal  interests  lay  in 
submission,  without  which  they  would  gain  neither  a  means  of  subsistence  nor 
protection  from  the  unrestrained  violence  of  others.  Millar's  emphasis  on  private  utility 
as  the  subject's  expectation  of  actual  or  potential  benefits  from  submission  to  the 
powers  of  their  "superiors"  is,  as  I  argue  below,  a  revision  of  the  notion  of  consent. 
This  emphasis  is  absent  in  Smith's  account,  in  which  utility  operated  as  a  perception  of 
the  coincidence  of  self-interest  with  the  public  good.  This  was  evident  in  the  quotation 
above  where  Smith  stated  that  it  was  a  sense  of  public  not  private  utility  that  inclined 
the  subject  to  obey  government  (LJ(B),  14,402).  The  necessary  coincidence  of  a 
private  with  the  public  interest  is  also  evident  in  the  following: 
"It  seems  therefore  to  be  his  own  interest  and  that  of  everyone  else  to  obey  the 
established  government,  when  it  acts  with  ordinary  moderation  and  tollerable  decency" 
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Of  note  is  that  for  these  principles  to  work  in  the  minds  of  "servants  and  retainers", 
certain  conditions  must  have  already  come  into  being.  These  are  the  following:  an 
inequality  between  rich  and  poor  must  be  established  through  a  competition  of 
individuals  for  scarce  natural  resources,  the  rich  must  have  acquired  surpluses  through 
their  own  labour;  the  poor  must  have  become  dependent  on  the  rich  for  subsistence; 
and  the  notion  of  property  as  exclusive  possession  must  have  arisen  to  defend  the 
property  of  the  rich  from  the  potential  violence  of  the  poor.  Historically,  Smith  and 
Millar  reinterpret  these  conditions  as  events  that  probably  coincided  with  individuals' 
knowledge  of  pasturage.  The  conditions  were  consolidated  once  individuals 
discovered  agriculture:  between  the  second  and  third  ages  or  steps  in  the  acquisition  of 
property. 
10.4.  Arguments  against  Contract 
Both  Smith  and  Millar  rejected  contractual  arguments  for  the  explanation  of  the 
origins  of  government.  One  of  the  ways  in  which  Millar  reinterpreted  the  Whig  theory 
of  government  was  as  an  example  of  the  operations  of  the  principle  of  utility.  Millar 
commented  on  Sidney  and  Locke  in  his  lectures  that  they  had  shown  that  "ranks  are 
produced  from  views  of  Utility  -  That  is  that  men  from  this  view  only  are  induced  to 
resign  their  natural  liberty  and  independence  and  hence  that  any  particular  form  of 
government  ought  only  to  be  allowed  to  continues  so  long  as  it  is  beneficiall" 
(LG1771,5).  Utility  required  that  individuals  not  only  had  an  understanding  of  their 
own  private  interests  but  an  understanding  of  the  public  interest.  Moreover,  the 
principle  operated  fully  only  if  they  understood  the  antagonistic  relationship  between 
private  and  public  interests.  They  could  argue  that  submission  to  government  was  for 
the  good  of  the  whole  even  when  the  consequences  of  submission  constrained  the 
satisfaction  of  immediate  short-term  private  interests.  Thus  Smith  rejected  private 
utility  as  an  explanation  of  submission  to  government  because  private  interests  often 
conflicted  with  the  public  interest. 
However,  as  a  means  of  explaining  the  historical  origins  of  ranks  (rather  than 
justifying  their  continued  existence  once  established),  public  utility  was  useless.  As 
Millar  stated:  "In  every  Country  a  Govt.  has  long  been  established  before  its  principles 
have  been  inquired  into"  (LG]771,4).  Millar  followed  Hume  in  supposing  that 
governments  had  come  into  being  out  of  the  needs  and  necessities  of  individuals  for 
protection  and  subsistence.  For  individuals  to  have  used  arguments  of  public  utility  in 
resigning  their  "natural  liberty  and  independence"  presupposed  that  the  savage 
patriarchal  head  of  a  household,  isolated  from  other  individuals  in  a  bitter  competitive 
struggle  for  scarce  resources,  had  as  sophisticated  an  awareness  of  the  good  of  the 240 
whole  of  society  as  the  civilised  man  socialised  through  commerce  and  knowledgeable 
of  world  literature. 
Both  Smith  and  Millar  recognised  that  there  was  an  element  of  material  or 
economic  compulsion  causing  propertyless  individuals  to  submit  to  those  who 
governed  them.  Traditional  Whig  arguments  based  on  contract  ignored  the  reality  of 
such  compulsion.  Contract  was  conceived  of  as  the  free  consensual  act  of  a  property- 
owning  subject.  It  was  useless  for  explaining  how  government  n-dght  arise  in  societies 
where  there  was  no  social  division  of  labour  or generalised  commodity  production  and 
the  subject  had  no  conception  of  freely  alienable  property.  Thus  Smith  argued  against 
those  Whigs  who  theorised  that  government  was  founded  on  contract: 
"when  certain  powers  of  government  were  at  first  entrusted  to  certain  persons  upon 
certain  conditions,  it  is  true  that  the  obedience  of  these  who  entrusted  it  n-dght  be 
founded  on  a  contract,  but  their  posterity  have  nothing  to  do  with  it,  they  are  not 
conscious  of  it,  and  therefore  cannot  be  bound  by  it.  It  may  indeed  be  said  that  by 
remaining  in  the  country  you  tacitly  consent  to  the  contract  and  are  bound  by  it.  But 
how  can  you  avoid  staying  in  it?  You  were  not  consulted  whether  you  should  be  bom 
in  it  or  not.  And  how  can  you  get  out  of  it?  Most  people  know  no  other  language  nor 
country,  are  poor,  and  obliged  to  stay  not  far  from  the  place  where  they  were  bom  to 
labour  for  a  subsistence.  "  (LJ  (B),  16,403) 
People,  especially  poor  people,  were  compelled  to  obey  their  governments  through 
force  of  circumstance  by  birth,  and  by  having  to  "labour  for  a  subsistence".  The  Whig 
theory  of  a  tacit  consent  assumed  that  subjects  possessed  an  absolute  freedom  to 
contract  out  of  a  government  they  disapproved  of.  This  was  contradicted,  Smýith 
thought,  by  the  experience  of  actual  economic  circumstances  constraining  the  subject's 
freedom. 
Millar  repeated  this  argument  in  his  lectures  when  he  said: 
"this  consent  [according  to  Whigs]  is  equally  binding  whether  tacit  or  express  and 
therefore  each  member  of  a  Community  is  bound  by  the  tacit  consent  which  he  gives  to 
it  -&  they  are  held  as  approving  of  it  while  they  continue  of  it  -  But  this  may  appear 
not  to  be  well  founded  when  we  consider  -  That  a  man  who  earns  his  Bread  cannot 
leave  the  Society  because  he  does  not  know  where  to  go  -  In  this  case  therefore  his 
promise  must  be  extorted  -a  promise  is  to  be  sure  the  strongest  of  all  but  then  such  a 
Contract  whether  express  or  tacit  is  only  to  be  considered  according  to  the  view  of 
public  utility.  "  (LGI  771,5) 241 
Millar  made  it  clear  that  economic  circumstances  forced  individuals  to  submit  to  a 
government  whether  they  approved  of  it  or  not.  If  a  man  "who  earns  his  Bread  cannot 
leave  the  Society"  and  disapproved  of  his  government,  then  his  "promise  must  be 
extorted".  Put  differently,  if  contract  was  conceived  of  a  freely  given  and  consciously 
undertaken  promise  to  obey  in  return  for  political  advantages,  then  there  was  no 
evidence  of  this  promise  in  the  experience  of  the  poor  and  economically 
disadvantaged. 
Moreover,  Smith  pointed  out  that  considerations  of  public  utility  could  support 
politically  oppressive  governments.  When  subjects  weighed  the  consequences  of 
overthrowing  such  a  government  against  the  advantages  of  continuing  under  it,  they 
were  dissuaded  from  acts  of  disobedience  or  subversion.  An  authoritarian  government 
was  a  lesser  evil  than  the  disruption  of  individuals'  peaceful  attempts  to  better 
themselves  in  a  period  of  civil  war  or  anarchy.  The  principle  of  public  utility  could 
therefore  be  used  for  conservative  purposes  (LI(A),  v.  131,322).  Smith  went  as  far  as 
stating  that  there  could  be  no  other  foundation  for  utility  than  in  an  authority  based 
upon  the  poor's  deference  to  the  rich  (LIA),  v.  132,322). 
This  is  not  to  argue  that  Millar  or  Smith  had  no  theory  of  consent.  Smith,  for 
example,  whilst  discussing  Locke's  right  to  resist  taxation  imposed  without  the 
agreement  of  the  people,  argued  that  most  people  had  no  notion  of  giving  consent  to 
taxation  that  could  later  be  withdrawn  if  the  measures  proposed  were  not  agreed  to. 
However,  he  also  stated  that  since  government  was  "established  to  defend  the  property 
of  the  subjects",  and  if  it  raised  "a  very  exorbitant  tax",  it  would  "justify  resistance  in 
the  people"  (LJ(A),  v.  136,324).  This  had  been  observed  historically  in  the  events  that 
preceded  the  English  civil  war.  Justifiable  resistance  demonstrated  that  people  had  a 
negative  notion  of  consent.  They  would  become  aware  of  the  need  to  resist  such  a 
government  if  the  disutility  of  continued  obedience  outweighed  the  utility  of  rebellion: 
"You  must  agree  to  repose  a  certain  trust  in  them  [sovereign  powers],  tho  if 
they  absolutely  break  thro  it,  resistance  is  to  be  made  if  the  consequences  of  it 
be  not  worse  than  the  thing  itself'  (ibid). 
Millar  agreed  that  the  disutility  of  continued  obedience  to  the  subject  could  be 
outweighed  by  calculations  of  the  utility  of  resistance.  He  observed  that  there  were  a 
few  situations  in  which  reform  could  not  be  achieved  "without  violence  and 
bloodshed"  (HV,  3,438).  In  such  cases,  it  was  prudent  and  just  for  the  subject  to  "adopt 
such  measures  as  are  likely  to  produce  the  end  in  view  with  the  least  possible  hardship; 
so  that  although  violent  and  irregular,  they  maybe  justified  by  the  great  law  of 
necessity"  (ibid).  As  I  shall  show  in  appendix  one,  he  thought  that  the  Irish  were 242 
justified  to  use  the  threat  of  violence  against  the  English  government  in  their  struggle 
for  freedom  of  trade. 
The  Whig  theory  of  obedience  as  freely  given  consent  failed  to  conform  to  the 
contents  of  the  minds  of  actual  subjects  of  experience.  As  Smith  put  it  "All  have  a 
notion  of  the  duty  of  allegiance  to  the  sovereign,  and  yet  no  one  has  any  conception  of 
a  previous  contract  either  tacit  or  express"  (LJ(A),  v.  128,321).  This  led  to  its 
replacement  with  the  principles  of  authority  and  utility.  The  beauty  of  the  theory  that 
informed  Smith's  exposition  of  the  principle  of  authority  was  that  the  sympathetic 
operations  of  the  mind  were  supposed  to  apply  to  personal  qualities  such  as  age, 
wisdom  and  physical  strength  as  well  as  wealth.  Millar  could  therefore  used  them  to 
understand  forms  of  submission  that  had  arisen  in  societies  with  no  idea  of  property. 
On  the  other  hand,  attitudes  of  deference  and  respect  for  personal  qualities  or  for 
wealth  could  not  explain  how  individuals  might  have  given  their  original  consent  to  be 
govemed.  Considerations  of  public  utility  and  the  beneficial  consequences  for  the 
whole  of  a  society  of  poor,  weak,  propertyless  individuals  alienating  their  natural 
rights  to  rich,  strong,  propertied  individuals  were  abstract  philosophical  principles 
beyond  the  comprehension  of  savages  or  barbarians  uncivilised  by  regular  trade  and 
govemment.  They  were  also  beyond  the  comprehension  of  the  labouring  poor  who 
formed  a  majority  of  the  population  in  a  civilised  society. 
10.5  Acquiescence:  the  Influence  of  Hume 
Millar  filled  the  historical  gaps  in  Smith's  theory  with  the  notion  of  a  voluntary 
submission  of  the  propertyless  poor  to  the  propertied  rich.  The  notion  of  voluntary 
submission  is  taken  directly  from  Hume's  essay  Of  the  Original  Contract.  There  Hume 
had  stressed  that  "the  apparent  interests  and  necessities  of  human  society"  determined 
the  natural  foundations  of  submission  (OC,  481).  Interests  and  necessities  were  causes 
of  submission  in  addition  to  consent.  Hume's  intention  was  not  to  exclude  consent  as  a 
possible  foundation  for  government,  but  to  demonstrate  that  the  subject's  experience 
of  history  proved  that  consent  was  extremely  limited  in  occurrence  and  operation.  The 
people's  consent  to  obey  government  was  an  unusual  event.  It  had  "very  seldom  had 
any  place  in  any  degree,  and  never  almost  in  its  full  extent.  And  that  therefore  some 
other  foundation  of  government  must  also  be  admitted"  (OC,  474). 
Hume's  focus  on  interests  and  necessities  existing  prior  to  reflection  constituted  a 
major  revision  of  the  notion  of  consent  itself.  Hume  conceived  of  consent  as  a  form  of 
"voluntary  acquiescence"  or  a  voluntary  submission  to  authority.  He  stated  that 
government  arose  from  habitual  "consent  or  rather  the  voluntary  acquiescence  of  the 
people"  to  their  chief  (OC,  469).  Moreover,  he  associated  this  notion  of  consent  with 
Whig  position  on  the  English  constitution.  For  Hume,  authority  was  an  attribute  both 
of  the  sovereign  power  and  of  the  propertied.  It  was  the  propertied  who  exercised  the 243 
most  personal  power  and  influence  in  civil  society.  Hume  considered  individuals  to  be 
naturally  predisposed  to  submit  "because  society  could  not  otherwise  subsist" 
(OC,  481).  On  reflection,  individuals  saw  submission  in  their  interests.  The  ruled 
submitted  to  the  rulers  to  out  of  necessity.  They  required  protection  to  preserve 
themselves  and  their  property.  If  the  private  interests  of  the  ruled  confirmed  their 
submission  to  their  rulers,  then  the  interests  of  the  whole  of  society  could  be  happily 
met. 
Hume's  essay  marked  a  shift  ftom  a  contractual  to  a  utilitarian  paradigm  -  utility 
being  conceived  in  both  private  and  public  forms.  For  at  least  a  century  or  more, 
thinkers  influenced  by  the  modem  doctrine  of  natural  law  had  followed  the  Roman 
conception  of  society  as  societas  -a  business  partnership  founded  upon  contract.  12  A 
paradigm  of  contractual  relations  between  individuals  and  the  sovereign  power 
dominated  theories  of  society  and  government.  In  the  minds  of  seventeenth  century 
historical  and  political  writers,  the  inquiry  into  the  historical  origins  of  society  and 
government  tended  to  be  inseparably  connected  with  its  logical  and  moral 
presuppositions.  13  The  agreement  to  a  contractual  relationship  to  enter  into  society  or 
to  be  ruled  entailed  that  it  took  place  temporally  -  prior  to  society  or  government 
coming  into  being.  Thus  the  notion  of  a  state  of  nature  was  both  a  logical 
presupposition  and  a  historical  fact.  Hume  conceded  this  notion  when  he  wrote:  "all 
government  is,  at  first,  founded  on  a  contract"  (OC,  468). 
Hume  gave  both  historical  and  philosophical  arguments  against  the  notion  of  an 
explicit  or  tacit  consent  -a  promise  to  obey  -  as  the  sole  foundation  for  government. 
As  I  have  shown,  both  Smith  and  Millar  repeated  Hume's  arguments  in  their  lectures 
on  public  law.  According  to  Craig's  account  of  his  lectures,  Millar  "was  at  some  pains 
to  enforce  Mr.  Hume's  objections  to  the  fiction  of  an  Original  Compact,  long  the 
favourite  opinion  of  English  Whigs"  (ORxlix-1). 
Millar  agreed  with  Hume  that  there  were  other  foundations  for  government  than 
consent  conceived  as  a  promise  to  obey  a  sovereign  power.  These  were  propensities 
"antecedent  to  any  such  reflection"  upon  their  justice  or  advantage  (OC  479).  Millar 
developed  Hume's  arguments  by  combining  them  with  Smith's  theory  of  moral 
sentiments.  The  two  foundations  were  respect  for  personal  qualities  and  admiration  for 
wealth.  Both  were  mediated  through  the  natural  propensity  of  sympathy.  Custom,  and 
an  aesthetic  sensibility  arising  from  "a  sense  of  order  and  regularity",  reinforced 
sympathetic  feelings  (LG]792,23). 
However,  Millar  went  further  than  Smith.  Combining  Hume's  arguments  with 
Smith's,  Millar  gave  utility  an  even  greater  salience  than  his  distinguished  peers.  In 
12Sce  Gierke  0.  (1934)  Natural  Lmv  and  the  Theory  ofSociety,  vol.  l.  Cambridge:  p68. 
13See  Gierke,  Natural  Lmv,  vol.  II:  p305. 244 
addition  to  feelings  of  deference,  utility  became  both  the  historical  foundation  for 
government,  and  the  reason  for  the  subject's  submission  to  all  forms  of  authority. 
Millar  wrote  that  the  notion  of  contract  conceived  as  a  promise  was  "a  peculiar 
explanation  and  view  of  the  former  principle  of  utility"  (HV,  4,300).  Authority  was 
founded  equally  upon  feelings  of  deference  individuals  naturally  had  for  their 
superiors,  and  upon  "the  utility  of  submitting  to  persons  possessed  of  them" 
(LG]792,19).  This  was  based  on  the  eighteenth  century  subject's  experience  of  a  social 
hierarchy  in  which  admiration  of  personal  qualities  and  wealth  led  to  a  reflective 
consideration  of  the  advantages  of  submission  (LG]771,3).  Millar's  theory  of  authority 
used  utility  to  explain  submission  as  a  voluntary  act.  The  interest  individuals  had  in 
their  preservation,  protection  and  improvement  prevailed  on  the  decision  to  submit. 
Hume's  essay  influenced  Millar's  historical  writing  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  a  social  and 
historical  context  determined  the  utility  of  the  contractual  relations  constituting  justice. 
Secondly,  the  individual's  consent  to  the  authority  of  the  sovereign  was  broadened  to 
include  the  weak's  relation  to  the  strong  and  the  poor's  relation  to  the  rich.  Millar  was 
therefore  able  to  conceive  of  liberty  as  a  relation  of  personal  independence  from  the 
arbitrary  exercise  of  power  by  anyone  in  authority. 
Hume  observed  that  force  and  conquest  without  "pretence  of  a  fair  consent" 
(OC.  471)  had  brought  into  being  modem  governments.  Consent  was  confirmed  post 
hoc  by  a  "sense  of  the  advantages  resulting  from  peace  and  order"  (OC,  468).  Modem 
governments  were  therefore  consistent  with  the  denial  of  political  liberty.  For  example, 
if  law  safeguarded  the  personal  liberties  of  the  individual's  pursuit  of  private  profit, 
then  conquest  by  a  foreign  power  or  the  rise  of  an  absolute  monarch  could  be 
consistent  with  civil  society.  This  would  be  the  case  if  the  conquering  nation  were 
more  civilised  or  advanced  than  the  conquered  nation,  or  if  the  absolute  power  of  the 
sovereign  established  the  conditions  for  individual  subjects  to  pursue  their  interests 
peacefully  through  economic  activity.  Such  a  government  secured  consent  because  of 
the  advantages  individuals  gained  from  submitting  to  the  rules  of  justice  that  upheld 
contracts  and  the  free  alienation  of  property.  Acquiescence  to  absolute  monarchy  was 
conditional.  It  held  as  long  as  laws  enabled  rather  than  impeded  efforts  to  accumulate 
property  and  promote  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange. 
10.6  A  Quasi-Contractual  Account  of  Submission 
As  I  shall  show  in  chapter  twelve,  voluntary  acquiescence  or  submission  played  an 
important  role  in  Millar's  understanding  of  slavery  and  of  feudal  society.  Despite 
Millar's,  abandonment  of  the  notion  of  contract  as  promise  to  obey  an  authority, 
voluntary  submission  nonetheless  had  a  quasi-contractual  element  to  it.  Poor  or  weak 
individuals  submitted  to  the  influence  of  rich  or  strong  individuals  in  exchange  for  the 
benefits  of  subsistence  and  personal  protection.  Circumstances  of  absolute  scarcity 245 
entailed  that  submission  was  coerced.  Wherever  subjects  faced  the  likelihood  of  death 
from  starvation  or  violence,  they  would  be  coerced  into  submission.  These  conditions 
applied  to  the  labouring  poor  in  a  civilised  society.  They  also  applied  to  the  subject's 
conjectured  existence  in  a  rude  original  condition.  Nonetheless,  once  habituated  to 
submission,  a  negative  form  of  consent  came  into  operation.  A  poor  man  could 
consider  withdrawing  his  consent  from  a  rich  man  once  he  possessed  an  independent 
means  of  subsistence  and  his  rights  to  his  person  and  property  were  safeguarded  in 
law.  He  would  withdraw  his  consent  on  grounds  of  private  utility  or  self-interest. 
When  the  subject  had  acquired  a  knowledge  of  commerce  and  manufactures  and  an 
awareness  of  the  right  to  alienate  property  freely,  habitual  feelings  of  admiration  and 
respect  for  particular  masters  would  be  ignored,  or  transferred  to  another.  This  would 
occur  if  the  vicious  interests  of  the  rich  and  powerful  hurt  or  harmed  the  subject's 
innocent  interests.  These  were  the  same  interests  that  motivated  the  individual  to 
produce  and  exchange  commodities  and  act  according  to  the  rules  of  natural  justice.  In 
addition,  therefore,  to  the  sympathetic  operations  of  deference  and  respect,  Millar 
included  the  subject's  perception  of  private  expectation  of  advantage  in  his  account  of 
how  the  operations  of  the  mind  established  the  principle  of  authority. 
Thus  Millar's  first  lecture  on  the  Origin  of  Influence  and  Authority  amongst 
Mankind  (LGI  771,1-5)  began  as  follows: 
"We  shall  begin  to  consider  this  with  respect  to  the  Rudest  State.  In  rude  times  before 
the  arts  are  known 
... 
Bodily  Strength  and  Agility  will  be  the  only  means  of  acquiring 
Reputation  &  authority  -  When  a  man  is  superior  in  strength  the  others  are  led  to 
submit  to  him  from  views  of  Ufility  -  They  do  not  choose  to  quarrel  with  a  man  who  is 
certain  to  get  the  better  of  them  -  When  they  go  out  to  war  his  superiority  there 
manifests  itself  which  procures  him  deference  -  Thus  we  see  in  schoolboys  that  the 
strongest  leads  &  has  the  greatest  authority  -  In  any  dispute  the  matter  is  naturally  led 
before  him  to  decide  -  '17hus  we  see  in  a  Village  to  this  day  there  is  commonly  a  man 
who  has  great  reputation  for  his  Bodily  talents  &  who  is  arbiter  of  all  the  Differences 
of  his  Neighbours  -  thus  we  see  in  Early  ages  Bodily  strength  is  particularly  noticed  in 
History  ... 
"The  next  thing  Constituent  of  authority  are  the  Endowments  of  the  Mind  -  In  this 
state  where  mere  strength  fails  it  will  be  found  that  cunning  &  Address  will  often 
prevail  especially  in  catching  their  prey  &  indeed  in  most  things  there  will  be  room  for 
Wisdom  &  Skill  -  and  where  this  takes  place  in  a  great  measure  they  will  soon  be 
brought  to  follow  it  implicitly.  Because  when  one  is  greatly  superior  in  parts  to  us  we 
have  no  data  to  know  the  extent  of  them.  We  therefore  look  upon  him  as  a  miracle  of 
nature.  71us  it  was  that  in  early  ages  they  were  all  looked  upon  as  Magicians.  And  we 
see  at  present  that  one  in  a  Society  who  is  any  thing  clever  acquires  more  reputation. 246 
And  as  mankind  in  general  have  the  ascendency  over  the  strongest  animals  so  a  man  of 
superior  parts  will  in  like  manner  overawe  the  rest.  -  In  troublesome  times  and  when 
the  management  of  affairs  is  attended  with  great  difficulty  they  will  find  their 
advantage  in  committing  the  lead  to  him  -  from  this  flows  the  authority  which  old  men 
have  in  barbarous  nations,  for  as  they  have  no  writing  nor  any  way  of  handing  down 
knowledge,  Experience  is  the  thing  which  must  be  attended  to.  - 
"Tle  Third  &  which  has  the  greatest  influence  of  all  is  superior  wealth  -  The  first  care 
of  men  is  to  procure  the  means  of  existence  -  next  they  think  of  laying  up  a  stock 
against  futurity.  &  upon  this  in  great  measure  will  depend  the  degree  of  power  -  for 
when  one  has  plenty  many  are  led  to  submit  to  him  from  prospect  of  advantage  -  for 
having  either  from  accidental  circumstances  or  from  their  own  misconduct  lost  their 
stock  they  will  be  in  danger  of  perishing  unless  they  come  under  the  protection  of  this 
Rich  man  -  he  therefore  gives  them  their  subsistence  for  their  service  -A  rich  man  is 
placed  in  an  eminent  point  of  view  so  that  his  grandeur  and  affluent  circumstances  will 
give  rise  to  admiration  -  They  thus  insensibly  connect  his  riches  with  other 
accomplishments  -  He  has  also  wherewithal  to  grant  many  favours  &  Thus  numbers 
will  be  always  disposed  to  honour  him  -&  his  influence  must  be  in  proportion  to  his 
riches  -  Now  we  see  that  with  respect  to  all  Three  -  we  first  admire  them  -  admiration 
creates  Deference  and  respect  -  and  we  are  led  to  submit  to  them  from  considerations 
of  Utility.  "  (LG]771,1-3) 
This  account  of  authority  is  clearly  influenced  by  both  Hume  and  Smith.  Thus,  like 
Smith,  Millar  chose  bodily  strength;  "endowments  of  the  mind"  or  wisdom;  and 
ownership  of  wealth  as  the  qualities  of  individuals  that  gave  rise  to  authority.  These 
were  the  first  three  of  the  four  conditions  Smith  laid  out  in  his  lectures.  Nfillar  covered 
the  fourth:  Smith's  "superior  antiquity"  under  the  category  of  "'posterity".  Millar  even 
gave  similar  examples  to  Smith  of  the  operation  of  authority  from  contemporary 
experience  such  as  the  clever  man  "at  present"  in  a  "Society"  who  gained  a  reputation. 
Moreover,  Millar's  references  to  deference,  respect  and  admiration  were  all  taken 
straight  from  Smith's  lectures.  Nonetheless,  the  emphasis  on  utility  as  a  reason  for,  and 
cause  of,  submission  was  an  original  reworking  of  Hume's  arguments.  It  was  Millar's 
own  contribution  to  an  empiricist  theory  of  government. 
All  the  examples  Millar  gave  were  from  the  perspective  of  a  self-interested  subject, 
conjecturally  drawn  from  the  experienced  social  reality  of  the  actual  or  potential 
commodity  owner  and  applied  to  the  rude  condition.  As  "we"  know  from  the 
experience  of  being  schoolboys,  individuals  did  not  quarrel  with  the  strong  man 
because  they  knew  it  was  against  their  interests  to  do  so.  As  "we"  know  from  being 
members  of  clubs  and  societies,  individuals  "find  their  advantage"  in  following  the 
cleverest  man.  As  "we"  know,  if  we  want  to  better  ourselves  and  become  rich  through 247 
our  own  economic  activity,  individuals  submit  to  the  rich  man  "from  prospect  of 
advantage".  There  was  an  exchange  of  utilities  as  a  result  of  this  voluntary  submission 
-  the  poor  man  gave  the  rich  man  his  service  and  in  return  the  rich  man  gave  the  poor 
man  protection  and  a  means  of  subsistence.  Moreover  implicit  in  Millar's  account  is  an 
explanation  of  the  historical  origins  of  both  the  accumulation  of  capital  and  of  consent 
to  government.  Competition  for  scarce  resources  led  a  few  individuals  to  acquire  not 
only  the  means  of  subsistence  but,  through  their  own  labour  and  prudent, 
parsimonious  behaviour,  "a  stock  against  futurity".  The  many,  however,  were  deprived 
of  both  through  accident  or  imprudent  "misconduct".  The  many  therefore  consented  to 
the  rule  of  the  few  to  avoid  the  "danger  of  perishing". 
By  the  time  of  the  1792  set  of  lecture  notes  on  government,  Millar  was  teaching 
his  students  that  authority  was  derived  from  two  separate  but  equally  important 
sources:  firstly,  admiration  and  respect  from  the  advantages  of  personal  qualities  and 
wealth;  and  secondly,  the  utility  of  submitting  to  those  who  possess  them.  "The  weak 
find  it  expedient  to  submit  to  the  strong,  from  an  apprehension  of  danger  in  opposing 
them"  (LG]792,15).  "The  poor  become  naturally  dependent  upon  the  rich,  from  views 
of  Interest"  (LG1792,19).  Moreover,  "contracts  and  agreements"  expressed  by 
elections  of  leaders  whose  "offices  may  at  length  be  rendered  hereditary"  strengthen 
"the  primitive  principles  of  submission".  Contracts  "are  chiefly  derived  from  views  of 
utility,  and  they  are  not  valid  when  contrary  to  the  great  interests  of  society" 
(LG]792,21).  Thus,  with  the  election  of  leaders,  public  utility  became  a  consideration. 
As  for  the  notion  of  the  "original  compact",  this  "has  been  misrepresented,  as  if  it 
arose  from  one  great  convention  for  settling  a  system  of  government  and  in  that  view 
treated  as  chimerical.  "  However,  in  fact,  the  notion  was  not  an  illusion  but  derived 
from  actual  historical  "contracts  and  agreements",  so  that  "the  members  of  society  are 
bound  by  the  consent  of  their  forefathers,  as  far  as  not  directly  hurtful  to  Society" 
(LGI  792,23). 
Millar  reinterpreted  Smith's  two  separate  principles  -  one  of  authority  based  on 
deference  and  respect  and  the  other  of  public  utility  founded  on  the  former  -  into  one 
principle  of  authority  with  two  different  sources.  The  first  was  Smitws  deference  and 
respect,  the  second  was  both  private  and  public  utility.  Private  utility  took  precedence 
over  public  utility  creating  the  possibility  of  a  multiplicity  of  agreements  between  weak 
and  strong  and  poor  and  rich  individuals.  Collective  agreements  arose  in  the 
institutional  form  of  the  elections  of  leaders.  These  were  confirmed  by  public  utility 
and  were  binding  upon  future  generations. 
By  the  time  Millar  was  writing  his  essay  The  Progress  of  Science  relative  to  Law 
and  Government"  (HV,  4,266-3  10),  he  could  state  with  confidence  that: 248 
"The  authority,  however,  of  the  rich  over  the  poor  is,  doubtless,  chiefly  supported  by 
selfish  considerations.  As  in  spending  a  great  fortune,  the  owner  gives  employment, 
and  consequently  subsistence  to  many  individuals,  all  those  who,  in  this  manner, 
obtain  or  expect  any  advantage  have  more  or  less  an  interest  in  paying  him  respect  and 
submission  ...  the  inequalities  in  the  division  of  wealth  are  varied  without  end;  and 
though  their  effect  is  greater  in  some  situations  of  mankind  than  in  others,  they  never 
cease,  in  any,  to  introduce  a  correspondent  gradation  and  subordination  of  ranks" 
(HV,  4,289-290). 
There  is  an  evident  sharp  contrast  here  between  Millar's  emphasis  on  the  poor 
individual's  "selfish  considerations"  and  his  "interest  in  paying"  respect  to  the  rich  as  an 
explanation  of  the  "gradation  and  subordination  of  ranks",  and  Smith's  explanation  of 
"the  distinction  of  ranks"  as  an  effect  of  the  "disposition  of  mankind,  to  go  along  with 
all  the  passions  of  the  rich  and  powerful"  (7MSIJii.  2,52).  Clearly  Millar  felt  his 
teacher's  opinion  that  private  expectations  of  benefit  had  little  influence  on  the  poor's 
deference  and  submission  to  the  rich  required  modification.  At  the  same  time  Mllar 
adopted  important  aspects  of  Smith's  contribution  to  understanding  the  nature  of 
social  inequality  and  ranks.  Millar  accepted  Smith's  explanation  of  the  poor's 
submissive  attitudes  before  the  rich  according  to  the  operation  of  the  poor  individual's 
sympathetic  identification  with  the  imagined  happiness  of  the  rich.  Indeed,  Millar 
thought  that  the  "feelings  of  the  human  mind,  which  give  rise  to  authority"  and  which 
operate  "without  rcflection"  had  a  salutary  use  both  in  preventing  the  ambitious 
projects  of  the  builders  of  political  systems  and  also  in  controlling  the  "unruly 
passions"  of  the  majority  of  the  ruled.  He  thought  that  this  majority  was  either  too 
busy  working  for  a  living  or  too  ignorant  or  stupid  to  question  the  advantages  or 
disadvantages  of  particular  laws  or  governments  according  to  any  rational  principles 
(HV,  4,3  09-3  10).  Nonetheless,  he  thought  that  the  "feelings  of  the  human  mind,  which 
give  rise  to  authority"  were  an  insufficient  explanation  of  the  causes  of  submission. 
Put  differently,  Millar  made  the  calculation  of  the  utility  of  innocent  self  interest  to 
the  private  individual  into  one  of  the  two  principles  "founded  in  human  nature" 
(LG]771,17).  This  determined  relations  of  dominance  and  submission  between 
autonomous  individual  subjects.  Alongside  "admiration  and  respect"  for  people  with 
superior  personal  qualities  and  wealth,  Millar  included  "considerations  of  utility".  As 
quoted  above:  "The  weak  find  it  expedient  to  submit  to  the  strong,  from  an 
apprehension  of  danger  in  opposing  them.  And  from  the  prospect  of  advantage  by 
yielding  them  precedents  in  common  enterprizes"  (LG]771,15)  and  "when  a  man  is 
superior  in  strength  the  others  are  led  to  submit  to  him  from  views  of  utility  -  they  do 
not  choose  to  quarrel  with  a  man  who  is  certain  to  get  the  better  of  them"  (LG1771,1). 
Moreover,  "The  poor  become  naturally  dependent  upon  the  rich  from  views  of 249 
Interest"  (LG1771,19)  and  "when  one  has  plenty  many  are  led  to  submit  to  him  from 
prospect  of  advantage"  (LG1771,3).  The  poor  submitted  to  the  rich  from  "selfish 
considerations"  (HV,  4,289-290).  The  rich  gave  the  poor  a  means  of  subsistence 
through  employing  them.  The  poor  therefore  had  "more  or  less  an  interest"  in 
returning  this  "advantage"  through  submissive  deference  and  admiration. 
Just  as  there  was  a  mutually  self-interested  exchange  between  commodity  owners, 
so  there  was  a  mutually  self-interested  bargain  or  agreement  between  the  rich  and  poor 
or  strong  and  weak.  From  the  perspective  of  the  rich  and  strong,  in  return  for  my  need 
for  respect  and  esteem,  I  give  you  the  means  of  subsistence  and  my  protection.  From 
the  viewpoint  of  poor  and  weak,  in  return  for  giving  me  subsistence  and  protection,  I 
give  you  my  respect  and  esteem.  Mllar  was  thus  able  to  harmonise  unequal  social 
relationships  through  the  notion  of  public  and  private  interests.  Without  inequality 
born  of  scarcity,  there  could  be  no  motive  for  industry,  for  the  only  means  to  the 
imagined  end  of  acquiring  the  respect  and  esteem  of  others  was  by  saving  the  produce 
of  labour  and  becoming  an  independent  commodity  producer  with  the  potential  to 
employ  others.  This  perspective  was  generalised  to  all  social  relations. 
10.7  Conclusion 
"Selfish  considerations",  the  "prospect  of  advantage",  "views  of  Interest"  and 
"views  of  utility",  were  all  conscious  acts  of  "sober  reflection"  by  the  individual 
subject.  These  examples  fit  nicely  with  Hirschman's  analysis  of  a  tendency  within  Smith 
and  Millar's  thinking  to  reduce  the  motives  of  human  action  to  calculative  self  interest. 
They  are  typical  of  Holmes'  characterisation  of  the  motivational  reduction  found  in  the 
twentieth  century  liberal  theory  of  society  -  every  individual  calculating  the  pecuniary 
means  by  which  he  can  obtain  his  subjectively  desired  ends.  I  considered  one  such 
version  of  the  liberal  theory  in  chapter  five  when  I  discussed  von  Mises,  concept  of 
rational  activity  as  the  activity  of  the  exchange  of  utilities  with  money. 
in  Millar's  political  theory,  however,  the  ends  that  individuals  attempted  to  achieve 
by  submission  to  others  "superior"  in  personal  qualities  and  wealth,  included  self- 
preservation,  social  recognition,  defence  of  their  personal  property  and  a  secure  means 
of  subsistence.  As  I  have  argued  in  chapter  nine,  the  subject's  perception  of  these  ends 
determined  the  motives  individuals  had  for  entering  into  acts  of  exchange  with  other 
individuals,  as  well  as  for  following  the  rules  of  natural  justice. 
I  stated  in  chapter  nine  that  Millar  conceived  of  the  individual  subject  as  the  actual 
or  potential  head  of  a  patriarchal  household  with  familial  dependants.  In  a  commercial 
society,  this  subject  was  atomised  in  competition  with  others.  Competition  inhibited 
the  operations  of  disinterested  passions  such  as  benevolence  and  generosity.  His 
friends  were  all  potential  enemies.  This  alienating  experience  isolated  him  from  other 
men.  Millar  reasoned  conjecturally  that,  if  this  were  the  case  in  a  civilised  condition, 250 
the  isolation  the  subject  would  feel  would  be  intensified  in  a  situation  of  absolute 
scarcity.  Thus,  in  order  to  explain  the  origins  of  submission  and  the  inequality  of  the 
distribution  of  wealth,  he  conjectured  that  every  individual  would  struggle  in 
competition  with  every  other  in  order  to  acquire  a  means  of  subsistence  and  a  mode 
the  accumulation  of  surpluses.  Both  were  necessary  for  self  preservation  and  the 
acquisition  of  dependants.  Law  and  government  could  not  arise  without  a  few 
individuals  being  successful  in  such  a  competition.  Juridical  and  political  institutions 
were  necessary  to  protect  the  possession  of  these  surpluses  from  the  appropriation  of 
the  poor  and  to  guarantee  their  alienation  according  to  the  interests  of  the  subject. 
Surpluses  were  acquired  by  individuals  through  saving,  frugality  and  industry.  As 
quoted  above,  Millar  accounted  for  inequality  in  the  distribution  of  wealth  in  the 
following  way: 
"upon  this  ["stock"  or  "fund  for  subsistence"  acquired  through  saving]  will  depend  the 
degrees  of  power  -  for  when  one  has  plenty  many  are  led  to  submit  to  him  from 
prospect  of  advantage  -  for  having  either  from  accidental  circumstances  or  from  their 
own  misconduct  lost  their  stock  they  will  be  at  danger  of  perishing  unless  they  come 
under  the  protection  of  this  rich  man.  he  therefore  gives  them  their  subsistence  for  their 
service"  (LGI  771,3). 
This  served  not  only  as  a  historical  explanation,  but  the  ideological  seed-bed  for  a 
later  vulgar  account  of  the  process  of  capital  accumulation.  This  is  evident  in  John 
Craig's  Elements  of  Political  Science.  Craig,  Millar's  nephew  and  biographer,  was  to 
argue,  as  Millar  suggested  here,  that  capital  was  originally  accumulated  through  the 
individual's  abstention  from  the  immediate  consumption  of  the  produce  of  his  labour, 
thereby  laying  up  a  store  of  goods  for  the  future.  The  surplus  the  individual  acquired 
through  saving  and  hoarding  was  then  used  to  maintain  servants.  Servants  produced  an 
equal  amount  of  the  commodities  originally  given  to  them  for  their  maintenance. 
Capital  was  therefore  the  outcome  of  the  prudent  behaviour  of  individuals  and  an 
equal  exchange  between  the  products  necessary  for  the  subsistence  of  servants  and 
their  labour.  14 
Like  social  inequality,  capital  accumulation  was  also  the  outcome  of  the  pleasure 
the  subject  derived  from  the  perception  of  his  own  interests.  The  individual  subject 
could  successfully  accumulate  a  surplus  only  through  his  own  industry  and  frugal 
habits.  This  entailed  the  invention  of  techniques  that  saved  labour  time  and  thrifty 
habits  of  saving  revenue.  Most  individuals  were  unsuccessful  "from  accidental 
circumstances  or  from  their  own  misconduct". 
14Craig,  Elements,  chapter  four,  pp64-65. 251 
Millar  therefore  explained  the  origins  of  social  inequality  as  the  product  of  the 
individual  subject's  experience  of  scarcity.  At  the  same  time  as  giving  an  explanation  of 
origins,  he  also  justified  the  persistence  of  social  inequality  and  scarcity  within  a 
commodity  capitalist  society.  Both  explanation  and  justification  were  derived  from  a 
law  founded  in  human  nature  determining  that  individuals  would  remain  unequal 
through  accident  or  misconduct.  This  was  the  law  of  natural  competition  between 
autonomous  equal  subjects. 252 
Chapter  Eleven: 
Property  and  Liberty 
11.1  Introduction 
Millar  stated  that  "the  advancement  of  natural  knowledge,  in  all  its  branches,  is 
highly  subservient  to  the  improvement  of  the  common  arts  of  life,  and  consequently, 
by  promoting  opulence  and  independence  in  the  great  body  of  the  people,  must 
contribute  to  inspire  them  with  sentiments  of  liberty"  (HV,  4,168-9). 
As  I  argued  in  chapter  nine,  the  cause  of  improvement  was  betterment  -  the 
rational  calculation  of  the  subject's  interests  within  a  class-divided  commodity 
capitalist  society.  Millar's  use  of  conjectural  reasoning  enabled  him  to  infer  from  the 
subject's  experience  of  scarcity  and  competition  in  his  contemporary  world  that 
betterment  would  have  operated  historically  to  bring  into  being  improvements  in  the 
material-technical  process  of  production. 
The  subject's  contemporaneous  experience  was  atomised  into  a  succession  of 
sensations,  ideas,  impressions  and  passions,  corresponding  to  a  multiplicity  of 
atomised  objects  and  events  connected  by  relations  of  contiguity  and  resemblance. 
This  empiricist  approach  to  morality  and  jurisprudence  had  been  used  to  explain 
natural  law  and  society  in  terms  of  the  uniformity  of  the  workings  of  the  mind  of  an 
abstract  universal  subject.  The  operations  of  the  subject's  mind  were  known  through 
introspection  informed  by  a  social  reality  determined  objectively  and  externally  to  the 
consciousness  of  every  particular  subject. 
Liberty,  according  to  Millar,  was  therefore  conceived  of  as  a  particular  feeling  or 
sentiment  caused  by  the  subject's  experience  of  two  conditions:  first,  the  opportunity 
the  subject  had  to  acquire  wealth  and  better  himself,  and  secondly,  his  experience  of 
independence. 
Regarding  the  first  condition,  the  subject's  self-interested  struggle  for  freedom 
from  scarcity  united  economic  progress  from  poor  to  rich  with  interests  in  juridical  and 
political  institutions  enabling  this  progress.  Such  institutions  would  conform  to  natural 
law  when  the  needs  of  generalised  commodity  production  corresponded  to  the 
judgements  of  a  disinterested  and  well  informed  spectator.  If  the  needs  for  competition 
of  capitals  and  workers  were  the  outcome  of  self-interested  economic  activity,  then  the 
freedoms  of  the  subject  to  produce  and  consume  were  unthinkable  without  a 
regulating  state.  This  state  could  not  be  based  on  the  interests  of  a  particular  individual 
but  on  legislation  that  took  shape  from  a  multiplicity  of  disputes  between  privately 
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As  I  have  shown,  Hume  thought  that  unchanging  passions  determined  the  subject's 
activity  in  all  societies  and  all  times.  Unchecked  by  self-interested  reflection,  the  free 
play  of  these  passions  coincided  with  conditions  of  scarcity  and  misery.  The  freedom 
of  savagery  was  therefore  identical  to  the  unlimited  exercise  of  the  subject's  passions 
and  his  subordination  to  natural  necessity.  Hume  and  Millar  gave  substance  to  this  idea 
of  barbarous,  ancient  liberty  with  their  empirical  observations  on  nations  such  as  the 
Irish,  Native  Americans  and  the  ancient  Germans. 
Individuals'  reflection  on  their  interests  checked  the  free  operation  of  their  selfish 
passions.  This  reflection  led  to  judgements  made  on  the  basis  of  utility.  The  utility  of 
the  attention  of  others,  the  utility  of  a  means  of  subsistence,  the  utility  of  rules  of 
justice,  and  the  utility  of  submission  to  authority  have  all  been  discussed.  I  have  argued 
that,  for  Millar,  an  understanding  of  economic  self-interest  was  all  that  was  needed  to 
persuade  the  subject  to  respect  the  law.  Moreover,  individuals'  perception  of  long  term 
interests  required  that  they  acquiesce  or  submit  to  wealthier  superiors. 
Freedom  from  scarcity  led  to  freedom  from  the  violent  effects  of  selfish  passions. 
Polite  manners  were  therefore  an  outcome  of  affluence.  Freedom  from  scarcity  was 
best  served  by  a  market  in  which  rules  of  justice  enabled  the  subject  to  alienate 
property  freely.  These  laws  were  natural  because  they  conformed  to  the  workings  of 
the  mind  of  an  abstract  universal  subject.  The  latter  was  theorised  from  the  particular 
experiences  of  the  eighteenth  century  subject.  Hume  and  Millar  gave  substance  to  this 
idea  of  civilised,  modem  liberty  with  their  empirical  observations  on  nations  such  as 
the  English  and  the  French. 
In  this  chapter,  I  discuss  the  relationship  that  Millar  thought  held  between  the 
distribution  of  property  and  liberty.  If  the  distribution  of  property  was  such  that  it 
upheld  the  particular  interests  of  an  individual  or  group  of  individuals,  then  Millar 
thought  the  conditions  for  liberty  would  be  limited.  The  opportunities  for  betterment 
and  the  accumulation  of  wealth  would  be  restricted. 
on  the  other  hand,  Millar  observed  that  generalised  commodity  production 
loosened  the  personal  bonds  of  the  subject's  dependence  upon  his  immediate 
neighbours  for  subsistence  and  protection.  Millar  thought  this  loosening  had  useful 
effects  on  the  workings  of  the  subject's  mind.  Thus  he  wrote  that: 
"The  tendency  of  improvement  in  all  the  arts  of  life  has  been  uniformly  the  same;  to 
enable  mankind  more  easily  to  gain  a  livelihood  by  the  exercise  of  their  talents,  without 
being  subject  to  the  caprice,  or  caring  for  the  displeasure  of  others;  that  is,  to  render 
the  lower  classes  of  the  people  less  dependent  of  their  superiors.  "  (HV,  4,128) 
Independence  here  is  defined  as  relative  to  the  submissive  subject's  experience  of 
the  hurt  or  harm  caused  by  the  "caprice"  or  "displeasure"  of  wealthy,  powerful 254 
superiors.  The  latter  could  be  patriarchal  head  of  household,  tribal  chief,  feudal  lord, 
absolute  sovereign  or employer  of  labour  power.  In  other  words,  one  of  the  conditions 
for  liberty  was  that  the  poor  and  weak  were  no  longer  forced  by  scarcity  to  be  subject 
to  the  unrestrained  passions  of  the  strong  and  powerful. 
As  I  argued  in  the  last  chapter,  Millar's  theory  of  subraission  entailed  that  there 
was  a  quasi-contractual  exchange  of  interests  between  rich  and  poor.  This  was 
necessary  in  order  to  reproduce  a  social  order  of  eternal  social  scarcities  of  the  means 
of  subsistence  and  free  time  for  attention.  Without  this  order  individuals  would  not  be 
motivated  to  better  themselves. 
in  this  chapter,  I  shall  therefore  also  discuss  Millar's  understanding  of  dependence 
in  relation  to  its  opposite:  the  independence  experienced  by  the  subject  as  a 
commodity  producer  and  exchanger.  As  the  discussion  on  the  conditions  for  liberty 
took  place  within  debates  informed  by  interpretations  of  seventeenth  century  political 
thinkers,  some  attention  will  be  given  to  how  Hume  and  Millar  use  Harrington's  maxim 
on  the  balance  of  property. 
11.2  Millar's  Debt  to  Hume 
Millar  acknowledged  his  debt  to  Hume  when  he  described  him  as: 
"The  great  historian  of  England,  to  whom  the  reader  is  indebted  for  the  complete 
union  of  history  with  philosophy.  "  (HV,  2,457) 
As  I  have  mentioned  in  chapter  two,  Millar  adopted  this  union,  and  throughout  this 
dissertation  I  have  argued  that,  under  Smith's  influence,  he  applied  Hume's  conjectural 
methods  to  history. 
Millar  was  a  thinker  who  defended  Hume's  empiricism  against  Reid.  He  described 
Hume  as  "one  of  the  first  philosophers  of  the  present  age"  (HV,  3,313).  He  was  also 
known  as  someone  who  was  in  disagreement  with  Hume's  constitutional  doctrines. 
This  is  clear  from  a  superficial  reading  of  his  Historical  View.  As  early  as  1775,  Millar 
showed  himself  to  be  "one  of  the  most  powerful  antagonists  of  Hume's  constitutional 
doctrines".  '  Reviewing  Historical  View  shortly  after  Millar's  death,  Francis  Jeffrey 
characterised  the  third  volume  as  "a  formal  answer  to  Mr.  Hume's  history,  or  a  specific 
antidote  to  the  poison  which  he  imagines  it  to  contain.  "2  Echoing  Jeffrey  over  a 
century  and  a  half  later,  J.  G.  A.  Pocock  has  remarked  that  Millar  supplied  an 
interpretation  of  history,  reliant  on  an  original  re-working  of  the  Whig  doctrine  of  the 
ancient  constitution,  that  "Hume  would  have  denied".  3 
lHill  Burton  J.  (1846)  The  Life  and  Correspondence  ofDavidHunie  in  two  vols.  Edinburgh:  p479. 
2Jeffrey,  Review,  p168. 
3Pocock,  "Varieties  of  Whiggism",  p299. 255 
In  agreement  with  Hume's  methods  but  in  opposition  to  his  conclusions,  Millar  set 
out  to  prove  that,  throughout  the  history  of  the  English  constitution,  parliament  had 
imposed  limits  on  the  crown.  Whereas  Hume  thought  that  William  I's  conquest  of 
England  imposed  feudal  law  for  the  first  time  on  the  country,  Millar  argued  that  the 
feudal  system  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  was  already  advanced  by  the  time  of  the  Norman 
invasion.  Mllar  thought  that  Hume's  comparison  of  the  liberties  of  the  subject  during 
the  Elizabethan  monarchy  to  those  under  a  Turkish  despot  was  exaggerated.  In 
contrast,  Mllar  wrote  of  a  constitution  under  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  I  containing  "the 
essential  principles  of  liberty"  (HV,  2,469).  4  Millar  criticised  Hume  on  frequent 
occasions  throughout  Historical  View  for  his  sympathies  with  the  Stuarts  and  for 
assuming  the  existence  of  an  absolute  monarchy  from  the  time  of  the  Norman 
Conquest  up  until  the  overthrow  of  Charles  1.  Millar's  aim  was  to  demonstrate 
conclusively  that  the  monarch's  powers  were  limited  throughout  the  period  of  the 
evolution  of  the  English  constitution.  Craig  also  made  reference  to  Mllar's 
commitment  to  reforms  as  a  means  of  checking  the  influence  of  the  Crown  -  the 
tendency  Hume  had  identified  towards  a  new  form  of  absolutism  described  so  vividly 
as  the  "Euthanasia  of  the  British  constitution"  (OR,  cvii). 
11.3  Harrington's  Maxim 
Despite  their  differences  on  the  English  constitution,  one  common  feature  of  Hume 
and  Millar's  discussion  of  the  evolution  of  government  was  they  both  referred  to  a 
maxim  first  used  by  James  Harrington.  Harrington,  writing  during  the  time  of 
Cromwell's  commonwealth,  stated  that  constitutional  forms  of  government  such  as 
absolute  monarchy,  mixed  monarchy,  and  republic  were  derived  from  the  distribution 
of  landed  property.  His  maxim  was  that  the  form  of  government  followed  the 
distribution  of  property.  He  thought  that  knowledge  of  the  distribution  of  property 
within  a  population  allowed  for  the  possibility  of  a  precise  analysis  of  the  balance  of 
power.  This  balance  would  be  based  upon  the  revenue  derived  from  landed  property. 
Harrington  had  stated  his  notion  of  the  balance  of  property  in  terms  of 
proportionality.  He  had  attempted  to  calculate  the  balance  of  property  in  the  feudal 
period  according  to  the  revenue  derived  from  land  that  could  support  a  militia.  His 
calculations  of  the  proportions  of  land  were  rough  and  ready.  Sometimes  he  suggested 
the  calculation  of  the  balance  could  be  made  according  to  the  size  of  territory  that 
4HV,  vol.  2,  Ch.  Xl  contains  Millar's  rebuttal  of  Hume's  comparison  of  Elizabeth's  reign  with  Turkish 
despotism,  pp447-87.  See  HK  vol.  1  for  the  progress  of  feudal  property  relations  and  law  in  the 
Anglo-Saxon  period.  Also  Miller  E.  F.  (1990)  "Hume  on  Liberty  in  the  English  Constitutions"  in 
Capaldi  &  Livingston  (eds)  Liberty  in  Hume's  History  of  England,  Dordrecht:  pp53-105.  Miller 
describes  the  breaks  Hume  made  in  his  history  of  the  constitution.  Milar  tried  to  restore  these  into 
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could  be  "managed  with  one  plough",  for  example  proportions  of  "hides".  5  At  other 
times,  he  suggested  that  they  could  be  made  according  to  either  the  value  of  the  land 
rated  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  or  the  exchange  value  of  the  produce  of  the  land. 
Attempting  to  calculate  the  balance  of  the  feudal  aristocracy  as  "60,000  knight's  fees 
. 
..  possessed  by  the  two  hundred  and  fifty  lordS",  6  he  stated  that  could  the  "worth"  of 
these  fees  be  known  -  "reckoned  in  some  writs  at  401.  a  year,  and  in  others  at  10"  -  he 
could  have  "exactly  demonstrated  the  balance  of  this  government".  7  At  the  same  time, 
he  also  threw  doubt  upon  whether  it  was  possible  to  make  an  accurate  calculation  of 
the  value  of  knights'  fees  according  to  the  number  of  hides  contained  within  a  certain 
territory.  "But  says  Coke,  it  [a  fee]  contained  twelve  plough-lands",  because  "one 
plough  out  of  some  land  that  was  fruitful  might  work  more  than  ten  out  of  some  land 
that  was  barren".  He  thereby  recognised  that  the  value  of  the  produce  of  a  hide  would 
vary  according  to  the  productivity  of  the  land. 
Millar  also  noted  this  "inaccurate  measure"  of  dividing  land  into  hides  "each 
comprehending  what  could  be  cultivated  by  a  single  plough"  as  the  "general  estimation 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  lands"  (HV,  1,129).  Nonetheless,  like  Hume  and  Smith,  he  made 
various  attempts  at  approximate  calculations  of  the  balance  of  property.  These 
calculations  attempted  to  assess  the  proportions  of  revenue  available  to  a  monarch 
which  could  then  be  used  to  support  a  standing  army.  Millars  interest  in  these 
calculations  was,  like  Harrington's,  an  attempt  to  have  exact  knowledge  of  the  balance 
of  power  between  the  monarch  as  a  large  landed  proprietor  and  the  people.  For 
example,  if  subjects  were  small  proprietors  whose  combined  revenue  was  less  than  the 
revenue  of  the  monarch,  then  the  militias  they  could  raise  in  a  conflict  of  interest 
would  be  less  well  maintained  than  the  standing  army  of  the  monarch.  The  balance  of 
power  would  therefore  be  inclined  towards  the  monarch  and  against  the  people. 
On  the  basis  of  these  calculations  Millar  could  therefore  give  an  argument  that 
would  explain  why,  with  the  exception  of  Cromwell's  English  commonwealth, 
historical  testimony  seemed  to  indicate  that  there  was  a  tendency  towards  a  republican 
form  of  government  in  small  countries  and  one  towards  absolute  monarchies  in  large 
countries.  Thus: 
"It  is  farther  to  be  considered  that  the  revenue  of  the  monarch  is  commonly  a  more 
powerful  engine  of  authority  in  a  great  nation  than  in  a  small  one.  The  influence  of  a 
sovereign  seems  to  depend,  not  so  much  upon  his  absolute  wealth,  as  upon  the 
5PocockJ.  G.  A.  (ed.  )  (1977)Jaines  Harrington:  Oceana  and  other  political  work%  Princeton:  p193. 
6pocock  (cd.  ),  Harrington,  p  195. 
7ibid. 
8ibid. 257 
proportion  which  it  bears  to  that  of  the  other  members  of  the  community"  (OR,  237- 
238). 
If  the  proportion  of  revenue  derived  from  the  wealth  of  a  nation  that  went  to  a 
monarch  was  no  greater  than  that  of  the  largest  proprietor  then  "it  is  only  the  surplus 
of  that  estate  which  can  be  directly  applied  to  the  purposes  of  creating  dependence" 
(ibid).  In  other  words,  monarchs  would  have  no  greater  means  of  maintaining  the 
voluntary  submission  of  their  subjects  than  any  other  landed  proprietor.  Both  would 
receive  the  same  amount  of  revenue  from  their  land  and  it  would  only  be  the  surplus 
above  the  amount  of  revenue  sufficient  to  supply  the  monarch's  "ordinary  expence  of 
living"(ibia)  that  could  be  used  to  ensure  dependants'  continual  submission. 
Millar  then  asked  his  readers  to  conduct  an  experiment  using  the  conjectural 
method.  He  asked  them  to  imagine  "a  country,  like  that  of  ancient  Attica,  containing 
about  twenty  thousand  inhabitants,  the  people  were,  by  assessment  or  otherwise,  to 
pay  at  the  rate  of  twenty  shillings  each  person,  this  would  produce  only  twenty 
thousand  pounds;  a  revenue  that  would  probably  not  exalt  the  chief  magistrate  above 
many  private  citizens"  (ibid). 
He  then  asked  them  to  compare  this  situation  with,  "a  kingdom,  containing  ten 
millions  of  people,  the  taxes,  being  paid  in  the  same  proportion,  would  in  all 
probability  render  the  estate  of  the  monarch  superior  to  the  united  wealth  of  many 
hundreds  of  the  most  opulent  individuals.  In  these  two  cases,  therefore,  the 
disproportion  of  the  armies  maintained  in  each  kingdom  should  be  greater  than  that  of 
their  respective  revenues;  and  if  in  the  one,  the  king  was  enabled  to  maintain  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  he  would,  in  the  other,  be  incapable  of  supporting  the 
expence  of  five  hundred.  It  is  obvious,  however,  that  even  five  hundred  regular  and 
well  disciplined  troops  will  not  strike  the  same  terror  into  twenty  thousand  people,  that 
will  be  created,  by  an  army  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand,  over  a  nation  composed 
of  ten  millions"  (ibid). 
Millar  argued  that  the  extent  of  power  that  a  "chief  magistrate"  had  in  a  country 
with  a  large  population  was  derived  from  a  calculation  of  the  proportion  of  revenue 
capable  of  being  commanded.  If  this  was  greater  than  the  "united  wealth  of  many 
hundreds  of  the  most  opulent  individuals",  then  the  balance  of  power  would  be 
weighted  towards  the  monarch  and  against  the  people,  and  the  form  of  government 
would  tend  towards  an  absolute  monarchy  rather  than  a  republic. 
Millar  made  use  of  Harrington's  maxim  above  to  explain  observations  that  large 
countries  tended  to  become  absolute  monarchies,  whereas  small  countries  could 
sustain  republican  forms  of  government.  He  repeated  this  example  with  a  similar  use  of 
an  experiment  that  involved  the  arithmetical  calculation  of  revenues  in  Historical 
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"Suppose,  for  example,  a  nation  composed  of  no  more  than  100,000  men  paying  taxes 
at  the  rate  of  forty  shillings  per  person.  the  revenue,  which  would  thence  arise,  of 
200,  OOOE  a  year,  would  probably  not  render  the  Sovereign  much  richer  than  a  few  of 
his  most  opulent  subjects,  and  consequently,  after  deducting  the  sum  requisite  for 
maintaining  his  family,  would  be  totally  inadequate  to  the  support  of  his  rank. 
"If  the  state  were  so  enlarged  as  that  the  people,  paying  taxes  at  the  same  rate, 
amounted  to  a  million,  it  is  evident,  that  by  the  revenue  of  two  millions  yearly,  which 
would  thus  be  levied,  the  king  would  be  exalted  in  a  much  greater  proportion,  and 
would  have  little  reason  to  fear  that  his  influence  n-tight  be  counterbalanced  by  any 
casual  accumulation  of  property  in  the  hands  of  his  refractory  subjects.  By  supposing 
a  state  to  comprehend  twenty  or  thirty  millions,  we  may  conceive  that  the  revenue, 
according  to  the  same  rate  of  taxation,  would  bear  down  on  all  opposition,  and  become 
perfectly  irresistible.  "  (HJý4,90-91) 
These  attempts  to  calculate  balances  of  power  arithmetically,  I  would  suggest, 
have  their  origins  in  Harrington's  aspirations  to  demonstrate  the  exact  balance  of  a 
government  according  to  revenue  derived  from  proportions  of  landed  property.  It  has 
to  be  borne  in  mind,  of  course,  the  differences  in  sources  of  revenue  that  Millar  would 
have  taken  into  account.  For  instance,  Millar  was  aware  that  property  in  the  form  of 
alienable  commodities  was  as  much  a  source  of  revenue  to  the  Crown  in  a  commercial 
society  as  non-alienable  landed  property.  Harrington,  in  contrast,  thought  that  revenue 
derived  from  the  possession  of  money  or  capital  rather  than  land  had  little  if  any  role 
to  play  in  the  calculation  of  the  balance.  Harrington  stated  that  only  "in  cities  that  have 
little  or  no  territory"  did  "property  in  money"  influence  the  distribution  of  property  and 
therefore  the  balance  of  power  that  led  to  different  forms  of  government.  9 
Millar  used  calculations  such  as  the  above  in  order  to  prove  that  the  greater 
distribution  of  property  amongst  a  larger  number  of  economically  active  individuals 
entailed  that  there  was  a  tendency  for  the  monarch  to  become  more  powerful.  The 
employment  of  mercenary  soldiers  in  a  standing  army  meant  that  the  use  of  force 
against  any  opposition  to  the  monarch's  private  interests  would  be  "perfectly 
irresistible".  Millar  reasoned  that  when  subjects'  minds  were  preoccupied  with  the 
pursuit  of  pecuniary  interests,  they  would  no  longer  have  the  time  or  the  inclination  to 
defend  their  property  through  the  bearing  of  anns.  An  increased  independence  from 
the  caprice  and  displeasure  of  immediate  superiors,  entailed  that  it  was  in  their  long- 
term  interests  to  defer  and  submit  to  a  monarch.  It  was  therefore  in  their  interests  to 
pay  taxes  to  a  monarch  who  then  could  use  this  revenue  to  maintain  a  standing  army 
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or  navy.  However,  this  agreement  was  conditional.  In  return  for  the  subject's 
submission,  the  monarch  should  defend  and  promote  the  subject's  interests  in  acquiring 
property  and  wealth  through  commodity  production  and  exchange.  The  coincidence  of 
interests  between  the  monarch  and  those  engaged  in  trade,  commerce  and 
manufactures  therefore  led  to  the  unintended  outcome  of  an  increase  in  the  monarch's 
power. 
Millar  thought  this  tendency  towards  despotism  was  an  important  feature  of  the 
constitutions  of  most  "commercial  governments".  The  exception,  of  course,  was  the 
English  constitution.  In  England,  the  subordination  of  political  relations  to  economic 
relations  was  more  advanced.  Individuals  were  more  independent,  their  feelings  of 
liberty  were  more  acutely  felt,  and,  as  I  shall  argue  below,  the  fluctuation  or  rotation 
of  landed  property  entailed  that  habits  of  deference  and  submission  had  less  time  to  fix 
themselves  unthinkingly  in  the  minds  of  subjects.  The  causes  of  the  conditions  for 
greater  liberty  in  England  were  twofold.  Firstly,  with  the  abolition  of  entails,  the  idea 
of  freely  alienable  landed  property  had  been  institutionalised  in  law;  and  secondly, 
England's  position  as  an  island  meant  that  the  monarch's  revenue  had  been  used  to 
maintain  a  strong  navy  rather  than  a  standing  army.  The  English  monarch  was 
therefore  in  a  weaker  position  to  crush  internal  opposition  than  his  continental  peers. 
Millar  used  phrases  that  echoed  Harrington's  maxim  on  various  other  occasions. 
For  example  he  wrote:  "The  distribution  of  property  among  any  people  is  the  principal 
circumstance  that  contributes  ...  to  determine  the  form  of  their  political  constitution" 
(HV,  1,127).  Assuming  that  property  generated  a  revenue  to  the  proprietor,  he  also 
made  causal  connections  between  "the  distribution  of  property,  and  the  means  of 
subsistence"  and  "the  spirit  of  liberty"  (HV,  4,114-115).  This  established  connections 
between  the  revenues  derived  from  different  sources  of  property  as  alienable 
commodities,  and  the  liberal  feelings  associated  with  these.  It  prefaced  his  outline  of 
political  economy.  Given  that  the  form  of  government  was  determined  by  the 
dependence  a  population  had  on  a  particular  distribution  of  property,  the  revenues 
derived  from  the  latter  could  be  analysed.  From  this  analysis,  Millar  thought  it  would 
be  possible  to  assess  not  only  the  extent  of  the  revenue  a  government  could  raise  in 
taxation  but  also  its  subjects'  feelings  of  liberty. 
11.4  Hume's  Commercialised  Harringtonianism 
Hume  took  Harrington  as  his  starting  point  for  his  essay;  Whether  the  British 
Government  inclines  more  to  an  Absolute  Monarchy,  or  to  a  Republic.  Harrington's 
general  principle  1vas,  according  to  Hume,  "that  the  balance  of  power  depends  on  that 
of  property"  (BG,  47).  It  was  on  the  basis  of  this  principle  that  Hume  attempted  to 
show  that  the  constitutional  arrangement  of  the  post-1688  settlement  period  would 
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Hume's  scepticism  concerning  the  use  of  the  maxim  for  predictive  purposes  is 
confirmed  by  his  mention  that  Harrington  was  falsified  by  history  when  he  suggested 
that  the  balance  of  property  in  the  seventeenth  century  would  preclude  the  restoration 
of  the  monarchy  of  the  Stuarts  (BG,  47-48).  On  the  other  hand  important  modifications 
to  the  maxim  allowed  Hume  to  present  a  strong  argument  for  the  encroaching 
inevitability  of  absolute  monarchy  and  a  weak  one  for  that  of  a  republic.  10 
Hume  modified  the  maxim  by  considering  the  situation  in  which,  given  a  balance  in 
which  one  person  had  less  property  than  a  larger  amount  in  the  hands  of  several 
persons,  the  one  person  would  still  be  able  to  exercise  a  greater  power  over  the 
several.  Hume  argued  that  the  one  person  would  still  be  able  to  exercise  a  greater 
power  over  the  several  "because  property,  when  united  causes  much  greater 
dependence,  than  the  same  property,  when  dispersed"  (BG,  48). 
By  affirming  the  concept  of  dependence  he  was  able  to  argue  for  the  inevitability 
of  absolutism.  He  gave  the  example  of  a  hundred  people  each  with  an  income  of  a 
E1,000  a  year  compared  to  one  person  with  an-income  of  1100,000  a  year.  Whereas  in 
the  former  "no  body  shall  ever  be  the  better  for  them,  except  their  servants  and 
tradesmen"  (ibid),  with  the  latter,  the  richer  man  "may  create  a  greater  dependence  by 
obligations,  and  still  a  greater  by  expectations"  (ibid).  The  -one  rich  man's  property 
could  therefore  overbalance  the  ten  poorer  men's  property  through  the  greater  number 
of  people  who  are  dependent  upon  the  wealth  of  the  former.  Those  who  were 
dependent  upon  the  wealth  of  the  poorer  man's  income  were  "their  servants  and 
tradesmen,  who  justly  regard  their  profits  as  the  product  of  their  own  labour"  (ibid). 
The  implication  was  that  the  power  given  by  a  man's  wealth  was  constituted  by  the 
lesser  or  greater  dependency  that  other  people  had  upon  it,  and  that  economically 
active  individuals  such  as  tradesmen  were  dependent  for  subsistence  upon  the  rich 
man's  desires  for  consumer  goods. 
The  first  assumption  of  his  argument  was  that  smaller  property  owners  would  be 
dependent  upon  the  greater  wealth  of  large  property  owners.  The  second  assumption 
was  the  inability  of  the  hundred  poorer  men  to  combine  their  property  against  the 
richer  man.  He  wrote:  "it  is  difficult  to  make  many  persons  combine  in  the  same  views 
and  methods"  (ibid).  As  I  shall  show  below,  Millar  challenged  the  truth  of  both  of 
these  assumptions  in  his  examination  of  the  effects  that  generalised  production  had 
upon  dependence  and  combination.  Millar  argued  that  the  fluctuation  of  property 
weakened  the  dependence  of  the  small  property  owner  on  the  large,  and,  using  Hume's 
1017orbes  cannot  be  entirely  correct  to  state  that:  "Hume's  conclusion  can  hardly  be  said  to  come  down 
on  one  side  or  the  other",  Hume's  Politics,  p2ll.  Hume  clearly  dismissed  the  arguments  from  the 
republican  side  as  "specious"(BG,  124).  He  stated  that  the  tide  was  beginning  to  turn  against  popular 
government  and  towards  monarchy  because  "the  power  of  the  crown,  by  means  of  its  large  revenue,  is 
rather  on  the  increase"(ibid),  This  observation  was  the  same  as  Millar's. 261 
principle  of  sympathy,  he  argued  that  the  many  were  able  to  combine  with  "the  same 
views  and  methods"  against  the  few. 
Hume  outlined  two  possible  hypotheses  concerning  the  question  of  whether  there 
were  tendencies  within  the  mixed  monarchy  of  the  1688  Settlement  towards  either 
absolutism  or  republicanism.  The  first  was  that  the  constitution  did  indeed  incline 
towards  an  absolute  monarchy;  the  second  was  the  opposite.  He  answered  from  the 
standpoint  of  utility  and  experience.  Experience  had  taught  him  that  the  republican 
form  of  government  in  Britain  under  Cromwell  led  to  one  man  assuming  powers  as 
despotic  as  Charles.  Utility  therefore  recommended  an  absolute  monarchy  to  a 
republic,  mercifully  bringing  into  being  the  "true  Euthanasia  of  the  British  constitution" 
(BG,  53).  The  experience  of  the  English  revolution  had  shown  that  the  alternative  was 
civil  war  at  "every  election".  Public  opinion  should  therefore  welcome  an  absolute 
monarchy  from  the  outset  as  "the  easiest  death",  the  alternative  being  "more  terrible" 
(ibia).  Hume  advised  his  readers  that  "Matters,  therefore,  must  be  trusted  to  their 
natural  progress  and  operation"  (BG,  52). 
Hume  saw  no  contradiction  between  an  increase  in  the  regulative  powers  of  the 
state  and  the  overall  happiness  of  its  subjects.  Both  resulted  from  the  growth  of 
industry  and  commerce.  However,  the  move  to  a  republican  form  of  government  in 
Britain  under  Cromwell  was  the  outcome  of  civil  war.  It  was  "more  terrible"  because 
of  the  disruption  to  the  subject's  liberty  to  accumulate  wealth,  and  the  emergence  of  a 
form  of  government  unregulated  by  law.  Moreover,  there  was  no  reason  to  prefer  a 
republic  over  an  absolute  monarchy  if  a  study  of  the  application  of  Harrington's  maxim 
applied  to  history  demonstrated  that  both  led,  from  the  perspective  of  the  subject,  to 
his  security  under  law. 
Hume's  warnings  about  the  future  of  the  British  constitution  were  also  reflected  in 
a  letter  he  wrote  to  a  nephew,  the  younger  David  Hume,  who  was  studying  Harrington 
whilst  boarded  with  Millar.  "  In  this  letter,  Hume  recognised  that  in  an  ideal  world  a 
republic  would  be  the  best  form  of  government,  and  given  that  the  experience  of  the 
English  commonwealth  was  one  of  despotism,  a  republic  might  be  welcome  in 
suppressing  potentially  de-stabilising  liberal  opinions  of  his  day.  He  wrote  to  his 
nephew: 
"[One]  great  advantage  of  a  commonwealth  over  a  n-dxed  monarchy,  is,  that  it  [would 
consid]erably  abridge  our  liberty;  which  is  growing  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be 
incom[patible  wi]th  all" 
I  lHill  Burton,  Life  and  Correspondence,  8th.  Dec.  1775,  p480.  The  original  letter  was  ripped  at  the 
edge.  I  have  taken  the  liberty  to  fill  in  the  missing  words  and  part-words  suggested  by  the  context  - 
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Of  interest  is  that  both  British  Government  and  the  letter  demonstrate  that  Hume 
thought  that  the  distribution  of  property  in  eighteenth  century  commercial  Britain  was 
such  that,  whether  the  constitution  was  monarchial  or  republican,  both  forms  would  be 
likely  to  assume  absolute  powers  unlimited  by  any  external  restraint  except  the  custom 
of  the  past.  Hume  thought  that  the  liberties  of  the  subject  in  his  person  and  property 
did  not  require  democratic  forms  of  expression,  and  that  the  feelings  of  liberty  a 
commercial  society  caused  had  the  potential  to  destabilise  the  very  society  that  had 
brought  them  into  being. 
Millar's  views,  as  I  have  argued,  were  similar  to  Hume's.  Like  Hume,  he  thought 
that  the  distribution  of  property  in  a  commercial  society  could  lead  to  absolutist  forms 
of  government.  He  agreed  with  Hume  that  English  republicanism  under  Cromwell  had 
led  to  a  form  of  military  despotism  which  he  called  "the  most  arbitrary  and  oppressive 
species  of  absolute  monarchy"  (HV,  3,348).  He  also  agreed  with  Hume  that  the  feelings 
of  liberty  of  the  subject  in  a  commercial  society  would  probably  lead  to  democratic 
reforms.  He  was,  however,  confident  that  if  the  suffrage  did  not  extend  to  the 
labouring  poor  -  those  individuals  whose  intelligence  was  most  damaged  by  the 
division  of  labour  and  who,  therefore,  would  be  the  least  likely  to  be  able  to  restrain 
their  violent  passions  through  calculative  self  interest  -  there  would  be  no  threat  to  the 
rule  of  law  in  a  commercial  society. 
Hume's  suspicion  of  any  potential  movement  towards  democratic  reform  can  be 
explained  with  reference  to  his  essay  Of  Civil  Liberty.  Hume  was  of  the  opinion  that 
the  subject  had  as  much  security  and  liberty  to  enjoy  his  property  within  what  he  called 
a  "civilised  monarchy"  as  within  a  republic.  A  "civilised"  monarchy  was  an  absolute 
monarchy  in  which  the  only  limits  to  the  monarch's  power  were  custom  and  his  own 
self  interest.  12  It  was  not,  however,  an  "arbitrary"  monarchy  because  every  minister 
and  magistrate  was  bound  by  law.  Functionaries,  officials  and  advisers  had,  therefore, 
no  discretionary  powers  to  oppose  their  own  self-interest  to  that  of  the  interests  of  the 
majority. 
When  Hume  reviewed  the  contemporary  forms  of  civilised  monarchies  he  wrote 
thatthey: 
"are  found  susceptible  of  order,  method,  and  constancy,  to  a  surprising  degree. 
Property  is  there  secure;  industry  encouraged;  the  arts  flourish"  (CL,  94). 
Hume's  conjectural  method  showed  that  a  modem  civilised  absolute  monarchy 
based  on  the  sovereign's  respect  for  law  was  the  governmental  form  that  afforded  the 
greatest  security  for  the  subject's  right  to  alienate  his  property  freely.  This  form  of 
12Forbcs,  Huma's  Politics,  p  157. 263 
government  gave  individuals  the  greatest  opportunity  for  their  self  improvement  or 
betterment.  It  would  therefore  be  approved  by  every  spectator  on  grounds  of  its 
utility.  The  historical  experience  of  modem  republican  governments  had  been  no 
different  in  this  respect.  The  problem  was  that  the  English  revolution  showed  that  in 
order  to  establish  the  conditions  for  the  liberty  of  the  subject  under  law,  a  republican 
form  of  government  had  led  to  a  form  of  military  despotism.  A  republican  form  of 
despotism  that  disrupted  the  accumulation  of  property,  industry  and  commerce  would 
therefore  most  probably  arise  again  if  there  were  any  attempt  to  reform  the 
constitution  in  a  more  democratic  direction.  A  spectator  would  therefore  be  less  likely 
to  approve  of  such  a  popular  movement  on  grounds  of  its  utility  than  the  customary 
re-establishment  of  the  unlimited  discretionary  powers  of  a  civilised  monarch. 
The  significance  of  the  use  of  a  version  Harrington's  maxim  modified  by  Hume  and 
Nfillar  by  their  conjectural  method  has  not  been  given  much  attention  in  the  secondary 
literature.  13  Pocock,  for  example,  draws  attention  to  how  Harrington  might  have 
influenced  Hume  when  he  writes  in  a  footnote:  "What  he  [Hume]  learned  from  him 
[Harrington)  might  be  sought  more  widely".  14 
The  maxim  was,  however,  considered  "scientific"  in  the  early  eighteenth  century  by 
Hume's  contemporary  George  Tumbull.  Tumbull's  opinion  of  Harrington  as  a  scientist 
glowed.  He  described  Harrington  as:  "a  Newtonian  before  Newton,  in  so  far  as  he 
managed  to  reduce  several  great  phenomena  in  the  moral  world  to  a  few  very  simple 
laws  or  principles".  15 
As  mentioned  in  chapter  one,  Pocock  argues  that  the  establishment  of  the  Bank  of 
England,  the  national  debt  and  public  credit  changed  eighteenth  century  conceptions  of 
property.  16  A  recognisably  new  social  grouping  of  creditors  and  speculators  had  come 
into  being  who,  it  was  claimed,  were  tending  to  dominate  politics.  Their  power  and 
influence  was  derived  from  interest  gained  from  loans  to  the  Crown.  This  group  were 
getting  rich  not  so  much  through  their  ownership  of  land,  as  through  the  exchange  of 
money.  Pocock  describes  this  revolution  as: 
"a  sudden  and  traumatic  discovery  of  capital  in  the  form  of  govenunent  stock  and  a 
sudden  and  traumatic  discovery  of  historical  transformation  as  something  brought 
about  by  public  credit".  17 
13Forbes  in  Hunie's  Politics  is  the  only  author  to  give  the  question  an  airing. 
14pocock  (ed.  ),  Harrington,  pl44,  n3. 
15Tumbull  G.  (1741)  Preface  to  his  translation  of  Heineccus'  Methodical  System  of  Universal  Law, 
p82.  Quoted  in  Forbes,  Hunie's  Politics,  p5.  Bernstein  E.  (1980),  a  social  democratic  political  thinker, 
suggested  that  the  maxim  "came  as  near  to  a  scientific  conception  of  history  as  was  possible  in  the 
seventeenth  century.  "  Cromwell  and  Communism,  Nottingham:  p206.  For  critical  remarks  on 
Bernstein's  idea  that  Harrington  anticipated  Marx,  see  footnotes  to  chapter  three. 
16Pocock,  "Mobility  of  Property",  pp103-123. 
17pocock,  "Mobility  of  Property",  p108. 264 
In  the  century  that  followed,  Pocock  argues  that  the  replacement  of  one  source  of 
wealth,  landed  property,  by  another,  what  he  calls  "mobile  property"  or  the  ownership 
of  capital  as  gover-nment  stock,  called  for  new  theories  of  political  power.  These  were 
to  ground  political  society  within  an  exchange  economy.  He  does  not  discuss  what 
effect  this  revolution  had  on  Harrington's  maxim  or  whether  the  maxim  might  have 
been  considered  a  scientific  principle  with  a  continuing  potential  to  illuminate  the 
relationship  of  property  to  power.  However,  he  is  clear  that,  firstly,  the  shift  in 
perception  of  property  was  from  something  that  was  passively  possessed  to  something 
that  was  actively  produced  and  exchanged,  and  secondly  that  a  perception  of  a  species 
of  "economic  man"  first  as  exchanger  and  then  as  both  producer  and  exchanger  came 
into  being  during  the  period.  18 
The  latter  has  a  bearing  upon  on  Hume's  use  of  the  maxim  and  Millar's  engagement 
with  Hume's  conclusions.  Firstly  it  is  clear  with  Hume  that  the  source  of  wealth 
available  to  the  Crown  was  in  terms  of  disposable  income  and  not,  as  for  Harrington, 
either  the  rateable  value  for  taxation,  the  value  of  the  produce  from  landed  property, 
or  the  land's  exchangeable  value  on  the  market.  Hume  referred  to  an  amount  of  three 
million  pounds  being  "at  the  disposal"  of  the  Crown  (BG,  49).  This  was  broken  down 
into  a  million  pounds  derived  from  the  collection  of  taxes,  a  million  spent  on  the  civil 
list  and  a  million  spent  on  the  employment  of  the  anny  and  the  navy.  The  property  to 
be  measured  by  the  maxim  was  not  necessarily  tied  to  taxation  as  the  only  source  of 
Crown  revenue.  It  can  be  assumed  that  Hume  thought  of  it  as  derived  from  other 
sources  such  as  credit. 
Secondly,  when  mentioning  the  limits  of  Harrington's  maxim,  he  pointed  out  that 
"much  less  property  in  a  single  hand  will  be  able  to  counterbalance  a  greater  property 
in  several"  (BG,  48).  One  of  these  reasons  was  that  the  several  hands  had  difficulty  in 
combining  against  the  single  hand.  The  other  was  because  the  men  of  smaller  landed 
estates  were  unable  to  use  their  revenue  to  create  the  same  form  of  dependence  as 
"property  when  united".  It  is  at  this  point  Hume  referred  to  the  smaller  proprietors' 
dependants  as  commodity  producers  and  exchangers.  These  were  the  "servants  and 
tradesmen"  who  "justly  regard  their  profits  as  the  product  of  their  own  labour"  (ibid). 
it  was  these  individuals  whom  Hume  argued  were  dependent  on  the  revenue  of  the 
landed  proprietor,  benefiting  from  his  revenue  as  a  means  of  subsistence  and  profit.  As 
I  shall  show  below,  Millar  argued  against  Hume  that  these  individuals  had  an 
independent  means  of  subsistence  and  profit.  This  suggests  that  the  changed 
perception  of  property  was  not  solely  dependent  upon  the  rise  of  credit,  as  Pocock 
18pocock,  "Mobility  of  Property",  p  119.  Pocock's  recognition  of  the  individual  as  economically  active 
is  played  down  by  Winch  who  denies  that  Smith  has  a  notion  of  the  individual  as  an  "economic  man". 
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argues,  but  also  upon  the  juridical  notion  of  a  natural  right  to  alienate  all  forms  of 
property  including  land.  The  latter  presupposed  the  generalised  commodification.  of 
both  the  land  and  agricultural  produce.  Hume's  reference  to  servants  who  "justly 
regard  their  profits  as  the  product  of  their  labour"  can  therefore  be  interpreted  as  a 
category  that  included  those  tenants  who  possessed  sufficient  capital  to  improve  the 
land  they  leased  from  a  proprietor. 
9.5  Millar  and  the  Distribution  of  Property 
Millar's  constitutional  concerns  flowed  directly  from  the  question  posed  by  Hume's 
essay.  Millar  agreed  with  Hume  that  during  the  eighteenth  century  there  had  been  a 
growth  of  dependency  upon  the  revenue  of  the  Crown,  thereby  making  it  possible  for 
the  monarch  to  exercise  his  prerogative  with  greater  frequency  and  impunity  against 
the  wishes  of  the  people.  However,  he  directly  contradicted  two  of  Hume's  other 
positions:  firstly  that  small  property  owners  in  a  commercial  society  were  dependent 
on  the  personal  influence  of  large  property  owners,  and  secondly  that  it  was  not 
possible  for  poorer  property  owners  to  combine  successfully  against  larger  property 
owners,  including  the  Crown.  Moreover  he  was  to  argue  that,  through  a  "fluctuation" 
or  "rotation"  of  property  brought  into  being  through  the  sale  and  purchase  of  landed 
property  as  commodities  with  exchange-value,  there  was  a  significant  shift  in  the 
balance  of  power  towards  those  individuals  of  differing  ranks  who  expressed  a  shared 
interest  in  encouraging  economic  activity  productive  of  profit.  The  question  of 
whether  or  not  the  Crown  would  perceive  its  own  interests  in  allying  with  the  latter 
would  determine  whether  or not  the  1688  settlement  with  its  mixed  constitutional  form 
of  government  was  to  survive  or  whether  it  would  change  into  an  absolutist  or  a 
republican  form.  Millar,  as  a  Whig,  favoured  the  former. 
The  theoretical  work  that  formed  the  background  to  this  position  was  initially 
undertaken  by  Smith  in  his  lectures  on  jurisprudence.  As  I  have  discussed  in  chapter 
eight,  Smith's  application  of  a  conjectural  method  to  the  distinction  between 
monarchies  and  republics  had  established  strong  causal  correlations  between 
knowledge  of  those  arts  enabling  individuals  to  subsist  and  acquire  surpluses  through 
their  own  activity,  and  ideas  of  property,  and  forms  of  law  and  government. 
Millar  shared  Smith's  overall  approach  to  the  teaching  of  public  law.  This  was  the 
inquiry  into  the  causal  relationship  between  the  arts  and  forms  of  government.  The  key 
to  this  relationship  was  the  application  of  universal  principles  of  the  mind,  such  as 
authority  and  utility,  to  circumstances  determined  by  the  level  of  knowledge  and 
application  of  the  arts.  Just  as  Smith's  and  Millar's  inquiry  into  private  law  had  led  to 
hypotheses  concerning  the  ideas  of  property  that  individuals  would  be  likely  to  have  if 
their  knowledge  were  limited  to  different  modes  of  subsistence  and  surplus 
accumulation,  so  their  inquiry  into  public  law  led  them  to  hypotheses  concerning  the 266 
wealth  that  individuals  would  possess  within  different  societies  in  which  knowledge 
was  so  confined.  This  wealth  became  property  as  a  result  of  individuals'  sense  of 
justice  as  theorised  in  the  lectures  on  private  law.  However,  the  operation  of  the 
principles  of  authority  and  utility  within  these  circumstances  determined  the 
relationships  of  dominance  and  subordination,  status  or  "rank"  individuals  had.  The 
distribution  of  property  amongst  the  population  determined  the  form  of  their 
government  -  whether,  for  example,  it  was  a  monarchy,  a  republic  or  a  rruxture  of 
both.  It  was  this  notion  that  had  its  origins  in  Harrington's  maxim.  It  was  more 
pronounced  in  Millar's  thinking  than  in  Smith's. 
Moreover,  both  writers  thought  of  government  as  satisfying  two  sets  of  needs 
mediated  through  the  principles  of  authority  and  utility:  first,  individuals'  needs  for 
defence  of  their  persons  and  property,  and  secondly,  their  needs  for  both  subsistence 
and  for  approval  and  recognition  through  the  acquisition  of  wealth  as  private  property. 
As  I  have  shown  in  chapter  nine,  these  needs  led  individuals  at  first  into  familial 
associations,  families  into  tribal  associations,  tribes  into  national  associations  and 
finally  into  a  world  in  which  nations  were  associated  through  commerce  and  trade.  The 
various  arrangements  of  individuals'  needs  for  subsistence  and  approval  corresponded 
to  their  knowledge  of  what  Millar  would  call  the  common  or  practical  arts  -  in  other 
words  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange  conceived  of  as  a  material- 
technical  process.  Knowledge  of  the  latter  led  inevitably  to  the  emergence  of  science. 
For  example,  Millar  wrote  of  how  the  science  of  law  arose  from  disputes  between 
individuals  over  their  property  and  "pecuniary  transactions".  This  acquainted  lawyers 
"with  the  rules  ofjustice  and  with  the  whole  system  of  legal  transactions"  (HV,  4,142). 
According  to  the  growth  of  this  knowledge,  different  relations  and  changing  roles 
of  dependence  and  independence  arose  between  individuals.  As  I  argued  in  chapter 
eight,  the  hypotheses  Smith  and  Millar  put  forward  on  these  causal  connections  were 
both  inductively  derived  from  and  confirmed  by  historical  and  contemporary  travel 
literature.  However,  once  fully  informed  of  the  probable  truth  of  the  hypotheses, 
spectators  could  test  whether  or  not  the  operation  of  the  principles  of  the  mind  such  as 
authority  and  utility  were  universal.  They  could  imagine  themselves  into  the  position  of 
individuals  socially  and  historically  circumstanced  by  their  knowledge  or  lack  of 
knowledge  of  arts,  customs,  manners,  laws  and  governments.  The  inability  of 
spectators  imagining  actions  determined  in  any  other  way  provided  further  proof  of  the 
truth  of  the  principles  and  their  application  to  history.  Smith  and  Millar's  observations 
that  the  principles  of  authority  and  utility  were  the  ones  used  to  assess  the  value  of 
forms  of  government  in  the  recent  past  provided  further  experimental  confirmation  of 
their  truth.  Past  debates  on  sovereignty  in  revolutionary  periods  during  the  seventeenth 
century  had  crystallised  into  the  poles  of  opposition  between  Tories  and  Whigs,  The 267 
Tories  had  used  the  principle  of  authority  in  opposition  to  the  principle  of  authority. 
The  Whigs  had  reversed  the  polarity. 
However,  as  noted  above  in  chapter  eight,  the  structure  Millar  adopted  in  his 
lectures  differed  from  that  of  Smith's  in  significant  ways.  Smith's  discussion  started 
with  forms  of  government:  monarchy  and  aristocratic  and  democratic  repubfics.  It  was 
only  after  he  had  made  these  distinctions  that  he  attempted  to  explain  the  origins  of 
government  according  to  the  four  modes  of  the  acquisition  of  property. 
Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  introduced  the  four  modes  at  the  start  of  his  discussion. 
They  were  described  as  steps  the  subject  of  experience  would  most  probably  take  in 
acquiring  different  forms  of  property.  By  presenting  a  general  theoretical  history  of  the 
arts,  property  and  government  before  discussing  examples  of  its  application  to 
particular  governments,  Millar  emphasised  the  salience  of  the  causal  connections 
between  the  arts  -  especially  commerce,  trade  and  manufactures  -  and  ideas  of 
property  and  forms  of  government  more  succinctly  than  Smith. 
Millar  generated  a  new  hypothesis.  Smith  had  noticed  one  side  of  this.  Smith 
observed  that  economic  activity  led  to  the  growth  of  standing  armies.  These  in  turn 
had  brought  into  being  what  Smith  called  military  monarchies  such  as  the  rule  of  the 
Roman  emperors  and  Cromwell.  This  was  the  arbitrary  rule  of  one  indivdual 
unbounded  by  law.  Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  argued  that  the  distribution  of  property 
and  changes  in  manners  caused  by  economic  activity  led  to  two  separate  tendencies  in 
governments.  The  first  was  the  one  recognised  by  Smith.  This  was  a  greater 
concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  a  despot  through  control  over  a  standing  army. 
As  Smith  had  observed,  this  concentration  of  power  took  place  in  large  countries 
irrespective  of  whether  the  government  was  monarchial  or  republican.  The  second, 
which  Smith  had  not  referred  to  in  his  lectures,  was  a  greater  confidence  amongst  a 
commercialised  people  in  asserting  their  personal  rights  in  law.  This  led  to  a  struggle 
against  abuses  of  the  arbitrary  power  of  rulers  and  brought  into  being  democratic 
forms  of  rule.  The  tendency  of  economic  activity  to  produce  democracy  influenced  the 
nature  of  the  institutions  with  sovereign  power  in  monarchies  and  republics.  Millar 
thought  that  these  tendencies  were  observable  in  all  societies  in  which  economic 
activity  dominated  the  mode  of  acquisition  of  property.  On  the  other  hand,  his  account 
of  which  tendency  would  prevail  depended,  he  thought,  on  accidents  of  geography,  for 
example  England's  island  status  and  the  size  of  territory  a  sovereign  power  had  control 
over. 
Millar  therefore  abandoned  Smith's  comparisons  between  monarchies  and 
republics  according  to  the  four-stage  classification  of  the  arts  and  adopted  a  new  set  of 
descriptive  categories:  feudal  aristocracy,  feudal  monarchy,  and  commercial 
governments.  The  latter  were  determined  by  differing  distributions  of  property.  These, 
in  turn,  were  determined  by  poor  individuals'  dependence  upon  the  rich  for  subsistence 268 
and  protection  when  property  could  not  be  acquired  through  generalised  commodity 
production  and  exchange,  and  their  relative  independence  and  upward  social  mobility 
as  they  became  economically  active.  Thus: 
"With  reference  to  the  distribution  of  property,  in  the  early  part  of  our  history,  which 
goes  under  the  name  of  the  feudal  system,  the  constitution  established  in  the  first  of 
these  periods,  may  be  called  the  feudal  aristocracy;  that  in  the  second,  the  feudal 
monarchy;  and  that  which  took  place  in  the  third,  may  be  called  the  commercial 
government.  "[Millar's  emphasis]  (HV,  1,4) 
11.6  The  Fluctuation  of  Property 
Smith  had  confined  his  discussion  of  the  operation  of  the  principles  of  authority 
and  utility  on  government  to  the  relations  of  dependence  between  individuals  caused 
by  a  competition  of  interests.  As  discussed  in  chapter  nine,  these  were  motivated  by 
the  desire  for  social  recognition  derived  from  wealth  protected  by  the  rules  of 
property.  Millar  applied  these  principles  in  the  same  way  but,  in  addition,  incorporated 
the  principles  to  Smith's  discussion  of  sources  of  authority  within  the  household.  19  This 
then  informed  his  account  of  the  origins  and  development  of  government.  Smith  had 
discussed  sources  of  authority  within  the  household  in  his  lectures  on  domestic  law 
(LI(B),  10  1-48.  LI(A),  iii.  1-  147).  Millar  made  this  discussion  relevant  to  his  account  of 
relations  of  dependence  that  affected  forms  of  public  law.  As  early  as  the  first  edition 
of  The  Origin  of  Ranks  in  177  1,  Millar  had  classified  forms  of  dependence  into  "the 
primitive  government  of  the  family",  the  government  of  a  "tribe  or  village",  the 
government  of  a  "union  of  several  tribes",  feudal  government  and  commercial 
goverriment.  20 
Already  armed  with  a  concept  of  voluntary  acquiescence  or  submission  mediated 
by  utility  taken  from  Hume's  essay  on  the  original  contract,  Millar's  synthesis  of 
Smith's  discussion  of  rights  between  master  and  slave  -a  form  of  dependence  within 
the  patriarchal  household  -  with  his  account  of  the  transition  from  allodial  to  feudal 
forms  of  property  -  with  its  resulting  forms  of  dependence  on  masters  external  to 
households  -  enabled  him  to  show  how  the  greater  sense  of  independence  caused  by 
economic  activity  resulted  in  changes  in  the  social  composition  of  the  English 
government  through  the  "fluctuation"  or  "rotation"  of  property.  This  fluctuation, 
N4illar  thought,  led  to  greater  social  equality  within  the  commercial  form  of 
governments  of  which  the  English  government  was  the  most  paradigmatic  example.  It 
also  had  a  tendency  to  introduce  a  democratic  element  in  the  constitution.  Thus: 
191gnatieff  recognises  this  as  important  to  the  structure  of  OR.  See  "Millar",  p321. 
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"T'his  fluctuation  of  property,  so  observable  in  all  commercial  countries,  and  which  no 
prohibitions  are  capable  of  preventing,  must  necessarily  weaken  the  authority  of  those 
who  are  placed  in  the  higher  ranks  of  life 
... 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that  these 
circumstances  have  a  tendency  to  introduce  a  democratical  govermnent.  "  (OR,  234- 
235) 
Preceding  this  quote,  Millar  had  explained  the  fluctuation  of  property  in  the 
following  way: 
"From  the  usual  effects  of  luxury  and  refinement,  it  may  at  the  same  time  be  expected 
that  old  families  will  often  be  reduced  to  poverty  and  beggary.  In  a  refined  and 
luxurious  nation  those  who  are  born  to  great  affluence,  and  who  have  been  bred  to  no 
business,  are  excited,  with  mutual  emulation,  to  surpass  one  another  in  the  elegance 
and  refinement  of  their  living.  According  as  they  have  the  means  of  indul&g 
themselves  in  pleasure,  they  become  more  addicted  to  the  pursuit  of  it,  and  are  sunk  in 
a  degree  of  indolence  and  dissipation  which  renders  them  incapable  of  any  active 
employment.  Ilus  the  expence  of  the  landed  gentleman  is  apt  to  be  continually 
increasing,  without  any  proportional  addition  to  his  income.  His  estate,  therefore, 
being  more  and  more  incumbered  with  debts,  is  at  length  alienated,  and  brought  into 
the  possession  of  the  frugal  and  industrious  merchant,  who,  by  success  in  trade,  has 
been  enabled  to  buy  it,  and  who  is  desirous  of  obtaining  that  rank  and  consequence 
which  landed  property  is  capable  of  bestowing.  The  posterity,  however,  of  this  new 
proprietor,  having  adopted  the  manners  of  the  landed  gentry,  are  again  led,  in  a  few 
generations,  to  squander  their  estate,  with  a  heedless  extravagance  equal  to  the 
parsimony  and  activity  by  which  it  was  acquired.  "  (OR,  233-234) 
The  power  and  influence  derived  from  landed  property  was  therefore,  according  to 
NEW,  constantly  shifling  from  those  who  were  "incapable  of  any  active  employment" 
to  the  "frugal  and  industrious  merchant"  who  acquired  landed  property  through 
"parsimony  and  activity".  Here  is  evidence  of  the  operation  of  the  self-interested 
passions  of  vanity.  Vanity  motivated  individuals  both  to  work  hard  and  to  save.  It  also 
brought  the  landed  gentry  ultimate  ruin  through  competitive  emulation.  This  passion 
that  Millar  and  Smith  thought  was  inherent  to  human  nature  and  caused  economic 
activity  required  that  the  idea  of  a  full  right  to  freely  alienable  property  be  recognised 
and  approved  by  every  spectator.  This  right  required  enforcement  by  government  and 
laws  administered  by  the  propertied.  The  quote  also  indicated  that  Millar  thought  that 
the  landed  gentry  would  become  an  unproductive  class  if  they  spent  their  revenue  on 
luxurious  consumption  rather  saving  it  for  future  investment. 
Nfillar  made  similar  statements  of  the  above  kind  elsewhere: 270 
"T'he  effect  of  superiority  in  wealth,  as  I  had  occasion  to  shew  in  a  former  part  of  this 
discourse,  is  further  diminished  in  commercial  counties,  by  the  frequent  alienation  of 
estates.  As  persons  of  low  rank  are  incited  by  their  situation  to  better  their 
circumstances,  and  commonly  acquire  such  habits  of  industry  and  frugality,  as  enable 
them  to  accumulate;  those  who  are  born  to  great  fortunes,  are  apt,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  become  idle  and  dissipated,  and  IiViDg  in  all  the  expence  which  opulence  renders 
fashionable,  are  frequently  tempted  to  squander  their  estates.  Hence,  opulent  families 
are  quickly  reduced  to  indigence;  and  their  place  is  supplied  by  professional  people 
from  the  lower  orders;  who,  by  the  purchase  of  land,  endeavour  to  procure  that 
distinction  which  was  the  end  of  their  labours.  "  (HV,  4,130-13  1) 
Here  Millar  made  the  hypothesis  that  "the  frequent  alienation  of  estates"  passing 
rapidly  "by  the  purchase  of  land"  from  those  "bom  to  great  fortunes"  to  "persons  of 
low  rank"  and  "professional  people  from  the  lower  orders"  had  a  diminishing  "effect" 
on  the  power  and  influence  derived  from  wealth.  Millar  suggested  that  the  increasingly 
rapid  fluctuation  of  ownership  of  land  between  high  and  low  ranking  proprietors 
entailed  that  those  poor  individuals  who  had  been  or  continued  to  be  dependent  upon 
the  landed  rich  had  less  time  to  develop  the  habits  of  submission  and  deference 
necessary  to  re-inforce  the  operation  of  the  principle  of  authority.  Thus: 
"Property  is  thus  commonly  subjected  to  a  constant  rotation,  which  prevents  it  from 
conferring  upon  the  owner  the  habitual  respect  and  consideration,  derived  from  a  long 
continued  intercourse  between  the  poor  and  the  rich.  "  (HV,  4,13  1) 
The  fluctuation  of  property  came  about  through  the  transformation  of  land  into  an 
alienable  commodity.  As  a  commodity  it  could  be  acquired  through  the  self-interested 
economic  activity  of  low-ranking  individuals.  This  process  functioned  to  confirm 
Harrington's  belief  that  a  rotation  of  offices  would  check  tendencies  to  oligarchy  in 
government.  In  also  confirmed  Millar's  liberal  belief  that  greater  political  equality 
could  be  achieved  without  state  interference  in  the  economy  -  the  rotation  happening 
as  a  natural  unintended  outcome  of  the  activities  of  a  multiplicity  of  economically  self- 
interested  individuals.  Moreover,  the  fluctuation  of  property  played  an  important  role 
in  Millar's  account  of  the  changes  in  the  form  of  government  from  "feudal  aristocracy" 
to  "feudal  monarchy"  and  later  into  a  "commercial  government".  Millar  thought  that 
economic  activity  not  only  caused  feudal  aristocrats  to  accrue  debts  as  they  bought  the 
commodities  produced  and  exchanged  by  artisans  and  merchants,  but  also  inclined 
them  to  "dismember  and  alienate"  their  estates  (HV,  2,189),  thus  diminishing  their 
wealth  and  power.  The  dismembered  estates  were  bought  by  smaller  property  owners 271 
who  had  previously  been  dependent  upon  them  for  protection  as  vassals.  This 
correspondingly  increased  the  power  of  the  lower  ranks.  Millar  described  this  change 
in  the  distribution  of  property  as  resulting  from  the  "general  propensity  to  alienation, 
arising  from  the  advancement  of  commerce  and  manufactures"  (HV,  2,402-403).  This 
formed  an  essential  component  of  his  argument  against  Hume  that  the  power  of  the 
monarch  in  the  English  constitution  had  always  been  limited.  Thus: 
"They  [the  house  of  commons]  well  knew,  that  at  no  period  of  the  English  history  was 
the  sovereign  ever  possessed  of  an  unlimited  authority;  that,  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  government,  and  under  the  princes  of  the  Norman  and  Plantagenet  race, 
the  chief  power  was  in  the  hands  of  the  nobility,  or  great  proprietors  of  land;  and  that, 
when  the  advancement  of  manufactures  and  of  agriculture,  in  the  reigns  of  the  Tudor 
princes,  had  contributed  to  dismember  the  estates,  and  to  diminish  the  influence  of  the 
nobles,  the  same  change  of  circumstances  tended  to  advance  the  middling  and  lower 
classes  of  the  people,  and  to  bestow  proportional  weight  and  authority  upon  that 
branch  of  parliament  composed  of  the  national  representatives.  "  (HV,  3,156-157) 
Thus  Millar  thought  that  economic  activity  in  the  form  of  "the  advancement  of 
manufactures  and  of  agriculture"  -  or  what  he  called  elsewhere:  the  "general  cause  of 
alienation"  (HV,  2,189)  both  dismembered  estates  and  gave  "proportional  weight  and 
authority"  to  the  "middling  and  lower  classes  of  the  people"  represented  in  parliament. 
This  proportionally  greater  influence  had  the  potential  to  limit  the  sovereign's  power  in 
commercial  governments  as  much  as  it  had  been  limited  by  the  "nobility  or  the  great 
landed  proprietors"  during  the  preceding  period  of  the  feudal  monarchy.  Moreover, 
contrary  to  Hume's  argument  that  it  was  difficult  for  poorer  men  to  combine  their 
property  against  the  richer  man  with  the  greater  number  of  dependants,  Millar 
demonstrated  that  poorer  property  owners  had  successfully  organised  around  shared 
interests  and  combined  against  larger  property  owners,  including  the  Crown.  The  latter 
was,  according  to  Millar,  a  fact  of  history  that  led  inexorably  to  the  English  Revolution 
and  Civil  War.  Thus: 
"But  when  the  splitting  of  large  estates,  and  the  introduction  of  representatives  from 
counties  and  boroughs,  had  extended  the  right  of  sitting  in  parliament  to  many  small 
proprietors,  their  authority  and  weight  came  to  depend  more  upon  their  collective,  than 
their  separate  power;  and  the  greater  weakness  of  individuals  obliged  them  to  unite 
more  in  a  body  for  the  defence  of  their  parliamentary  privileges.  "  (HV,  3,454) 
Economic  activity  thus  caused  the  break  up  of  the  estates  of  the  feudal  nobility,  the 
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into  a  "collective"  power  with  a  shared  interest  to  defend  "their  parliamentary 
privileges.  "  This  increasingly  commercialised  social  grouping  gained  the  power 
through  their  combined  action  to  limit  the  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  sovereign  to 
establish  an  absolute  monarchy  in  England.  They  also  demonstrated  that  the  combined 
weight  of  smaller  property  was  sufficient  to  overbalance  the  weight  of  the  property  of 
the  wealthiest  and  most  powerful  proprietor:  the  Crown. 
11.7  A  Tendency  to  Despotism 
Millar  was  "a  decided  whig".  21  He  dedicated  Historical  View  to  Charles  James 
Fox,  the  Whig  politician.  Throughout  the  book,  Millar  upheld  the  virtues  of  the  1688 
Settlement  which  brought  into  being  a  government  which  had: 
"the  advantages  of  both  a  monarchy  and  a  republic,  by  uniting  the  dignity  and 
authority  of  an  hereditary  monarch,  calculated  to  repress  insurrection  and  disorder, 
vAth  the  joint  deliberation  of  several  chief  executive  officers,  and  a  frequent  rotation  of 
their  offices,  tending  to  guard  against  the  tyranny  of  a  single  person.  "  (HV,  4,76) 
It  was  this  form  of  mixed  constitution  that  Millar  wanted  to  defend  and  uphold. 
However,  Millar  also  thought  the  constitutional  settlement  was  unstable.  It  was  in 
constant  danger  of  becoming  absolutist,  as  long  as  "the  sovereign  claims  a  principal 
share  at  least,  in  the  nomination  of  public  officers"  (OR,  229).  Through  the 
employment  and  dependency  of  these  functionaries  upon  the  revenue  of  the  Crown, 
the  monarch  was  able  to  "support  and  to  extend  his  authority"  (ibid).  It  was  these 
circumstances  that  increased  "the  general  bias  towards  the  absolute  domination  of  a 
single  person"  (ibid).  Thus  he  observed  during  the  century:  "the  growing  influence  of 
the  crown,  arising  from  the  patronage  which  it  has  acquired,  and  the  corresponding 
habits  of  dependence  in  the  people  which  have  thence  been  produced"  (HV,  4,78). 
His  outrage  concerning  the  parasitic  group  of  dependants  of  the  Crown  reached 
colossal  proportions  in  his  essay:  Political  Consequences  of  the  Revolution  (HV,  4,69- 
10  1),  and  formed  a  powerful  indictment  of  an  unproductive  group  of  people: 
"To  what  a  monstrous  height  has  this  abuse;  which  has  continued  for  more  than  a 
century  been  at  length  carried!  How  many  officers,  in  church  and  state,  obtain 
immense  fortunes  from  the  public  for  doing  no  work,  or  next  to  none!  How  many  are 
often  employed  to  perform  the  duty  which  might  easily  be  performed  by  a  single 
person!  The  tendency  of  this  is  to  increase  the  patronage  and  consequently  the 
influence  of  the  crown,  is  too  obvious  to  require  illustration"  (HV,  4,93). 
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This  influence  had  grown  particularly  because  of  the  number  of  wars  that  had 
taken  place  post-1688.  A  war,  he  pointed  out: 
"though  generally  hurtful  to  the  community  at  large,  proves  often  highly  beneficial  to  a 
patron  of  its  members;  to  the  landed  gentlemen,  who,  by  serving  in  the  army  and  navy, 
obtain  a  provision  for  themselves  and  their  families:  and  those  of  the  mercantile 
interest,  who  by,  the  extensive  loans  to  government  and  by  lucrative  employments 
obtain  the  means  of  accumulating  fortunes"  (HV,  4,85-86). 
Moreover,  the  influence  of  the  crown  acquired  during  war  "will  not  be  immediately 
extinguished  upon  the  conclusion  of  peace"  (HV,  4,86-87).  The  result  of  this  "new 
principle  of  authority"  were  habits  of  dependence  which  could  seduce  individuals  from 
"the  duty  which  they  owe  to  the  public"  (ibid). 
Millar  was  well  known  for  his  anti-war  activity,  opposing  British  hostilities  against 
the  revolutionary  regime  in  France.  There  is  no  contradiction  in  supposing  that  his 
involvement  was  based  both  on  Whig  fears  that  war  would  strengthen  the  absolutist 
tendencies  of  the  monarch  and  also  of  liberal  fears  that  the  suppression  of  the 
movement  for  parliamentary  reform  would  frustrate  the  rising  interests  of  a  productive 
industrial  bourgeoisie  against  those  of  an  unproductive  land-owning  bourgeoisie. 
Certainly,  in  a  letter  to  Samuel  Rose,  he  indicated  that  he  thought  the  hostility  towards 
the  French  Revolution  by  such  writers  as  Burke  was  motivated  by  a  desire  to  suppress 
reform  in  Britain.  Millar  commented  on  contemporary  events  as  follows: 
"By  some  accounts  from  London,  I  see  people  are  disposed  there  to  decide  in  favour  of 
the  invective  against  the  French  Assembly.  But  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  opinion  of 
any  person  I  have  conversed  with  here.  The  truth  is,  it  grieves  me  to  differ  from  so 
excellent  a  man  as  Burke,  but  I  do  not  see  in  this  instance  how  he  can  be  vindicated. 
He  is  an  enemy  to  the  reform  of  parliamentary  representation  and  to  the  repeal  of  the 
test  act  -  and  seeing  that  the  revolution  in  France  is  likely  to  forward  those  measures, 
he  chooses  to  take  the  first  word  in  declaiming  against  that  revolution.  It  is  all  in  vain 
however.  The  system  established  in  France  will  have  the  effect  of  reflecting  upon  this 
country  some  of  those  rays  which  have  been  received  from  her  through  the  medium  of 
America"  (16.  Feb.  1790).  22 
On  the  issue  of  parliamentary  reform  he  went  on  to  say: 
"T'here  is  a  great  pecuniary  interest  that  must  lead  many  powerful  individuals  to 
oppose  it,  and  it  must  require  some  length  of  time  before  the  voice  of  the  community  at 
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large  is  able  to  silence  the  opposition  arising  from  private  views.  But  I  should  think  it 
impossible  that  the  people  of  England  will  be  contented  with  a  national  assembly  so  ill 
constituted  while  they  have  the  example  of  one  so  much  superior  in  France.  "  (ibid) 
If  this  letter  correctly  reflects  opinion  of  the  time,  then  it  is  evident  that  Mllar  was 
optimistic  that,  whatever  financial  power  was  used  to  justify  and  support  repressive  or 
backward  legislation,  the  "voice  of  the  community"  would  eventually  win  through,  for: 
"When  a  law  is  directly  contrary  to  the  bent  of  a  people,  it  must  either  be  repealed  or 
evaded"  (HV,  2,402).  His  historical  views  proved  that  backward  legislation,  such  as  the 
law  of  entails,  succumbed,  as  he  saw  it,  to  a  natural  disposition  within  humanity  to  the 
free  alienation  of  commodities. 
11.8  A  Tendency  to  Liberty 
Millar  explained  that  although  there  had  been  a  shift  of  influence  towards  the 
Crown  in  the  century  post-1688,  and  that  this  influence  had  produced  a  corresponding 
form  of  dependence  upon  the  revenue  of  the  Crown,  yet  the  shift  was  neither  an 
irreversible  one  nor  one  that  would  lead  to  either  a  republican  or  a  monarchial  form  of 
despotism.  As  I  show  below,  Millar  theorised  that  there  was  a  countervailing  historical 
tendency  to  that  of  a  despotic  forms  of  rule,  whether  it  be  monarchial  or  republican. 
This  was  the  effect  of  the  growth  of  "liberal  sentiments"  belonging  to  those  engaged  in 
productive  economic  activity.  These  came  into  being  as  individuals'  followed  their  self- 
interested  quest  for  profit.  They  ensured  that  legislation  and  forms  of  representation 
were  adapted  to  the  advancement  of  commercial  activities  unimpeded  by  the 
interference  of  corrupt  and  unproductive  administrators  and  court  flunkeys. 
Millar  asked  whether,  during  the  post-1688  period,  there  had  been  nothing  "to 
counterbalance  the  effect  of  this  growing  patronage,  and  its  corresponding  influence?  " 
(HV,  4,99).  He  pointed  to  the  rapid  extension  of  commerce,  the  greater  degree  of 
wealth  and  affluence,  and  a  greater  diffusion  of  "a  feeling  of  independence  and  a  high 
spirit  of  liberty,  through  the  great  body  of  the  people"  (HV,  4,100).  These  feelings  were 
to  be  found  within  the  "men  of  inferior  condition"  who  were  enabled  to  live  in 
affluence  by  their  own  industry,  and,  in  procuring  their  livelihood,  "have  little  occasion 
to  court  the  favour  of  their  superiors"  (OR,  241-2).  It  was  within  this  group  of  people 
that  "we  may  expect  that  ideas  of  liberty  will  be  universally  diffused"  (ibid). 
Such  circumstances  were  "naturally  produced  by  commerce  and  manufactures" 
(ibid).  Millar  picked  the  artificer  and  tradesman  as  the  typical  occupations  of 
individuals  whose  subsistence  and  profits  were  not  derived  from  one  but  from  many 
people  and  who  sold  his  goods  in  a  free  market.  The  individual  commodity  producer 
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through  his  acquisition  of  property  was  able  to  generate  profits  through  his  own 
labour: 
"An  artificer,  whose  labour  is  enhanced  by  the  general  demand  for  it,  or  a  tradesman 
who  sells  his  goods  in  a  common  market,  considers  himself  as  his  own  master.  He  says 
that  he  is  obliged  to  his  employers,  or  his  customers,  and  he  treats  them  with  civility; 
but  he  does  not  feel  himself  greatly  dependent  upon  them.  His  subsistence,  and  his 
profits,  are  derived  not  from  one,  but  from  a  number  of  persons;  he  knows,  besides, 
that  their  employment,  or  their  custom,  proceeds  not  commonly  from  personal  favour, 
but  from  a  regard  to  their  own  interest,  and  consequently  that,  while  he  serves  them 
equally  well,  he  has  no  reason  to  apprehend  the  decline  of  his  business.  "  (HV,  3,101) 
These  mercantile  people  were  not  only  the  "best  judges  of  their  own  interest" 
(HV,  4,109)  but  also  "by  pursuing  those  lines  of  trade  which  they  find  most  beneficial 
to  themselves,  they  are  likely  to  produce,  in  most  cases,  the  greatest  benefit  to  the 
public"  (ibid).  Moreover,  the  administrators  in  government,  -.  'hom  Millar  treated  with 
contempt  because  of  their  dependency  on  the  wealth  of  the  Crown,  were  neither 
qualified  to  judge  nor  sufficiently  free  from  direction  by  "persons  who  have  an  interest 
to  mislead  them"  (HV,  4,110).  The  governmental  administrative  elite  who  tampered 
with  "the  commercial  machine"  (ibia)  were  more  likely  to  damage  than  improve  it: 
"and  their  impositions,  besides  loading  the  public  with  inunediate  expence,  from  the 
bounties  bestowed  upon  the  favourite  branches  of  trade,  have  diverted  the  mercantile 
capitals  of  the  nation  into  channels,  very  different  from  their  natural  course,  in  which 
they  have  been  productive  of  less  profit,  than  they  would  otherwise  have  yielded.  " 
(ibid) 
This  is  an  example  of  one  of  Millar's  attacks,  similar  to  those  that  Smýith  made  in 
the  Wealth  ofNations,  on  the  same  group  of  state  functionaries  and  professionals  who 
were  a  drain  on  a  state  revenue  that  could  be  productively  invested  in  labour  that 
generated  capital.  23  It  also  reflected  a  shared  Smýithian  view  that  a  free  play  of  the 
individual's  self-interests  was  the  most  conducive  to  the  public  good.  It  is  evidence  that 
Mllar  was  a  transitional  thinker,  moving  from  a  Whig  framework  with  its 
preoccupations  with  the  struggle  between  the  people  and  the  Crown,  to  a  liberal 
framework  which  stressed  an  untrammelled  freedom  for  individuals  to  pursue  their 
"  some  of  the  most  respectable  orders  in  society  is,  Me  that  of  menial  servants,  23"The  labour  oA 
unproductive  of  any  value  ... 
The  sovereign,  for  example,  with  all  the  officers  both  ofjustice  and  war 
who  serve  under  him,  the  whole  army  and  navy,  are  unproductive  labourers.  They  are  the  servants  of 
the  public,  and  maintained  by  a  part  of  the  annual  produce  of  the  industry  of  other  people" 
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own  interests,  both  economically,  in  the  form  of  freedom  to  invest  capital  without  any 
form  of  state  interference,  and  personally,  as  freedom  which,  if  pursued  without 
interruption,  would  produce  a  form  of  social  arrangements  conducive  to  the  general 
happiness  and  well-being  of  humanity. 
As  a  Whig,  Millar  argued  from  the  standpoint  of  the  people's  struggle  against  the 
prerogative  of  the  monarch.  As  an  economic  liberal,  he  argued  that  state  interference 
in  the  individual's  pursuit  of  profit  was  a  violation  of  natural  liberty.  This  could  be 
limited  only  by  the  self-interested  restraint  the  subject  exercised  over  his  passions. 
Subjects  were  motivated  by  the  universal  operations  of  the  human  mind  to  better 
themselves  through  production  and  exchange  of  commodities.  Unless  state  policy  was 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  manufacturing  interest  with  their  more  independent  and 
liberal  customs  and  manners,  it  was  bound  to  fail. 
in  Millar,  there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  which  social  grouping  advanced  liberty: 
commodity  producers  and  exchangers.  This  was  a  conglomerate  grouping  reflecting  a 
real  social  alliance  of  the  time.  This  alliance  consisted  of  improving  landlords;  agrarian, 
industrial  and  banking  capitalists;  and  the  skilled  working  class.  It  was  soon  to  fall 
apart,  a  victim  of  growing  class  antagonisms.  Fanned  by  the  flames  of  the  French 
revolution  and  by  the  state's  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  landed  section  of  the 
bourgeoisie,  antagonisms  grew  between  the  industrial  and  landed  bourgeoisie. 
Antagonisms  were  also  to  manifest  themselves  between  the  bourgeoisie  as  a  whole  and 
a  rapidly  maturing  factory  proletariat  which  absorbed  the  formerly  prosperous  section 
of  the  working  class  dispossessed  of  a  means  of  production.  These  conflicts  took 
political  shape  in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
11.9  Dependence  and  Liberty 
Millar's  discussion  of  developments  in  the  British  constitution  post-1688  focused 
on  the  degree  of  dependence  or  independence  that  individuals  were  likely  to  have  in 
relation  to  other  individuals.  Ideas  or  feelings  of  liberty  were  more  likely  to  flower  in 
the  minds  of  commodity  producers  and  exchangers  because  their  acquisition  of  both 
subsistence  and  profits  were  derived  not  from  one  person  but  from  many.  Wages  and 
profits  were  revenues  that  took  the  form  of  property  and  were  acquired  through 
exchange  rather  than  through  personal  favours. 
The  first  way  Millar  used  the  concept  of  independence  was  as  the  craftsman  or 
wage  labourer's  indifference  to  the  will  of  his  customer  or  employer.  Millar  conceived 
of  a  master  as  a  customer  of  the  commodities  a  labourer,  or  craftsman  produced. 
When  Millar  directed  the  attention  of  his  readers  to  the  lowest  social  grouping  of 
labourers,  he  stated  that  they  were  almost  universally  dependent  upon  their  masters  for 
an  employment  which  would  permit  them  to  subsist.  Millar  reasoned  that,  if 
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dependent  labourers  in  order  to  gratify  their  interested  passion  of  vanity.  Thus  in  a 
condition  of  original  scarcity,  Millar  reasoned  conjecturally: 
"Ilere  are  ways  of  spending  money  by  which  you  will  not  procure  so  much  authority 
as  by  others  -  Ilius  the  purchasing  of  luxuries  does  not  create  much  dependence  of  the 
seller  upon  the  buyer.  In  this  state  however  there  is  but  little  opportunity  of  spending 
one's  money  in  buying  luxuries,  they  therefore  lay  it  out  purposely  to  procure  respect 
and  influence.  "  (LGI  771,17) 
If  labourers  were  dependent,  then  they  would  develop  habits  of  submission  to  their 
masters'will.  They  would  be  reluctant  to  come  into  conflict  with  their  masters  for  fear 
of  losing  a  means  of  subsistence  given  to  them  in  return  for  their  admiration  and 
respect.  The  personal  relationship  of  dependence  and  its  effect  upon  authority  was 
conceived  in  a  way  analogous  to  children's  deference  to  the  will  of  their  fathers  -a 
recognition  that  respect  and  submission  was  due  to  the  master  for  their  efforts  in 
providing  for  their  subsistence.  Indifference  to  the  father's  will  and  a  weakening  of  his 
authority  followed  from  the  adult's  ability  to  subsist  through  his  own  labour. 
The  difference  between  circumstances  that  perpetuated  these  habits  and  those  that 
undermined  them  were  contained  within  the  idea  that,  when  a  purchase  and  sale  took 
place,  the  commodity  producer  was  indifferent  to  the  needs  of  customers.  The  aim  of 
exchange  was  to  gain  money  that  could  be  used  in  whatever  way  the  producer  liked. 
This  notion  of  indifference  was  transferred  to  the  relationship  between  master  and 
labourer.  As  I  argued  in  chapter  seven,  Millar  thought  of  the  labourer  as  an  embryonic 
craftsman  and  capitalist.  There  was  therefore  a  disposition  to  link  the  independent 
craftsman's  indifference  to  his  customers  with  the  constantly  fluctuating  movement  of 
workers  from  one  master  to  another  that  he  would  have  observed  in  the  labour  market 
of  his  day. 
Given  Millar's  focus  upon  changing  habits,  rather  than  the  social  division  of 
labour,  there  was  no  need  for  him  to  distinguish  between  labourers,  artificers  and 
manufacturers,  nor  between  manufacturers  and  merchants.  They  were  all  "mercantile 
people"  and  for  every  "mercantile  person"  what  were  previously  considered  the 
appropriate  behaviour  patterns  of  the  inferior  to  his  or  her  superior  had  changed. 
A  second  way  Millar  conceived  of  independence  was  therefore  as  the  dissolution 
of  relations  of  personal  dependence  upon  one  master  for  subsistence  over  a  lifetime. 
The  personal  aspect  of  the  relationship  of  dependence  remained  essential  to  an 
understanding  of  the  category,  for,  without  a  life-time  bond  between  master  and 
servant,  habits  of  submission  and  deference  could  no  longer  reproduce  themselves  with 
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Millar's  attention  focused  upon  changes  in  ideas  and  opinions,  habits  and  customs, 
and  he  connected  these  to  the  transformation  of  the  direct  personal  relationship 
between  master  and  servant  into  an  impersonal  relationship  motivated  solely  by  self- 
interest.  Thus  Millar  described  the  artificer  or  tradesman  as  someone  "who  sells  his 
goods  in  a  common  market".  He  did  not  feel  dependent  on  his  customers  because  his 
"employment  or,  their  custom,  proceeds  not  commonly  from  personal  favour,  but  from 
a  regard  to  their  own  interest"  (HV,  3,101-102).  This  feeling  of  independence  was 
shared  by  the  wage  labourer  with  the  merchant  and  independent  craftsman  whom  he 
stated  formed  but  a  "slight  connection"  with  a  succession  of  different  masters 
(HV,  4,116).  Generalised  commodity  production  loosened  the  "bond  of  union  between 
the  workmen  and  their  employer"  (ibid).  The  emphasis  here  was  on  the  worker's  or 
craftsman's  or  capitalist's  subjective  estimation  of  dependence  or  independence;  the 
breach  of  older  "habits  of  submission"  to  the  will  of  a  master  when  property  or  a 
means  of  subsistence  was  "derived  not  from  one  but  a  number  of  persons". 
A  third  way  Millar  used  the  concept  of  independence  was  as  a  relationship  of 
status  and  authority  based  upon  the  esteem,  respect  and  deference  given  to  those  who 
acquired  propertied  wealth.  The  assumption  throughout  was  that  the  market  enabled 
every  individual  the  opportunity  to  be  well  off  by  freeing  them  to  pursue  wealth  in  a 
self-interested  way.  This  was  linked  to  his  observations  that  an  expanding  economy 
generated  a  demand  for  labour  and  that  this  demand  permitted  employers  to  give 
labourers  high  wages.  As  I  showed  in  chapter  seven,  the  labourer  acquired  property, 
turned  into  a  craftsman  and  became  a  capitalist.  I  argued  in  chapter  eight  that  Srnýith 
and  Millar  explained  this  progress  as  the  result  of  a  universal  propensity  for 
betterment,  the  latter  being  nothing  more  than  the  outcome  of  the  subject's  calculations 
of  his  long-term  interests.  Observations  of  the  world  Millar  lived  in  were  objective 
confirmations  of  this  thesis: 
"when  we  observe  the  number  of  common  labourers  who  are  daily  converted  into 
artificers,  frequently  vending  their  own  productions;  what  crowds  of  people  are 
continually  rising  from  the  lower  ranks,  and  disposed  of  in  the  various  branches  of 
trade;  how  many  have  acquired,  and  how  many  more  are  in  the  high  road  of  acquiring 
opulent  fortunes;  how  universally  mutual  emulation,  and  mutual  intercourse,  have 
diffused  habits  of  industry,  have  banished  idleness,  which  is  the  parent  of  indigence, 
and  have  put  it  into  the  power  of  almost  every  individual,  by  the  exertion  of  his  own 
talents,  to  earn  a  comfortable  subsistence;  when,  I  say,  we  attend  to  the  extent  of  these 
improvements,  we  cannot  entertain  a  doubt  of  their  powerful  efficacy  to  propagate 
corresponding  sentiments,  of  personal  independence,  and  to  instil  higher  notions  of 
general  liberty.  "  (HJý4,124-125) 279 
On  the  assumption  that  labourers  received  high  wages,  they  "enjoy  a  degree  of 
affluence  and  of  importance,  which  is  frequently  productive  of  insolence  and 
licentiousness"  (HV,  4,126). 
Millar's  assessment  of  the  relative  degrees  of  independence  experienced  by 
agricultural  producers  confirmed  the  view  that  his  attention  was  focused  on  status  and 
authority  derived  from  wealth.  Millar  stated  that: 
"the  improvement  of  husbandry  gives  more  dignity  to  this  useful  profession,  and  raises 
the  condition  of  those  who  exercise  it.  As  the  operation  of  the  farmer  becomes 
extensive,  his  capital  must  be  enlarged;  and  as  he  lays  out  greater  expence  in 
improvement,  he  must  obtain  a  longer  lease  to  afford  him  the  prospect  of  a  return  from 
the  lands.  He  is  thus  totally  emancipated  from  his  former  dependence.  "  (HV,  4,126- 
127) 
Peasants  were  thereby  emancipated  from  their  "former  dependence"  upon  a 
landlord.  They  were  raised  to  a  position  of  dignity  based  upon  the  status  and  authority 
their  capital  commanded.  Changes  in  contractual  relations  such  as  the  extension  of 
longer  leases  followed  from  the  changes  in  status  derived  from  the  dignity  acquired 
through  by  the  agricultural  producers  acquisition  of  wealth. 
This  is  consistent  with  Millar's  general  position  that  the  body  of  law  and  forms  of 
government  and  law  changed  in  response  to  the  changed  manners  and  opinions  of  a 
people  who  have  acquired  authority  derived  from  wealth.  Justice  and  the  law  was 
improved  when  a  greater  number  of  people  felt  the  "injuries  arising  from  the  breach  of 
promise,  from  dishonesty  and  fraud,  or  from  any  violation  of  property"  with  "greater 
sympathy  and  regret"  (HV,  4,236-237).  The  extension  of  the  notion  of  contractual  law 
to  every  social  relation  followed  from  the  higher  status  of  a  greater  number  of 
individuals  who  had  acquired  landed  property  through  the  alienation  of  commodities. 
Ignatieff  has  remarked  perceptively  that: 
"For  Millar,  it  was  not  the  mode  of  production  which  defined  commercial  society  as  a 
social  formation,  but  rather  the  general  principle  of  exchange,  permeating  all  social 
relations  of  authority  in  the  household,  in  the  economy  and  in  polity.  "Independence" 
was  the  generalised  social  condition  of  all  men  in  a  society  based  on  contract  rather 
than  that  of  status  relations".  24 
However,  his  sharp  contrast  between  "contract"  and  "status"  could  rrýislead  the 
reader  into  thinking  that  Millar  regarded  the  subject's  interest  in  rules  ofjustice  that 
enforced  contract  as  separable  from  an  interest  in  acquiring  wealth  as  a  means  to 
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status.  If  Millar  conceived  of  status  or  "rank"  in  a  commercial  society  as  the  result  of 
esteem  derived  from  the  possession  of  wealth,  and  if  wealth  took  the  form  of 
commodities,  then  the  idea  of  property  would  entail  that  all  forms  of  property  be  freely 
alienable.  The  exchange  of  the  latter  would,  of  course,  be  regulated  by  the  law  of 
contract.  Independence  would  therefore  be  associated  not  just  with  the  status  and 
esteem  derived  from  the  possession  of  wealth,  but  also  with  the  juridical  freedom  for 
every  individual  to  acquire  wealth  through  producing  and  exchanging  activities. 
Ignatieff  s  description  of  the  "generalised  principle  of  exchange"  opposed  to  a 
"mode  of  production"  could  also  mislead  the  reader  into  thinking  that  Millar  regarded 
commodity  production  as  something  separable  from  commodity  exchange.  Both  were, 
for  Millar,  the  outcome  of  a  natural  propensity:  individuals'  universal  disposition  and 
capacity  for  improving  or  bettering  their  condition.  Millar  conceived  of  this  capacity  as 
no  different  from  other  natural  capacities  such  as  hunger,  thirst,  the  intercourse 
between  the  sexes  and  the  "various  arts  which  procure  the  progressive 
accommodations  and  conveniences  of  life"  (BV,  4,219).  ft  was  thus  conceivable  that 
there  could  be  societies  without  commodity  exchange  but  inconceivable  that  there 
could  be  societies  in  which  individuals  did  not  have  the  capacity  as  free  and  equal 
personalites  to  recognise  their  right  to  alienate  their  property.  Generalised  commodity 
production  and  exchange  was  therefore  the  universal  necessary  condition  for  natural 
liberty.  It  was  absent  in  earlier  forms  of  society  because  insufficient  power  and 
authority  had  yet  been  acquired  by  rich  individuals  to  exercise  justice  over  the  poor's 
violation  of  their  private  property.  Commodity  exchange,  being  as  natural  a  form  of 
activity  to  humans  as  eating,  drinking  and  procreation,  fell  into  the  universal  sphere  of 
those  types  of  activity  that  were  motivated  by  the  satisfaction  of  needs  and  desires 
within  the  material-technical  process  of  production  and  reproduction  of  the  species. 
Ignatieff  has  also  stated  that  neither  Millar  nor  Smith  was  "so  naive  as  to  assume 
that  the  day  labourer,  buried  under  the  weight  of  necessity,  could  be  called 
'independent',  and  they  even  admitted  that  artisans  were  increasingly  hard  pressed  to 
maintain  their  freedom.  As  Smith  had  remarked  in  1776,  for  every  independent  master, 
there  were  twenty  dependent  journeymen"25 
Whereas  Ignatieff  s  remarks  apply  to  Smith  with  an  element  of  accuracy,  they  have 
little  bearing  upon  Millar.  The  passage  of  Smith  to  which  Ignatieff  draws  our  attention 
was  discussed  in  chapter  seven.  It  prefaces  SmitWs  discussion  of  combination 
(WN,  I.  viii.  10,83).  Smith  recognised  that,  within  the  contract  made  between  labourer 
and  capitalist,  the  "interests  are  by  no  means  the  same.  The  workmen  desire  to  get  as 
much,  the  masters  to  give  as  little  as  possible.  The  former  are  disposed  to  combine  in 
order  to  raise,  the  latter  in  order  to  lower  the  wages  of  labour"  (WN,  Lviii.  11,83). 
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The  recognition  of  the  possibility  of  a  conflict  of  interest  between  employer  and 
employee  based  upon  contract  in  Smith  was  absent  from  Millar's  account  of  the 
labourers'  relationship  to  their  employers.  Rather,  as  I  argued  in  chapters  seven  and 
nine,  he  conceived  of  a  harmony  of  interests  between  employer  and  labourer.  Millar's 
focus  of  attention  was  upon  the  political  effects  of  an  independence  that  both  labourer 
and  capitalist  shared.  The  reason  for  this  has  been  discussed  above.  He  wanted  to 
demonstrate  that  Hume  was  wrong  to  suppose  that  Britain's  peculiar  limited  monarchy 
would  evolve  into  either  a  republican  despotism  or  an  absolute  monarchy.  Rather,  he 
wanted  to  demonstrate  the  possibility  that  the  mixed  monarchy  could  be  saved  through 
limited  democratic  reforms.  Moreover,  he  hoped  to  prove  that  the  two  tendencies 
towards  despotism  and  liberty  in  commercial  governments  might  resolve  themselves  in 
a  similar  fashion  elsewhere,  for  example  in  the  establishment  of  limited  monarchies  in 
other  countries  such  as  France  or  Germany. 
Millar's  topic  was  the  growth  of  ideas  and  opinions  conducive  to  liberty.  The  key 
to  the  understanding  of  the  enlargement  of  the  "spirit  of  liberty"  was  to  be  found  in  the 
effects  of  economic  changes,  firstly,  on  the  overall  distribution  of  property  and  the 
means  of  subsistence,  secondly,  on  feelings,  ideas  and  habits  of  the  majority  of  a 
population,  and,  thirdly,  on  the  facility  individuals  had  for  combining  together  to 
express  a  collective  interest.  He  intended  thereby  to  illustrate  the  difference  in  habits 
and  manners  conducive  to  liberal  sentiments  by  contrasting  the  condition  of  labourers 
in  poor  countries  with  that  of  those  in  rich  countries. 
Millar  therefore  recognised  a  degree  of  dependence  "in  every  country"  when 
labourers  had  "little  or  no  property"  and  therefore  required  employers  who  could 
provide  them  with  the  means  by  which  they  could  secure  a  "bare  subsistence" 
(HV,  4,115).  In  contrast,  workers  in  a  rich  country  were  independent  because  they 
were  "indiscriminately  engaged  in  the  service  of  different  persons"  (HV,  4,116). 
Moreover  their  status  and  authority  was  raised  because  they  received  high  wages. 
They  could  therefore  no  longer  be  described  as  dependent  on  anyone  else  for  their 
subsistence.  In  a  rich  country,  every  individual  had  the  power  "by  the  exertion  of  his 
own  talents,  to  earn  a  comfortable  subsistence"  (HV,  4,124).  No-one  was  therefore 
absolutely  dependent  upon  the  personal  favours  of  another.  This  affected  everyone 
who  got  some  kind  of  revenue  from  their  economic  activity,  including  "the  common 
labourer"  (HV,  4,123).  It  was  only  the  size  or  "extent  of  his  revenue"  which  made  the 
manufacturer  or  merchant  more  independent  than  the  labourer  (ibid).  A  larger  revenue 
commanded  greater  admiration.  The  relative  degrees  of  independence  were  measured 
by  the  extent  of  the  income  the  individual  had  and,  secondly,  by  the  lack  of  personal 
obligation  individuals  felt  towards  their  "customers"  for  their  maintenance  or 
subsistence  (ibid).  The  person  who  felt  the  least  obligation  to  his  customers  was  the 282 
"monied  man"  who  "lives  entirely  upon  his  property,  and  is  obliged  to  nobody  for  any 
part  of  his  maintenance"  (ibid). 
Millar's  account  of  combination  ignored  any  reference  to  the  conflict  between 
employer  and  employee  which  Smith  discussed  and  described.  as  concern  was  an 
older  form  of  political  conflict.  This  was  the  conflict  between  monarch  and  the  people. 
To  illustrate  his  political  concerns,  he  wanted  to  demonstrate  that  the  power  of  the 
sovereign  was  diminished  as  the  independence  of  the  people  grew.  Combination,  and 
in  particular  combinations  of  "labourers  or  artificers,  who  by  following  the  same 
employment"  and  by  being  concentrated  in  towns  could  "with  great  rapidity 
communicate  their  sentiments  and  passions"  (HV,  4,135),  demonstrated  that  uniformity 
of  interest  which  acted  to  promote  "general  measures  for  the  benefit"  of  trade 
(HV,  4,136).  Millar  used  the  idea  of  independence  from  personal  obligation  and  favour 
as  being  a  characteristic  feature  of  all  classes  in  commercial  society.  Combination 
manifested  itself  in  a  political  form  in  the  struggle  between  the  people  and  the 
monarch.  It  served  as  a  description  and  explanation  of  the  weakness  of  the  sovereigres 
will  against  the  will  of  the  people,  and  to  warn  those  who  might  be  inclined  to  side 
with  the  monarch  against  the  mercantile  people.  Thus:  "The  clamour  and  tumultuary 
proceedings  of  the  populace  in  the  great  towns  are  capable  of  penetrating  the  utmost 
recesses  of  administration,  of  intimidating  the  boldest  minister,  and  of  displacing  the 
most  presumptuous  favourite  of  the  back-stairs"  (HV,  4,136-137).  Hirschman  is 
correct,  therefore,  to  remark  that  Millar's  political  motivation  coloured  his  analysis. 
Millar  was  determined  to  show  the  power  that  "certain  social  groups"  have  when  they 
"resort  to  collective  action  against  oppression  and  mismanagement".  26 
This  has  bearings  upon  the  three  aspects  of  Millar's  concept  of  independence 
discussed  above.  The  first  is  an  indifference  to  the  will  of  others  except  as  equally  self- 
interested  individuals.  The  second  is  the  dissolution  of  habits  of  submission  and 
deference.  The  third  is  the  authority  and  status  derived  from  wealth.  Millar  conceived 
of  the  difference  between  the  labourer  and  capitalist  as  one  of  relative  degrees  of 
independence  dependent  upon  the  size  of  the  revenue  available  to  the  individual. 
Compared  with  labourers  in  a  society  with  no  exchange  of  commodities,  therefore, 
wage  labourers  were  independent  as  long  as  they  were  on  high  wages  and  did  not 
become  unemployed.  Millar's  account  of  the  political  economy  of  a  commercial  society 
served  a  political  purpose  which  was  to  demonstrate  that  the  tendency  of  a  sovereign 
to  oppress  the  people  was  less  likely  if  the  people  were  independent  commodity 
producers. 
Millar  was  operating  within  a  philosophical  framework  determined  by  Hume's 
Enquiry  and  Smith's  Theory  ofMoral  Sentiments.  This  background  provided  him  with 
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the  means  by  which  he  could  explain  both  the  motivation  to  industry  and  the  power  of 
the  mercantile  people  to  change  the  law  in  their  own  interests  through  the  facility  of 
combination. 
11.10  Combination  and  Liberty 
Hume  had  stated  that  "It  is  difficult  to  make  many  persons  combine  in  the  same 
views  and  methods"(BG,  48)  as  part  of  his  argument  to  show  that  poorer  individuals 
were  unable  to  combine  against  the  one  richer  individual.  Ironically,  Mllar  derived  the 
idea  of  combination  from  Hume's  principle  of  sympathy.  Forbes  described  Hume's 
principle  of  sympathy  as  "the  high-watermark  of  his  sociological  imagination".  27  As  I 
have  discussed  in  chapter  nine,  Hume  used  sympathy  to  explain  the  similarity  of 
customs  and  manners  amongst  individuals  of  a  nation.  It  enabled  individuals  to  move 
from  an  isolated  condition  to  a  comprehension  of  the  social  and  political  whole. 
Sympathy  was  also  the  essential  category  in  Smith's  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments.  It 
was  through  sympathy  that  the  subject  circumstanced  by  scarcity  was  able  to  have 
access  to  the  sentiments  of  the  rich,  thereby  imagining  the  approval  and  respect 
naturally  given  to  wealth.  This  triggered  off  the  self-interested  passion  of  vanity  that 
motivated  individuals  to  work  hard,  save  their  wages,  and  invent  labour-saving 
technology.  The  operations  of  betterment  and  improvement  on  the  mind  of  the  subject 
were  not  possible  without  sympathy. 
As  discussed  in  chapter  nine,  Mllar,  like  Smith,  used  the  principle  of  sympathy  to 
account  for  the  origins  of  deference  and  submission.  He  also  used  it  to  account  for 
combination:  how  individuals  could  unite  together  to  pursue  joint  interests.  This 
enabled  him  to  explain  the  power  of  the  mercantile  people  to  change  the  law  in  their 
own  interests.  This  was  a  typical  example  of  Nfillar's  use  of  Hume's  philosophy  to 
adjust  his  constitutional  doctrines. 
As  mentioned  above,  combination  was  the  second  circumstance  after  the 
distribution  of  property  upon  which  liberty  depended.  "The  facility  with  which  the 
several  members  of  society  are  enabled  to  associate  and  to  act  in  concert  with  one 
another"  (HV,  4,115)  was  also  brought  about  by  trade  and  manufactures,  in  this  case 
the  collection  of  large  bodies  of  "labourers  or  artificers"  in  the  towns,  "who  by 
following  the  same  employment,  and  by  constant  intercourse,  are  enabled,  with  great 
rapidity  to  communicate  all  their  sentiments  and  passions"  (HV,  4,135). 
Firstly,  commodity  producers  would  feel  more  free  because  they  were  not,  like 
vassals,  villeins,  servants  or  poor  labourers,  dependent  upon  one  person  for  their 
livelihood,  and  secondly,  through  the  exchange  of  commodities  in  the  towns,  from 
town  to  town,  and  from  town  to  country,  their  feelings,  opinions  and  ideas  would  be 
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rapidly  communicated  through  the  principle  of  sympathy.  Commodity  producers 
would  be  able  to  combine  with  others  around  a  mutual  interest,  or  shared  opinion. 
This  could  bring  into  being  "popular  discontent",  even  riots  and  insurrection 
(HV,  4,135).  The  superior  orders  of  mercantile  people  "by  a  constant  attention  to 
professional  objects"  (HV,  4,136)  could  quickly  perceive  what  their  common  interest 
should  be,  unlike  the  unproductive  landed  proprietor  whose  mind  was  sunk  in  lethargy. 
The  latter  had  a  narrow  conception  of  an  interest  separate  from  others  or  even  a  total 
ignorance  of  what  others'  interests  might  be.  The  merchant  on  the  other  hand: 
"though  he  never  overlooks  his  private  advantage,  is  accustomed  to  connect  his  own 
gain  with  that  of  his  brethren,  and  is,  therefore,  always  ready  to  join  with  those  of  the 
same  profession,  in  soliciting  the  aid  of  government,  and  in  promoting  general 
measures  for  the  benefit  of  their  trade.  "  (HV,  4,136). 
It  followed  from  the  greater  power  of  combination  derived  from  the  operations  of 
the  principle  of  sympathy  within  the  less  dependent  and  more  liberty  conscious 
merchants  and  manufacturers  that: 
"The  voice  of  the  mercantile  interest  never  fails  to  command  the  attention  of 
government,  and  when  firm  and  unanimous  is  even  able  to  control  and  direct  the 
deliberations  of  the  national  council.  "  (HV,  4,137) 
It  was  this  greater  power  of  combination,  coupled  with  the  easier  communication 
of  feelings  of  independence  and  freedom,  together  with  the  natural  respect  and 
admiration  given  to  this  newly  wealthy  group  that  forced  the  legislator  to 
accommodate  his  policies.  Millar's  view  of  history  demonstrated  that,  indeed,  this  was 
what  had  been  happening  at  all  periods  during  the  gradual  changes  in  the  English 
constitution  and  moreover  that,  ultimately,  whatever  influence  legislators  might 
acquire  through  their  dependants,  they  would  be  forced  to  concede  to  the  voice  of  the 
community  of  commodity  producers  and  exchangers  on  the  question  of  reform  and 
legislation. 
In  the  long  run  Millar  was  proved  correct.  Despite  the  extreme  forms  of  repression 
that  occurred  during  and  after  the  French  Revolution,  orchestrated  around  the  defence 
of  "Church  and  King",  the  manufacturing  bourgeoisie  was  able  to  gain  not  only  the 
repeal  of  the  Com  Laws  but  also  a  greater  direct  influence  on  legislation  through  the 
1832  and  1867  Reform  Bills,  through  manipulating  and  co-opting  the  desire  of  the 
working  classes  for  universal  suffrage.  It  is  clear  how  potentially  threatening  an 
assertion  of  the  reality  and  power  of  combination  might  have  been,  arriving  just  prior 
to  legislation  which  restricted  the  rights  of  working  people  and  their  employers  from 285 
combining  -  legislation  that  was  successfully  evaded  by  the  latter  but  enforced 
ruthlessly  over  the  former.  Millar  can  be  interpreted  as  affirming  the  potential  power  of 
the  early  strikes  within  the  working  classes. 
The  first  strike  or  "combination"  of  any  importance  in  Scotland  was  in  July  1787, 
when  the  weavers  of  Glasgow  refused  to  work  at  the  usual  rates  of  pay.  Negotiations 
having  failed,  a  riot  followed,  the  army  was  called  in,  and  three  weavers  were  killed. 
One  of  the  strikers  was  whipped  and  banished  for  seven  years.  The  generally  accepted 
view  of  combinations  at  the  time  was  that  they  were  dangerous  to  the  general  welfare 
of  the  public. 
Were  Nfillar  consistent  to  his  principles  one  should  expect  him  to  have  been 
ambivalent  on  the  question  of  the  imposition  of  legislation  preventing  workers  from 
combining.  On  the  one  hand,  combination  was  a  natural  process  with  the  power  to 
overturn  legislation  and  governments,  on  the  other  hand: 
"Any  attempt,  upon  the  part  of  the  public  to  lin-dt  the  free  accumulation  of  wealth, 
would  be  fatal  to  that  industry  or  exertion  which  is  the  foundation  of  national 
prosperity.  "  (HV,  4,128) 
A  combination  of  workers  against  employers  could  be  understood  as  just  such  an 
attempt. 
Technically,  the  Combination  Act  of  1799  applied  to  employers  as  well  as 
labourers,  and  one  would  therefore  have  expected  Nfillar  to  have  objected  to  attempts 
to  restrict  employers'  forms  of  association.  Given  that  the  Act  was  evaded  by 
employers  but  applied  ruthlessly  and  exclusively  against  workers,  it  might  have  found 
justification  in  Nfillar's  imagination,  on  the  one  hand,  as  being  favourable  to  the  "free 
accumulation  of  wealth"  and,  on  the  other,  as  evidence  that  legislation  opposed  to  the 
interests  of  the  "community"  was  unworkable.  This  would  have  posed  an  insoluble 
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Chapter  Twelve: 
Class  and  Slavery 
12.1  Class,  Rank  and  Exploitation 
Meek  states  that  Millar  had  no  understanding  of  exploitation.  This  is  correct.  ' 
However,  Meek  contradicts  himself  by  stating  that  Millar  had  an  awareness  of  "the 
existence  of  classes  in  modem  society".  If  Millar  had  had  the  same  understanding  of 
class  that  Marx  adopted,  then  he  would  have  had  an  understanding  of  exploitation. 
However,  Millar's  understanding  of  class  is  derived  from  his  empiricist  standpoint  on 
the  knowledge  available  to  the  eighteenth  century  subject  of  experience.  This  led  him 
to  describe  classes  according  to  three  criteria. 
The  first  was  the  classification  of  groups  of  individuals  according  to  the  occupation 
they  were  engaged  in  as  a  means  of  subsistence  and  the  accumulation  of  property.  The 
second  was  the  classification  of  individuals  according  to  the  source  of  their  revenue  in 
a  commercial  society.  The  third  was  the  classification  of  individuals  according  to  the 
extent  of  their  knowledge.  This  latter  criterion  has  already  been  discussed  in  chapter 
three. 
The  first  criterion  contributed  both  to  his  classification  of  individuals  according  to 
the  occupations  of  hunting,  pasturage,  agriculture  and  commerce  of  the  four  modes  of 
the  acquisition  of  property.  It  also  contributed  to  his  classification  of  individuals 
according  to  the  variety  of  occupations  that  had  a  mutual  interest  in  exchanging  the 
commodities  they  possessed.  These  were  numerous  and  included  lawyers,  doctors, 
clergymen,  teachers,  merchants,  manufacturers,  smiths,  brewers,  tailors,  mechanics, 
artificers,  labourers  and  peasants.  Moreover  there  was  an  overlap  between  this 
criterion  and  the  classification  of  individuals  according  to  rank,  order  or  status  within  a 
social  hierarchy.  This  overlap  will  be  discussed  further  below. 
The  second  criterion  classified  individuals  within  a  commercial  society  according 
to  whether  their  capacity  to  alienate  property  was  dependent  upon  their  possession  of 
different  revenues  derived  from  capital,  rent  or  wages.  This  is  clear  from  the  three-fold 
classification  of  capitalists,  landlords  and  labourers  he  took  from  Smith.  It  is  evident  in 
his  account  of  political  economy  discussed  in  chapter  seven.  Outwith  a  commercial 
IThere  is  only  one  reference  I  know  of  in  Millar's  work  that  might  suggest  he  had  an  awareness 
that  a  ruling  class  benefited  disproportionately  from  the  labour  of  a  subordinate  class.  I 
mentioned  it  in  chapter  nine.  This  is  in  the  context  of  his  discussion  of  the  effect  that  commerce 
and  manufactures  have  on  morals,  in  particular  the  use  of  alcohol.  He  wrote  of  the  consoling 
effect  that  alcohol  has  on:  "a  class  of  men  [the  labouring  poor],  by  whose  painful  exertions  the 
prosperity  of  every  state  is  principally  supported,  and  the  rest  of  society  maintained  in  ease  and 
affluence"  (HV,  4,209).  Of  note  here  is  Millar's  subjective  understanding  of  labour  circumstanced 
by  scarcity  or  a  technical  division  of  labour  as  a  painful  activity. 287 
society,  individuals  were  classified  according  to  the  revenue  they  could  generate  for 
their  master,  chief,  lord  or  sovereign.  They  therefore  included  vassals,  villains, 
servants,  retainers  and  slaves. 
It  was  the  classification  of  individuals  according  to  sources  of  revenue  that  Marx 
was  referring  to  when  he  attributed  to  "bourgeois  economists"  the  discovery  of  "the 
economic  anatomy  of  classes".  2  Meek  is  therefore  only  correct  to  assert  that  Millar 
was  "in  advance  of  most  of  his  contemporaries"  in  understanding  the  "economic 
anatomy"  of  classeS,  3  if  the  second  criterion  Millar  used  to  illustrate  the  changing 
effects  of  the  distribution  of  property  on  government  was  an  advance  on  Smith's  work 
in  the  Wealth  of  Patiotis.  I  have  argued  in  chapter  seven  that  it  was  not.  It  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  not  only  did  Millar  not  share  Smith's  understanding  of  the  labour  of 
the  independent  commodity  producer  as  being  a  means  of  determining  equivalence 
within  relations  of  value,  but  also  that,  unlike  Smith,  he  did  not  recognise  that  a 
master's  dependence  upon  slaves  was  a  source  of  wealth  in  ancient  societies.  Both  the 
recognition  that  labour-time  determines  the  equivalence  of  value  and  also  the 
theorisation  of  class  society  in  terms  of  the  acquisition  of  a  surplus  through  the 
personal  or  impersonal  dependence  of  labouring  individuals  upon  non-labouring 
individuals  are  essential  to  the  objective  theory  of  exploitation  and  its  specific 
historical  forms  associated  with  Marx.  4  As  I  argued  in  chapter  seven,  an  embryo  of 
Marx's  theory  of  the  surplus  can  be  found  in  Smith.  Smith  therefore  planted  the  seeds 
for  later  theories  of  exploitation.  This  perception  is  absent  in  Millar's  political 
economy.  His  political  economy  is  more  subordinated  to  a  Whig  political  perception  of 
the  historically  ascendant  bourgeoisie  than  that  of  his  teacher. 
Meek  has  a  mistaken  appraisal  of  Millar's  understanding  of  class.  This  can  be 
highlighted  by  remarks  he  makes  that  indicate  he  thinks  that  Millar's  use  of  "class"  and 
"rank"  are  synonymous.  As  evidence  that  Millar's  understanding  of  class  was  closer  to 
Marx's  and  therefore  "in  advance  of  most  of  his  contemporaries",  Meek  quotes 
Lehmann  favourably.  Lehmann  states  that  Millar  was  perceptive  in  his  treatment  of 
"the  discrepancies  that  frequently  occur  between  rank-position  and  individual  merit".  5 
Meek's  conflation  of  Millar's  understanding  of  class  with  his  category  of  "rank"  serves 
to  reinforce  the  sociological  interpretation  of  Millar  criticised  in  chapter  three.  It  has 
2Marx  refcrs  to  Ricardo  who  reiterates  Smith's  threefold  classification  of  individuals  according  to 
revenue  -  landlords,  capitalists  and  labourers;  -  as  an  example  of  a  bourgeois  economist  who 
understood  the  "economic  anatomy"  of  classes.  The  bourgeois  historians  he  mentions  who 
described  the  development  of  a  class  struggle  are  Thierry,  Guizot  and  John  Wade.  These  are 
nineteenth  century  historians.  Marx,  Correspondence,  pp56-57. 
3Mcek,  "Contribution",  1967,  P44. 
4"What  I  did  that  was  new  was  to  prove:  (1)  that  the  existence  of  classes  is  only  bound  up  with 
particular,  historic  phases  in  the  development  ofproduction"  Narx's  emphasis].  Marx, 
Correspondence,  P57. 
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no  relation  to  the  connection  that  Meek  intends  to  establish  between  Millar  and  Marx 
and  rnight,  perhaps,  be  more  useful  to  those  sociologists  who,  following  Hopfl,  are 
familiar  with  Weber's  theorisation  of  class  as  the  outcome  of  ideal  types  of  individual 
action. 
As  I  have  discussed  in  the  three  preceding  chapters,  Millar  followed  Smith  in 
explaining  differences  in  rank  according  to  the  feelings  of  admiration,  deference  and 
respect  that  poor  and  weak  individuals  have  when  confronted  by  rich  and  strong 
individuals.  He  differed  from  Smith  by  assuming  that  there  was  a  rational  calculative 
element  to  the  establishment  of  ranks  that  reinforced  the  latter  feelings.  Thus  he 
thought  that  poor  and  weak  individuals  behaved  in  an  admiring,  deferential  and 
respectful  manner  towards  rich  and  strong  individuals  because  they  were  in  a  position 
of  dependence  upon  the  latter  for  subsistence  and  protection.  Once  they  began  to 
become  independent  of  the  latter  through  their  own  economic  activity  as  commodity 
producers,  they  had  the  potential  to  become  wealthy  and  command  the  attention  and 
respect  of  others  they  hired  as  labour.  Millar  therefore  thought  that  if  they  were  able  to 
acquire  landed  property  their  rank  would  change.  Moreover,  because  commodity 
exchange  entailed  that  they  were  dependent  for  subsistence  and  the  acquisition  of 
property  upon  a  multiplicity  of  individuals  rather  than  a  single  individual,  their  manners 
would  also  change  from  one  of  deference  and  submission  to  one  of  indifference  and 
insolence. 
"Rank"  therefore  was  a  completely  different  concept  to  "class".  For  example,  an 
individual  classed  according  to  the  occupation  of  "merchant"  could  acquire,  through 
buying  landed  property,  the  same  rank  as  a  member  of  the  nobility  who  had  acquired 
property  through  inheritance.  Likewise,  a  member  of  the  nobility  could  lose  rank  by 
spending  an  inheritance  in  profligate  consumption  of  luxuries  rather  than  investing  it  as 
capital  in  the  improvement  of  property.  Different  individuals  were  ranked  according  to 
the  deference  and  submission  they  could  command,  and  the  capacity  of  perpetuating 
this  command  was  determined  in  a  commercial  society  principally  by  whether  or  not 
individuals  made  their  labour  and  wealth  productive  of  economic  value. 
To  confirm  the  difference  between  Millar's'  use  of  "rank"  and  "class",  a  reader 
needs  only  to  consult  the  text  of  The  Origin  of  Ranks.  A  survey  of  the  text  would 
reveal  that  Millar  makes  reference  to  "rank"  forty-eight  times,  and  to  "class"  only  four 
times.  There  is  only  one  mention  of  "class"  in  the  form  of  the  active  verb  "to  class" 
(OR,  198-189).  Millar  was  showing  how  government  progresses  within  a  society 
"composed  of  different  tribes  or villages".  His  argument  was  based  on  the  evidence  of 
ancient  Greece  and  Rome.  This  confirmed  an  opinion  he  held  that  the  move  towards  a 
monarchial  form  of  government  had  a  quicker  pace  within  a  small  state  compared  with 
a  large  one.  The  collection  of  different  tribes  within  the  confines  of  a  city  enabled 
continual  intercourse  between  different  members  of  these  tribes,  a  common  need  for  a 289 
single  policy  to  deal  both  with  intra-tribal  and  extra-state  antagonisms,  and  a  general 
blurring  of  social  differences.  In  such  circumstances,  Nfillar  suggested,  tribal  loyalties 
to  chiefs  derived  from  familial  attachments  were  eroded  and  the  influence  of  the 
monarch  grew. 
His  evidence  for  the  assertion  that  the  power  of  kin-based  chiefs  declined  was 
taken  from  records  which  described  changes  in  government  prior  to  the  stage  of 
historical  writing.  Thus  in  Rome  "so  early  as  the  reign  of  Servius  Tullius",  Millar 
remarked  that  "the  practice  of  convening  the  people  according  to  their  tribes,  or 
curiae,  was  entirely  laid  aside;  and  the  public  assemblies  were  held  in  such  a  manner, 
that  every  individual  was  classed  according  to  his  wealth"  (OR,  199).  [My  emphasis 
throughout  the  following  references  to  "class",  "rank"  and  "order".  ] 
To  be  "classed"  according  to  wealth  on  an  individual  basis  is  reminiscent  of  the 
second  criterion  of  the  classification  of  individuals  according  to  the  quantitative 
criteria  of  their  sources  of  revenue.  It  is  in  accord  with  Millar's  perspective,  following 
Harrington  and  Hume,  that  it  would  be  possible  to  determine  the  distribution  of 
property  if  actual  quantities  of  personal  revenues  are  known  to  and  calculable  by  a 
legislator  interested  in  sources  of  taxable  public  revenue. 
Two  other  references  to  "class"  occur,  firstly  in  a  passage  describing  the  condition 
of  slaves:  "In  a  public  capacity  people  of  this  class  were  viewed  in  a  light  no  less 
humiliating"  (OR,  263),  and  secondly  in  a  passage  explaining  how  the  social  position  of 
villeins  was  improved  at  the  same  time  that  the  power  of  the  monarch  was 
strengthened  at  the  expense  of  the  power  of  the  feudal  barons:  "While  the  monarch 
was  ...  endeavouring  to  protect  the  villains  possessed  by  his  barons,  and  to  raise  them 
to  such  a  condition  as  might  render  them  less  dependent  upon  their  masters,  he  found 
means  of  deriving  some  revenue  from  the  people  of  that  class,  upon  the  pretence  of 
confirming,  by  royal  authority,  the  privileges  that  were  bestowed  upon  them" 
(OR,  277).  These  uses  of  the  term  "class"  are  consistent  with  the  notion  that  slaves  and 
villeins  are  conceived  by  Millar  to  be  occupations  that  generated  a  type  of  revenue. 
Confirmation  of  the  use  of  "class"  to  refer  to  a  grouping  of  citizens  who  were  a 
source  of  revenue  to  their  superiors  can  be  found  in  the  following:  "People  of  the 
lower  class  at  Rome  were  all  attached  to  some  particular  patron  of  rank  and 
distinction;  and  every  patrician  had  a  number  of  clients,  who,  besides  owing  him 
respect  and  submission,  were  bound  to  portion  his  daughters,  to  pay  his  debts,  and  to 
ransom  his  person  from  captivity"  (OR,  182).  The  source  of  revenue,  in  this  case,  was 
the  client's  payment  of  a  patron's  debts. 
It  is  not  possible  to  read  Millar's  use  of  "class",  "order"  and  "rank"  as  if  they  are 
synonymous,  or  equivalent  terms  -  capable  of  substitution  without  change  of  meaning. 
Whereas  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  there  is  a  seepage  of  meaning  between  "class"  and 290 
"order"  and  between  "order"  and  "rank",  there  is  a  marked  contrast  in  Millar's  use  of 
"class"  and  "rank". 
One  way  of  making  the  contrast  clear  is  to  examine  Millar's  use  of  "rank"  when  he 
referred  to  people  or  persons  of  low  or  the  lowest  rank.  The  first  reference  to  "persons 
of  low  rank"  is  in  a  discussion  of  "servants"  or  "retainers"  in  the  early  period  of 
agriculture.  This  was  "a  rude  age,  when  people  are  strangers  to  luxury"  (OR,  230). 
Mllar  stated  that: 
"In  this  situation,  persons  of  low  rank,  have  no  opportunity  of  acquiring  an  affluent 
fortune,  or  of  raising  themselves  to  superior  stations;  and  remaining  for  ages  in  a  state 
of  dependence,  they  naturally  contract  such  dispositions  and  habits  as  are  suited  to 
their  circumstances.  They  acquire  a  sacred  veneration  for  the  person  of  their  master, 
and  are  taught  to  pay  an  unbounded  submission  to  his  authority.  They  are  proud  of 
that  servile  obedience  by  which  they  seem  to  exalt  his  dignity,  and  consider  it  their 
duty  to  sacrifice  their  lives  and  their  possessions  in  order  to  promote  his  interest,  or 
even  to  gratify  his  capricious  humour.  "  (OR,  230-23  1) 
Of  note  in  this  quote  is,  firstly,  the  connection  between  "affluent  fortune"  and 
"rank"  or  "superior  station",  the  former  being  the  means  to  acquiring  the  latter,  and 
secondly,  the  "dispositions  and  habits"  that  arose  from  "a  state  of  dependence".  The 
latter  could  be  classed  as  a  set  of  attitudes  or  general  types  of  behaviour  which 
characterised  a  "person  of  low  rank".  These  included  "sacred  veneration"  for  the 
master,  "unbounded  submission"  to  the  master's  authority  and  "servile  obedience". 
Such  observable  character  traits  were  learrit  ("acquired"  or  "taught")  from  the  position 
that  the  person  of  low  rank  found  her  or  himself  to  be  in.  Millar  implied  that  a 
dependent  status  was  naturally  caused  through  the  operation  of  the  subject's 
sympathetic  imagination  and  an  interest  in  subsistence  and  protection. 
The  passage  has  a  strong  psychological  flavour  to  it,  as  would  any  writing  that 
emphasised  "dispositions  and  habits".  This  is  in  accord  with  Millar's  stated  intentions 
given  in  the  introduction  of  The  Origin  of  Ranks.  There  he  asked  the  reader  to  pay 
attention  to  those  circumstances  that  gave  "a  peculiar  direction  to  ... 
inclinations,  and 
pursuits"  and  are  "productive  of...  habits,  dispositions,  and  ways  of  thýinking"  (OR,  2). 
The  development  of  this  section  shows  Millar  attributing  a  description  of  a  theoretical 
kind  to  the  causes  that  promote  the  independence  and  liberty  of  "persons  of  low  rank". 
This  included  an  explanation  of  those  circumstances  that  allowed  for  small-scale 
commodity  production.  Thus  he  wrote:  "they  often  find  it  more  profitable  to  work  at 
their  own  charges,  and  to  vend  the  product  of  their  own  labour"  (OR,  231).  In  turn, 
such  changes  had  psychological  or  behavioural  effects  which,  over  time,  obliterated 
the  impressions,  ideas  and  habits  of  submission,  veneration  and  deference  acquired  in  a 291 
state  of  dependence:  "and  that  vanity  which  was  formerly  discovered  in  magnifying  the 
power  of  the  chief,  is  now  equally  displayed  in  sullen  indifference,  or  in  contemptuous 
and  insolent  behaviour  to  persons  of  superior  rank  and  station"  (OR,  232). 
Millar  made  a  clear  distinction  here  between  "persons  of  low  rank"  who  had  a 
dependent  and  those  who  had  an  independent  means  of  subsistence.  These  two  groups 
had  a  different  relationship  to  their  superiors.  The  former  had  no  opportunity  of 
gaining  wealth  through  their  work.  They  were  naturally  predisposed  to  develop 
attitudes  of  deference  towards  their  masters  through  a  sympathetic  admiration  -of  the 
advantages  gained  from  wealth.  The  latter,  conversely,  on  the  one  hand,  sold  their 
goods  to  many  persons  of  higher  rank,  and  found,  through  this  occupation,  a  source  of 
subsistence  no  longer  restricted  to  dependence  on  one  person.  On  the  other  hand  they 
gained  the  chance  of  acquiring  wealth  themselves  by  which  means  they  succeeded  in 
getting  the  respect,  power  and  influence  that  wealth  naturally  attracted.  It  followed 
that  they  were  indifferent  to  their  superiors'  vain  interest  in  praise  and  admiration. 
Millar  was  consistent  in  this  use  of  "rank"  to  the  end  of  the  passage.  "Rank"  was 
determined  by  the  amount  of  respectful  attention  a  person  received  from  others.  If 
individuals  had  been  unsuccessful  in  acquiring  wealth  then  they  were  dependent  on 
wealthy  superiors  for  subsistence  and,  whilst  they  might  get  no  respectful  attention  in 
return,  dependants  were  naturally  disposed  to  feel  respectful  towards  their  providers. 
But  if  individuals  became  commodity  producers,  then  they  had  the  opportunity  to  gain 
respect  from  a  range  of  persons  they  traded  with.  They  would  be  respected  in 
accordance  with  the  greater  affluence  they  acquired. 
The  means  to  that  respectful  attention  which  eradicated  previous  servile  and 
deferential  character  traits  was  wealth  acquired  through  commodity  production  and 
exchange.  The  dependency  pattern  was  therefore  both  psychological  and  economic  in 
origin.  In  contrast  to  the  propertyless  subject  who  acquiesced  to  a  propertied  superior 
in  return  for  a  living,  subjects  as  commodity  producers  satisfied  their  subsistence  needs 
through  their  own  labour.  Thus  Millar  could  write: 
"In  proportion  to  the  improvement  of  commerce  and  manufactures,  the  demand  for 
labour  is  increased,  and  greater  encouragement  is  given  to  industry.  The  poor  have 
more  resources  for  procuring  a  livelihood,  by  such  employments  as  are  productive  of 
little  subjection  or  dependence.  By  degrees,  therefore,  people  of  inferior  condition  are 
freed  from  the  necessity  of  becoming  slaves  in  order  to  obtain  subsistence"  (OR,  252). 
implicit  throughout  Millar's  account  was  the  notion  that  a  certain  level  of  affluc'Ice 
must  be  gained  by  individuals  before  they  could  gain  any  respectful  recognition  from 
others.  Affluence,  by  a  process  of  emulation  and  by  the  stimulation  of  the  sympathetic 
response  in  others,  served  to  motivate  others  to  industry.  It  also  offered  a  greater 292 
range  of  objects  for  consumption,  inspiring  invention  and  the  development  of  a  wider 
range  of  skills.  The  extension  of  production  for  exchange  and  a  division  of  labour  was 
a  result  as  well  as  a  cause  of  motivational  changes  within  individuals,  diffusing  wealth 
amongst  a  greater  number  of  people.  This  created  changes  in  social  status  and  the 
opportunity  for  those  of  inferior  rank  to  rise  in  the  estimation  of  others. 
It  followed  that,  within  any  society  that  attributed  rank  on  the  basis  of  wealth,  it 
was  possible  to  classify  groupings  of  the  same  rank  as  distinct  social  entities  by  other 
criteria.  The  difference  between  a  slave  and  a  villein  could  be  found,  therefore,  within 
the  proximity  that  the  "person  of  inferior  rank"  had  to  a  master. 
Whilst  Millar  made  a  clear  distinction  between  "class"  and  "rank",  there  were 
seepages  of  meaning  between  his  use  of  "order"  and  "class"  and  between  "order"  and 
"rank".  The  first  two  mentions  of  "order"  are  the  closest  in  meaning  to  "rank".  Millar 
described  the  different  "orders  of  knighthood"  which  arise  in  the  feudal  period  as  "a 
subdivision  ... 
in  the  degrees  of  honour  conferred  upon  individuals"  (OR,  76). 
Individuals  were  literally  "distinguished"  by  the  honour  they  received  in  combat,  and 
the  esteem  they  acquired  was  for  these  personal  accomplishments.  They  were  dignified 
by  their  peers.  He  also  referred  to  the  king,  the  nobility  and  the  people  as  being  of 
"different  orders". 
However,  when  he  described  the  development  of  the  standing  army  and  of  the 
judiciary,  "order"  took  on  a  meaning  closer  to  "class":  in  tws  case  a  classification  of  a 
social  group  by  occupation  as  a  paid  employee  and  a  product  of  the  division  of  labour. 
Mercenary  soldiers  in  a  standing  army  formed  a  separate  "order"  of  men.  So  did 
judges  on  account  of  the  fact  that:  "the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  becomes  a  separate 
employment,  and  is  committed  to  an  order  of  men,  who  require  a  particular  education 
to  qualify  them  for  the  duties  of  their  office,  and  who,  in  return  for  their  service,  must 
therefore  be  enabled  to  earn  a  livelihood  by  their  profession"  (OR,  226)  [my  emphasis]. 
The  link  with  a  developing  division  of  labour  was  made  clear  when  he  wrote  that  there 
was  an  analogy  "with  respect  to  every  sort  of  manufacture,  in  which  an  artificer  is 
commonly  paid  by  those  who  employ  him"  (ibid).  A  reader  could  therefore  infer  that 
artificers,  merchants  and  manufacturers  would  be  properly  described  as  different 
"orders  of  men"  as  well  as  "classes". 
Turning  to  Historical  View,  the  frequency  of  Millar's  use  of  "class"  increased,  but 
the  distinction  of  meaning  between  "class"  and  "rank"  was  retained.  Thus,  when 
accounting  for  the  changing  composition  of  parliament  from  the  reigns  of  Edward  I  to 
Henry  VIL  Millar  contrasted  the  "three  different  classes  of  men"  (HV,  2,219) 
burgesses,  clergy  arJ  lay  barons  of  an  emerging  commercial  government,  with  the 
"two  classes  or  orders"  (HV,  2,217)  clergy  and  lay  barons  of  the  feudal  governments  of 
Europe.  These  were  different  "sets  of  men"  with  different  interests.  This  is  another 
example  of  classification  of  individuals  according  to  the  grounds  of  the  sources  of  their 293 
revenue,  or,  more  specifically,  burgesses'  role  within  the  national  assembly 
"representing  the  commercial  interest"  (HV,  2,221),  burgesses  having  to  consult  their 
constituents  concerning  proposed  monetary  forms  of  taxation.  However,  Millar  made 
clear  that,  although  the  burgesses  made  a  "coalition"  with  the  smaller  independent 
barons  or  "landed  gentry"  in  the  House  of  Commons  -  siding  as  crown  vassals  with  the 
monarch  against  the  clergy  and  larger  barons  or  feudal  "nobility"  -  these  two  classes 
were  not  of  the  same  rank.  The  "landed  gentry,  for  a  long  time,  enjoyed  the  first  rank" 
(HV,  2,223). 
The  change  in  perception  of  rank  came  about  through  changes  in  the  distribution 
of  property.  The  latter  was  an  effect  of  juridical  and  economic  changes.  It  formed  a 
part  of  Millar's  doctrine  of  the  two  tendencies  discussed  in  chapter  nine.  These 
changes,  however,  would  have  been  impossible  to  theorise  if  Millar  had  not  kept  the 
meanings  of  "class"  and  "rank"  distinct.  Thus,  writing  about  the  effect  that  "advances 
in  commerce  and  manufactures"  had  on  political  institutions  during  the  reigns  of  the 
Stuart  monarchs,  he  stated  the  following: 
"The  nobility,  or  great  barons,  were  thus  deprived  of  that  armed  force,  and  of  that 
multitude  of  adherents  and  dependants  by  which  they  had  formerly  supported  their 
dignity.  Many  individuals  among  them,  from  the  progress  of  dissipation  and 
extravagance,  were  at  length  obliged,  upon  the  failure  of  other  resources,  to  contract 
debts,  to  mortgage,  and  to  squander  their  estates.  The  frugal  and  industrious  merchant, 
who  had  acquired  a  fortune  by  trade,  was  enabled,  in  such  a  case,  to  purchase  what  the 
idle  and  extravagant  proprietor  found  it  necessary  to  sell.  Property  in  land,  originally 
the  great  source  of  influence,  was  in  this  manner  transferred  from  the  higher  to  the 
lower  classes;  the  character  of  the  trader  and  that  of  the  landed  gentleman  were  in 
some  measure  confounded;  and  the  consideration  and  rank  of  the  latter  were,  by  a 
change  of  circumstances,  communicated  to  the  former.  "  (HV,  3,107) 
The  preceding  loss  of  the  feudal  nobility's  dependants  came  about  as  a  result  of  a 
coincidence  of  interest  between  the  monarch  and  the  lower  ranking  classes  of 
merchants,  manufacturers,  artisans,  and  peasant  individuals.  These  classes  were 
naturally  predisposed  "by  their  industry  and  good  behaviour,  of  bettering  their 
circumstances"  (HV,  3,17).  The  monarch  had  not  only  spent  public  revenue  in 
promoting  trade  but  had  passed  legislation  that  enabled  landowners  to  sell  their  estates 
on  the  market.  As  a  result,  a  greater  part  of  the  population  both  in  the  towns  and  the 
countryside  was  engaged  in  producing  for  the  market.  Moreover,  through  the 
development  of  economic  activity  and  a  division  of  labour,  peasants  had  been  able  to 
pay  money  through  "scutages"  to  avoid  their  duties  as  vassals  to  their  feudal  masters. 
As  a  consequence,  they  deprived  the  nobility  of  an  "armed  force".  The  acceptance  of 294 
rents  in  the  form  of  money,  and  the  greater  variety  of  commodities  available  upon  the 
market,  entailed  that  sections  of  the  nobility  had  "contracted  debts"  to  pay  for  their 
emulative  habits  of  luxury  consumption,  thus  forcing  them  to  sell  them  to  the  "frugal 
and  industrious  merchant".  Thus  there  was  a  transference  of  landed  property  from  the 
"higher  classes"  of  the  nobility  and  clergy  to  the  "lower  classes"  of  merchants  and 
manufacturers.  The  wealth  derived  from  landed  property  commanded  the  admiration 
and  respect  in  the  minds  of  spectators.  This  confirmed  the  operation  of  the  principle  of 
authority.  Thus  the  same  "consideration  of  rank"  that  had  previously  been  conferred 
upon  the  hereditary  feudal  nobility  was  "communicated"  to  merchants  who  possessed 
land.  What  was  not  stated  here  but  implied  elsewhere  was  that,  once  in  possession  of 
land,  the  "frugal  merchants"  intent  on  accumulating  greater  wealth  through  their 
improving  activities  were  to  apply  to  the  land  "those  inventions  which  contribute  to 
shorten  and  facilitate  labour"  (HV,  3,86).  As  discussed  in  chapter  seven,  this  was 
Mllar's  short-hand  for  capitalising  productive  forces:  machinery  and  a  technical 
division  of  labour. 
The  above  quote,  HV,  3,107,  is  taken  from  Millar's  discussion  of  the  effect  that 
these  juridical  and  economic  changes  had  on  both  the  political  powers  of  the  monarch 
also  of  parliament.  These  enlarged  the  Crown's  revenue  and  enabled  a  monarch  to 
create  political  dependants  out  of  a  weakened  nobility  through  patronage.  It  enabled  a 
sovereign  power  to  employ  a  standing  army.  On  the  other  hand,  the  changes  also 
increased  the  powers  of  parliament.  The  monarch  became  increasingly  dependent  upon 
monetary  forms  of  taxation.  According  to  the  original  feudal  English  constitution, 
taxation  had  been  the  prerogative  of  the  House  of  Commons.  The  accidental 
circumstances  of  England's  island  status  had  meant  that  public  revenue  had  been  spent 
on  a  navy  rather  than  an  army.  The  English  monarch  was  relatively  weak  compared 
with  other  European  monarchs.  Unlike  his  peers,  Charles  I,  for  example,  did  not  have 
a  large  standing  army  to  enforce  his  interests  in  increased  taxation.  Millar  therefore 
thought  that  the  generalisation  of  commodity  production  and  exchange  strengthened 
the  powers  of  both  monarch  and  parliament.  This  would  lead  to  inevitable  conflict  and 
civil  war.  The  point  here,  however,  has  been  to  stress,  against  Meek,  the  distinct 
usages  Millar  had  of  "class"  and  "rank". 
12.2  The  English  Civil  War 
Meek  states  that  Millar  saw  the  English  civil  war  "quite  clearly  as  a  class  war".  I-Es 
evidence  for  this  statement  is  the  following  quote: 
"The  adherents  of  the  king  were  chiefly  composed  of  the  nobility  and  higher  gentry, 
men  who,  by  their  wealth  and  station,  had  much  to  lose;  and  who,  in  the  annihilation  of 
monarchy,  and  in  the  anarchy  that  was  likely  to  follow,  foresaw  the  ruin  of  their 295 
fortunes,  and  the  extinction  of  their  consideration  and  influence.  The  middling  and 
inferior  gentry,  together  with  the  inhabitants  of  towns;  those  who  entertained  a 
jealousy  of  the  nobles,  and  of  the  king,  or  who,  by  the  changes  in  the  state  of  society, 
had  lately  been  raised  to  independence,  became,  on  the  other  hand,  the  great  supporters 
of  parliament.  "  (HV,  3,295) 
Meek's  reading  of  this  passage  focuses  on  those  who  "had  lately  been  raised  to 
independence"  who  were  "merchants,  manufacturers,  and  merchants"  (HV,  3,103).  6  He 
could  also  have  included  here  "artificers  and  tradesmen"  (BV,  3,102),  and  "the 
peasantry  or  farmers,  that  other  great  class  of  the  commonalty"  (BV,  3,104)  who  by 
"the  extension  of  leases  of  land"  had  been  "emancipated  from  their  primitive 
dependence"  and  had  "acquired  a  degree  of  rank  and  importance  unknown  in  most 
countries"  (HV,  3,105). 
The  context  of  this  quote  shows  that  Millar,  by  assessing  the  balance  of  forces  on 
the  side  of  the  king  against  those  on  the  side  of  parliament,  wanted  to  explain  how  it 
was  that  the  military  forces  of  parliament  should  have  had  "a  decided  superiority" 
over  those  of  the  king.  This  suggests  that  Millar  thought  it  was  rank  rather  than  class 
that  was  the  decisive  influence  on  the  outcome  of  the  war.  It  was  the  estimation  of 
rank  with  its  associated  habits  of  submission  caused  by  prolonged  dependency  upon 
those  individuals  who  possessed  inherited  landed  property  that  swung  the  balance  on 
favour  of  parliament.  Thus  the  king's  forces  were  commanded  by  officers  whose  "rank 
in  life"  as  nobles  or  "higher  gentry"  had  given  them  both  military  experience  fighting 
wars  abroad  and  also  "a  degree  of  influence  over  their  followers"  (HV,  3,296).  This 
gave  the  king's  forces  an  initial  advantage.  However,  their  feudal  independence  from 
one  another  and  from  the  king  led  them  "to  act  in  separate  pillaging  parties,  at  the  head 
of  their  respective  followers".  They  were  unable  to  combine  their  forces  to  fight 
effectively. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  men  who  came  to  be  the  military  leaders  of  the 
parliamentary  forces  were  of  a  low  rank  and  gained  the  respect  of  their  troops  "not 
from  their  birth  or  their  opulence,  but  from  their  military  services"  (BV,  3,297).  It  was 
the  personal  qualities  of  low-ranking  leaders  that  commanded  respect,  not  their  wealth. 
Mllar  thought  that  "As  the  forces  of  parliament  comprehended  the  great  mass  of  the 
people,  we  need  not  wonder  that  when  they  came  to  surpass  those  of  the  king  in 
subordination  and  discipline,  as  well  as  in  numbers,  they  should  immediately  obtain  a 
decided  superiority"  (ibid). 
it  is  also  arguable  that,  when  Millar  referred  to  the  antagonism  between  the 
"higher"  and  the  "middling  and  inferior  gentry"  in  the  quote  Meek  gives  of  evidence  of 
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Mllar's  theorisation  of  the  civil  war  as  a  class  war,  he  was  also  thinking  in  terms  of 
differences  in  rank  rather  than  class.  The  gentry  was  a  class  of  individuals  that  gained 
property  through  inheritance.  The  long-established  wealth  of  the  gentry  encouraged 
dependants  to  be  submissive  and  deferential.  Millar  had  theorised  the  effects  of 
inherited  wealth  on  dependency  in  his  lectures  on  private  and  public  law.  The  extent  of 
influence  of  the  gentry's  rank  could,  in  theory,  be  calculated  according  to  the  extent  of 
revenue  landed  property  generated.  As  I  have  argued  in  chapter  eleven,  Millar, 
following  Hume,  adopted  a  commercialised  version  of  the  Harringtonian  maxim  of  the 
balance  of  property.  This  demonstrated  that  the  greater  the  amount  of  revenue  or 
exchangeable  value  of  the  landed  property  possessed,  the  greater  the  number  of 
individuals  who  would  find  it  in  their  interests  to  be  dependent  for  protection  and 
subsistence  upon  the  landed  proprietor.  The  proprietor  who  could  support  the  largest 
number  of  dependants  would  be  able  to  command  the  largest  rnilitia  with  the  highest 
level  of  deference  and  submission  amongst  retainers  or  servants.  The  "higher  gentry" 
would  therefore  be  the  landed  proprietors  who  could  support  the  largest  number  of 
dependants,  command  the  most  respect  and  submýission,  and  have  the  highest  rank. 
Conversely,  the  "middling"  and  "inferior"  gentry  would  support  lesser  numbers  of 
dependants  and  have  therefore  a  lower  rank. 
The  counter  argument  that  Millar's  use  of  "higher",  "middling"  and  "lower"  gentry 
is  consistent  with  his  use  of  "class"  is  that  Hume  and  Millar's  use  of  Harrington's 
maxim  entailed  a  precise  classification  of  individual  proprietors  according  either  to  the 
revenue  their  land  generated  or  to  its  exchangeable  value.  7  Classification  of  individuals 
according  to  revenue  is  one  of  the  criteria  of  Millar's  use  of  "class"  mentioned  above. 
In  this  case  it  would  be  classification  according  the  quantity  of  revenue  derived  from 
the  land,  either  for  taxable  purposes  or  according  to  the  exchangeable  value  of  the  land 
on  the  market  or  the  exchange-value  of  its  annual  produce.  According  to  this  line  of 
thought,  the  "higher"  gentry  would  be  those  proprietors  whose  inherited  land 
generated  the  most  revenue;  the  "inferior"  gentry  being  those  proprietors  whose  land 
generated  the  least  revenue;  and  the  "middling"  gentry,  those  whose  land  generated  a 
revenue  the  quantity  of  which  was  less  than  that  of  the  "higher"  and  more  than  that  of 
the  "lower"  gentry. 
Moreover,  Meek's  quotation  from  HV,  3,295  needs  to  be  read  in  the  light  of  that  of 
HV,  3,107,  quoted  above.  The  latter  states  that  property  was  transferred  from  the 
higher  classes  to  the  lower  classes  through  landed  property  becoming  an  alienable 
commodity.  As  Millar  theorised  in  his  lectures,  this  had  an  effect  upon  the  habits  of 
71  have  argued  in  chapter  eleven,  that  Harrington,  Hume  and  Millar  were  ambiguous  in  their 
understanding  of  revenue  generated  by  property.  This,  however,  does  not  effect  the  validity  of 
this  argument.  It  is  the  extent  of  political  and  economic  dependency  that  the  revenue  could  create 
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those  individuals  who  were  dependent  upon  the  landed  proprietor.  Because  land 
changed  hands  frequently  during  the  life  of  a  proprietor  and,  with  the  explosion  of 
entails,  was  no  longer  necessarily  transferred  through  inheritance,  dependants,  would 
not  have  as  long  a  period  of  time to  develop  the  appropriate  habits  of  deference  and 
submission  to  the  new  owners.  This  was  one  aspect  in  his  doctrine  of  the  fluctuation  of 
property  that  he  thought  led  to  greater  equality  and  liberty  in  a  commercialised  society. 
Thus  Millar  thought  not  only  that  landed  property  passed  from  one  class,  the 
feudal  nobility  to  another,  wealthy  merchants  and  manufacturers,  but  that  there  was 
simultaneously  a  raising  of  the  rank  of  landed  merchants  to  the  same  standing  as  the 
gentry,  and  also  a  lowering  of  the  rank  of  sections  of  feudal  nobility  to  that  of  the 
"inferior  gentry"  as  they  sold  off  their  land  to  cover  their  debts. 
In  favour  of  Meek's  interpretation  of  Millar's  understanding  of  the  civil  war  as  a 
class  war,  it  could  be  argued  that  Millar  intended  his  readers  to  understand  "nýiiddling 
and  inferior  gentry"  to  include  "merchants  and  manufacturers"  who  had  bought  land 
and  risen  in  rank  thereby.  In  which  case,  Millar  intended  to  include  the  "middle  and 
inferior  gentry"  within  the  category  of  all  those  individuals  who  "by  the  changes  in  the 
state  of  society  [generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange],  had  lately  been 
raised  to  independence"  (HV,  3,295). 
The  above  discussion  has  taken  place  within  the  context  of  Millar's  own 
understanding  of  class  and  rank,  and  I  have  concluded  it  with  an  argument  that  places 
Meek's  interpretation  of  Millar's  theorisation  of  the  civil  war  as  a  class  war  in  the  most 
favourable  light. 
Nonetheless,  it  would  be  misleading  to  leave  it  here,  for  two  reasons.  The  first  is 
that,  by  presenting  Millar's  account  of  the  civil  war  as  a  class  war,  Meek  deflects 
attention  away  from  Millar's  overall  historiographical  intention.  This  is  to  explain 
changes  in  the  English  constitution  according  to  the  conflict  between  the  two 
tendencies  he  identified  as  arising  within  a  commercial  society.  The  second  reason  is 
that  "class  war"  is  a  term  Meek  associates  with  Marx's  historical  method,  suggesting 
that  the  analysis  of  class  conflict  is  the  defining  characteristic  of  a  materialist 
understanding  of  history.  Both  of  these  suggestions  are  contestable  and  require  further 
discussion. 
As  mentioned  in  chapter  two,  Millar's  historiographical  intention  was  to  produce 
an  impartial  scientific  account  of  the  English  constitution  which  was  both  consistent 
with  Hume's  empiricist  and  conjectural  methods  and  also  a  correction  of  what  he 
perceived  to  be  inaccuracies  within  Hume's  account.  These  inaccuracies  were  the 
product  of  political  interpretations  of  the  constitution  that  favoured  the  private 
interests  of  the  Crown  against  the  perception  of  the  public  interest  institutionally 
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Millar's  account  of  the  events  leading  up  to  the  English  civil  war  stressed  not  only 
the  peculiarities  of  English  liberty  compared  with  those  of  other  European  nations  but 
also  the  unbroken  continuity  of  the  dependence  of  the  English  monarch  upon 
legislation  initiated  by  parliament  on  the  matter  of  raising  revenues  for  the  Crown 
through  pecuniary  forms  of  taxation.  Hume  had  been  mistaken  to  assume  that  there 
was  a  breach  in  the  form  of  this  dependence  with  the  Norman  conquest  and  the 
consolidation  of  the  feudal  system.  The  latter,  Millar  argued,  had  arisen  in  England  as 
it  had  in  Scotland  and  throughout  Europe  prior  to  the  Norman  conquest.  It  had  not 
been  imposed  on  England  through  conquest.  The  monarcWs  powers  were  continually 
limited  by  a  dominant  feudal  aristocracy  whose  interests  were  represented  within 
parliament.  Moreover,  although  there  were  many  examples  of  attempts  by  English 
monarchs  to  circumvent  parliament's  legislative  independence,  Millar  was  at  pains  to 
argue  that,  despite  both  the  mutual  interest  of  the  rising commercial  interest  with  that 
of  the  Crown  against  the  power  of  the  feudal  barons,  and  despite  revolutionary 
changes  in  the  social  and  economic  composition  of  the  lower  house,  no  monarch  until 
the  first  Stuarts  had  attempted  to  secure  a  source  of  revenue  through  taxation  without 
the  consent  of  parliament.  Hume  was  therefore  wrong  in  describing  the  Tudors, 
especially  Elizabeth,  as  having  assumed  absolute  powers  comparable  to  an  Oriental 
despot.  The  monarch's  prerogative  had  always  been  limited  by  her  or  his  dependence 
on  parliament  as  a  source  of  state  revenue. 
Hume  had  observed  that  absolute  monarchies  differed  from  Asiatic  despotism 
because  they  guaranteed  the  individual's  security  to  accumulate  and  alienate  their 
property  against  the  invasions  of  the  feudal  nobility.  Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  thought 
that  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange  created  a  tendency  within  all 
forms  of  large  commercial  governments,  whether  monarchies  or  republics,  towards  a 
form  of  military  dictatorship.  Within  the  observed  context  of  the  evolution  of  other 
European  governments  towards  absolute  monarchies,  Millar  thought  that  the  events 
leading  up  to  the  civil  war  in  England  were  exceptional.  They  were  peculiar  to  a 
country  that  had,  through  the  accident  of  its  geographical  position  as  an  island,  been 
capable  of  rapidly  recovering  its  knowledge  of  commerce  and  manufactures  from  the 
destructive  imposition  of  barbarian  customs  and  manners.  The  commercial  form  of  the 
English  government  had  not  required  a  large  standing  army  in  order  to  defend  teh 
country  from  foreign  invasion.  The  events  preceding  the  civil  war  were  also  peculiar 
because  of  the  differing  perceptions  of  the  nature  of  the  constitution  held  by  monarch 
and  parliament.  This  manifested  itself  in  a  conflict  between  the  self-interest  of  the 
monarch  with  the  disinterested  views  of  parliament.  " 
8Millar  asked  his  readers  to  enter  sympathetically  into  the  feelings  of  the  parliamentary  reformers 
of  1640  and  concluded:  "However  much  they  n-dght  be  tinctured  by  enthusiasm  and  religious 299 
Millar's  explanation  of  the  former's  self-interest  relied  upon  the  accidental  influence 
of  individual  personality.  Millar  discounted  Hume's  explanation  of  Charles,  conduct 
before  and  during  the  civil  war  as  leading  to  "a  laboured  apology"  (HV,  3,314)  that 
would  "mislead  an  incautious  and  superficial  observer".  According  to  Millar,  Hume 
had  explained  Charles'  behaviour  as  consistent  with  someone  who  thought  of  himself 
as  an  "absolute  prince".  Charles  was  convinced  that  the  absolute  powers  of  the 
monarch  were  constitutional  and  therefore  legitimate.  Given  that  Millar  had  argued 
throughout  his  book  that  these  views  depended  upon  a  false  account  of  the  origins  and 
nature  of  the  constitution  -  one  which  he  thought  Hume  had  reproduced  in  his  history  - 
it  is  no  surprise  that  Millar  should  have  stated  that  "Charles  must  have  known  better" 
(HV,  3,316).  Following  Hume's  comparative  and  conjectural  methods,  Millar  had 
compared  forms  of  government  typical  of  the  feudal  period  in  Europe  with  those  of 
Asiatic  Arabs  and  Tartars;  however,  unlike  Hume,  he  had  avoided  assimilating  the 
two. 
The  "barbarous  chief'  of  a  tribe  whose  property  consisted  of  flocks  and  herds  had 
the  absolute  power  to  "subsist  by  robbery  and  murder".  Knowledgeable  of  agriculture, 
they  acquired  landed  property  and  dependants.  They  assembled  together  with  other 
chiefs  in  order  to  protect  their  property  from  violent  appropriation  and  make  schemes 
for  the  robbery  of  others'.  Gradually,  through  an  accumulation  of  legal  precedents, 
individuals'  natural  efforts  at  bettering  themselves  through  their  economic  activity 
would  be  protected  from  the  violence  of  rapacious  barons.  Charles  therefore  "must 
have  known"  of  the  "different  forms  of  government  which  had  existed  in  different 
countries".  He  "must  have  known"  that  he  was  the  king  of  "a  civilized  nation,  in  which 
a  regular  system  of  law  has  been  long  established".  He  "must  have  known"  that 
England  had  never  been  "subjected  to  a  despotical  government"  (BV,  3,317).  He  "must 
have  known"  that  previous  English  monarchs  had  "never  ventured  to  assume  the  direct 
power  of  taxation,  without  the  concurrance  of  parliament"  and  that  English  legislation 
on  this  matter  differed  from  that  of  other  European  countries.  Moreover,  Millar  could 
explain  that  Hume  did  not  appear  to  understand  that  Charles  "must  have  known"  by 
challenging  Hume's  use  of  historical  sources  that  were  apologetic.  In  this  way,  Millar 
challenged  those  who  used  Hume's  sympathetic  account  of  Charles  to  exonerate  him 
from  responsibility  for  the  war. 
in  the  process  of  arguing  that  Charles  was  an  intelligent  man,  knowledgeable  of  the 
difference  between  barbarous  and  civilised  forms  of  monarchy  -a  man  who 
consciously  pursued  his  interest  in  transforming  the  limited  form  L-P  the  English 
monarchy  into  one  that  conformed  to  the  absolute  monarchies  of  his  European  p,;  ers  - 
prejudices,  they  seem  to  have  acted  from  pure  and  disinterested  motives"  (HV,  3,276).  They  were 
therefore  entitled  to  "a  high  degree  of  approbation". 300 
NUlar  was  at  the  same  time  trying  to  explain  the  origins  and  outcome  of  the  civil  war. 
The  latter  was  the  result  of  the  two  tendencies  caused  by  generalised  commodity 
production.  Both  tendencies  were  the  outcome  of  the  unintended  consequences  of  the 
actions  of  a  multiplicity  of  self-interested  individual  subjects.  They  were  uncontrollable 
forces  acting  within  the  sphere  of  the  politics  of  commercial  societies.  The  tendency 
towards  the  growth  of  the  sentiments  of  liberty  of  a  commercialised  people  was 
temporarily  successful  over  the  tendency  towards  despotism.  The  causes  of  this 
tendency  -  the  fluctuation  of  property,  the  rise  of  a  class  of  independent  commodity 
producers,  their  indifference  to  dependency  upon  their  superiors  for  subsistence,  and 
their  changed  habits  and  manners  have  been  discussed  in  chapter  nine.  The 
countervailing  tendency  towards  despotism  based  on  a  large  well-disciplined  standing 
army  reasserted  itself  in  a  republican  form  with  Cromwell's  protectorate.  The  balance 
between  these  tendencies  was  established  only  with  the  1688  settlement.  As  I 
described  in  the  previous  chapter,  it  was  Millar's  fear  that  this  balance  would  be  upset, 
and  the  tendency  towards  despotism  would  once  more  reassert  itself  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  that  motivated  him  to  support  limited  reforms  enfranchising  a  larger  section  of 
a  commercialised  population. 
Meek's  proposition  that  Millar  clearly  understood  the  civil  war  to  be  a  class  war 
deflects  attention  away  from  Millar's  politically  informed  distinction  between  the 
people  and  the  sovereign  power.  This  was  not  a  distinction  grounded  on  a  Marxian 
conception  of  class.  Although  Millar  was  able  to  give  a  description  of  the  different 
social  groupings  that  saw  their  interest  in  siding  with  the  king  and  was  able  to  compare 
these  with  other  social  groupings  that  had  interests  in  siding  with  parliament,  this 
description  was  based  on  classifications  of  individuals  according  to  rank,  occupation 
or  revenue.  These  classifications  combined  the  commercialised  Harringtonianism  he 
inherited  from  Hume  with  the  principles  of  authority  and  utility  he  inherited  from 
Smith. 
12.3  Millar  on  Slavery 
I  noted  in  chapter  two  that  Nfillar  is  known  as  a  significant  figure  in  the  accounts 
of  the  history  of  the  anti-slavery  movement  of  the  period.  Comment  has  been  made  on 
how  his  arguments  focused  on  the  unprofitable  nature  of  slavery.  The  following 
outline  of  his  arguments  bears  this  point  in  mind.  It  also  draws  out  various  aspects  of 
Nfillar's  method  discussed  above,  in  particular  his  application  of  conjectural  reasoning 
to  history  and  the  standpoint  he  adopts  of  judging  slavery  according  to  principles  of 
the  mind  such  as  uýility.  Thus  he  compared  the  utility  of  legislation  supporting  slavery 
with  laws,  such  as  contract,  that  would  gain  the  approval  of  every  self-interested 
subject  of  experience.  This  comparison  found  slavery  to  be  incompatible  with  subjects' 
assessment  of  their  natural  rights  to  own  and  dispose  of  their  property.  It  also  followed 301 
that  the  unproductive  nature  of  slavery  would  lin-dt  the  potential  of  individuals  to 
better  themselves  either  as  wage  labourers  or  as  capitalists.  The  following  discussion 
assumes  a  knowledge  of  Millars  contribution  to  political  economy  as  outlined  in 
chapter  five. 
12.3.1  Juridical  Aspects 
Millar  addressed  the  topic  of  slavery  in  the  second  "new"  course  of  his  lectures  on 
private  law.  This  is  his  discussion  of  rights  between  Master  and  Servant  (LJ1789, 
vol.  2,  lecs.  14-16,28-42).  Millar  divided  the  discussion  of  these  rights  into  two  parts. 
The  first  part  referred  to  judgements  on  the  right  to  own  slaves  based  on  natural 
feelings  and  utility  (LJ]789,2,15,33-4).  The  second  part  generalised  from  comparisons 
between  the  laws  of  different  nations  at  different  historical  stages  (LJ]789,2,15,38- 
40).  The  former  section  appealed  to  the  judgements  of  his  students  in  the  role  of 
disinterested  spectators  and  the  latter  referred  to  their  knowledge  of  customs  and 
manners,  and  means  of  production  and  subsistence.  These  attempted  to  explain 
deviations  of  positive  law  from  rules  that  would  have  generated  approval  if  considered 
disinterestedly  from  the  standpoint  of  a  fully  informed  spectator.  The  generalisations 
derived  from  history  were  therefore  necessary  for  informed  judgements  that  could 
bring  into  being  laws  more  in  accord  with  principles  derived  from  knowledge  of  the 
operations  of  the  human  mind. 
For  example,  in  lecture  fourteen,  Millar  discussed  differing  laws  applying  to 
servants  and  labourers  contrasting  the  position  of  propertyless  individuals  in  different 
countries.  He  observed  that,  in  ancient  Greece  and  Rome,  Afiica,  America  and  the 
colonies,  labourers  were  slaves,  but  in  most  European  nations  they  were  either  free 
wage  labourers  or  artisans.  This  prompted  two  separate  but  connected  inquiries.  The 
first  was  to  explain  the  differences  in  the  legal  position  of  free  and  unfree  labour.  The 
second  was  to  assess  how  far  these  legal  differences  conformed  to  the  feelings  of 
humanity  and  judgements  of  utility  of  an  informed  spectator.  He  referred  his  students 
to  the  explanations  he  gave  in  Yhe  Origins  of  Ranks  (OR,  243-249).  The  methods  of 
acquiring  slaves  were  through  voluntary  submission,  captivity,  judicial  sentence  and 
breeding.  The  reasons  for  the  rise  of  free  labour  in  Europe  were  "peculiar" 
(LJ]789,2,14,32)  and  again  he  assumed  that  his  students  had  read  and  studied  the 
account  of  feudal  society  he  gave  in  the  book.  The  second  part  of  the  discussion,  in 
lecture  fifteen,  contained  his  assessment  of  slavery,  first,  according  to  the  feelings  of 
humanity,  and  second,  on  the  basis  of  judgements  of  utility.  The  ubiquitous  use  of  the 
first  person  plural  pronoun  "we"  and  its  corresponding  possessive  adjective  "our" 
indicated  Millar's  appeal  to  the  feelings  of  the  disinterested  spectator.  These  feelings 
did  not  incline  the  spectator  to  disapprove  of  relative  servitude.  Servitude  that  came 
into  being  through  individuals  taking  advantage  of  the  misfortune  of  "our  neighbours", 302 
and  "reducing,  "  them  into  servants,  did  not  appear  to  offend  natural  feelings  as  long  as 
there  was  some  form  ofjuridical  control  over  the  actions  of  masters  (L11789,2,15,34). 
On  the  other  hand  feelings  did  make  the  spectator  disapprove  of  absolute  servitude: 
"that  he  [our  neighbour]  should  have  nothing  in  return  for  his  labour,  but  what  we 
chuse  [sic]  to  allow  him  in  return  for  it"  (ibid).  The  spectator  would  therefore  also 
disapprove  of  the  power  the  master  has  to  kill  or  punish  a  dependent  labourer  and  to 
sell  him  at  will.  In  order  to  illustrate  the  justice  of  the  institution  of  slavery,  Millar  then 
reviewed  the  various  methods  of  acquiring  slaves:  voluntary  submission,  captivity, 
judicial  sentence  and  breeding.  He  did  this  according  to  the  "rules  established  in  other 
branches  of  law"  similarly  determined  by  disinterested  feelings  (ibid).  Thus  the  law  of 
contract  determined  that  it  was  wrong  to  "give  nothing  in  return"  to  someone  who 
"gives  away  all  his  rights"  by  voluntary  submission  "but  what  depends  upon  the 
arbitrary  will  of  his  master"  (ibid).  Moreover,  natural  feelings  of  humanity  determined 
that,  for  slaves  captured  by  force,  a  slave  who  "labours  for  our  benefit 
...  should  be 
entitled,  to  a  certain  maintenance  independent  of  our  whim  &  caprice"  and  "that  he 
should  be  capable  of  property  &  have  rights  as  a  man"  (LJ1789,2,15,35).  Similar 
judgements  are  made  for  slaves  acquired  by  the  two  other  means:  judicial  sentencing 
and  breeding. 
The  examination  of  slavery  according  to  the  feelings  of  the  spectator  led  Millar  to 
conclude  that  only  absolute  forms  of  servitude  in  which  the  master  had  the  power  to 
punish  or  kill  the  slave  at  will  were  unjust.  Although  Millar  thought  that  it  was  difficult 
to  determine  "with  accuracy"  whether  or  not  feelings  of  humanity  would  incline 
spectators  to  disapprove  of  whether  masters  were  entitled  to  use  the  labour  of  slaves, 
he  observed  that,  in  fact,  they  did  not.  According  to  prevailing  standards  of  propriety, 
it  was  not  judged  inhuman  to  use  the  labour  of  slaves.  If  masters  gave  the  slave  some 
equivalent  in  cash  or  kind  sufficient  for  him  to  subsist,  and  if  they  considered  their 
slaves  as  potential  property  owners  and  consequently  as  individuals  with  the  capacity 
to  bear  rights,  then  the  feelings  of  the  spectator  would  tend  to  approve  of  the 
institution. 
However,  Millar's  interpretation  of  Hume  and  Smith's  theory  of  morality  and  law 
entailed  that  justice  was  determined  not  only  by  the  immediate  feelings  of  a 
disinterested,  well-informed  spectator,  but  also  by  the  spectator's  rational  judgements 
of  utility.  These  coincided  with  calculations  of  public  and  private  interest  to  the  self 
and  to  others.  Millar  argued  that  from  whatever  perspective  spectators  looked  at  the 
institution,  when  they  considered  public  utility  there  was  no  rational  justification  for 
slavery.  He  developed  this  argument  by  reviewing  slavery  in  terms  of  the  misery  of  the 
slaves  themselves,  the  harmful  effects  that  slavery  had  on  work  incentives,  and  the 
lower  profits  a  master  extracted  from  the  exploitation  of  unfree  compared  with  free 
labour.  Millar  discussed  the  effect  slavery  had  on  population  levels,  government,  the 303 
maintenance  of  the  poor.  He  also  reviewed  the  harmful  effect  the  institution  had  on  the 
morals  of  both  masters  and  slaves.  In  lecture  form,  these  arguments  were  presented  as 
summaries  of  the  more  extended  treatment  to  be  found  in  the  final  chapter  of  7he 
Origins  ofRanks  (OR,  282-296);  nonetheless,  they  effectively  demonstrated  aspects  of 
Millar's  method.  This  depended  on  information  drawn  from  a  variety  of  contemporary 
and  historical  sources.  To  make  informed  judgements  of  the  utility  of  free  or  unfi7ee 
forms  of  labour,  the  spectator  required  knowledge  of  the  history  of  the  laws  governing 
slavery  in  different  countries  and  at  different  historical  periods.  These  sources  included 
Hume's  and  Wallace's  speculations  on  the  population  of  slaves  in  Athens,  9  and 
Ramsay's  calculations  of  slaves'  life  expectancy  in  the  West  Indies  (LJ1789,2,16,39- 
40).  10  Millar  referred  to  a  more  extensive  list  of  ancient  and  contemporary  sources  on 
slavery  within  The  Origins  of  Ranks.  He  assumed  that  his  students  were  familiar  with 
the  book. 
12.3.2  Economic  Aspects 
Robin  Blackburn  has  remarked  that  Millar  argued  against  slavery  "on  the  grounds 
that  it  was  inimical  to  personal  industry,  profitable  economy  and  family  life".  "  This  is 
obviously  true  from  the  above  examination  of  Millar's  use  of  the  principle  of  utility. 
Not  only  did  Millar  argue  that  it  was  in  the  interests  of  masters  that  slavery  be 
abolished  so  that  a  greater  profit  be  gained  from  the  employment  of  free  wage  labour, 
but  that  it  was  in  the  interests  of  a  slave  that  "that  he  should  be  capable  of  property  & 
have  rights  as  a  man"  (LJ1789,2,15,35).  However,  Blackburn  also  remarks  that,  when 
applied  to  the  slavery  of  the  plantations,  Millars  position  was  mistaken  because  he 
failed  to  "consider  the  superprofits  which  co-ercive  co-operation  on  the  plantation 
could  produce".  12  It  is  true  that  Millar  was  mistaken  in  his  arguments  about  the 
unprofitable  nature  of  plantation  slavery.  However,  Blackburn's  explanation  of  this 
mistake,  that  it  was  a  result  of  Mllar's  intentions  to  "construct  slavery  as  a  foil  to  his 
own  view  of  the  direction  social  progress  should  take"  13  is  opaque.  It  is  not  clear  what 
exactly  Blackburn  is  referring  to  by  suggesting  that  Millar  was  in  a  position  to 
"construct  slavery  as  a  foil"  to  his  views  on  social  progress. 
9Hume  D.  (1752)  Of  the  Populousness  ofAncient  Nations  in  ed.  Miller  EX,  1985,  pp377-464. 
Wallace  Dr.  R.  (1753)  A  Dissertation  on  the  Numbers  ofMankind  in  Antient  Nations,  Edinburgh. 
Millar  referred  to  this  debate  in  OR,  258  &  267. 
IORamsay  Revd.  1  (1784)  An  Essay  on  the  Treatment  and  Conversion  ofAfrican  Slaves  in  the 
British  Sugar  Colonies,  London.  Ramsay  argued  against  Hume's  racist  assumption  that  black 
African  were  probably  less  intelligent  than  Europeans  because  they  had  produced  no  cultural 
artefacts  than  equalled  those  of  the  ancient  Germans  (NC,  208n). 
I  IBIackburn  R.  (1988)  The  Overthroiv  of  Colonial  Slavery,  1776-1848,  London.  p53. 
12131ackbum,  Colonial  Slavery,  ibid. 
1313lackbum,  Colonial  Slavery,  ibid. 304 
It  is  likely,  however,  that  Blackburn  is  directing  the  reader's  attention  to  the  way  in 
which  Millar  used  historical  illustrations  to  demonstrate  the  disutility  of  slavery  in 
general  and  plantation  slavery  in  particular  (OR,  261-281).  Millar's  opinions  on  the 
unprofitable  nature  of  plantation  slavery  were  influenced  by  his  account  of  how  slavery 
had  been  abolished  in  Europe.  The  latter,  in  turn,  was  informed  both  by  his 
understanding  of  both  jurisprudence  and  political  economy.  Millar  conceived  of 
slavery  as  a  non-kin  related  form  of  servitude  within  the  patriarchal  household.  It  was 
therefore  comparable  to  other  domestic  forms  of  servitude  such  as  villeinage  in  the 
feudal  period.  These  became  influenced  by  a  more  sophisticated  understanding  of 
natural  rights.  The  extension  of  a  division  of  labour  and  the  exchange  of  commodities 
brought  this  into  being.  As  a  result,  spectators  made  judgements  on  the  obligations  of 
masters  to  servants,  whether  slaves  or  villeins,  according  to  the  rules  determining 
contracts.  As  villeins  "frequently  obtained  a  small  gratuity,  which,  by  custom,  was 
gradually  converted  into  a  regular  hire;  and,  being  allowed  the  enjoyment  and  disposal 
of  that  subject,  they  were  at  length  understood  to  be  capable  of  having  separate 
property"  (OR,  264). 
Spectators  came  to  judge  that  it  was  wrong  "that  he  [our  neighbour]  should  have 
nothing  in  return  for  his  labour,  but  what  we  chuse  [sic]  to  allow  him  in  return  for  it" 
(L/1789,2,15,34).  It  followed  that  these  more  "civilised"  notions  of  the  subject's  rights 
should  also  be  extended  to  the  Afro-American  plantation  slaves.  Thus  Millar  argued 
that  it  was  in  the  interests  of  plantation  owners  to  give  their  slaves  "small  wages" 
(OR,  293).  These  would  make  them  more  productive  by  giving  them  an  economic 
incentive  to  work.  Millar  thought  it  was  "astonishing"  that  slave  owners  had  not  come 
to  an  understanding  of  such  "improvements"  given  that  "the  good  effects  of  them  have 
been  so  fully  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  villains  of  Europe"  (OR,  294). 
It  is  here  that  Millar's  sympathetic  commitment  to  slaves  as  self-interested  subjects 
with  the  capacity  to  have  rights  to  their  person  and  property  coincided  with  his 
understanding  of  political  economy.  In  the  same  way  that  he  thought  villeins  had  been 
able  to  move  from  a  position  of  "regular"  hired  labour  to  that  of  independent 
commodity  producers,  so  he  thought  that  slaves  could  also  become  artisans  and 
craftsmen  who  owned  their  own  means  of  production.  Through  developing  habits  of 
frugality  and  saving  they  would  have  the  opportunity  to  accumulate  capital. 
One  of  his  most  powerful  arguments  against  the  unproductive  nature  of  plantation 
slavery  can  be  best  understood  within  this  context.  Millar  argued  that  plantation  slaves 
were  unproductive  because  they  were  not  "excited  to  make  such  improvements  as  tend 
to  facilitate  labour"  (LJ1789,2,15,38).  They  did  not  possess  "the  contrivances  to 
shorten  and  facilitate  the  more  laborious  employments  of  the  people"  (OR,  292).  The 
examples  he  gave  made  it  clear  that  he  was  thinking  of  these  "contrivances"  as 
technical  instruments  of  labour.  For  example,  he  mentioned  that,  in  Jamaica,  "there  is 305 
hardly  a  spade  in  the  whole  island"  (ibid).  As  a  result  it  took  two  slaves  a  whole  day  to 
dig  a  grave.  He  also  observed  that  slaves  worked  without  saws  or  axes.  He  compared 
the  output  of  the  work  of  ten  slaves  in  one  day  with  that  of  two  free  labourers  who 
could  produce  the  same  quantity  of  goods  in  two  hours  "with  our  instruments  and 
machinery"  (OR,  293). 
As  I  argued  in  chapter  seven,  Millar  tended  to  conceive  of  productivity  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  material-technical  process  -  commodities,  money  and  capital  being 
thought  of  as  use-values.  The  view  he  had  of  the  unproductive  nature  of  plantation 
slavery  was  therefore  coloured  by  his  theorisation  of  the  origins  of  capital 
accumulation.  This  was  simultaneously  the  outcome  of  the  savings  of  money  by  thrifty 
individual  commodity  producers  and  of  the  savings  of  labour-time  made  through  their 
use  of  tools,  machinery  and  the  technical  division  of  labour.  His  understanding  of 
political  economy  would  have  limited  his  conception  of  the  actual  productivity  of  slave 
labour.  If  he  conceived  of  capital  technically  as  tools  and  machinery,  then  only  free 
labour  could  either  possess  its  own  capital  or,  through  savings  of  revenue  and  labour- 
time,  be  capable  of  owning  the  means  of  accumulating  capital.  If  Millar  conceived  of 
value  as  use-value,  then  a  greater  quantity  of  values  could  be  generated  only  through 
the  use  of  contractually  free  labour,  a  technical  division  of  labour,  and  machinery.  He 
would  have  had  difficulty  with  the  notion  that  value  could  be  generated  through  the 
rapid  working  to  death  of  plantation  slaves  and  their  replacement  through  breeding  or 
the  importation  of  fresh  slave  labour. 
Millar's  mistaken  views  on  the  unproductive  nature  of  plantation  slavery  are 
therefore  as  well  understood  by  examining  his  views  on  political  economy  as  his  views 
on  social  progress.  The  latter  were  consistent  with  those  of  reforming  political  and 
juridical  institutions  according  to  the  principles  of  the  mind  experienced  by  subjects 
who  were  interested  both  in  economic  activity  as  a  means  to  social  recognition  and 
also  in  laws  that  protected  their  potential  to  own  and  alienate  property  free  from 
violence  or  interference.  The  progressive  nature  of  Millar's  involvement  in  the 
campaign  to  abolish  slavery  was  prefaced  upon  his  assumption  that  these  principles 
operated  as  equally  within  the  minds  of  Afro-American  slaves  as  in  the  minds  of  their 
colonial  masters.  It  followed  that  Nfillar  argued  that  abolition  was  not  only  in  the 
interests  of  both  slaves  and  masters,  but  also  in  the  interests  of  everyone  who  benefited 
from  the  consumption  of  slave-produced  commodities  such  as  sugar,  tobacco  and 
cotton.  This  was  comprehensible  by  everyone  who  had  a  knowledge  of  public  utility. 
NOW  was  therefore  astonished  that  American  slave  owners  were  ignorant  of  such  a 
self-evident  philosophical  principle.  He  accounted  for  their  ignorance  according  to  the 
lack  of  attention  they  paid  to  their  own  enlightened  self-interest.  If  they  were  to 
consider  slavery's  "pernicious  effects  upon  industry"  they  would  soon  abandon  their 
attachment  to  the  institution  (OR,  294-295). Part  Six, 
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Chapter  Thirteen: 
Summary 
This  chapter  consists  of  a  summary  of  conclusions  concerning  Meek's  reading  of 
Mllar.  As  I  stated  in  chapter  one,  Meek's  propositions  regarding  the  unity  'of  the 
relationship  between  Millar  and  Marx  could  be  itemýised  in  the  following  list: 
(1a)Millar  developed  a  "new  way  of  looking  at  society".  ' 
(1b)This  was  a  philosophy  of  history  that  could  appropriately  be  called  a 
"materialist  conception  of  history".  2 
k2)Millar's  materialist  conception  of  history  assumed  that  "basic  economic 
factors"  influenced  "power-relations"  through  "changes  hi  property  relationslf.  3 
(3)Millar  identified  "what  might  be  called  'tech  n  o-econom  ic  bases'  for  certain 
great  social  changes  ...  * 
such  as  the  institution  of  private  property,  the  rise  of 
commodity  production  and  trade,  and  the  institution  and  abolition  of  slavery".  4 
(4)In  his  examination  of  English  history,  Millar  saw  "the  civil  war  quite  clearly  a 
class  war".  5 
(5)"Millar  was  certainly  well  aware  of  'the  existence  of  classes  in  modern 
society'.  116 
I  also  stated  that  Meek's  propositions  regarding  the  differentiation  between  the 
relationship  between  Millar  and  Marx  could  be  iternised  in  the  subsequent  list: 
(6)Millar  had  no  "feeling  for  the  dialectic  of  social  change".  This  was 
"conspicuously  lacking".  7 
Week,  "Contribution",  1967,  p4l. 
2Meek,  "Contribution",  1967,  p42. 
3ibid. 
4ibid. 
5Meck,  "Contribution",  1967,  p43. 
6Mcck,  "Contribution",  1967,  p44. 
7Meck,  "Contribution",  1967,  p43. 308 
(7)Millar  "denied  that  the  labour-capital  relationship  was  based  upon 
exploitation".  What  impressed  Millar  was  "the  capacity  of  the  labourer  to 
become  a  little  capitalist  himself"  not  "the  subordination  of  the  labourer  to  the 
capitalist".  8 
(8)It  followed  that,  unlike  Marx,  Millar  theorised  the  transition  from  feudalism 
to  capitalism  as  one  in  which  there  was  "the  emergence  of  a  state  of  economic 
and  political  independence"  [Meek's  emphasis]  not  "the  substitution  of  a  new 
ruling  class,  with  a  new  method  of  exploitation,  for  an  old  one.  " 
Proposition  (1b)  is  the  most  substantial  claim  Meek  makes  about  Millar.  This  is 
that  Millar's  conception  of  history  was  a  variant  of  Maoes  -  materialist  but,  as  stated  in 
(6),  lacking  a  feel  for  the  dialectic.  I  suggested  in  chapter  three  that  any  truth  that 
proposition  (1b)  has  lies  in  Millar  having  a  version  of  history  that  Marx  might  have 
characterised  as  a  form  of  "naturalistic  materialism"  -  "naturalistic"  because  society  is 
conceived  of  as  arising  out  of  an  abstraction  of  individuals  who  are  naturally 
predisposed  to  economic  activity,  and  "materialism"  because  Millar  adopted  a 
contemplative  attitude  to  the  theorisation  of  sensuous  reality.  I  argued  there  that 
Millar,  like  Hume  and  Smith,  was  an  empiricist  philosopher.  He  assumed  that  reality 
could  only  be  known  through  the  atomised  sensory  experience  of  the  individual 
subject.  In  order  to  make  sense  of  this  experience,  the  subject  had  to  connect  an 
awareness  of  mental  events  such  as  feelings,  ideas  and  impressions  with  external 
events.  To  gain  the  knowledge  necessary  to  act  as  a  moral  or  political  agent,  the 
subject  had  to  imagine  him  or  herself  as  another  in  order  to  experience  feelings  and 
ideas  that  corresponded  to  those  of  the  other.  This  was  an  act  of  the  mind  that 
required  an  effort  that,  to  be  completely  successful,  required  leisure  afforded  only  to  a 
contemplative  comfortable  well-educated  few.  The  vulgar  many,  whose  minds  were 
pre-occupied  by  responses  to  passions  and  ideas  caused  by  the  objects  that 
immediately  confronted  them,  were,  in  the  absence  of  superior  instruction,  denied 
most  of  the  knowledge  they  needed  to  act  in  a  rational  and  moral  fashion.  I  developed 
this  reading  of  Millar's  naturalistic  materialism  in  chapters  eight  and  nine. 
Aspects  of  proposition  (2)  were  discussed  in  chapters  four  and  nine.  In  chapter 
four  I  argued  that  neither  Millar  nor  Marx  had  anything  approximating  a  theory  of 
factors,  economic  or  otherwise.  To  read  this  concept  into  either  of  the  two  thinkers  is 
a  late  nineteenth  or  twentieth  century  anachronism.  However,  the  truth  or  falsity  of  (2) 
depends  on  the  reader's  interpretation  of  the  concept  of  "economic  factors".  If  she  or 
Week,  "Contribution",  1967,  p45. 
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he  thinks,  firstly,  that  the  existence  of  a  self-interested  subject  who  is  not  motivated  to 
possess  property  in  some  form  is  conceivable  but,  if  she  or  he  exists,  statistically 
insignificant;  and  that,  secondly,  every  form  of  property  is  a  potentially  exchangeable 
means  for  the  satisfaction  of  use-values;  and  that,  thirdly,  that  self-interest  is  a  "factor" 
that  influences  most  forrns  of  human  activity  whether  self-interest  is  morally  approved 
or  not,  then  the  proposition  is  true.  Arguments  for  this  interpretation  of  "economic 
factor"  can  be  drawn  from  chapters  nine  and  ten  where  I  discussed  Millar's 
individualism  and  his  concept  of  self-interest.  If,  however,  the  reader  rejects  the 
category  of  "factor"  as  a  hypostasis  derived  from  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  century 
division  of  academic  labour  with  little  or  no  heuristic  value  then  proposition  (2)  is 
false. 
The  veridical  status  of  Meek's  propositions  is  complicated  by  the  differences 
between  Marxists  and  Marxologists  over  the  category  of  economic  determination. 
Both  Marxists  and  non-Marxists  have  given  various  differing  interpretations  of  the 
category.  It  is  clear  that  Marx  was  either  an  economic  determinist  or  he  was  not. 
However,  even  though  the  very  mention  of  the  term  generates  controversy,  there  is  no 
consensus  over  what  "economic  determinism"  means.  Chapter  four  therefore  included 
a  discussion  of  some  of  the  problems  that  have  arisen  as  a  result  of  adopting  textbook 
sociological  readings  of  Marx's  materialist  conception  of  history.  In  this  chapter,  I 
identified  two  sociological  models  derived  from  an  analysis  of  the  use  of  "productive 
forces"  and  "productive  relations"  in  textbook  readings.  I  called  these  the 
"technological"  and  the  "ownership"  models.  I  argued  that  these  models  have 
generated  problems  both  for  those  interpreters  who  have  had  argued  that  Millar  is  a 
precursor  of  "Marxist"  sociology  and  for  critics  who  have  emerged  from  both  the 
natural  jurisprudential  and  the  civic  humanist  schools  of  interpretation. 
Noticing  that  in  the  secondary  literature  on  Millar  no  commentator  had  bothered  to 
define  what  they  or  Millar  meant  by  "economic"  -  except  to  assume,  as  Ignatieff  does, 
that,  if  it  meant  anything  at  all,  it  referred  to  the  satisfaction  of  subsistence  needs  - 
chapter  five  consisted  of  a  discussion  of  two  different  interpretations  of  the  concept  of 
economic  activity.  I  decided  to  settle  on  a  definition  which  proposes  that  economic 
activity  is  the  specific  form  taken  by  productive  activity  within  a  commodity-producing 
society.  It  is  therefore  productive  of  value  as  well  as  use-value. 
Chapter  six  made  some  preliminary  remarks  on  Millar's  conception  of  economic 
activity.  This  focused  on  Millar's  own  use  of  the  term  "economic"  and  the  problem  of 
anachronistic  readings.  I  argued  that,  although  Millar's  use  of  the  term  "economic" 
referred  to  the  prudent  management  of  revenue,  his  work  contained  a  recognisable 
concept  of  generalised  commodity  production. 
Chapter  seven  was  an  examination  of  Millar's  contribution  to  political  economy  in 
which  I  critically  evaluated  Millar's  understandin  of  value,  the  division  of  labour,  the  9 310 
alienation  of  commodities  and  other  political  economic  categories  such  as  capital, 
wages,  rent  and  profit.  This  was  intended  to  illustrate  Millar's  understanding  of 
economic  relations  as  outlined  in  chapter  six.  It  also  confirmed  the  truth  of  proposition 
(7).  Meek  was  clearly  correct  to  suggest  that  Millar  had  neither  the  economic 
categories  nor  a  conception  of  class  sufficient  even  to  suggest  a  theory  of  exploitation. 
In  this  he  differed  from  Smith. 
In  chapter  seven,  I  stated  that  Smith's  understanding  of  value  as  labour  purchased 
or  commanded,  and  of  productive  labour  as  labour  exchanged  directly  with  capital, 
provided  the  theoretical  grounds  for  an  embryonic  theory  of  exploitation.  It  was  not  a 
theory  itself  This  theory  would  be  developed  by  Ricardian  socialists  such  as  William 
Thompson,  Thomas  Hodgskin  and  Robert  Owen  in  the  early  nineteenth  century.  It 
would  find  its  clearest  exposition  in  Marx's  political  economy.  Millar's  political 
economy,  on  the  other  hand,  made  no  theoretical  distinction  between  use  and 
exchange  value,  and  reproduced  the  less  sophisticated  elements  that  can  be  found  in 
Smith's  Wealth  ofNations.  These  are  the  lack  of  differentiation  between  the  social  and 
technical  divisions  of  labour,  the  notion  that  capital  is  an  elementary  technical 
requirement  for  every  form  of  productive  activity,  and  that  capital  is  accumulated 
through  individual  savings  of  revenue  or  labour-time. 
It  is  the  concept  of  determinism  and  the  suggestion  that  there  is  no  role  for 
individual  freedom  in  history  that  most  scholars  appear  to  object  to,  whether  it  is 
applied  to  Smith  and  Millar  or  to  Marx.  10  Ironically,  Francis  Jeffrey,  the  contemporary 
Edinburgh  reviewer  of  Millar's  Historical  View  objected  to  Millar's  philosophy  of 
history  on  grounds  similar  to  those  who  have  subsequently  criticised  Marx.  Millar 
appeared  to  Jeffrey  to  be  unconcerned  about  the  role  individuals  played  in  history.  " 
Millar  was  quite  happy  to  use  the  language  of  determination.  In  chapter  eight 
therefore,  I  considered  it  important  to  draw  some  conclusions  regarding  Millar's 
thinking  on  determination  and  causality.  This  led  me  to  examine  Hume's  influence  on 
Millar  and  to  re-situate  Millar's  approach  to  the  progress  of  history  within  a 
developing  empiricist  tradition  of  natural  jurisprudence.  This  emphasised  the  role  that 
the  subject  of  experience  plays  both  in  making  historical  conjectures  about  customs, 
laws  and  manners  in  the  past  and  also  in  justifying  the  juridical  and  political  institutions 
necessary  for  an  emerging  capitalist  order.  This  falsifies  Meek's  proposition  (1a)  -  that 
Millar  developed  a  new  way  of  looking  at  society.  It  also  provides  supporting  evidence 
for  the  truth  of  (6)  -  that  Millar  did  not  have  a  dialectical  conception  of  social  change. 
100n  Smith  and  Millar,  see  Skinner,  Contribution?,  PpI00-104.  Also  Haakonssen,  Legislator,  pp178- 
189.  On  Marx,  see  De  Ste  Croix  G.  E.  M.  (1981)  The  Class  Struggle  in  the  Ancient  Greek  World, 
London:  "In  fact  there  is  nothing  in  the  least  'deterministic,  in  the  proper  sense  in  Marx's  view  of 
history;  and  in  particular  the  role  of  no  single  individual  is  'determined'by  his  class  position.  "  p.  29. 
I  lieffrey  F.  (1803)  Article  XIII:  "An  Historical  View  of  the  English  Government.  "  In  Edinburgh 
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Chapters  nine  and  ten  developed  certain  themes  that  arose  in  chapter  eight.  These 
themes  are  necessary  to  the  evaluation  of  the  truth  of  propositions  (2)  and  (8).  They 
included  Millar,  Smith  and  Hume's  rejection  of  the  abstraction  of  the  state  of  nature 
favoured  by  natural  law  theorists  to  explain  submission  to  the  authority  of  a  sovereign 
power.  Secondly,  they  addressed  Millar's  choice  of  calculations  of  private  and  public 
utility  to  explain  the  acquiescence  of  the  weak  to  the  strong  and  of  the  poor  to  the 
rich.  I  gave  some  attention  to  the  concept  of  self-interest  and  its  relationship  both  to 
economic  activity  and  to  the  passions  that  motivate  individuals  to  acquire  property.  I 
argued  that  Smith  and  Millar's  theories  of  property,  submission  and  self-interested 
motivation  do  not  make  sense  without  the  assumption  that  social  scarcities  of  goods 
(such  as  the  need  for  respectful  attention  and  the  material  necessities  that  the  subject 
experiences  as  means  to  satisfying  this  need)  were  thought  of  as  determined  by  nature. 
In  chapter  eleven,  I  used  the  main  body  of  Millar's  Historical  View  to  illustrate  an 
original  political  doctrine  informing  his  historiography.  This  chapter,  therefore,  goes 
some  way  to  addressing  the  second  issue:  how  far  and  on  what  grounds  Millar  was 
successful  in  recognising  that  there  was  a  causal  relationship  between  economic 
activity,  the  distribution  of  property  and  forms  of  government.  It  is  well  established 
that,  according  to  Millar,  the  development  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  in  particular 
commerce,  trade  and  manufactures,  changed  the  distribution  of  property.  What  is 
evident  in  Millar's  work  is  that  on  one  occasion  he  used  the  metaphor  of  "foundation" 
and  "superstructure"  to  describe  the  relationship  between  the  distribution  of  property 
and  the  form  of  government  in  a  country.  In  chapter  three  I  mentioned  this  shared 
metaphor  as  one  of  the  superficial  similarities  between  Millar'  and  Marx.  In  chapter 
eleven,  I  discussed  the  relationship  that  Millar  thought  existed  between  foundation  and 
superstructure  in  greater  depth.  I  suggested  that  he  got  the  idea  via  Hume's  Essays 
from  Harrington.  Harrington  thought  he  had  found  a  scientific  or  philosophical 
principle  that  explained  the  classical  distinction  between  monarchies  and  republics.  He 
called  this  the  "balance  of  property".  Millar  thought  that  changes  in  the  balance  of 
property  resulted  in  two  tendencies  that  determined  the  form  of  governments  in 
commercial  societies.  The  first  tendency  was  towards  the  absolute  monarchies  of 
Europe,  such  as  Louis  XIV's  rule  over  France  and  the  despotic  period  of  Cromwell's 
reign  in  England.  He  explained  this  in  terms  of  the  increase  of  state  revenue  through 
taxation  that  the  monarch  or  dictator  used  to  pay  for  a  standing  army  to  act  in  his  or 
her  interests.  The  second  tendency  was  towards  a  growing  "spirit  of  liberty"  amongst 
the  people.  This  limited  the  powers  of  rulers.  If  the  latter  did  not  act  in  the  people's 
interests,  then  they  would  refuse  to  pay  taxes  or  embark  on  a  violent  rebellion  which 
could  remove  the  offending  government  and  replace  it  with  one  that  respected  the  law. 
The  spirit  of  liberty  was  a  result  of  changes  in  customs  and  manners  caused  by  civil 
society  becoming  dominated  by  a  frequent  and  regular  alienation  of  commodities. 312 
Meek  was  therefore  right  to  observe  that  Millar  conceived  of  the  transition  from 
feudalism  to  capitalism  in  terms  of  the  greater  extent  of  the  subject's  political  and 
economic  independence.  Proposition  (8)  is  therefore  true.  As  I  showed  in  chapter 
eleven,  Millar  thought  that  economically  active  subjects  were  less  dependent  upon 
other  individuals  for  subsistence  and  protection,  if,  as  an  unintended  outcome  of  their 
actions,  there  emerged  juridical  and  political  institutions  that  satisfied  their  long-term 
interests  in  acquiring  and  alienating  property.  Moreover,  the  self-interested  subject's 
activity  not  only  generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange,  but  also  changed 
the  distribution  of  property.  Forms  of  government  arose  on  the  alienation  of  landed 
property  as  a  commodity  which,  whilst  guaranteeing  the  individual's  natural  rights  to 
make  contracts  and  securing  his  property  from  the  violence  of  others,  also  had  the 
potential  to  be  despotic  and  politically  oppressive.  Millar  therefore  thought  that  the 
feelings  of  liberty  that  economic  activity  gave  to  the  subject  would  probably  lead  to 
increasingly  democratic  forms  of  representative  government.  A  democratic  outcome 
was,  however,  far  from  inevitable.  He  thought  that  Harrington  had  discovered  in 
Oceana  "the  true  principles  of  democracy"  (HV,  3,286).  These  were  that  in  a  large 
country  "the  supreme  powers  of  government  should  be  committed  to  a  body  of 
representatives,  chosen  by  the  nation  at  large"  (HV,  3,287),  the  representatives  being 
subject  to  frequent  elections  (HV,  3,288).  However,  Harrington's  discovery  was  a 
peculiarity  of  the  circumstances  of  an  English  constitution  in  which  the  balance  of 
power  had  fallen  into  the  House  of  Commons  through  the  more  advanced  progress  of 
the  propensity  to  alienate  commodities.  Millar  had  shown  that  the  emergence  of  a  form 
of  democratic  control  by  the  commercial  and  manufacturing  interest  over  the  state 
after  the  civil  war  was  an  accident  of  England's  status  as  an  island.  His  review  of  other 
commercial  governments,  both  ancient  and  modem,  demonstrated  that  the  greater 
liberties  of  the  subject  to  pursue  his  interests  within  the  law  coincided  with  military 
despotism  and  absolute  monarchy.  Following  a  commercialised  version  of  Harrington's 
maxim,  he  attempted  to  demonstrate  that  the  balance  of  power,  through  the  increased 
tax  revenue  available  to  the  state  and  a  concentration  of  property  in  the  hands  of  one 
person,  could  easily  overrule  any  tendencies  towards  a  more  egalitarian  distribution  of 
property.  Generalised  commodity  production  led  just  as  much  to  a  consolidation  of 
the  centralised  forces  of  the  state  as  it  did  towards  popular  participation  in 
government.  Moreover,  if  a  commercialised  people  were  too  vociferous  in  articulating 
their  interests,  these  forces  could  be  turned  in  violent  confrontation  against  the  people. 
it  is  true  that  Millar  thought  that  the  greater  personal  indepcndence  of  an  economically 
productive  population  would  secure  the  continued  dependence  of  the  state  upon 
revenues  generated  by  the  merchant  and  manufacturing  classes.  It  is  also  true  that,  in 
opposing  Hume's  scepticism  concerning  the  future  of  the  British  constitution,  he 
argued  that  the  1688  settlement  would  survive.  Nonetheless,  he  also  thought  the 313 
interests  of  an  unproductive  section  of  the  capitalist  class  that  derived  its  profits  from 
interest  on  loans  to  the  government  could  drive  the  British  state  into  continued  warfare 
with  other  states.  Moreover  the  increased  revenues  available  to  the  military  could  lead 
to  a  political  form  of  despotism. 
Millar's  commitment  to  free  trade  was  therefore  articulated  from  the  perspective  of 
that  section  of  the  capitalist  class  which  saw  its  interests  as  the  general  interest.  This 
general  interest  was  not  local  or  national.  This  section  of  the  bourgeoisie  perceived  the 
accumulation  of  property  through  productive  investment  in  the  world's  market  for 
capital  and  labour  power  to  be  a  universal  benefit.  The  profits  derived  from  these 
investments  could  be  disrupted  by  external  or  internal  warfare.  It  was  from  the 
perspective  of  an  international  capitalist  class,  which  shared  a  common  interest  in 
productive  investment,  that  he  showed  sympathy  for  limited  democratic  reforms,  for 
opposition  to  the  war  on  France,  and  for  the  Irish  threat  of  civilian  disobedience  in 
their  pursuit  of  political  independence  and  unrestricted  access  to  internal  and  external 
British  markets.  12 
Chapter  twelve  was  concerned  with  an  appraisal  of  Meeles  propositions  (3)  -  on 
Millar's  explanation  of  the  institution  and  abolition  of  slavery  -  and  (4)  and  (5)  on 
Millar's  understanding  of  class.  According  to  Meek,  the  institution  and  abolition  of 
slavery  were,  like  private  property  and  the  rise  of  commodity  production,  the  result  of 
"techno-economic  bases"  -a  concept  taken  from  Sombart,  not  Marx.  13  In  chapters 
eight  and  nine,  I  argued  that  Millar  conceived  of  the  rise  of  commodity  production 
according  to  individuals'  perception  of  their  interests  in  the  following:  a  means  of 
subsistence  and  a  mode  of  the  acquisition  of  property  that  would  provide  a  surplus 
sufficient  to  support  their  dependants;  rules  of  justice  that  would  protect  the  right  to 
freely  alienate  property;  and  acquiescence  to  the  authority  of  individuals  with  the 
power  to  enforce  these  rules.  I  argued  that,  as  a  result  of  the  subject's  pursuit  of  these 
interests,  the  perception  of  property  changed  to  one  that  conformed  to  the 
requirements  of  natural  law.  This  requirement  was  that  every  individual  was  equally 
free  to  alienate  property  exclusively  possessed  whether  or  not  his  or  her  ancestors  had 
acquired  it  through  conquest,  robbery  or  plunder. 
If  Meek  had  conceived  of  "techno-economic"  bases  according  to  the  above 
account,  then  I  would  not  contest  the  vagueness  of  the  form  of  expression  he  chose.  I 
have,  for  example,  argued  throughout  this  dissertation  that  Millar  conceived  of 
generalised  commodity  production  and  exchange  from  the  one-sided  perspective  of  a 
development  in  the  material-technical  process  abstracted  from  its  social  form  as 
objective  value.  However,  "techno-econon-tic"  is  also  a  term  suggestive  of  the 
1217or  Millar's  views  on  Ireland  see  appendix  one. 
13See  chapter  four. 314 
technological  model  of  materialist  sociology  criticised  in  chapter  four.  If  Meek  was 
inclined  to  this  conception  of  Marx's  historical  and  social  theory,  then  the  notion  of 
"techno-economic  bases"  with  its  association  with  Lehmamfs  "techno-economic 
determinism"  must  be  rejected  as  so  opaque  that  it  helps  clarify  neither  Manes  nor 
Millar's  philosophical  methods. 
In  chapter  twelve,  I  attempted  to  show  that  Millar's  account  of  the  institution  of 
slavery  and  the  reasons  for  its  abolition  is  consistent  both  with  Millar's  conjectural 
method  applied  to  private  law,  and  also  with  his  conception  of  political  economy.  Both 
Millar's  conjectural  method  and  his  political  economy  were  discussed  in  greater  depth 
in  chapters  eight  and  seven.  I  used  this  discussion  to  reject  the  truth  of  proposition  (3). 
Whether  the  reader  is  committed  to  the  theory  that  changes  in  technology  determine 
social  relations  or  not,  there  is  no  evidence  to  support  the  truth  of  the  proposition  that 
Millar  thought  that  techno-economic  bases  were  the  causes  of  the  institution  and 
abolition  of  slavery. 
There  was  an  attempt  in  chapter  twelve  to  clarify  Meek's  confused  assumption  that 
Millar's  conception  of  class  was  similar  to  Manes.  Millar's  conceptions  of  class  and 
rank  were  thoroughly  discussed.  I  argued  here  that  the  truth  or  falsity  of  propositions 
(4)  -  that  Millar  saw  the  English  civil  war  as  a  class  war.  -  and  (5)  that  Millar  was 
aware  of  the  existence  of  classes  in  society  depended  on  the  reader's  commitments  to 
different  understandings  of  social  class.  If  she  or  he  is  committed  to  a  sociological 
understanding  of  the  concept  of  social  class  -  for  example  as  the  classification  of 
individuals  according  to  the  type  of  occupation  they  are  engaged  in,  or  the  extent  of 
revenue  derived  from  these  occupations  or  other  sources,  then  there  is  evidence  to 
support  their  truth.  It  must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  truth  of  these 
propositions  also  entails  the  assumption  that  social  status  is  attached  to  these 
classifications.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  reader  is  committed  to  a  concept  of  class 
derived  from  Marx's  political  economy,  the  propositions  are  clearly  false.  Given  the 
context  in  which  they  are  made  -  one  in  which  Meek  is  attempting  to  prove  that 
Millar's  theory  of  history  is  the  same  as  Marx's  -I  suggested  that  the  conclusion  that 
propositions  (4)  and  (5)  are  false  is  correct. 
it  follows  from  this  examination  of  the  veridical  status  of  Meek's  propositions  on 
Millar  that  they  are  not  consistent  with  one  another.  This  is  clearest  when  (1b),  (5)  and 
(7)  are  considered  together.  Meek  was  correct  to  state  that  Millar  had  no  theory  of 
exploitation.  He  could  therefore  have  had  no  conception  of  the  nature  of  the  social 
relationship  between  classes.  Millars  accurate  classification  of  individualb  according  to 
the  sources  of  their  revenue  in  a  capitalist  society  -  rent,  capital,  and  wages  -  did  not 
entail  that  the  economic  surplus  that  takes  the  form  of  rent  or capital  is  extracted  in  the 
form  of  value  from  the  labouring  activity  of  the  immediate  producers.  In  fact,  not  only 
did  Millar's  subjective  theory  of  value  prevent  such  a  discovery,  but  his  jurisprudential 315 
approach  also  allowed  him  to  avoid  making  any  statements  that  would  indicate  that 
surpluses  are  extracted  by  a  ruling  class  from  the  labouring  activities  of  any  other 
subordinate  class.  On  the  contrary,  Millar  posited  the  notion  that,  regardless  of 
whether  he  was  in  a  "rude"  or  a  "civilised"  condition,  every  individual  was  an  actual  or 
potential  commodity  owner.  Millar  generalised  the  eighteenth  century  subject's 
experience  of  a  public  interest  in  forms  of  government  that  enforced  his  right  to 
accumulate  surpluses  in  the  form  of  capital  to  the  whole  of  humanity.  He  conceived  of 
the  appetites,  desires  and  passions  that  motivated  individuals  to  be  economically 
productive  as  inherent  and  necessary  aspects  of  human  nature.  This  juridically  inspired 
perspective  informed  his  arguments  on  the  origins  and  evolution  of  slavery,  villeinage 
and  wage  labour.  Although  he  recognised  that  the  labouring  activity  of  slaves,  villeins, 
and  hired  labourers  benefited  their  masters  and  superiors,  he  also  thought  that  it  was 
the  economic  activity  of  the  latter  as  actual  or  potential  commodity  owners  that 
geverated  the  surpluses  of  time  and  goods  that  contributed  to  their  wealth,  luxurious 
consumption,  leisure  and  authority.  Smith's  observation  that,  in  the  ancient  world,  the 
possession  of  slaves  freed  citizens  from  manual  labour  and  gave  them  the  leisure  to 
participate  in  democratic  forms  of  government  cannot  be  found  in  Millar's  writings. 
Similarly,  Millar  does  not  refer  to  Smith's  observation  that  there  was  a  potential 
conflict  of  interest  between  workers  and  capitalists.  On  the  contrary,  Millar  stressed 
the  advantages  that  workers  derived  from  the  exchange  of  their  labour  power  with 
capital  and  the  mutual  interest  capitalists  and  workers  had  in  resisting  oppressive 
governments. 
In  contrast,  Meek's  propositions  suggest  both  that  Millar  was  conscious  of  class 
exploitation  and  that  he  was  not.  The  former  would  follow  from  his  proto-Marxian 
conception  of  history,  and,  therefore,  his  recognition  of  the  role  of  the  class  struggle. 
The  latter  would  follow  from  a  mistaken  application  of  this  theory.  This  mistake  could 
be  easily  corrected  in  the  light  of  Marx's  further  development  of  the  same  theory.  I 
have  argued  that  this  perspective  is  mistaken.  The  only  similarity  between  Millar's  and 
Marx's  theories  is  that  they  both  appreciated  that  there  is  a  real  historical  tendency  for 
all  social  relations  to  become  subsumed  within  commodity  relations.  Their 
understanding  of  the  origins,  nature  and  influence  of  commodity  relations  within  an 
evolving  social  totality  is  so  different  that,  conceptually  and  methodologically,  their 
theories  of  history  have  nothing  else  in  common.  Even  the  mention  of  concepts  such  as 
totality  or  social  evolution  when  referring  to  Millar  has  the  flavour  of  an  anachronistic 
category  i,,  istake. 
Millar  was  indeed  conscious  of  the  historical  oppression  of  his  own  class. 
However,  he  theorised  this  oppression  according  to  the  requirements  of  humanity  as  a 
whole.  The  general  interests  of  the  economically  active  individual  subject  of 
experience  -  his  welfare,  security  and  libertv  -  had  been  and  continued  to  be  threatened 316 
by  the  vicious  private  interests  of  state  functionaries.  Millar  was  also  conscious  that 
unintended  and  therefore  unplanned  tendencies  within  generalised  commodity 
production  could  lead  to  states  that  suppressed  personal  liberties  rather  than  promoted 
them.  It  was  an  accident  of  history  that  the  latter  tendency  had  dominated  the  English 
constitution.  This  circumstance  could  be  reversed  in  favour  of  a  tendency  that  led  to 
oppressive  state  controls  over  personal  liberty.  In  so  far  as  these  observations  of  the 
effects  of  influence  that  capital  accumulation  has  on  governments  are  still  true  and 
that,  for  example,  there  is  no  necessary  correlation  between  the  subsumption  of  social 
relations  within  the  market  and  the  democratic  control  of  the  majority  of  the 
population  over  these  relations  (even  in  a  limited  representative  form),  Millar's 
contribution  to  the  science  of  history  may one  day  appear  to  be  much  greater  than 
Meek's  assimilation  of  his  work  to  the  Soviet  or  social  democratically  inspired 
misapprehension  of  Marx  discussed  here  once  suggested. Apendices 318 
Appendix  One: 
The  Essay  on  Ireland 
The  example  I  have  decided  to  choose  as  typical  of  Millar's  philosophical  history  is 
his  Review  of  the  Government  of  Ireland.  The  Review  forms  the  first  chapter  of  the 
fourth  volume  of  Historical  View  (HV,  4,1-68).  The  essay  demonstrates  various 
aspects  of  the  methods  developed  within  the  empiricist  school  of  natural  jurisprudence 
discussed  in  the  main  body  of  this  dissertation. 
Firstly,  the  dissertation  is  an  example  of  Millars  commitment  to  a  conjectural 
method  of  reasoning.  Millar  makes  inductive  inferences  from  general  causes  distilled 
from  the  testimony  of  a  number  of  observers  of  the  customs,  manners,  laws, 
knowledge  of  the  arts  and  forms  of  government  of  a  variety  of  different  peoples  and 
nations.  Millar  reasons  from  what  he  supposed  to  be  the  general  or  probable  course  of 
historical  and  economic  development  of  political  society  to  the  particular  uneven 
development  of  the  Irish.  He  thought  of  the  Irish  as  a  people  isolated  from  the  rest  of 
Europe,  whose  opportunities  for  improvement  were  both  retarded  and  advanced  by 
English  conquest. 
Secondly,  it  is  an  example  of  Millar's  use  of  the  principle  of  utility  to  explain  both 
Irish  submission  to  and  their  independence  from  English  rule.  The  calculations  of 
utility  that  the  Irish  made  as  self-interested  subjects  of  experience  predisposed  them  to 
acquiesce  to  laws  passed  by  the  English  government.  This  acquiescence  depended  on 
whether  English  law  and  government  assisted  their  economic  progress.  Utility, 
however,  influenced  them  to  resist  laws  that  impeded  this  progress  at  a  later  date. 
Moreover,  Millar  assumed  that  the  economic  doctrine  of  free  trade  would  be  approved 
by  every  disinterested,  well-informed  spectator  of  the  progress  of  the  improvement  of 
arts,  manufactures,  laws  and  government. 
Finally,  the  essay  can  be  usefully  contrasted  with  Hume's  account  of  the  Irish  in  his 
History  of  England.  '  Although  Millar  did  not  mention  Hume  it  is  clear  that  Millar 
would  have  judged  Hume's  descriptions  of  Irish  customs,  manners  and  national 
character  as  unduly  influenced  by  the  prejudices  of  English  historians. 
6.1  The  Historical  Background 
Millar  wrote  about  the  Irish  from  the  reign  of  Henry  II  to  1782.  For  most  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  English  policy  had  closed  external  markets  to  the  sale  of  Irish 
commodities,  chiefly  wool  and  linen.  However,  by  the  end  of  the  century,  the 
lHume  D.  (1824)  The  History  of  England,  from  the  invasion  of  Julius  Caesar,  to  the  revolution  in 
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constitutional  means  of  protecting  English  monopoly  from  Irish  competition  were  in 
disarray.  War  with  America  gave  the  Irish  the  opportunity  to  raise  a  large  volunteer 
citizen  army.  Using  a  combination  of  sanctions,  political  pressure  and  the  threat  of 
rnilitary  force,  the  Irish  managed  to  acquire  a  measure  of  economic  and  constitutional 
independence.  2  In  1780,  the  English  parliament  abolished  its  commercial  restrictions 
on  Irish  trade.  By  1782,  it  was  forced  to  repeal  most  of  the  laws  subordinating  Irish 
legislative  and  judicial  powers  to  itself  Millar  concluded  the  Review  with  an  account 
of  these  changes.  It  was  "the  general  advancement  of  commerce  and  manufactures" 
that,  in  part,  had  inspired  the  movement  for  Irish  independence  (RG1,60). 
Contemporary  Ireland  was,  he  thought,  "an  independent  kingdom,  connected  by  a 
federal  union  with  Britain"  (RGI,  68).  3 
In  the  eighteenth  century,  the  North  of  Ireland  was  famous  for  its  opposition  to 
British  influence.  A  few  decades  later,  however,  it  was  notable  for  its  unbending 
support  for  political  union.  This  appears  paradoxical.  Irish  patriots,  who  had 
campaigned  so  vigorously  for  free  trade  prior  to  1782,  were  soon  engaged  in 
boycotting  English  imports.  The  demand  for  protective  tariffs  became  a  part  of  Irish 
nationalist  doctrine.  A  major  theme  in  unionist  and  anti-unionist  literature  of  the  late 
1790s  was  whether  or  not  Ireland  would  benefit  from  Britain's  industrial  growth. 
Unionist  propaganda  appealed  to  the  example  of  Scotland's  post-union  economic 
success.  Anti-unionists  argued  for  protection  of  Irish  industry  by  an  independent 
parliament.  Union  with  Britain,  they  argued,  would  exacerbate  the  problem  of  agrarian 
poverty  and  absentee  landlordS.  4 
Millar's  approach  to  history  could  have  been  of  use  to  nineteenth  century  Irish 
unionists  and  nationalists  alike.  According  to  Millar,  it  was  the  successful 
"advancement  of  commerce  and  manufactures"  -  the  emergence  of  commodity 
production,  a  division  of  labour  and  the  accumulation  of  capital  in  Ireland  -  that 
explained  not  only  the  acquiescence  of  the  Irish  to  English  government  in  the  Tudor 
and  Jacobean  periods,  but  also  the  later  movement  for  Irish  independence.  Irish 
acceptance  and  rejection  of  English  jurisdiction  on  grounds  of  public  utility  had  shaped 
the  Irish  constitution.  The  nineteenth  century  Irish  bourgeoisie  could  therefore  look 
back  on  a  constitution  which  was,  in  origins  and  progress,  both  independent  from  and 
dependent  upon  that  of  the  English. 
However,  a  historical  perspective  that  put  the  self-interested  subject  of  experience 
at  its  centre  contained  polarities.  At  one  end  was  the  idea  that  political  union  with 
2Sce  McDowell  R.  B.  (1944)  Irish  Public  Opinion  1750-1800,  London:  pp51-74. 
3Millar  made  no  reference  to  the  reform  movement  of  1783-5,  the  1798  uprising  nor  the  legislative 
union  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  in  1800,  all  of  which  he  would  have  lived  through.  This  suggests 
that  he  wrote  the  Review  in  1782  or  shortly  after. 
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Britain  was  the  most  advantageous  constitutional  form  for  guaranteeing  the  freedom 
to  accumulate  capital.  At  the  other  was  the  notion  that  a  complete  break  with  the 
English  constitution  along  American  lines  would  advance  Irish  economic  and  personal 
freedom.  The  latter  entailed  restricting  the  greater  opportunities  English  capital  had  of 
exploiting  the  country's  land  and  labour. 
Such  polarities  were  likely  to  divide  Irish  opinion  in  the  following  century.  Like  the 
Scots,  unionists  could  have  highlighted  the  advantages  of  submission  to  the  English 
parliament  in  removing  the  oppressive  influence  of  a  barbarous  feudal  aristocracy  and 
promoting  free  trade.  5  At  the  same  time,  unlike  the  Scots,  Irish  nationalists  could  have 
selected  continued  English  economic  and  juridical  oppression  as  the  cause  of  the 
country's  retarded  development.  Moreover,  nationalists  could  also  show  that  an  armed 
citizenry  was  the  most  effective  means  of  advancing  the  movement  for  Irish 
independence.  In  future  debates,  both  would  have  been  able  to  appeal  to  the 
contradictory  nature  of  the  Irish  constitution.  Public  utility  would  have  justified  both 
acquiescence  and  violent  resistance  in  achieving  the  goal  of  material  prosperity.  By  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  success  of  Belfast  as  a  commercial  and  industrial  centre  and  the 
emergence  of  an  agrarian  surplus  population,  famine  and  mass  emigration  from  other 
parts  of  Ireland  would  have  given  renewed  force  to  such  polarities. 
6.2  The  Goal  of  Impartiality 
As  stated  in  chapter  one,  Millar  inherited  from  Hume  the  aim  of  writing  impartial 
history.  This  was  history  that,  whilst  critically  engaging  with  party-influenced  histories, 
tried  to  avoid  reproducing  the  prejudices  of  sectional  or  factional  interests.  It  also 
attempted  to  explain  constitutional  change  by  reference  to  the  gradual  progress  from 
ancient  to  modem  liberties. 
Explaining  constitutional  change  entailed  a  theory  of  how  civilisation  developed 
world-wide.  Millar's  assumptions  were  similar  to  Hume's:  there  could  be  no  possibility 
for  individuals'  betterment  without  an  impartial  system  of  law  that  protected  and 
encouraged  the  growth  of  private,  freely  alienable  property.  Millar  agreed  with  Hume 
that  there  could  be  no  modern  liberty  without  this  safeguard.  There  is  clear  evidence  to 
suppose  that  Millar  followed  Hume's  intentions  on  the  matter  of  impartiality.  6 
Jeffrey's  review  described  NOW's  essay  as  "a  very  impartial  account  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  two  countries".  7  NEllar  thought  that  previous  accounts  of  Irish 
5This  was  Adam  Sn-dth's  opinion.  "Without  a  union  with  Great  Britaip,  the  inhabitants  of  Ireland  are 
not  Rely  for  many  ages  to  consider  themselves  as  one  people"  (JVNV.  iii.  89,944).  Mllar's  opinion  is 
unknown. 
6"In  delineating  the  progress  of  the  English  government,  I  have  endeavoured  to  avoid  ...  the 
prejudices  peculiar  to  the  two  great  parties,  which  the  nature  of  our  limited  monarchy  has  produced.  " 
(HV,  1,  viii). 
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history  had  suffered  "from  the  partiality  and  prejudices  of  English  historians"  (RGI,  7). 
They  were  contaminated  by  "national  vanity  and  prejudice"  (RG1,5  1).  Millar  therefore 
set  out  to  correct  two  prejudiced  opinions.  The  first  was  that  the  Irish  national 
character  was  peculiarly  vicious,  ferocious  and  barbaric.  The  second  was  that  the  Irish 
constitution  had  always  been  subordinate  to  that  of  the  English. 
Mllar  confronted  two  conflicting  party  opinions  on  Irish  history.  These  had  been 
"agitated  by  lawyers  and  politicians"  (RG1,54).  In  one  party  were  "almost  all  the 
English  lawyers".  They  argued  that  the  Irish  constitution  gained  its  nature  from  the 
right  of  conquest.  The  Irish  legislature  was  "from  the  beginning,  subordinate  to  that  of 
England"  (RGI,  55).  The  other  party  were  the  "fHends  of  Irish  independence".  They 
argued  that  force  could  never  confer  a  right  to  govem.  They  held  that  the  forcible 
appropriation  of  Irish  property  was  a  crime  that  "merited  punishment". 
From  the  one  party,  Millar  drew  on  the  fact  that  English  conquest  had  indeed 
shaped  the  nature  of  the  Irish  constitution.  English  attempts  to  subdue  the  Irish  had 
affected  their  customs,  manners,  laws  and  government  as  well  as  their  development  of 
the  arts.  With  the  other  party,  he  shared  the  opinion  that  the  early  conquest  of  Ireland 
had  retarded  the  development  of  its  people  to  a  commercial  and  civilised  state.  This 
could  never  be  justified.  Millar  was  an  advocate  of  free  trade.  He  thought  English 
restrictions  on  Irish  commerce  and  manufactures  held  progress  back. 
6.3  Hume  and  Millar  on  Irish  Civilisation 
Both  Millar  and  Hume  thought  a  modem  judicial  system  was  necessary  for  Irish 
society  to  develop.  Hume  stated  that  civilising  the  Irish  entailed  reconciling  them  to 
"laws  and  industry"  (HE,,  561).  Millar  remarked  that,  when  the  Irish  embraced  English 
law,  it  was  "an  extensive  improvement"  (RGI,  22).  However,  Hume  and  Millar  differed 
on  the  timing  of  reconciliation  and  improvement.  Hume  thought  it  had  started  when 
Elizabeth  I  suppressed  the  rebellions  of  the  O'Neills  in  Tyrone.  This  enabled  James  I  to 
abolish  ancient  Irish  customs.  Millar  agreed  James  was  in  a  better  position  to  "extend 
the  advantages  of  regular  government  and  civilized  manners"  to  the  Irish.  He  gave 
them  the  chance  to  "taste,  in  some  measure,  the  blessings  of  security  and  freedom" 
(RGI,  33-34).  However,  Millar  thought  the  process  began  at  an  earlier  date.  Henry 
VIII  had  been  the  first  monarch  to  extend  a  "regular  policy"  to  Ireland  with  Poynings' 
law  (RGI,  21). 
Both  Millar  and  Hume  thought  Henry  II's  conquest  of  Ireland  had  been  a  disaster. 
Hume  called  the  English  conquerors  "inhuman  mastere'  who  marked  the  Irish  out  "as 
aliens  and  as  enemies".  The  consequence  was  that  "Being  treated  like  wild  beasts,  "  the 
Irish  "became  such"  (HE,,  526).  Millar  also  judged  Henry  II's  conquest  unfavourably. 
The  English  were  no  more  than  a  "band  of  robbers"  (RGI,  2)  who  parcelled  out  the 
"whole  kingdom"  of  Ireland  "among  ten  proprietors"  (RG1,20).  A  concentration  of 322 
property  and  power  in  English  hands  served  to  arrest  the  progress  of  "the  cultivation 
of  the  country,  and  the  civilisation  of  the  inhabitants"  (ibid). 
Both  historians  observed  that  the  native  Irish  assimilated  the  English.  Hume  wrote 
that  the  English  had  "more  civilised  customs"  when  they  invaded  Ireland  (HE,  526). 
They  soon  "degenerated  from  the  customs  of  their  own  nation".  They  foolishly  refused 
to  communicate  to  Irish  "the  privilege  of  their  laws"  (ibid).  Millar  remarked  that  the 
power  and  numbers  of  the  Irish  overwhelmed  the  English  (RG1,21).  The  English 
declined  over  the  centuries  into  "a  state  of  rudeness  and  barbarism"  (ibia). 
Hume  and  Milar  thought  of  "rudeness  and  barbarism"  as  a  state  of  relative 
lawlessness.  It  was  a  condition  in  which  the  individual's  right  to  accumulate  property 
was  constantly  violated.  Preceding  "barbarism"  was  "the  state  of  mere  savages",  a 
propertyless  state  of  isolated  families  without  any  customary  restraint  between  them. 
This  original  condition  was  so  miserable  that,  as  Millar  put  it,  there  was  "nothing  that 
can  tempt  any  one  man  to  become  subject  to  another"  (OR,  241).  A  comparison  of 
Millar's  account  with  Hume's  will  show  how  much  of  a  gap  there  was  between  their 
opinions  on  the  state  of  Irish  society  prior  to  the  adoption  of  English  law. 
Hume  stated  that  until  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  Ireland  was  "inhabited  by  a 
people  whose  customs  and  manners  approached  nearer  those  of  savages  than  of 
barbarians"  (HE,,  99).  They  were  ignorant  of  the  "most  simple  arts  of  life,  even  tillage 
and  agriculture,  were  almost  wholly  unknown  to  thern"  and  "exercised  pasturage  in 
the  open  country"  (ibid).  The  Irish  were  "not  tamed  by  education,  or  restrained  by 
laws"  (ibid).  Unlike  the  English,  the  more  civilised  Romans  had  never  conquered  the 
Irish.  This  was  a  reason  why  they  were  nearer  savagery  than  barbarism.  In  contrast, 
Millar  agreed  with  Hume  that  the  Irish  "had  never  attained  that  civilisation,  which  the 
ancient  Romans  communicated  to  their  conquered  provinces"  (RG1,7).  On  the 
contrary,  they  had  "comparatively,  for  some  centuries,  enjoyed  a  degree  of  tranquillity 
which  was  likely  to  become  the  source  of  improvement"  (ibid).  Millar's  source  was 
Bede's  history.  Although  Hume  had  used  Bede  extensively  as  an  authority  on  the 
Anglo-Saxons,  he  had  ignored  his  references  to  the  Irish.  8 
Hume  thought  Irish  customs  did  not  merit  the  proper  description  of  law.  They 
-supplied  the  place  of  laws".  The  three  customs  he  mentioned  were  the  "Brehon  law 
or  custom",  "Gavelkinde"  and  "Tanistry".  9  They  were  "attended  with  the  same 
absurdity  in  the  distribution  of  property"  (HE,  561).  Tanistry  prevented  any  hereditary 
succession  of  land  from  father  to  son.  Hume  remarked  that  "As  no  man,  by  reason  of 
8For  Hume's  use  of  Bede  see  the  Notes  to  chapter  one,  HE,  14-15. 
913rehons  were  arbitrators  who  settled  disputes  within  a  clan  using  customary  maxims.  Tanists  were 
elected  during  the  life-time  of  a  clan  cWcf  as  Ws  successor.  Gavelkind  entailed  that,  when  a  clan 
member  died,  the  whole  of  the  common  property  of  the  clan  was  redistributed  of  amongst  the 
surviving  male  members.  See  Nicholls  K.  (1972)  Gaelic  and  Gaelicised  Ireland,  Dublin:  pp44-65. 323 
this  custom,  enjoyed  the  fixed  property  of  any  land;  to  build,  to  plant,  to  enclose,  to 
cultivate,  to  improve,  would  have  been  so  much  lost  labour"  (HE,  562).  Hereditary 
succession  was  a  necessary  condition  for  private  property. 
Hume  observed  that  the  Irish  had  a  notion  of  landed  property  without  any 
knowledge  of  "tillage  or agriculture".  How  was  this  possible?  Millar  filled  the  gap  with 
"joint  property".  Milar  agreed  with  Hume  that  the  Irish  had  no  idea  of  hereditary 
succession.  He  gave  the  same  customs  as  Hume  as  evidence.  Tanistry  meant  that 
succession  was  not  "by  hereditary  descent,  but,  upon  the  death  of  the  proprietor, 
passed  to  the  eldest  of  his  male  relations"  (RGI,  11-12).  The  custom  presupposed 
property  in  land  but  "vested  in  the  chiefs  only"  (RGI,  11).  It  showed  that  most  of  the 
land  in  Ireland  was  a  form  of  "joint  property".  Landed  property  was  "retained  in 
common"  by  a  whole  tribe  (RGI,  14).  Following  Gilbert  Stuart,  Millar  had  argued 
elsewhere  that  labour  expended  upon  land  is,  at  first,  the  aggregated  labours  of  the 
indi,  ý,  idual  members  of  a  tribe.  10  All  that  followed  from  "joint  property"  in  land  was 
that  agriculture  was  insufficiently  advanced  through  "a  long  course  of  cultivation" 
(RG1,11)  for  the  idea  of  private  property  to  arise.  II 
Millar  therefore  agreed  with  Hume  that  the  Irish  had  no  idea  of  private  property. 
Without  the  latter,  there  could  be  no  improvement  of  the  arts,  or  of  manners.  For 
example,  civilised  "feelings  of  humanity"  could  not  flourish  amongst  barbarians. 
However,  it  did  not  follow  from  this  that  the  Irish  were  completely  ignorant  of 
agriculture.  The  "progress  of  agriculture"  in  Ireland  had  not  taken  place  "universally" 
(RGI,  10).  Appropriation  of  the  land,  "in  all  countries  ... 
has  arisen  from  agriculture" 
(ibid).  In  Ireland,  it  was  in  a  "limited  and  imperfect  state"  (ibid).  Nfillar  thought  the 
Irish  were  knowledgeable  of  agriculture  as  well  as  of  pasturing  animals.  12  It  followed 
that  they  were  not  savages  when  James  I  abolished  their  brehon  law.  The  Irish  had 
made  limited  improvements  in  the  arts  with  the  potential  for  recognising  rights  of 
private  property  posterior  to  Henry  11's  conquest. 
For  both  historians,  an  important  source  on  Irish  history  prior  to  the  Tudor  period 
was  the  writings  of  the  Jacobean  lawyer  and  colonial  administrator  Sir  John  DavieS.  13 
Davies  alleged  that  Irish  barbarism  was  unique  amongst  Christian  nations.  Hume 
tended  to  share  Davies'  notion  that  the  Irish  were  exceptional.  Davies  blamed  tanistry 
10Sec  reference  to  Stuart's  (1768)  An  Historical  Dissertation  Concerning  the  Antiquity  of  the  English 
Constitution.  Edinburgh.  (OR,  155).  Also:  "as  each  individual  is  entitled  to  the  fruit  of  his  own 
labour,  the  crop,  which  has  been  raised  by  the  joint  labour  of  all,  is  deemed  the  property  of  the  whole 
society"  Ubicý- 
II  See  chapter  eight. 
12Later  research  confirmed  Nfillar's  conjecture.  The  ploughing  of  land  for  oats,  wheat  and  barley  is 
recorded  from  the  late  middle  ages.  Nicholls,  Gaelicised  Ireland,  ppl  15-116. 
BEspecially  his  A  Discovery  of  the  True  Causes  Why  Ireland  Was  Alever  Entirely  Subdued  Nor 
Brought  under  Obedience  of  the  Crown  ofEngland  (London,  ý747,  Reprinted  from  1612  edition  for 
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and  gavelkind  for  an  alleged  Irish  antipathy  to  building  houses  of  stone,  living  in 
villages  and  towns,  or  taking  any  interest  in  agricultural,  mechanical  or  commercial 
activity.  He  thought  of  the  Irish  as  little  better  than  cannibals.  14  Hume's  judgement  that 
the  Irish  were  ignorant  of  the  arts  therefore  gave  a  dark  colouring  to  his  picture  of 
their  national  character.  Amongst  modem  European  nations,  the  Irish  appeared  to  be 
peculiarly  vicious.  This  smacked  of  the  kind  of  English  prejudice  Millar  was  keen  to 
dispel. 
The  forceful  language  Hume  used  to  describe  the  1641  insurrection  was  the  closest 
he  came  to  suggesting  that  Irish  viciousness  was  a  European  exception.  Jacqueline  Hill 
has  argued  that  we  must  consider  Hume's  narrative  as  an  indication  of  anti-Catholic 
and  anti-Irish  bias.  15  For  example,  Hume  made  no  reference  to  any  suffering  English 
and  Scottish  Protestant  colonists  had  inflicted  on  native  Irish  Catholics.  Instead,  he 
focused  on  cruelty  the  English  planters  experienced  as  "the  most  barbarous  that  ever, 
in  any  nation,  was  known  or  heard  of'  (HE,  652).  The  killings  were  "the  most 
detestable  of  which  there  ever  was  any  record".  (HE,  652)  Throughout  his  account  of 
the  rebellion,  Hume  associated  barbarity  with  inhumanity.  Inhumanity  was  the  absolute 
absence  of  compassion  or  sympathy  for  the  suffering  of  others.  Nonetheless,  Hume's 
anti-Catholic  bias  requires  qualification.  16  Although  he  relied  heavily  on  English 
Protestant  sources,  17  he  thought  the  Irish  interest  in  the  uprising  arose  as  much  ftorn  a 
preference  for  "barbarous  community"  as  from  the  hope  of  restoring  revenues  lost  to 
the  Catholic  clergy  (HE,  649).  Moreover,  religious  bigotry  was  insufficient  to  explain 
the  intense  cruelty  he  alleged  had  occurred.  18  He  associated  such  excesses  with 
peoples  "steeled  by  native  barbarity"  (HE,  65  1).  Likewise,  assessments  of  Hume's  anti- 
Irish  bias  are  incomplete  without  closer  attention  to  his  conjectural  approach  to 
history.  This  entailed  the  likelihood  that  inhumanity  was  natural  to  peoples 
unacquainted  with  agriculture,  commerce  and  private  property.  19  The  ground  of  his 
bias  was  therefore  more  an  opinion  that  the  English  settlers  had  a  superior  knowledge 
14Davies,  Discovery,  pp168-171.  For  Davies'  role  in  developing  British  imperial  policy  through  the 
use  of  English  common  and  Roman  natural  law,  see  Pawlisch  H.  S.  (1985)  Sir  John  Davies  and  the 
Conquest  of1reland,  Cambridge. 
1514ill  J.  (1988)  "Popery  and  Protestantism,  Civil  and  Religious  Liberty:  The  Disputed  Lessons  of 
Irish  History  1690-1812.  "  Past  &  Present,  118,  Feb.:  pp96-129,111. 
161t  is  untrue  to  state  that  Hume  saw  "fear  of  popery"  as  a  "legitimate  "  cause  of  the  Scottish  rebellion 
in  the  1630s.  (Hill,  "Popery  and  Protestantism",  115).  On  the  contrary,  Hume  described  "fear  of 
popery"  as  a  "groundless  apprehension"  with  a  "fatal  influence"  (HE,  625). 
17Espccially  Sir  John  Temple  (1646)  The  Irish  Rebellion,  London.  This  is  what  Hill  calls  a 
"beleaguered  Protestant"  account.  "Popery  and  Protestantism"  (111). 
"Hume  observed  that  the  Irish  treated  the  Scottish  Protestant  planters  with  relative  leniency  in  order 
to  gain  their  "passive  neutrality"  (HE,  65  1). 
19Comparc  his  bias  against  the  Irish  with  his  opinion  that  black  Africans  were  "naturally  inferior  to 
the  whites"  because  written  testimony  showed  they  had  "no  arts,  no  sciences"  (MC,  208).  Hume 
discussed  prejudices  based  on  unphilosophical  probability  such  as  "An  Irislunan  cannot  have  wit"  in 
THN,  14  6. 325 
of  the  arts,  industry  and  an  interest  in  alienating  their  private  property,  than  that  their 
religion  was  freer  of  superstition.  20 
For  Hume,  theft  and  plunder,  deceitfulness,  laziness  and  ignorance  were  vices 
typical  of  savages.  The  Irish  would  have  been  "for  ever  subject"  to  them  had  they  not 
been  "restrained  by  laws".  If  the  English  had  not  destroyed  their  customs  regarding 
property,  the  Irish  would  have  stayed  "for  ever  in  a  state  of  barbarism  and  disorder" 
(HE,  56  1).  If  Ireland  had  not  been  colonised  by  the  more  advanced  English  and  Scots, 
then  the  Irish  could  not  have  been  cured  "of  that  sloth  and  barbarism  to  which  they 
had  ever  been  subject"  (HE,,  649).  If  the  English  government  had  not  prohibited  the 
import  of  Irish  cattle  to  England  in  the  reign  of  Charles  11,  then  "the  indolent 
inhabitants  of  Ireland 
..  would  never  be  induced  to  labour,  but  would  perpetuate  to  all 
generations  their  native  sloth  and  barbarism"  (HE,  779). 
Millar  agreed  with  Hume  that  people  "unacquainted  with  civility  and  regular 
government"  were  vicious  (RGI,  7).  However,  he  amended  this  judgement  of  Irish 
national  character  in  four  ways.  First,  he  argued  that  the  Irish  were  no  more  vicious 
than  any  other  "barbarous  nation"  at  a  similar  stage  of  development.  In  this  respect, 
the  Irish  were  no  different  from  the  Anglo-Saxons.  Second,  Henry  IIIs  ruinous 
conquest  had  held  back  the  progress  of  the  Irish  "in  refinements  and  the  arts"  (RGI,  7). 
Third,  the  oppression  of  the  Irish  "both  in  temporal  and  spiritual  matters"  had  caused 
so  much  "animosity  and  jealousy",  they  had  been  more  preoccupied  with  "distressing 
and  humbling  each  other,  than  in  prosecuting  any  scheme  of  national  improvement" 
(RGI,  50-51).  Finally,  exaggerations  of  Irish  viciousness  were  "more  applicable  to  the 
inhabitants"  of  the  seventeenth  century  than  of  the  eighteenth.  They  were  typical  of 
"the  lower  classes"  not  of  the  upper  (RGI,  51-52).  Taken  together,  these  circumstances 
had  shaped  the  peculiarities  of  Irish  national  character.  They  were  sufficient,  he 
thought,  to  correct  English  bias.  21 
6.4  Millar's  Use  of  Conjectural  Reasoning 
Millar  reasoned  about  the  Irish  conjecturally.  22  The  agreement  he  found  in 
historical  accounts  of  "rude"  and  "civilised"  peoples  throughout  the  world  indicated 
that  there  were  general  causes  that  affected  Irish  society.  When  historical  evidence  was 
201-Iume  contrasted  the  "stately  buildings  or  commodious  habitations  of  the  planters"  with  the  "sloth 
and  ignorance  of  the  natives"  (HE,  650). 
21Thus  the  Irish  had  "A  tempcr,  ardent  and  vehement,  a  disposition  open,  forward,  undesigning,  and 
sincere,  little  corrected  by  culture,  might  be  expected  to  produce  incorrectness  of  thought  and 
expression,  with  a  tendency  to  such  inaccuracies  and  blunders  as  proceed  from  speaking  without  due 
consideration,  and  from  attempting  to  convey  a  first  impression,  without  a  full  examination  of 
particulars"  (RG.,,  51). 
22  See  chapter  eight. 326 
lacking,  Millar  filled  the  gaps  with  probabilistic  or  conjectural  reasoning  from  general 
causes.  As  we  have  seen,  he  tried  to  show  that  native  Irish  customs  and  manners 
indicated  "no  uncommon  degree  of  barbarism"  (RG1,8).  Compared  with  those  of  other 
nations,  they  showed  a  "striking  resemblance"  to  every  county's  customs  and  manners 
"before  the  advancement  of  arts  and  civilization"  (RGI,  9). 
There  are  three  notable  inferences  of  this  kind  in  the  essay.  The  first  was  from  the 
knowledge  of  arts  to  customs  and  manners.  Bede's  testimony  showed  that,  by  the 
seventh  century,  the  Irish  were  literate  and  had  a  religious  form  of  government 
(RGI,  8).  This  knowledge  had  an  improving  effect  on  Irish  customs  and  manners.  It 
established  "a  degree  of  tranquillity"  (RGI,  7). 
The  second  inference  had  two  stages.  The  first  was  to  infer  Irish  ideas  of  property 
from  their  customs  and  manners.  He  stated  that  "with  regard  to  the  laws  enforced  by 
the  Brehons  in  the  distribution  ofjustice,  they  were  similar  to  those  of  the  other  early 
European  nations"  (RGI,  16).  They  were  "of  a  similar  nature  and  origin  to  that  of  the 
Stewarts  [his  emphasis],  whom,  in  the  countries  under  the  feudal  system,  the  barons 
authorised  to  distribute  justice  among  their  tenants  and  vassals"  (RGI,  9).  Tanistry  was 
found  in  Scotland  and  elsewhere:  "Traces  of  this  mode  of  succession  are  very 
universally  to  be  found  in  the  early  history  of  mankind"  (RG1,12).  He  compared  the 
brehon  law  "by  which  the  head  of  every  sept  was  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  all  his 
followers"  with  the  English  custom  of  tything.  23  He  commented  that  "in  all  probability, 
it  [the  brehon  law]  proceeded  independent  of  imitation,  from  the  similarity  of 
circumstances  in  both  countries".  Both  customs  were  "agreeable  to  the  notions  of 
justice  and  expediency  suggested  by  a  state  of  rudeness  and  barbarism".  He  therefore 
inferred  that  Irish  property  relations  were  feudal  or  pre-feudal. 
The  second  stage  was  to  infer  Irish  knowledge  of  the  arts  from  their  notions  of 
property  and  justice.  The  latter  arose  out  of  similar  "interests  and  necessities".  These 
were  the  same  in  all  societies  with  the  same  knowledge  of  the  arts.  He  argued  that  it 
"may  be  expedient"  for  land  possessed  by  "little  societies"  which  were  "almost 
continually  engaged  in  predatory  expeditions"  to  remain  undivided.  In  a  statement 
which  is  similar  to  many  in  Millar's  work,  he  wrote  that,  "in  all  countries"  the 
transition  from  appropriation  of  land  by  a  whole  tribe  to  private  property  in  land  was 
comparable: 
"the  cultivators  of  a  particular  spot  become  entitled  to  the  immediate  produce,  as  fruit 
and  reward  of  their  labour;  and,  after  a  long  course  of  cultivation,  having  meliorated 
the  soil,  were,  upon  the  same  principle,  entitled  to  the  future  possession  of  the  land 
23"a  tything  man  might  be  called  to  account  for  the  offences  of  every  member  of  his  Pything" 
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itself,  by  which  alone  they  could  reap  the  advantages  derived  from  their  past 
improvements.  "  (RGI,  11) 
Millar  made  this  statement  to  illustrate  that  the  Irish  used  most  of  the  land 
communally  for  pasturage.  Land  was  not  private  property.  As  we  have  seen  above, 
Millar  inferred  the  knowledge  of  pasturing  animals  and  the  first  steps  towards 
agriculture  from  the  notion  of  "joint  property".  "Joint  property"  broke  up  for  two 
reasons.  Firstly,  tribes  found  decisions  on  the  equal  distribution  of  the  produce  of  the 
land  inconvenient.  Secondly,  when  an  individual  became  attached  to  a  particular  spot 
of  land,  he  made  claims  over  the  disposal  of  the  product  of  his  private  labour.  24People 
first  recognised  a  private  right  to  the  product  of  labour.  It  was  then  transferred  to  the 
exchange  of  land  itself  This  was  a  natural  right  existing  prior  to  its  confirmation  in 
positive  law.  Evidence  of  positive  law  protecting  natural  rights  entitled  Millar  to  infer 
that  a  tribe  had  a  division  of  labour  and  a  knowledge  of  commerce  and  manufactures. 
There  was  no  evidence  of  this  in  early  Irish  society.  25 
Millar  thought  there  was  a  general  transition  from  collective  appropriation  to 
private  property  in  land.  Conjectural  reasoning  would  make  this  apply  to  the  Irish. 
irrespective  of  Henry's  conquest,  it  was  probable  that  a  change  in  succession  from 
chief  to  eldest  male  relation  to  that  of  father  and  son  would  have  occurred.  Millar 
found  evidence  of  this  change  in  the  histories  of  England,  Scotland,  France  and 
Germany.  Millar  had  theorised  the  transition  in  his  lectures  and  Yhe  Origin  of  Ranks. 
In  these  works,  he  reasoned  conjecturally  from  a  large  stock  of  testimonies  on  customs 
and  manners,  notions  of  property  and  private  and  public  law  to  the  four  occupational 
stages  in  the  knowledge  of  the  arts  necessary  for  the  acquisition  of  property.  26 
Millar's  final  two  inferences  were  the  following.  He  inferred  a  knowledge  of 
commerce  and  manufactures  from  changes  in  customs,  manners  and  law.  Conversely, 
he  inferred  changes  in  customs,  manners  and  law  from  the  knowledge  of  commerce 
and  manufactures.  During  Henry  VIII's  reign,  the  Irish  adopted  Poynings'  law. 
Subsequent  monarchs  extended  English  jurisprudence  to  Ireland.  As  a  result, 
"considerable  advances  were  made  in  agriculture  and  even  in  manufactures"  (RGI,  38). 
By  the  reign  of  Charles  I,  the  Irish  had  established  their  own  linen  manufactures 
(RGI,  39).  Commerce  and  manufactures  inspired  a  spirit  of  freedom  and  independence 
amongst  the  Irish.  They  exerted  this  spirit  in  a  campaign  against  laws  favouring 
24Thus  "every  one  is  desirous  of  employing  his  labour  for  his  own  advantage,  and  of  having  a 
separate  possession,  which  he  may  enjoy  according  to  his  own  inclination"  (OR,  157). 
25The  individual's  natural  right  to  private  property  in  the  product  of  his  labour  exists  prior  to  the 
appropriation  of  the  land.  It  is  used  to  explain  both  the  "joint  property  of  the  tribe"  and  its  break  up 
(OR,  055).  Public  utility  confirmed  thejustice  of  this  arrangement. 
26See  especially  OR,  140-175.  Also  chapter  eight. 328 
English  manufacturing  interests.  This  change  in  Irish  customs  and  manners  eventually 
removed  "every  remaining  obstacle"  to  independence  (RGI,  66). 
Millar's  essay  also  included  a  refutation  of  the  proposition  that  the  Irish 
constitution  was  subordinate  to  that  of  the  English.  Millar  upheld  the  independence  of 
the  Irish  constitution  on  historical  grounds.  Hume's  philosophy  clearly  influenced  his 
argument. 
Empirical  evidence  of  Irish  independence  lay  in  the  relationship  between  the  Irish 
parliament  and  the  English  crown.  The  date  of  the  origin  of  the  parliament  was 
"uncertain"  (RGI,  5).  The  crown  called  parliament  "for  the  same  purposes  with  that  of 
England"  (RGI,  6).  It  was  constructed  along  the  same  lines.  It  had  two  houses  and 
carried  out  similar  kinds  of  tasks.  It  had  similar  powers.  Millar  remarked  that  members 
of  the  Irish  parliament  thought  of  themselves  as  having  an  "independent  authority" 
from  their  peers  in  England  (ibid).  Referencing  Leland's  History  of  Ireland,  he  noted 
that,  during  the  English  "Wars  of  the  Roses",  the  Irish  parliament  declared  "its  own 
legislature"  as  the  only  government  (RG1,19).  27  From  the  Irish  parliament's  first 
adoption  of  English  law  when  Poyning  ruled  as  lord-deputy,  Millar  inferred  that  it 
possessed  "an  independent  legislative  authority".  It  had  powers  to  reject  English  law  as 
well  as  to  accept  it.  This  testified  to  "the  exertion  of  independence  upon  the  part  of 
Ireland"  (RGI,  22-23).  Millar  noted  that  the  Irish  commons  refused  subsidies,  and 
objected  to  taxes  imposed  by  Charles  I.  The  Anglo-Irish  landowners  had  "caught  the 
enthusiastic  love  of  freedom"  from  their  English  counterparts  (RG1,40-4  1). 
Using  conjectural  reasoning,  Millar  thought  it  was  improper  to  reason  from 
exceptional  examples  of  "usurpation  or  inadvertency".  There  were  very  few  incidences 
of  English  legislation  imposed  on  Ireland.  "The  independence  of  the  Irish  legislature  is 
to  be  inferred  from  the  general  tenor  of  proceedings"  (RGI,  58).  The  Irish  parliament 
had  always  asserted  its  independence  over  taxation.  It  had  rejected  and  amended 
money  bills  in  1690  and  1709.  This  independence  persisted  despite  the  crown's 
attempts  to  influence  and  frustrate  matters.  During  the  Tudor  reigns,  the  parliament 
could  not  introduce  bills  of  its  own  without  the  crown's  permission.  Debating  the 
"heads  of  a  bill"  proposed  by  the  crown,  it  successfully  evaded  this  measure.  -It  thereby 
ensured  that  opposition  was  well  known. 
27Leland  T.  (1773)  The  History  oflrelandfrom  the  invasion  ofHenry  A3  vols.  London.  Thomas 
Leland  (1722-85)  was  an  Irish  Protestant  historian  Nvho  "consciously  intended  to  be  the  Irish 
equivalent  of  Hume,  Robertson  and  Voltaire.  He  declared  in  the  introduction  to  his  history  that  'the 
Irish  have  no  philosophical  historian'.  "  See  Kidd  C.  (1994)  "Gaelic  Antiquity  and  National  Identity  in 
Enlightenment  Ireland  and  Scotland.  "  English  Historical  Review,  Nov.  1197-1214.  (1208). 329 
6.5  Acquiescence  and  Utility 
Millar's  argument  for  Irish  independence  relied  on  a  notion  of  consent.  Private  and 
public  utility  determined  whether  people  affirmed  or  withheld  consent.  Like  Hume,  he 
conceived  of  consent  as  customary  acquiescence  to  government.  The  use  of  force,  for 
example,  required  acquiescence.  If  legislation  failed  to  conform.  to  the  interests  and 
needs  of  a  people,  utility  would  eventually  overcome  habitual  submýission.  People 
would  refuse  to  acquiesce.  The  history  of  England  showed  that  refusal  turned  into 
violent  resistance.  28 
This  idea  of  consent  is  central  to  Millar's  conception  of  an  impartial  account  of 
history.  After  reviewing  the  party  opinions  of  the  "English  lawyers"  and  the  "friends  of 
Irish  independence",  he  stated: 
"T'he  nature  of  the  Irish  constitution,  therefore,  is  to  be  inferred,  not  from  the  force 
used  by  England,  but  from  the  acquiescence  [my  emphasis]  of  the  people  after  this 
force  was  withdrawn,  and  when  they  could  be  supposed  to  have  a  free  choice.  " 
(RGI,  5  6) 
Hume  had  observed  that  force  and  conquest  without  "pretence  of  a  fair  consent" 
(OC,  47  1)  had  brought  into  being  modem  governments.  Consent  was  confirmed  post 
hoc  by  a  "sense  of  the  advantages  resulting  from  peace  and  order"  (OC,  468).  Modem 
governments  were  therefore  consistent  with  the  denial  of  political  liberty.  For  example, 
if  law  safeguarded  the  personal  liberties  of  individuals'  pursuit  of  their  private  interests, 
then  conquest  by  an  absolute  monarch  could  be  consistent  with  civil  society.  Such  a 
government  secured  consent  because  of  the  advantages  individuals  gained  from 
submitting  to  laws.  Acquiescence  to  absolute  monarchy  was  conditional.  It  held  as 
long  as  laws  enabled  rather  than  impeded  efforts  to  accumulate  property  and  promote 
productive  industry. 
Millar,  like  Hume,  did  not  deny  that  conquest  could  bring  these  advantages.  If  the 
conquered  saw  conquest  in  their  interests,  acquiescence  was  secure.  By  this  criterion, 
Millar  judged  Henry  R's  conquest  a  failure.  Henry's  conquest  did  not  implant  laws 
protecting  private  property  for  the  whole  of  the  Irish.  It  rather  served  to  hold  the 
progress  of  the  arts  back.  The  conquered  gained  nothing  from  it  but  a  prolonged 
absence  of  the  "peace  and  tranquillity"  needed  for  improvement. 
At  a  later  date,  Millar  thought  submission  to  English  law  was  advantageous  to  the 
Irish.  The  Irish  submitted  voluntarily  to  English  law  to  gain  greater  security  and 
28Millar  upheld  the  right  to  resist  oppressive  governments  on  the  grounds  of  public  utility.  Public 
utility  was  the  "general  happiness  of  the  human  race".  Resistance  rarely  happened  "without  violence 
and  bloodshed"  (HV,  3,438439).  The  appeal  to  universal  human  happiness  is  consistent  with  Ws 
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freedom.  English  law  was  more  advanced.  The  Irish  could  therefore  pursue  the 
development  of  the  arts,  protect  their  property,  and  achieve  the  satisfaction  of  ends 
determined  by  their  private  interests.  English  law  secured  the  property  rights  of  those 
Irish  who  wanted  to  spend  their  labour  profitably  on  the  land,  in  manufactures  or  in 
trade. 
Thus  voluntary  acquiescence  informed  Millar's  account  of  Irish  acceptance  of  the 
suppression  of  their  ancient  CUStOMS.  29  Nfillar  remarked  that: 
"By  this  reformation,  people  of  the  lower  ranks  were  protected  from  those  numerous 
exactions,  which  their  superiors  had  formerly  imposed  upon  them,  and  began  to  taste, 
in  some  measure,  the  blessings  of  security  and  freedom.  Ile  inhabitants  were  thus 
comforted  for  the  loss  of  their  barbarous  usage's,  by  the  evident  advantages  resulting 
from  the  new  regulations;  and  if  they  were  denied  the  privileges  of  plundering  their 
neighbours,  had,  in  return,  the  satisfaction  of  being  less  exposed  to  theft  and  robbery, 
or  to  personal  injury.  I'lic  change  at  first,  was  probably  not  relished,  but  it  could  not 
fail  in  time  to  become  palatable.  It  resembled  the  transition  from  poverty  to  riches; 
from  hunger  and  hard  fare,  to  plenty  and  delicacy.  "  (RGI,  35) 
The  advantages  enabling  individuals  to  move  out  of  poverty  and  acquire  wealth 
confirmed  the  utility  of  these  laws.  Once  the  Irish  recognised  this,  Millar  thought  they 
submitted  voluntarily  to  the  destruction  of  their  old  customs  regarding  property. 
On  the  English  side,  the  self-interest  of  the  sovereign  motivated  law  promoting  the 
arts  in  Ireland  (RGI,  39).  The  Irish  now  had  the  opportunity  of  acquiring  wealth 
generated  by  agriculture,  industry  and  commerce.  Utility  held  the  coincidence  of 
interest  between  the  crown  and  people  together.  30  This  broke  asunder  as  England's 
mercantile  class  grew  stronger.  By  the  time  that  "Ireland  came  to  be  in  a  condition  to 
push  her  trade  and  manufactures,  she  was  checked  by  the  mercantile  regulations  of  the 
English  government"  (RGI,  52).  The  English  government  treated  Irish  manufactures  in 
the  same  way  as  colonial  American  manufactures.  The  "Irish  were  prohibited  from 
exporting  wool  or  woollen  cloth"  (RGI,  53).  As  the  perception  of  a  shared  interest  with 
the  British  crown  changed  to  its  opposite,  the  Irish  withdrew  acquiescence. 
"This  was  achieved  by  the  thirty  two  county  system  of  sheriff  courts  during  James  I  ýign.  See  also 
Davies'  application  through  these  courts  of  the  natural  law  doctrine  of  conquest  right,  an  "imp--,.  ial 
formula"  that  "set  the  pattern  for  colonial  expansion  elsewhere".  Pawlisch,  Sir  John  Davies,  p  13. 
30The  coincidence  of  interest  between  crown  and  people  formed  part  of  his  general  theory  of  the 
progress  of  government.  Nfillar  mentioned  two  tendencies  of  conunerce  and  industry:  firstly  to 
increase  the  power  of  the  crown  and  secondly  to  increase  the  liberty  and  independence  of  the  people. 
See  OR  chapter  five,  and  discussion  of  the  two  tendencies  in  chapter  eleven  of  this  dissertation.. 331 
6.6  Economic  and  Juridical  Interests 
Confirming  the  Irish  parliament  had  always  been  independent  of  England,  Millar 
wrote: 
"the  cffcct  of  old  usage  must  be  limited  by  considerations  of  public  utility,  and  that  the 
most  universal  submission  of  a  people,  however  long  continued,  will  not  give  sanction 
to  measures  incompatible  with  the  great  interests  of  society.  "  (RGI,  58) 
These  interests  were  economic  as  well  as  juridical.  The  "great  interests  of  society" 
determined  legislative  changes  encouraging  free  trade.  They  dictated  an  explosion  of 
the  English  merchants'  and  manufacturers'  monopolistic  trading  interest.  Competition 
on  a  world  market  needed  legislation  free  from  British  state  interference.  The 
exclusion  of  the  Irish  from  trade  with  English  colonies  was  an  injustice.  It  robbed  the 
Irish  of  the  "fi-uits  of  their  industry"  and  condemned  them  to  poverty  and  slavery 
(RGI,  61).  Millar  explained  the  Irish  threat  of  armed  insurrection  b'y  public  utility.  The 
Irish  argued  they  needed  free  trade  to  develop  their  industry  like  every  other  nation. 
During  the  war  of  American  independence,  the  Irish  formed  a  volunteer  citizen  army 
to  defend  Ireland  from  the  threat  of  French  invasion.  Ireland  used  this  army  to 
"procure  the  redress  of  her  grievances"  (RGI,  64).  The  Irish  wanted  free  trade  not  only 
with  British  colonies  but  with  other  foreign  countries.  They  argued  that  free  trade  was 
the  only  way  that  Ireland  would  be  saved  from  "impending  ruin"  (RGI,  65).  Under  the 
pressure  of  an  Irish  parliament  withholding  taxes  and  Irish  determination  to  use  every 
means  to  "assert  their  liberties"  -  thereby  spreading  "an  universal  panic  over  Great 
Britain"  (RGI,  66)  -  the  British  were  forced  to  grant  free  trade  and  the  repeal  of 
jurisdiction  over  Ireland. 
Hume  had  argued  that  free  trade  was  consistent  with  the  interests  of  society.  Every 
nation  had  an  interest  in  the  development  of  international  commerce  -  in  doing  away 
with  those  "numberless  bars,  obstructions,  and  imposts,  which  all  nations,  and  none 
more  than  England,  have  put  upon  trade.  "31  If  one  country  increased  its  wealth,  this 
increase,  he  argued,  was  to  the  advantage  of  every  other.  Free  trade  stimulated 
industry,  and  industry  improved  the  mind.  This  brought  civilisation  in  which  the 
"feelings  of  humanity"  flourished.  32  Millar  agreed  with  Hume  that  commerce 
established  a  "constant  and  permanent  intercourse  of  nations"  (LG]771,264). 
Moreover,  he  argued  that  state  interference  in  economic  activity  was  harmful. 
Government  intervention  hurt  the  "commercial  machine".  It  tended  to  divert  capital 
31Hum  D.  (1748)  "Of  the  Balance  of  Trade.  "  In  Essays,  Mller,  ',  A)  p324. 
32Hume  D.  (1748)  "Of  Refinement  in  the  Arts.  "  In  Essqvs,  Mller  (ed.  )  p27  1. 332 
into  unproductive  channels.  It  was  best  to  leave  people  alone  to  pursue  "those  lines  of 
trade  which  they  find  most  beneficial  to  themselves"  (HV,  4,328). 
Nfillar's  "great  interests  of  society"  were  therefore  identical  with  the  interests  of  a 
commodity  owning  subject  of  experience.  The  social  recognition,  real  or  imagined, 
acquired  with  wealth  motivated  the  commodity  owner  to  engage  in  economic  activity. 
Surplus  accumulation  was  the  means  to  this  end.  Surpluses  were  useful  for  favour  and 
influence,  to  spend  on  the  luxury  commodities  the  market  supplied,  and  to  spur  others 
into  productive  economic  activity.  According  to  Millar,  surpluses  were  at  first 
accumulated  by  hoarding,  saving  and  luck;  then  by  exchange  and  hire.  Once  some 
individuals  had  acquired  a  surplus  through  saving  the  "fruits  of  their  labour",  they  were 
motivated  to  exchange  it.  33  The  development  of  a  world  market  entailed  that  there  was 
a  greater  opportunity  for  a  majority  of  the  population  to  buy  and  sell  commodities,  hire 
out  their  labour,  and  become  wealthy.  The  utility  of  the  market  and  of  legislation  that 
protected  and  promoted  it  was  therefore  self-evident  to  every  subject  of  experience. 
33See  chapter  six. 333 
Appendix  Two: 
The  Lectures  on  Private  and  Public 
Law 
Mllar's  appointment  to  the  Chair  of  Civil  Law  at  Glasgow  took  place  in  1761 
when  he  was  in  his  mid-twenties.  This  appointment  coincided  with  the  last  two  or 
three  years  of  Smith's  lectures.  He  was  employed  to  teach  civil  law,  canon  law,  feudal 
law  and  Scots  law.  '  Lehmann  remarks  that  the  teaching  of  canon  law  had  been 
"jealously  guarded  by  the  divinity  interest".  2  The  Chair  in  Civil  Law  had  been 
established  in  1714  in  order  to  distinguish  the  teaching  of  the  former  from  canon  law. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  Millar  taught  canon  law. 
(a)  The  Lectures  on  Justinian 
It  seems  likely  that  Mllar's  first  lectures  were  not  on  government  but  on  Roman 
Law  (ORxix-xxi).  For  these  he  used  J.  G.  Heineccius's  textbook  arrangement  of 
Justinian's  Institutes:  Elementa  juris  civilis  secundum  ordinem  Institutem, 
(Amsterdam,  1725).  There  are  ten  sets  of  student  notes  of  these  lectures  in  Glasgow 
University  Library,  the  National  Library  of  Scotland  and  Edinburgh  University  Library. 
These  are  consistent  in  content  with  each  other  and  according  to  Haakonssen  "stem 
fairly  directly  from  Millar's  own  notes".  3  The  earliest  of  these  were  dated  1777-8.  This 
was  more  than  fifleen  years  afler  Nfillar  started  lecturing  on  the  subject.  4  The  set  I 
decided  to  use  is  a  copy  of  notes  of  lectures  given  in  1789  (MS  Gen  812-4).  This is  a 
copy  by  Alexander  Dunlop  Jr.,  dated  1816.  It  appears  to  be  a  copy  of  a  copy. 
Throughout,  Dunlop  added  his  own  comments  to  the  text  prefacing  them  with  his 
initial,  "D".  However,  he  also  copied  out  the  comments  of  the  original  unnamed  copier 
whose  initial  was  "B".  The  fact  that  Dunlop  took  so  much  care  to  copy  B's  comments 
shows  that  he  was  a  faithful  and  accurate  transcriber. 
Millar  took  over  the  Chair  of  Civil  Law  in  1761  from  Hercules  Lindesay.  Lindesay 
lectured  to  no  more  than  four  or  five  students.  5  Craig  mentioned  that  Millar  thought 
that  his  predecessors'  method  of  teaching  the  Institutes  "tracing,  with  the  utmost 
accuracy  and  tedious  erudition,  the  exact  line  of  Roman  Law"  (ORxx)  was  a  waste  of 
time.  He  therefore  decided  to  devote  half  of  the  teaching  session  to  a  new  course  of 
I  Cainis  J.  W.  (1988)  "John  Millar's  Lcctures  on  Scots  Criminal  Law",  Oxford  Journal  of  Legal 
Studies,  8,364400,367. 
2Lehmann,  Millar,  p2  1. 
3Haakonsscn,  Natural  Law,  p  15  8. 
4Cairns,  "Uctures",  374,  n47. 
5Lclimann,  Millar,  p  19. 334 
lectures.  These  focused  on  general  principles  that  influence  the  positive  law  of  every 
particular  country,  and  "have  their  origin  in  those  sentiments  of  justice  which  are 
imprinted  on  the  human  heart"  (ibid).  The  lectures  were  therefore  divided  into  two 
parts  entitled  "first  course"  and  "second  course".  The  second  course  was  the  "new 
course"  Craig  referred  to.  The  first  course  consisted  of  sixty-five  lectures  in  which 
Nfillar  confined  his  discussion  to  the  sequence  of  topics  laid  down  by  the  Romans 
following  the  distinction  between  rights  and  actions  and  the  division  within  rights 
between  personal  and  real  rights. 
It  would  be  a  mistake,  however,  to  think  that  his  presentation  of  each  topic  was 
tediously  erudite  or  lacking  in  any  references  to  general  principles.  For  example,  in  the 
two  lectures  he  gave  on  occupancy  in  the  first  course  (LJ1  789,  vol.  1,  lecs.  23-4,  pp46- 
7),  he  summarised  views  developed  further  in  the  seventeen  lectures  he  gave  on 
property  in  the  second  course  (LJ]789,1,18-34,47-150).  Thus  he  referred  to  the  light 
of  the  first  possessor  founded  on  "the  principle  of  Humanýty"  that  led  individuals  11to 
relieve  the  distress  and  sufferings  of  their  fellow  creatures  and  independent  of 
particular  connexions,  produces  a  desire  to  relieve  in  proportion  to  the  greateness  of 
the  distress"  (LJ]789,1,23,46).  Millar  observed  this  principle  working  in  the  mind  of 
an  impartial  spectator.  It  inclined  the  spectator  to  judge  in  favour  of  the  first  possessor 
through  a  sympathetic  identification  with  the  hardship  the  first  possessor  had  suffered 
in  acquiring  the  object  of  possession;  with  the  possessor's  feelings  of  attachment;  and 
with  the  expectation  of  feelings  of  pleasure  evoked  when  the  possesor  thought  of  how 
the  object  could  be  used.  Moreover  this  fight  was  subsequently  confirmed  by 
"considerations  of  Utility",  in  particular  how  the  fight  encouraged  individuals  to  work 
hard  in  order  to  satisfy  their  subsistence  needs.  The  combined  operations  of  pre- 
reflective  universal  human  sentiment  with  post-reflective  rational  calculations  of  utility 
informed  all  of  Millar's  discussions  of  fights  and  corroborate  Craig's  opinion  that 
Millar  was  happy  to  combine  Hume's  and  Smith's  moral  theory  -  in  this  case  Hume's 
theorisation  of  justice  as  a  virtue  confirmed  by  utility  combined  with  Smith's 
theorisation  ofjustice  as  a  virtue  arising  out  of  the  reactions  of  spectators  (ORxxvi). 
The  second  course  of  lectures  consists  of  forty-seven  lectures  divided  into  seven 
lectures  on  ethics  and  jurisprudence;  six  on  the  fights  of  individuals  as  husbands  and 
wives;  one  on  their  fights  as  parents  and  children;  three  on  the  rights  of  masters  and 
slaves;  one  on  guardians  and  wards;  seventeen  on  property  rights;  three  on  contract 
and  quasi-contract;  six on  criminal  law;  and  three  on  actions.  The  first  seven  lectures 
consist  of  a  short  natural  history  of  moral  and  legal  philosophy.  The  latter  are  reprinted 
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(b)  The  Lectures  on  Government 
Little  is  known  of  the  content  of  Millar's  lectures  until  ten  years  after  his 
appointment.  The  earliest  copy  of  student  lecture  notes  is  a  copy  of  Millar's  lectures  on 
government  "Extended  by  George  Skene"  in  1771  (MS  99,  Mitchell  Library).  I  have 
used  this  copy  as  a  source  for  this  dissertation.  There  are  various  later  student  copies 
of  Millar's  lectures  on  government  in  the  Special  Collection  of  Glasgow  University's 
Library.  These  include  copies  by  Alexander  Campbell  (1783),  James  Millar  (1787-88), 
William  Rae  (1789)  and  David  Boyle  (1790).  John  Cairns  suggests  that  it  was 
customary  for  law  students  to  establish  a  trade  in  copies  of  professors'  lecture  notes. 
He  remarks  that  it  was  likely  that  copies  of  Nfillar's  notes,  either  in  the  form  of  written 
transcripts  or  student  notes  from  auditing,  were  sold  and  bought  by  students.  6  There 
are  few  obvious  differences  between  the  later  copies.  Of  these,  I  decided  to  use  the 
one  with  the  greatest  authority  -  the  set  taken  by  Millar's  son,  James  (MS  Gen  289- 
91).  Cairns  states  that  it  is  likely  that  James  Millar  transcribed  these  notes  "perhaps 
acting  as  his  father's  amanuensis,  as  an  act  of  filial  piety".  7 
Although  this  later  copy  tends  to  follow  the  sequence  of  topics  found  in  Skene's 
1771  plan,  there  are  differences  in  presentation  and  content.  Both  copies  are  divided 
into  three  parts.  The  first  part  covered  the  origin  and  progress  of  government  in 
general  (LG1771,1-60  &  LGI792,146,1460).  This  is  the  part  Craig  described  as 
Millar's  "theoretical"  history  of  government:  a  form  of  historiography  that  made  no 
"reference  to  the  history  of  particular  governments"  (ORxlv).  The  second  part 
covered  the  origin  and  progress  of  particular  governments.  These  are,  in  the  following 
order,  the  governments  of  Athens,  Sparta,  Rome,  France,  Germany,  England,  Scotland 
and  Ireland.  It  concluded  with  lectures  covering  Christian  ecclesiastical  government. 
Millar  discussed  all  these  particular  forms  within  the  general  perspective  he  developed 
in  the  first  part  (LG1771,61-237  &  LG]792,17-37,161-243).  The  third  part  covered 
the  nature  of  the  British  constitution  in  the  light  of  the  1688  settlement.  NEllar 
discussed  the  powers  of  parliament,  the  national  debt,  the  powers  of  the  different 
branches  of  parliament,  the  prerogative,  and  judicial  power  in  England  and  Scotland 
(LGI  771,23  8-33  7&  LGI  792,3  8-5  1,1  -  100). 
The  differences  in  presentation  between  the  two  copies  are  the  most  clearly 
noticeable.  Skene's  copy  is  handwritten  in  continuous  prose.  Each  lecture  reads  like  a 
well-composed  student  essay.  The  main  text  is  on  the  right  side  of  the  manuscript.  On 
the  left,  Skene  added  the  occasional  note  or  comment.  This  was  prefaced  by  a  diagonal 
cross-mark.  The  latter  corresponded  to  a  similar  mark  at  the  end  of  the  sentence  to 
6Caims,  "Latures",  369,  n32. 
7Cairns,  "Lecturcs",  370,  n33. 336 
which  it  referred  or  was  an  addition.  The  mode  of  presentation  of  Skene's  copy 
suggests  that  his  "extended"  version  was  written  from  notes  he  made  in  class. 
In  contrast,  the  text  of  each  lecture  of  James  Millar's  1792  copy  was  broken  up  by 
numerically  ordered  sections  and  sub-sections.  Some  of  these  sections  have  titles. 
Other  sections  have  no  titles.  Some  of  the  titles  are  underlined.  Other  titles  have  no 
underlining.  Comments,  additional  remarks  and  examples  were  included  within  the 
main  text  of  the  manuscript.  In  some  places  addenda  were  bracketed  off  In  other 
places  they  are  introduced  by  diagonal  cross-marks  or  the  symbol  similar  in  shape  to 
the  criss-cross  used  in  the  game  of  noughts  and  crosses  and  now  used  to  refer  to 
number  in  general.  Moreover  various  words  in  sentences  in  the  text  are  underlined  for 
emphasis.  These  would  be  useful  in  attracting  the  attention  of  a  speaker.  They  make 
little  sense  to  a  reader.  The  underlined  emphases  suggest  that  the  later  copies  were 
written  transcripts  of  the  notes  Millar  used  for  teaching  purposes.  If  so,  it  is  difficult  to 
imagine  that  Millar  would  not  have  given  permission  for  at  least  one  of  his  students  to 
have  copied  his  notes.  Perhaps  this  is  a  good  reason  why  the  Ider  copies  are  almost 
indistinguishable. 
The  differences  in  content  are  what  might  be  expected  in  a  lecture  course  that 
develops  through  time.  The  1792  copy  shows  that  Millar's  approach  grew  in 
confidence.  Millar  illustrated  his  lectures  with  in  increasing  number  of  examples.  This 
reflected  the  growth  of  the  relevant  literature.  For  example,  in  the  1792  copy,  Millar 
recommended  his  students  read  Polybius,  Tacitus,  Voltaire,  Robertson,  Hume  and 
Priestly  for  an  understanding  of  history;  and  Temple,  Sydney,  Locke,  Harrington, 
Hume,  Montcsquieu's  Spirit  of  the  Laws  and  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations  for  an 
understanding  of  "the  science  of  government"  (LG]792,1,7-9).  In  Skene's  1771  copy, 
Nfillar  recommended  his  students  read  only  Temple  and  Locke  on  government 
(LG1771,59-60).  Millar  referenced  Sydney  and  Locke  as  examples  of  whigs  who 
explained  ranks  by  utility  (LG1771,5).  Millar  recommended  Montesquieu  for  his 
account  of  commerce;  Harrington  and  Robertson  for  their  accounts  of  the  effects  of 
commerce  on  property;  and  Charlevoix,  Lafitau,  Tacitus,  Caesar  and  Bossuet  for  their 
descriptions  of  non-commercial  peoples.  Millar  did  not  mention  Hume  as  a  contributor 
to  political  theory.  Although  Millar  referred  to  Hume's  history  in  the  second  part  of  the 
course  in  his  review  of  the  history  of  English  government  (LG]771,173,  on  Charles  I's 
character  &  LG1771,178  on  the  authority  of  Cromwell's  rule),  he  did  not  recommend 
him  as  a  historian  either.  Smith's  absence  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  in  1771  he 
had,  of  course,  yet  to  publish  The  Wealth  ofNations. 
There  are  three  possible  reasons  why  the  recommended  reading  differed.  The  first 
is  that  the  1792  copy  shows  that  Millar  decided  to  start  the  first  part  of  the  lecture 
course  with  an  introductory  lecture  titled  "Prelir--nary  Observations"  (LG]792,1,1- 
13).  This  lecture  not  only  outlined  the  -ructure  of  the  course,  but  also  prefaced  the 337 
latter  with  discussions  of  the  distinction  between  public  and  private  law,  a  brief 
statement  of  aims  and  methods,  and  a  twofold  classification  of  relevant  literature: 
historiography  and  political  theory.  The  former  divided  historians  roughly  into  two 
stylistic  groups:  those  who  had  given  a  narrative  or  biographical  account  of  events, 
and  those  who  had  "produced  a  more  scientific  method"  (LGI792,1,7).  The  latter  had 
written  about  customs,  manners,  and  laws;  arts  and  sciences;  and  commerce  and 
manufactures  separately  from  the  narrative  of  events.  Millar's  recommended  historians 
fell  into  this  second  category.  Millar  described  Montesquieu  and  Smith  as  having 
written  natural  histories  of  government.  He  implied  that  their  work  not  only 
exemplified  a  scientific  method  of  historiography  but  also  contained  insights  derived 
from  the  political  theorists  he  recommended  such  as  Locke,  Temple,  Sydney  and 
Harrington. 
In  contrast,  Skene's  1771  copy  shows  that  Millar's  first  lecture  took  his  students 
straight  into  a  discussion  of  the  two  principles  of  government.  Millar  took  these, 
authority  and  utility,  directly  from  Smith's  lectures.  Millar  identified  the  literature  he 
considered  important  for  students  to  study  only  at  the  end  of  the  first  part  of  the 
course.  He  recommended  literature  briefly  at  the  end  of  his  last  lecture  on  the  decline 
of  nations  (LG]771,59-60).  The  recommended  literature  seems  to  have  been 
mentioned  as  an  afterthought.  It  is  as  if  he  had  been  prompted  into  it  by  his  students. 
Mllar  made  no  mention  of  styles  of  writing,  methods  or  aims,  and  stated  that  he  found 
"a  great  difficulty  in  recommending  any  in  preference  to  the  rest"  because  of  "too  great 
a  number"  (ibid). 
The  second  reason  why  the  recommended  literature  might  differ  depends  on 
whether  Skene's  copy  is  of  lectures  Millar  gave  before  the  publication  of  Yhe  Origin  of 
Ranks  in  1771.  There  is  no  mention  of  the  book  in  Skene's  copy,  whereas  the  1792 
copy  references  it  as  an  authority  on  familial  government  (LG]792,3,35&37).  Millar 
used  Charlevoix,  Lafitau  and  Bossuet  as  sources  of  information  on  Native  Americans, 
Tartars,  and  Afficans  throughout  The  Origin  qfRanks.  There  was  therefore  no  need  to 
make  a  special  mention  of  them  in  subsequent  lectures.  Besides,  Lafitau  was  a 
missionary  and,  although  an  important  source  for  historians,  his  descriptions  did  not 
constitute  any  particular  style  of  historiography.  The  importance  of  the  accounts  of 
missionaries  and  travellers  for  the  new  scientific  writers  of  history  was  that 
contemporary  observations  appeared  to  agree  in  content  with  observations  made  by 
ancient  writers  such  as  Tacitus.  In  Skenc,  Millar  therefore  warned  his  students  to 
ignore  Lafitau's  "disquisitions  regarding  the  existence  of  the  Catholic  religion" 
(LG]771,59).  They  could  ignore  them  altogether  once  they  had  access  to  a  copy  of 
Millar's  book. 338 
The  third  reason  depends  on  whether  Skene's  copy,  as  seems  likely,  was  based  on 
class  notes,  in  which  case  he  could  have  failed  to  record  literature  Mllar  mentioned. 
Perhaps  this  might  explain  the  noticeable  absence  of  any  recommendation  of  Hume. 
Comparing  the  differences  between  Skene's  1771  copy  and  the  later  1792  copy 
further,  in  the  first  part  of  the  course  Mllar  expanded  the  earlier  comments  of  the 
effects  of  commerce  on  morals  (LG]771,32-33  and  footnote)  into  a  separate  lectures 
(LG]792,9,83-85).  In  Skene,  Mllar's  comments  on  the  topic  took  place  at  the 
beginning  of  a  lengthier  discussion  of  the  effects  of  commerce  on  government.  Milar 
confined  them  to  short  remarks  on  the  improvement  of  honesty  and  justice  and 
destruction  of  generosity  and  fidelity  in  a  commercial  society.  He  followed  these 
remarks  with  an  observation  of  the  state  of  manners  in  the  Highlands  before  it  was 
"associated  with"  the  Lowlands.  N1illar  illustrated  the  absence  of  any  notion  of  justice 
amongst  rude  peoples  in  a  long  footnote  which  recalled  how  "before  property  comes 
to  be  established"  the  I-lighlanders  did  not  consider  it  a  crime  to  steal  from 
Lowlanders.  Mllae  made  mention  of  a  recent  "famous"  example  of  this  "in  the  year 
1745  -a  Highlander  who  notwithstanding  of  all  the  promised  rewards  kept  the 
Pretender  concealed  in  his  house  -  was  soon  after  taken  up  for  stealing  a  horse.  "  Mllar 
expanded  this  story,  informing  the  reader  that  the  Highlander  was  tried  and  sentenced 
to  capital  punishment  in  Inverness,  in  the  sixth  essay  of  the  fourth  volume  of 
Historical  View  (HV,  4,240). 
In  contrast,  lecture  nine  of  the  1792  copy  (LG.  1792,9,83-85)  reproduced  topics 
addressed  in  parts  of  the  later  essay.  This  was  Yhe  Effects  of  Commerce  and 
Manilyactures,  and  of  Opulence  and  Civilisation,  upon  the  Morals  of  a  People. 
(HV,  4,174-265).  The  lecture  started  with  a  criticism  of  Rousseau  who  dealt  with  the- 
topic  "with  more  declamation  than  cool  examination"  (LG]792,9,83).  This  compares 
with  Nlillar's  introduction  to  his  essay  in  which  Milar  classified  Rousseau  along  with 
those  moral  writers  who  "in  declaiming  against  the  vices  of  their  own  times,  have  been 
led  to  exalt  the  merit  of  distant  ages"  (HV,  4,174).  NOW  then  addressed  the  different 
effects  that  commerce  had  on  justice:  how  its  utility  is  more  easily  recognised,  how 
education  and  laws  are  used  to  reinforce  justice,  and  how  habits  of  honesty  become 
needed  amongst  trading  peoples  (HV,  4,236-239).  He  went  on  to  contrast  the  morals 
of  rude  with  polished  nations,  giving  reasons  why  in  the  former  period  traders  were 
"the  most  dishonest"  -  because  they  were  despised  and  because  there  was  no  way  of 
detecting  fraud  in  the  absence  of  a  developed  market  (BV,  4,241-245).  He  considered 
the  unfavourable  effect  that  commerce  had  on  generosity  and  benevolence;  how 
avarice  and  ambition  arose  out  of  the  pursuit  of  wealth;  and  how  competition  gave  rise 
to  "envy,  emulation,  and  selfishness"  (HV,  4,246-251).  He  concluded  with  the  effect 
that  wealth  generated  by  commerce  had  on  the  pursuit  of  "the  excesses  of  sensual 
pleasures".  He  contrasted  the  sexual  modesty  of  savages  with  the  conspicuous 339 
"voluptuousness"  of  the  wealthy,  and  described  how  the  indulgence  of  bodily  pleasure 
co-operated  in  strengthening  selfishness  and  avarice  (HV,  4,251-252). 
Millar  therefore  developed  the  topic  from  a  few  remarks  at  the  beginning  of  a 
lecture  on  the  effects  of  commerce  on  government  in  Skene  in  1771,  to  a  lecture 
devoted  solely  to  the  topic  by  1792,  to  the  content  of  a  third  of  a  substantial  essay  by 
the  time  of  his  death  in  1801.  Craig  commented  that  Millar's  lectures  contained 
"digressions"  into  "speculations  on  Manners,  on  National  Character,  Literature,  and 
the  Fine  Arts"  intended  both  to  "awaken  curiosity,  or  illustrate  the  general  principles  of 
his  theory"  (ORxiiii).  These  "principles"  were  explanatory  in  intent,  Millar  discussing 
first  the  effect  of  commerce  and  wealth  on  morals  and  manners,  then  the  combined 
effect  of  both  commerce  and  commercialised  morals  and  manners  on  government. 
The  final  difference  that  points  to  a  development  of  Millar's  thought  in  the  lectures 
is  a  "digression"  found  in  the  1792  copy  that  has  no  mention  in  the  1771  copy.  This  is 
an  additional  lecture  on  the  effect  of  commerce  on  "Manners,  Temper  and  Deportment 
of  Mankind"  or  "The  behaviour  and  disposition  of  mankind  in  things  where  morality  is 
not  concerned"  (LG]792,10,87-98).  In  this  lecture,  Millar  compared  the  expression  of 
emotions  of  people  in  "rude  nations"  with  those  of  people  in  "polished  nations".  He 
classified  these  into  "Reserve  or  Frankness",  "Sensibility  and  Vivacity"  and  "Modesty 
and  Vanity".  He  also  considered  "Eloquence"  and  "Humanity"  and  concluded  with  a 
review  of  comic  literature  from  Aristophanes  to  Fielding  and  Smollet.  He  explained 
the  growth  of  humorous  literature  by  the  "variety  of  characters"  brought  into  being  by 
a  division  of  labour  typical  of  a  commercial  society.  The  content  of  the  second  part  of 
this  lecture  was  reproduced  in  a  lengthier  form  at  the  end  of  the  second  part  of  the 
eighth  essay  of  the  fourth  volume  of  Historical  View.  He  titled  this  The  Gradual 
Advancement  of  the  Fine  Arts  -  Their  ItIfluence  upon  Government.  Part  II  of  the 
essay  titled  Of  Dramatic  Poetry  reproduced  the  content  of  the  earlier  lecture 
(HV,  4,365-375).  In  both  the  lecture  and  the  essay,  Millar  explained  the  superiority  of 
English  comic  literature  over  that  of  the  French  by  the  more  advanced  economic  social 
relations  found  in  England.  These  produced  a  "multiplicity  and  diversity  of  characters" 
for  "humourous  exhibition"  (HV,  4,357&370). 
There  is  no  indication  from  a  comparison  of  the  two  sets  of  notes  that  Millar 
changed  his  method  of  theorising  government.  Both  are  united  by  the  same  doctrine. 
The  above  discussion  shows  how  Millar,  starting  with  conjectures  on  the  effects  of 
commerce  on  government,  was  led  to  further  conjectures  on  its  effects  on  morals, 
manners  and  literature.  It  suggests  that  the  differences  between  the  early  1771 
lectures,  the  later  1792  lectures,  and  the  final  content  of  Historical  View  were  in 
presentation  and  the  development  of  topics.  All  were  unified  by  the  same  conjectural 
method. 340 
Appendix  Three 
Lectures  1-7  of  the  "Second  Course"  of  Mr.  Millar's  Notes  on  the 
Institutes  of  Justinian  according  to  Heineccus  -  Glasgow  1789.  By 
Alexander  Dunlop  Ar.  1816. 
(Ms  Gen  812,  Vol.  1,  pp.  101-136,  Glasgow  University  Special 
Collections) 
This  handwritten  copy  is  to  be  found  in  the  last  part  of  volume  one  of  a  three-  volume 
copy  of  Millar's  lecture  notes  (Ms  Gen  812).  There  are  two  sets  of  footnotes:  the  first 
by  "B"  the  second  by  "D".  These  were  both  written  on  unnumbered  facing  pages  to  the 
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Lecture  I  [p.  1011 
Preliminary  observations  concerning  Ethics  and  Jurisprudence 
Every  man  understands  the  difference  between  virtue  and  vice.  Some  actions  we 
approve  of,  others  we  condemn.  Everyone  approves  of  a  grateful  return  for  a  good 
action.  Ingratitude  and  treachery  on  the  other  hand  create  universal  disgust.  We  are 
sensible  of  the  difference  between  justice  and  other  virtues.  The  practice  ofjustice  may 
be  enforced,  but  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  force  a  man  to  be  generous  or  grateful. 
Hence  the  difference  between  Ethics  and  Law;  the  latter  is  a  branch  of  the  former. 
Of  the  manner  in  which  the  study  of  Ethics  has  been  conducted. 
(1)  The  distinction  of  virtue  and  vice  must  have  been  early  observed  in  society.  Among 
the  ruiest  and  most  barbarous  people,  those  who  display  courage,  fidelity,  and 
disinterested  attachment,  will  be  loved  and  esteemed. 
Those  who  discover  the  opposite  qualities  will  be  hated  and  despised.  As  men 
therefore  are  extremely  solicitous  to  procure  the  esteem  of  each  other,  they  naturally 341 
endeavour  to  possess  those  qualities  by  which  it  is  to  be  acquired,  [p.  1021  and  we  are 
continually  vying  with  each  other,  in  the  display  of  our  virtues.  Hence  the  distinction 
between  the  virtues  and  the  vices,  which  takes  place  in  every  community  becomes  an 
object  of  universal  attention. 
It  is  natural  to  expect  that  in  consequence  of  this,  particular  persons  of  experience  and 
sagacity,  would  make  observations  with  regard  to  the  conduct  of  life  and  introduce  a 
number  of  moral  maxims,  which  gaining  reputation,  would  be  inculcated  by  the  old  on 
the  young,  and  by  being  usually  recommended  by  every  father  to  his  children,  rnight  be 
communicated  to  a  whole  people. 
Hence  the  origin  of  proverbs  of  which  there  are  some  remains  in  every  nation,  but 
which  are  usually  very  numerous  in  early  societies. 
They  are  often  expressed  in  rhyme,  or  at  least  contain  some  antithesis  or  point  of 
expression,  which  rude  people  are  apt  to  admire. 
We  have  also  many  collections  of  moral  maxims  made  by  particular  persons  which 
seem  to  go  beyond  the  common  proverbs  of  a  country.  Such  are  the  writings  of 
Soloman  -  the  words  of  Aqui  [?  ]  -  The  wisdom  of  the  son  of  Seioch  [?  ].  The  writings 
of  Hesiod  contain  also  a  collection  of  maxims  intended  to  direct  mankind  in  their 
common  concerns  of  life.  [p.  1031  Of  the  same  kind  were  the  writings  of  the  wise  men 
of  Greece,  which  have  been  thought  worthy  of  being  preserved.  The  fables  of  Aesop, 
and  those  which  have  come  from  the  East  are  an  attempt  to  illustrate  these  maxims. 
(2)  After  a  number  of  such  maxims  have  been  collected,  people  are  naturally  led  to 
methodise  them,  so  that  they  may  be  perused  with  pleasure,  and  easily  retained  in  the 
memory. 
One  of  the  most  considerable  attempts  of  this  kind,  has  been  handed  down  to  us  from 
the  Greek  philosophers.  All  moral  maxims  may  be  reduced  to  two  classes. 
(a)  Such  as  more  immediately  concern  ourselves. 
(b)  Such  as  more  immediately  concern  our  neighbours. 
(a)  Those  which  more  immediately  concern  ourselves  are  naturally  reduced  into  three 
heads. 
(i)  The  great  source  of  misconduct  is  a  want  of  proper  attention  and  deliberation,  in 
forming  ourjudgement.  We  often  determine  ourselves  rashly  and  hastily  without  being 
at  proper  pains  to  procure  information,  and  we  proceed  to  action  upon  a  partial  view, 
without  calling  up  all  the  different  motives  which  might  have  had  an  influence  on  our 
conduct. 
[p.  1041  The  maxims  and  observations  that  tend  to  correct  our  conduct  in  this  respect 
fall  under  one  class.  They  recommend  the  virtue  of  prudence. 
(ii)  Besides  the  vices  proceeding  from  rashness  and  inattention,  there  are  others  which 
arise  from  the  irregularity  of  our  feelings. 342 
The  two  great  motives  to  action  are  the  love  of  pleasure  or  good  and  the  fear  of  pain 
or  evil. 
With  respect  to  the  love  of  good;  a  pleasure  which  is  near  at  hand,  is  apt  to  produce  a 
much  stronger  effect  upon  the  mind  than  one  which  is  at  a  distance. 
Thus  men  are  often  destitute  of  that  self  command,  which  enables  them  to  sacrifice  a 
present  gratification,  for  a  future  one  that  is  of  greater  moment. 
By  debauchery,  for  example,  a  man  ruins  his  health  and  fortune. 
The  maxims  which  tend  to  correct  such  misconduct  belong  to  one  class.  They 
recommend  the  virtue  of  temperance. 
(iii)  With  respect  to  the  fear  of  evil  or  pain,  a  present  in  like  manner  is  apt  to  have  too 
strong  an  effect,  and  to  make  us  act  so,  as  to  view  a  greater  future  evil.  The  maxims 
on  this  head  recommend  the  virtue  of  fortitude. 
(b)  The  maxims  which  more  immediately  concern  our  neighbours  may  be  reduced  to 
one  class,  [p.  105]  the  views  in  our  conduct  with  regard  to  our  neighbours,  proceed  all 
from  one  source;  too  great  a  degree  of  selfishness  and  too  little  benevolence. 
The  aim  of  all  the  maxims  therefore  upon  this  head  must  be  to  correct  our  feelings  in 
this  respect  and  to  recommend  what  is  called  justice. 
Such  is  the  celebrated  division  of  the  virtues  into  those  of  prudence,  temperance, 
fortitude,  and  justice. 
This  division  commonly  ascribed  to  Pythagoras  has  been  brought  by  him  from  India 
(see  Temple  on  ancient  leaming)  [Sir  William  Temple  1626-99]. 
Lecture  2 
Having  made  a  general  arrangement  of  the  virtues,  men  were  led  to  consider  more 
particularly  the  nature  of  them;  &  to  examine  the  circumstances  in  which  they  will 
agree  with  one  another  &  and  are  distinguished  from  the  opposite  vices.  That  is 
wherein  consists  virtue.  Upon  running  over  the  several  virtues  &  vices,  we  find  that 
the  latter  consists  in  the  defect  or  excess  in  the  wrong  direction  of  particular  feelings. 
Thus  imprudence  (so  far  as  it  can  be  called  a  vice)  consists  in  the  want  of  proper 
attention.  Intemperance  in  the  excessive  love  of  pleasure,  [p.  1061  or  want  of  self- 
command  in  resisting  an  immediate  gratification.  Injustice  is  an  immoderate  aelfishness 
or  the  defect  of  benevolence.  Want  of  fortitude  is  the  excess  of  fear,  or  the  defect  of 
strength  of  mind  to  support  present  evil. 
From  this  view  of  the  subject  it  seems  reasonable  to  conclude,  that  all  our  feelings  & 
desires  are  proper  in  a  certain  degree  or  direction,  &  that  the  improper  degree  or 
direction  of  them  is  what  constitutes  vice. 343 
This  conclusion  is  further  confirmed  by  considering  that  the  Author  Of  Nature  must 
have  intended  that  all  the  affections,  which  he  has  bestowed  upon  us,  should  in  some 
measure  be  indulged. 
*According  to  this  way  of  thinking  virtue  consists  in  acting  according  to  nature,  vice 
in  the  contrary.  @' 
This  was  the  opinion  of  Plato,  Aristotle  &  Zeno.  @2 
When  we  examine  the  feelings  of  the  human  mind  we  can  scarce  fail  to  distinguish  two 
different  sets  of  affection;  the  selfish  &  the  benevolent,  which  are  continually  exerted 
in  opposition  to  each  another. 
Comparing  these  different  affections  together  it  appears 
(1)  that  the  praise  bestowed  upon  the  benevolent  is  always  out  of  all  proportion 
greater  than  what  is  bestowed  upon  the  selfish  [p.  1071  (2)  that  the  latter  are  the  cause 
why  the  former  are  not  properly  exerted. 
Taking  virtue  to  mean  what  is  the  object  of  considerable  praise,  @3  it  appeared  to  some 
philosophers,  that  this  quality  belongs  only  to  the  benevolent  actions. 
This  was  the  opinion  of  the  latter  Platonists  or  Eleatics  (who  began  to  figure  about  the 
end  of  the  2nd  century)  &  of  Mr.  Hutcheson. 
It  is  to  be  observed  that  according  to  their  opinion,  prudence,  temperance  &  fortitude 
are  only  valuable,  as  they  contribute  to  the  good  of  society. 
Epicurus  held  on  the  other  hand  that  all  affections  are  at  bottom  selfish.  *4 
(1)  Upon  an  examination  many  actions  apparently  benevolent  are  in  reality  derived 
from  self  love. 
(2)  *Every  object  it  seems  arises  from  a  certain  desire,  which  is  the  obtaining  that 
which  gives  pleasure.  ` 
To  this  philosopher  therefore  &  his  followers,  virtue,  of  consequence,  appeared  to 
consist  in  a  prudent  exercise  of  the  selfish  affections  (see  Cicero  de.  fin.  ).  *6 
I  *Under  the  feelings  or  desires  which  are  virtuous,  we  must  comprehend  not  only  such  as  excite  us 
to  a  good  action,  but  such  as  were  produced  by  reflection  upon  it  -  by  the  notion  of  excellence  & 
propriety  in  our  own  conduct,  &  of  procuring  it  the  love  and  esteem  of  others  -  B. 
CThis  however  implies  perfection  in  our  nature  &  our  natural  feelings  -  D. 
2gCertainly  not  of  Zeno  who  recommended  the  almost  total  subversion  of  all  the  pas  i 
_or 
Lons 
LegHngs  -  D. 
3(gTjiS  is  certainly  a  false  criterion  &  great  praise  is  often  given  to  great  ambition  &  great  feeling  on 
receiving  insults  accompanied  with  revenge  -  D. 
4*This  opinion  tho'  not  strictly  true  is  founded  upon  an  exaggeration  of  certain  real  appearances,  and 
may  have  a  good  effect  by  fixing  our  attention  upon  the  higher  class  of  virtues.  -  B. 
5*Our  deception  in  this  particular  is  much  more  extensive  than  we  are  apt  to  be  aware  of.  (1)  We 
have  an  interest  to  impose  upon  others  by  the  possession  of  benevolence.  (2)  By  so  doing,  &  by  a 
species  of  self-flattery  we  are  led  even  to  impose  upon  ourselves  -B. 
*This  leads  to  a  piece  of  sophistry  by  which  the  present  question  is  evaded  -  Every  feeling  by  which 
the  good  of  others,  becomes  an  ultimate  source  of  pleasure  -  is  properly  benevolent 
-B. 
6*-Mis  opinion  not  only  erroneous  but  pernicious  -  B. 344 
These  are  the  most  noted  opinions  upon  this  question,  which  has  been  entertained  by 
philosophers. 
The  forgoing  question,  of  what  constitutes  virtue  leads  to  an  enquiry  concerning  the 
influence  of  virtue  upon  happiness.  [p.  108]  In  recommending  the  practice  of  certain 
moral  virtues,  it  is  to  be  supposed  this  circumstance  would  not  be  overlooked,  from 
whence  an  inquiry  into  the  summum  bonum  mýight  be  apt  to  arise.  In  considering  what 
is  the  summum  bonum,  it  seems  reasonable  to  conclude- 
(1)  that  the  gratification  of  all  our  desires  is  pleasant  so  far  as  they  are  not  inconsistent 
with  each  other.  (2)  In  order  to  obtain  such  gratification,  the  exertion  of  the  active 
powers  of  the  mind  is  frequently  necessary  (a)  in  selecting  proper  objects  (b)  in 
steadily  pursuing  them. 
This  exertion  gives  pleasure,  (i)  by  raising  our  attention  to  the  agreeable  object,  & 
therefore  encreasing  its  apparent  value.  (ii)  By  suggesting  the  idea  of  our  own 
excellence  (iii)  By  procuring  the  esteem  of  others. 
Virtue  consists  in  selecting  the  proper  objects  of  desire,  &  in  acting  properly,  that  is  in 
making  suitable  exertions,  in  order  to  obtain  them.  But  this,  tho'  it  frequently  does,  will 
not  always  procure  the  actual  gratifications  in  view.  Prudence  does  not  always  secure 
us  from  mistakes.  Temperance  does  not  always  secure  health  &  happiness-  Fortitude 
does  not  always  overcome  danger.  Justice  does  not  always  preserve  from  fraud  & 
oppression. 
It  would  appear  then  that  happiness  consists  not  merely  in  acting  properly  in  order  to 
obtain  the  proper  objects  of  desire,  [p.  1091  but  in  such  acting  together  with  the 
obtaining  of  these  objects.  This  was  the  opinion  of  Aristotle  &  his  followers. 
With  respect  to  these  two  sources  of  happiness,  the  acting  &  and  obtaining  the  primae 
_naturae. 
The  former  appears  out  of  all  proportion  greater  than  the  latter.  The  former 
will  support  the  mind  in  most  cases  without  the  latter,  but  the  latter  can  by  no  means 
do  so,  without  the  former.  When  a  man  by  a  proper  degree  of  activity,  preserves  the 
vigour  of  his  own  mind;  when  he  is  conscious  that  he  has  the  approbation  of  his  own 
heart,  &  that  he  deserves  the  esteem  of  others,  he  may  be  able  to  bear  most  of  the  evils 
of  life  with  some  degree  of  tranquillity,  more  especially  when  he  considers,  that  the 
more  trying  the  situation  in  which  he  is  placed,  he  merits  the  greater  approbation,  if  he 
behaves  in  it  with  propriety.  And  also  when  he  joins  this  religious  consideration,  that 
what  he  suffers  is  only  a  partial  evil,  intended  to  promote  the  greater  good  of  the 
whole.  If  on  the  contrary  a  man  is  conscious  of  being  a  villain;  if  he  is  conscious  that 
his  conduct  exposes  him  to  the  contempt,  or  draws  upon  him  the  resentment  & 
indignation  of  mankind,  and  that  he  deserves  to  be  the  object  of  those  feelings,  it  is 
impossible  to  suppose  that  he  can  enjoy  any  degree  of  satisfaction.  [p.  1101 
The  more  we  reflect  upon  the  subject  we  find  more  different  views  to  confirm  the 
foregoing  observations.  In  considering  this  point  we  need  not  wonder,  if  some 345 
philosophers  have  been  exerted  to  a  degree  of  enthusiasm,  and  have  maintained  that 
virtue  alone  constitutes  the  highest  happiness.  Such  was  the  doctrine  of  the  Stoics. 
On  the  other  hand  Epicurus  &  and  his  followers  viewed  this  matter  in  an  opposite 
light.  As  we  always  act  with  a  view  to  procure  good  or  avoid  evil,  and  as  virtue 
consists  in  that  cause  of  action,  which  tends  to  obtain  the  prima  naturae,  he  supposed 
it  merely  to  be  valuable  as  the  means  to  an  end.  So  that  according  to  this  set  of 
philosophers,  happiness  consisted  merely  in  obtaining  the  prima  naturae,  that  is 
pleasure  or  the  absence  of  pain. 
At  the  same  time  Epicurus  admitted  that  the  satisfaction  which  a  man  derives  from  the 
good  will  &  esteem  of  others,  is  a  primary  object  of  desire. 
The  objections  to  this  opinion  are  obvious. 
(1)  In  acting  to  obtain  any  particular  object,  the  pleasure  is  often  greater  than  what 
arises  merely  from  the  end  in  view. 
(2)  The  mind  cannot  enjoy  a  great  number  of  pleasures,  without  some  intervals  of 
activity.  These  appear  necessary  in  order  to  preserve  a  relish  for  any  enjoyment,  and 
without  these,  [p.  111]  the  mind  is  apt  to  sink  under  that  tardium  vitae,  so  observable 
among  those  who  are  affluent  &  idle. 
It  is  scarce  necessary  to  take  notice,  that  some  of  the  followers  of  Epicurus  supposed 
the  prima  naturae,  to  be  ultimately  reduced  to  bodily  pleasure. 
These  are  the  chief  opinions  which  have  had  any  reputation  with  regard  to  this  branch 
of  Ethics. 
Lecture 
After  these  important  inquiries,  the  attention  of  philosophers  was  turned  to  a  more 
speculative  point. 
To  examine  those  principles  of  the  mind,  by  which  we  approve  of  virtue,  or  disapprove 
of  vice;  this  inquiry  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  any  of  the  ancient  sects  of 
philosophers;  unless  perhaps  we  expect  that  of  Epicurus,  whose  opinion  with  respect 
to  other  points,  led  to  the  consideration  of  this. 
The  opinion  in  modem  times  with  respect  to  this  question  seems  to  have  been,  that  we 
approve  of  virtue  &  conceive  ourselves  bound  to  the  practice  of  it,  from  a  regard  to 
the  will  of  the  Deity.  As  an  earthly  governor  establishes  certain  laws,  which  his 
subjects  are  bound  to  obey,  so  the  supreme  Being  has  established  the  rules  of  virtue, 
and  our  observance  of  them,  [p.  1121  is  incumbent  upon  us,  as  a  contrary  behaviour 
would  be  an  act  of  rebellion  against  the  Maker  &  Founder  of  the  Universe. 
This  opinion  seems  to  be  liable  to  several  difficulties. 346 
(1)  If  we  have  no  antecedent  principle  by  which  we  distinguish  virtue  from  vice,  how 
do  we,  independent  of  revelation,  discover  that  the  rules  of  virtue  are  agreeable  to  the 
Deity. 
(2)  Upon  what  principle  do  we  hold,  that  it  is  proper  to  obey  the  will  of  the  Deity?  If 
we  have  no  faculty  by  which  we  distinguish  right  from  wrong,  we  can  only  obey  him 
from  the  hope  of  reward  &  and  the  fear  of  punishment. 
It  occurred  therefore  to  some  philosophers  that  there  must  be  a  real  distinction 
between  virtue  &  vice,  arising  from  the  nature  of  things,  and  discernable  to  us 
antecedent  to  our  considering  the  will  of  the  Deity  as  to  this  particular.  That  virtue 
was  founded  upon  the  relation  of  things,  was  held  by  Malbranche,  &  was  afterwards 
supported  by  Cudworth.  This  point  is  particularly  established  by  D.  Clarke,  who 
maintains  that  these  are  different  relations  or  proportions  of  things  from  which  arises 
their  agreement  or  disagreement  with  each  other;  and  that  these  properties  or  relations 
are  perceived  by  reason  &  understanding.  That  there  is  a  difference  between  virtuous 
&  and  vitious  actions  must  be  admitted.  But  it  may  further  be  inquired,  [p.  1131 
wherein  this  difference  consists.  When  we  attend  particularly  to  this  subject,  I  imagine 
we  shall  be  convinced  that  the  difference  consists  in  this.  Virtuous  actions  give 
pleasure  to  the  beholder,  and  excite  love,  esteem,  &  other  sentiments  of  a  similar 
nature,  towards  the  person  who  performs  them.  Vicious  actions  the  contrary. 
it  would  seem  therefore  that  moral  good  &  evil  are  distinguished  ultimately  from  each 
other  by  certain  feelings  or  sentiments  which  they  excite  in  us,  &  unless  we  were 
possessed  of  such  feelings  &  sentiments,  we  should  never  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of 
this  distinction. 
Reason  &  understanding  is  employed  in  discovering  the  fact  whether  we  have  such 
feelings  or  not.  It  is  also  employed  in  examining  the  several  circumstances  of  an  action, 
its  tendencies  &  and  connections,  before  it  can  be  fairly  prescribed  to  the  mind,  so  as 
to  call  forth  proper  feelings  with  regard  to  it.  And  this  seems  to  be  the  whole  use  of 
the  understanding  in  cases  of  this  kind.  *7 
Mr.  Hutcheson  seems  to  have  been  the  first  who  established  this  point  on  a  satisfactory 
manner.  To  this  sentiment  by  which  virtue  is  distinguished  from  vice,  he  gave  the  name 
m., 
&  and  he  supposed  it  to  be  a  particular  faculty  planted  in  the  mind  of  the  moral  sense 
7*Many  authors  have  been  willing  to  draw  the  following  conclusion,  from  an  apprehension  that  it  is 
unfavourable  to  the  stability  of  virtue.  (1)  That  the  present  question  relates  to  a  matter  of  fact,  to  be 
determined  by  experience  only.  (2)  That  if  the  constitution  of  human  nature  is  uniform  with  respect 
to  the  feelings  which  distinguish  virtue  from  vice;  the  distinction  will  be  stable  and  uniform.  (3) 
Supposing  the  distinction  between  virtue  and  vice  to  be  discovered  solely  by  reason  this  would  not 
exclude  errors  and  diversity  of  judgement  on  this  point;  not  to  mention  that  the  mere  discovery  of 
that  distinction  by  reason,  would  be  of  little  use,  unless  we  had  also  certain  feelings  rendering  virtue 
agreeable  &  vice  disagreeable  -  B. 347 
for  this  very  purpose,  [p.  1141  (as  each  of  the  external  sense  is  given  to  us  to 
distinguish  particular  external  objects). 
Dr.  Butler  agrees  with  Hutcheson,  in  supposing  the  principle  of  approbation  to  be  a 
peculiar  faculty,  and  gives  it  the  name  of  conscience.  This  name  is  improper  as  it  is 
used  in  common  language  only  to  apply  to  a  man's  own  conduct. 
The  establishing  of  this  great  point  which  is  now  admitted  by  the  greater  part  of  the 
writers  on  Ethics  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  considerable  step  in  this  inquiry. 
After  being  satisfied  that  approbation  is  ultimately  a  matter  of  sentiment,  it  remains  to 
inquire  whether  this  sentiment  be  simple  or  compounded  of  several  feelings  & 
consequently  capable  of  being  analysed. 
The  latter  opinion  having  appeared  most  probable  to  many  acute  writers,  they  have 
been  led  to  attempt  an  analysis  of  the  moral  sense.  And  in  doing  this,  the  different 
tendency  of  virtuous  &  vicious  actions  has  become  a  principal  object  of  attention. 
As  virtuous  actions  have  a  tendency  to  promote  the  happiness,  either  of  the  actor 
himself  or  of  others,  &  consequently  of  society  they  must  upon  that  account  [p.  1151 
be  agreeable  to  a  spectator  both  from  consideration  of  self-love  &  benevolence. 
it  is  to  be  observed  that  it  is  the  general  &  usual  tendency  of  actions,  not  their 
accidental  tendency  in  any  particular  cases,  which  stamps  upon  them  their  actual 
character,  of  beneficial  or  hurtful. 
According  to  this  view  the  effect  is  confounded  with  its  cause,  &  the  agreeableness  of 
the  one  is  communicated  to  the  other.  This  is  analogous  to  what  happens  with  regard 
to  the  beauty  of  external  objects.  Ex.  A  rich  field  of  corn.  A  well  contrived  machine  or 
house  are  beautiful  objects  as  objects  of  sight.  @8 
A  different  sentiment  excited  by  a  virtuous  man  &a  useful  machine,  or  any  other 
useful  object;  the  pleasure  arising  from  the  contemplation  of  the  former  produces  love 
&  affection  which  cannot  take  place  in  the  latter. 
Difference  between  the  kind  excited  by  a  good  understanding  &  by  virtuous  affections; 
the  former  may  be  directed  to  do  either  good  or  harm  to  society,  the  latter  always  is 
usefiil.  @9 
Difference  also  between  the  sentiment  excited  by  the  selfish  &  and  the  benevolent 
affections.  The  former  please  the  spectator  from  his  regard  to  the  good  of  the  person 
by  whom  they  are  excited.  The  latter  please  him  from  regard  to  his  own  good,  [p.  1161 
as  well  as  the  general  good  of  mankind.  This  system  is  illustrated  with  great  elegance 
&  perspicuity  by  Mr.  Hume. 
801s  a  very  fat  son  wallowing  beside  a  cottage  beautiful  to  the  sight  because  it  is  very  useful  to  the 
inhabitants?  -  D. 
9gToo  much  kindness  &  indulgence  is  often  very  hurtful  tho'  proceeding  from  virtuous  affections  - 
D. 348 
Objections  to  this  system. 
(1)  Actions  seem  often  to  be  applauded  or  blamed  before  we  reflect  on  their  tendency 
&  by  persons  who  are  very  little  given  to  reflect  on  that  circumstance. 
(2)  In  many  cases  the  applause  or  censure  of  actions  is  not  proportioned  to  their  good 
or  bad  tendency. 
Generosity  is  less  useful  than  the  observance  of  promises  but  it  is  more  applauded. 
Lecture  4th 
Without  considering  the  consequences  of  actions,  we  are  apt  to  regard  them  as 
'PEPPer 
or  improper,  according  as  they  appear  suitable  or  unsuitable,  to  the  objects  for  which 
they  have  been  produced. 
Ex.  Suppose  a  person  is  grave  when  he  hears  a  good  jest,  &  laughs  when  he  is  told  of 
a  real  misfortune.  Even  the  greatest  virtues  may  be  improperly  excited.  The  sentiments 
of  an  individual  are  apprehended  to  be  suitable  or  unsuitable  to  the  objects  by  which 
they  are  excited,  when  they  are  agreeable  or  repugnant  to  the  general  criterion  of 
human  nature.  We  appear  to  have  another  standard  of  propriety.  A  man  is 
apprehended  to  laugh  out  of  place,  when  he  laughs  on  an  occasion  when  others  are 
disposed  to  be  grave.  [p.  1171  This  said  to  be  imprudent,  when  he  shows  less  respect  to 
a  company,  than  others  do  in  like  circumstances.  Or  to  be  a  coxcomb,  when  he  is  more 
attentive  to  small  accomplishments  than  is  usual  in  ordinary  behaviour.  In  these  & 
similar  cases,  a  spectator  seems  to  disapprove  of  the  sentiments  exhibited  on  account 
of  their  deviating  from  what  appears  natural  &  without  any  consideration  of  their 
hurtful  consequences. 
As  any  remarkable  deviation  from  the  figure  of  the  human  being  is  called  Monstrous 
so  any  remarkable  deviation  from  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  is  received  in  a 
similar  light. 
A  person  totally  destitute  of  gratitude,  of  humanity  who  had  no  regard  to  veracity, 
who  was  void  of  spirit  either  to  defend  himself,  or  resent  an  injury,  would  appear 
equally  a  monster,  as  one  born  without  the  ordinary  members  of  the  human  body. 
Thus  to  aggravate  a  crime,  it  is  common  to  shew  that  there  was  little  temptation  for  it. 
To  alleviate  an  offence,  the  contrary. 
From  the  same  principle  what  are  called  vices  of  nature  excite  greater  disapprobation 
than  would  arise  merely  from  their  hurtful  consequences. 
(1)  The  approbation  of  what  is  agreeable  to  nature  is  supposed  by  some  authors, 
[p.  1181  to  be  derived  from  custom. 
(2)  A  late  ingenious  writer  has  supposed  that  it  arises  from  the  coincidence  of  our 
sentiments  with  those  of  others,  which  is  the  source  of  great  pleasure.  I  am  pleased 349 
with  your  sentiments  when  by  imagining  myself  in  your  situation  I  can  sympathise  with 
them. 
I  am  pleased  with  my  own,  when  I  imagine,  that  others  will  sympathise  with  what  I 
feel.  Thus  the  sentiments  of  the  cool  spectator  become  in  all  cases  the  standard  of 
propriety. 
To  excite  high  approbation  it  is  not  enough  that  actions  are  such  as  have  a  good 
tendency  -  they  might  also  be  exhibited  in  cases  where  such  actions  are  uncommon  & 
difficult. 
A  man  is  not  much  applauded  for  shewing  prudence  in  very  common  situations,  for 
abstaining  from  gluttony,  for  taking  care  of  his  family  &  even  for  acts  of  common 
charity  &  humanity.  It  should  seem  that  moral  approbation  is  affected  by  the  same 
circumstances  which  influence  our  taste  of  beauty  in  external  objects  &  in  the  fine 
arts. 
(1)  External  objects  are  beautiful  by  exciting  admiration,  wonder  &  surprise. 
These  emotions  are  excited  [p.  1191  (a)  by  simple  objects  which  are  great,  new,  or 
uncommon.  (b)  by  complex  objects  which  have  uniformity  &  variety. 
(2)  Human  actions  may  give  pleasure  by  exciting  similar  emotions.  (a)  in  the  case  of 
great  or  uncommon  actions.  (b)  From  the  exact  propriety  of  conduct  established  in  a 
train  of  virtuous  actions  proceeding  from  uniform  principles. 
Jurisprudence.  Lecture  5 
Of  the  progressive  inquiries  of  mankind  concerning  law 
The  distinction  between  justice  so  called,  &  the  other  virtues  is  apt  to  be  very  easily 
discovered.  The  man  who  does  not  take  proper  care  of  his  own  interest  by  exerting 
prudence,  temperance,  &  fortitude;  or  who  does  not  promote  the  happiness  of  others 
by  the  exertion  of  benevolence,  is  in  a  very  different  situation  from  him,  who  actually 
without  provocation  hurts  his  neighbour.  The  former  may  excite  hatred  or  contempt. 
But  the  latter  excites  indignation  and  resentment. 
(1)  Benevolent  actions  are  beneficial  as  well  as  suitable,  to  their  causes.  Malevolent 
actions  are  hurtful  as  well  as  unsuitable.  The  former  excite  love  and  a  disposition  to 
reward.  The  latter  hatred  &a  disposition  to  punish.  [p.  120(a)] 
(2)  Injustice  is  the  proper  object  of  punishment.  Resentment  excites  a  stronger 
disposition  to  punish,  than  the  feeling  produced  by  benevolence  to  reward.  The 
punishment  of  injustice  may  be  extorted  but  the  reward  of  benevolence  cannot. 
(3)  The  mere  sentiment  or  affection  is  not  the  object  of  punishment,  unless  followed  by 
action.  (a)  because  it  excites  less  resentment.  (b)  because  punishment  must  be  directed 
according  to  precise  rules. 350 
(a)  When  one  man  injures  another,  there  naturally  arises  a  dispute  or  quarrel  between 
the  two  parties,  who  in  the  infancy  of  government  must  decide  the  controversy  either 
by  fighting,  or  by  reference  to  an  arbiter. 
The  more  a  people  become  civilised  such  references,  become  more  frequent,  the 
arbiter  acquires  more  &  more  influence.  The  society  endeavours  to  support  his 
decisions,  &  he  is  at  last  invested  with  power  of  a  judge. 
When  an  arbiter  or  judge  has  an  occasion  to  decide  in  such  a  case,  he  will  consider, 
not  what  each  of  the  parties,  according  to  the  most  exact  propriety  should  be  disposed 
to  do,  but  what  with  propriety,  they  may  be  impelled  to  do.  [p.  120(b)] 
He  will  not  require  that  either  should  increase  the  happiness  of  the  other  but  that  they 
should  mutually  abstain  from  doing  hurt:  or  if  either  has  already  done  hurt,  by 
committing  an  injury,  he  will  oblige  the  offender  to  make  reparation. 
In  this  manner  law  and  ethics  came  to  be  distinguished.  The  latter  made  the  subjects  of 
moral  maxims.  The  former  of  decisions  by  arbiters  or  judges. 
When  a  set  of  judges  have  been  introduced  into  a  country,  they  may  frequently  give 
bad  decisions  from  ignorance  or  conception.  It  may  also  happen  that  the  general 
interests  of  society  should  require  the  establishment  of  certain  rules  of  conduct,  not 
determined  by  the  natural  principles  ofjustice. 
Hence  a  legislative  power  is  established  to  direct  &  control  the  judicial.  Thus  a 
collection  of  laws  may  be  introduced  into  a  country,  arising  partly,  from  the  ideas  of 
justice  in  the  judges,  &  partly  from  the  interposition  of  the  legislature. 
(b)  From  what  has  been  observed,  it  appears  evident  that  law  &  ethics  will  be 
differently  cultivated  in  every  country. 
(i)  Law  is  the  object  of  more  constant  attention  than  ethics.  [p.  1211  Men  are  left  at 
liberty  to  neglect  or  practice  the  latter.  They  are  compelled  by  means  of  punishment  to 
observe  the  former;  &  to  enforce  the  observance  the  observance  is  the  business  of 
judges  &  legislators. 
(ii)  The  rules  of  law  are  necessarily  more  accurate  than  those  of  ethics.  When  a  man  is 
commanded  to  follow  a  certain  course  of  conduct,  &  and  is  punished  for  disobedience, 
it  seems  requisite  that  he  should  be  distinctly  &  clearly  informed  what  this  conduct  is. 
When  he  is  advised  to  a  certain  course  of  action,  it  is  sufficient  that  a  general 
description  of  that  course  should  be  given.  The  casuists  have  attempted  to  provide 
rules  for  other  virtues  besides  that  ofjustice. 
(iii)  The  rules  of  law  are  less  apt  to  be  methodically  arranged  than  those  of  ethics.  The 
former  are  collected  by  judges  and  legislators,  who  consider  each  point  as  it 
accidentally  comes  before  them,  and  who  have  nothing  in  view  but  the  practical  use  of 
each  rule  which  they  establish.  The  latter  tho'  intended  for  practical  use,  being 
collected  by  philosophers,  are  more  immediately  the  subject  of  speculative  reasoning  & 
are  digesied  in  proper  order. 351 
Tho'  a  system  of  law  is  introduced  by  judges  and  legislators,  it  may  afterwards  excite 
the  attention  of  speculative  reasoners.  [p.  1221 
The  body  of  laws  in  a  country  whether  private  or  public  laws,  must  be  an  interesting 
object  to  the  inhabitants,  and  philosophers  may  employ  themselves  in  pointing  out  its 
defects  &  excellencies. 
The  system  of  law  in  no  country  ever  approaches  near  to  perfection.  It  is  necessary 
that  general  rules  should  be  established,  which  cannot  be  applicable  to  the  endless 
number  of  particular  cases. 
Such  observations  on  particular  branches  of  law,  are  to  be  found  in  ancient  &  modem 
authors. 
Such  observations  naturally  lead  to  a  comparison  of  the  different  systems  of  law 
established  by  different  nations.  It  must  happen,  that  some  systems  are  in  some 
particular  cases,  more  agreeable  to  justice  &  more  beneficial  to  society  than  others. 
The  observation  of  this,  suggested  the  idea  of  delineating  the  general  principles  of 
justice,  independent  of  the  various  systems  established  in  different  countries. 
Hence  what  are  called  systems  of  jurisprudence.  There  are  no  attempts  of  this  kind 
among  the  ancients,  whose  experience  does  not  seem  to  have  extended  to  a  great 
variety  of  systems  of  law.  [p.  1231 
Grotius  is  the  first  considerable  author  of  this  kind.  He  gives  a  delineation  of  the 
different  rights  of  mankind  &  an  explanation  of  the  principles  on  which  they  are 
founded. 
as  facts  are  taken  chiefly  from  the  Roman  system  of  law. 
The  same  subject  has  been  treated  of  by  Pufendorf,  Cumberland  etc. 
The  authors  upon  jurisprudence  have  commonly  taken  up  too  much  time  in 
establishing  the  general  principles  of  natural  law  &  have  been  too  sparing  of 
illustration,  by  giving  a  detail  of  the  varieties  of  justice.  They  have  also  frequently 
confounded  ethics  with  jurisprudence. 
Lecture 
After  attempting  to  delineate  the  general  principles  of  law,  the  attention  of  speculative 
reasoners  was  turned  to  examine  the  causes  which  have  produced  admiration  from 
those  in  particular  countries. 
The  imperfection  of  every  system,  that  is  actually  carried  into  execution,  compounded 
with  the  idea  of  mankind  upon  the  subject  may  always  be  expected.  But  the  various  & 
opposite  deviations  from  justice  in  different  countries  seem  to  require  a  more 
particular  account  [p.  1241  than  what  occurs  from  the  general  imperfection  of  every 
human  contrivance. 352 
Many  authors  have  supposed  that  the  great  diversity  that  occurs  in  the  systems  of 
public  &  private  law  among  different  nations,  has  arisen  from  the  genius  and  character 
of  early  legislators. 
The  effect  of  this  interference  cannot  be  so  great  as  has  been  supposed.  A  society  must 
have  been  formed  a  considerable  time,  &  consequently  many  customs  introduced, 
before  any  person  could  have  so  much  influence  as  to  enable  him  to  introduce  a  system 
of  his  own.  His  institutions  will  therefore  naturally  be  founded  on  the  customs  already 
established. 
He  may  carry  them  a  little  farther,  but  it  is  impossible  that  he  can  go  contrary  to  them. 
For  institutions  contrary  to  the  sentiments  of  the  people  could  never  be  permanent. 
When  we  examine  the  regulations  ascribed  to  early  lawgivers,  we  find  them  no  more 
than  the  customs  of  the  country  a  little  methodized. 
Others  seem  to  think  that  it  has  been  derived  from  the  climate,  &  other  physical 
circumstances. 
This  cause  may  operate  two  ways. 
(1)  The  soil  and  climate  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  may  give  rise  to  different  sorts 
of  application,  &  to  different  habits. 
In  many  of  the  warm  countries  the  soil  is  so  fertile,  as  to  produce  sufficient  food  for 
the  inhabitants,  with  little  cultivation.  It  is  besides  more  difficult  to  act  with  vigour  in  a 
hot  country.  These  two  circumstances  naturally  render  the  inhabitants  of  such 
countries  inactive  &  lazy. 
They  are  apt  to  be  guided  by  the  present  impression  &  incapable  of  making  any 
vigorous  resistance  to  the  feeling  which  is  strongest  in  their  mind.  They  are  therefore 
slaves  to  their  passions  &  we  cannot  expect  that  they  should  have  great  strength  of 
understanding. 
(2)  Climate  is  also  supposed  to  work  immediately  or  insensibly  on  the  temper  & 
disposition. 
Heat  has  a  certain  effect  on  the  human  body  &  it  is  supposed  that  it  has  a  similar  effect 
upon  the  mind.  It  tends  to  relax  and  weaken  the  body,  &  it  is  supposed  without  any 
intervention  of  moral  causes  -  it  has  the  same  effect  upon  the  mind.  *10 
10*Doubtful  whether  any  such  general  effects  can  be  ascertained. 
(1)  jgLourage  in  cold  climates  or  temperate  ones. 
Heat  relaxes  &  cold  braces  the  fibres. 
fit  may  be  questioned  whether  the  nations  of  hot  climates  are  subject  to  inconvenient  relaxation  from 
heat. 
Courage  of  the  woman  of  Hindustan. 
Savages  in  every  climate  discover  little  courage. 
Rude  nations  are  naturally  courageous.  ] 
Animal  food  supposed  to  promote  courage. 
Carnivorous  animals. 
Ans.  [Carnivorous  animals  become  fierce  from  their  way  of  life.  Game  cocks  granivorous.  ] 
(2)  Genius  in  warm  climates. 353 
Lecture  7  [p.  1251 
It  has  of  late  become  a  prevailing  opinion  that  the  chief  differences  in  the  public  & 
private  law  of  different  nations  may  be  deduced  from  the  advancement  of  the  people  in 
the  common  arts  of  life.  [p.  126] 
If  we  trace  the  history  of  any  nation  to  its  original,  we  find  the  people  in  a  state  of 
ignorance  &  barbarism. 
There  is  a  natural  tendency  in  mankind  to  improve  their  circumstances;  a  capacity  of 
exertion  in  order  to  acquire  necessaries  &  conveniences.  Property  is  introduced  & 
extended.  Society  enlarged.  Connexions  of  Society  multiplied. 
The  progressive  improvements  are  attended  with  corresponding  changes  in  manners, 
customs  &  laws.  Making  allowance  for  the  different  degrees  of  advancement,  there 
may  be  discovered  a  wonderful  uniformity  in  the  systems  of  every  nation. 
Montesquieu  was  the  first  considerable  author  who  accounted  for  diversity  of  laws, 
and  customs,  from  progress  of  society. 
On  the  same  subject  Dr.  Karnes  &  Dr.  Smith. 
From  this  view  ofjurisprudence  several  advantages  may  be  derived. 
(1)  It  tends  to  a  complete  detail  of  facts. 
(2)  It  tends  to  conform  the  general  principles  of  jurisprudence,  That  men  in  all  ages 
and  countries  would  adopt  the  same  system  [p.  1271  were  they  not  prevented  by  a 
difference  in  circumstances@.  11 
(3)  It  affords  a  pleasant  speculation  with  regard  to  the  improvement  of  the  human 
mind. 
Heat  by  relaxing  the  skin  said  to  encrease  sensibility  -  but  unfavourable  to  the  exercise  of 
judgement. 
Ans.  [This  effect  relates  only  to  the  sense  of  touch.  No  mark  of  this  in  the  genius  of  hot  climates. 
Oriental  imagination  similar  to  Africans  poems.  ] 
Alacrity  &  cheerfulness  produced  from  serene  weather. 
Ans.  [This  effect  depends  very  much  upon  novelty. 
Cannot  be  thought  of  very  much  importance. 
Proceeds  not  from  physical  causes,  but  from  pleasing  sensations.  ] 
J3)  Drunkenness  in  cold  climates. 
Drunkenness  said  to  the  physical  effect  of  the  cold  [rather  effect  of  barbarism] 
(4)  Propensity  of  sex  in  hot  ones. 
May  be  accounted  for  from  the  fertility,  &  the  indolent  habits,  experienced  in  warm  regions  -  B. 
1  '@Then  these  circumstances  may  themselves  be  the  causes  of  difference  of  systems,  without  taking 
into  account  the  degree  of  civilisation  -  D. 354 
Remarks  upon  the  analogy  between  the  principles  of  taste  &  those  of  moral 
approbation 
There  seems  to  be  a  great  resemblance  between  the  feeling  by  which  we  distinguish 
virtue  from  vice,  &  those  by  which  we  distinguish  beauty  &  deformity  in  external 
objects. 
[By  beauty  I  understand  what  pleases  in  our  object  of  sight.  ] 
An  immediate  pleasure  &  satisfaction  is  felt  from  the  view  of  certain  external  objects; 
an  immediate  pain  &  disgust  from  the  view  of  others.  Similar  emotions  arise  from  the 
contemplation  of  certain  affections  of  the  mind;  such  as  compassion,  gratitude, 
benevolence,  or  the  contrary.  [Hence  the  beauty  of  sentiments  is  a  common 
metaphorical  expression] 
(1)  Analysis  of  taste  in  external  beauty.  Objects  may  appear  beautiful  either  of 
themselves  or  by  connexion  with  others  that  are  agreeable. 
(a)  Objects  beautiful  in  themselves. 
(i)  In  simple  objects  those  are  beheld  with  pleasure  which  excite  [p.  1281  (A) 
admiration,  (B)  wonder,  (C)  or  surprise. 
(A)  Great  objects. 
[High  mountain.  Rocky  precipice.  The  ocean.  Large  &  rapid  river  overflowing  its 
banks.  The  sky.  The  admiration  excited  by  such  objects  seems  to  be  always 
accompanied  not  only  by  an  exertion  of  the  organ  of  sight  but  by  an  effort  of  the  mind 
in  order  to  comprehend.  Obscurity  which  renders  these  objects  indistinct  tends  to 
increase  the  admiration  of  them] 
(B)  New  objects. 
[Strong  &  uncommon  appearances  excite  curiosity.  In  opposition  to  such,  as  have 
become  familiar  which  disregarded  &  overlooked. 
The  pleasing  emotion  of  wonder  is  accompanied  with  a  degree  of  attention  which 
makes  them  produce  a  strong  &  lively  impression.  ] 
(C)  Unexpected  objects. 
[In  proportion  as  the  n-dnd  is  occupied  with  a  particular  set  of  objects  it  is  less  capable 
of  passing  immediately  to  others  more  remote.  Sudden  noise.  Surprise  when  not 
violent,  seems  to  have  a  very  agreeable  effect,  by  enlivening  our  thoughts,  & 
occasioning  a  brisk  flow  of  ideas  -  of  short  duration] 
(ii)  In  complex  objects,  [p.  1291  those  are  the  most  beautiful,  which  unite  the  greatest 
ýLqd  Ut,  with  uniformity. 
The  variety,  in  some  small  degree  excites  successive  emotions  of  wonder.  The 
uniformity  or  correspondence  of  parts,  occasions  a  sort  of  surprise,  &  besides  it 
enables  the  mind  to  take  in  agreeable  variety. 355 
p11dgn--,  g  in  the  parts  of  the  same  object.  yadcly  &  corrc  pCc 
A  square  more  beautiful  titan  an  irregular  sided  parallelogram.  A  circle  than  a  square. 
Flowing  or  waving  line. 
[The  greatest  variety  of  a  circular  line.  The  beauty  illustrated  by  Hogarth.  A  middle 
bct%vccn  a  line  that  is  too  straight  &  too  convex,  by  having  a  large  proportion  of 
opposite  air  is  Serpentine  line  more  varied] 
Smoothness. 
[Which  carries  the  eyesight  over  an  object  so  as  to  take  in  easily  all  its  parts. 
(Beauty  or  natural  objects  front  these  sources  -  gently  swelling  grounds  -  Smooth 
winding  rivers.  Trees  c1c. 
Order  among  different  objects  surveyed  in  one  group. 
(Ex.  Windows  &  doors  of  a  building]  Enables  the  mind  to  take  in  greater  variety 
without  conflusion. 
Proportion  -  the  relation  between  the  size  of  objects  has  the  same  effect.  [p.  130] 
(b)  Beauty  of  colour.  (i)  Simple  unvaried  colour  seems  to  be  most  beautiful  when  it  is 
in  a  due  medium  between  that  brightness  which  is  too  violent  for  the  organ  of  sight,  & 
that  darkness  which  renders  objects  indistinct. 
(ii)  All  thc  objects  taken  notice  of  for  the  beauty  of  their  colour,  have  in  this  respect  a 
good  deal  of  variety. 
[Front  the  cffccl  of  light  &  shade,  no  colour  extended  over  a  body,  can  ever  appear 
unvaricd  to  the  eye.  Bright  colours  vary  least  front  the  effect  of  light  &  shade.  ] 
Colours  of  a  different  kind  may  produce  the  cffcct  of  variety,  when  they  are  contrasted 
&  shadcd  into  one  another. 
In  the  first  case  we  fccl  a  more  violent  cmotion,  in  passing  from  to  another. 
In  the  lattcr  the  transitions  are  more  easily  made,  &  the  mind  comprehends  a  greater 
variety  before  it  is  ratigued. 
[Shades  from  the  bright  yellow  to  the  dark  green  in  a  beautiful  landscape. 
Shades  front  the  vermilion  to  the  white  in  a  fine  complexion]  fp.  1311 
(c)  Cause  of  the  pleasure  derived  front  the  view  of  such  objects. 
It  should  seem  that  a  great  part  of  our  happiness  consists  in  occupation,  either  by  the 
exercise  of  the  bodily  organs,  or  of  our  mental  faculties. 
That  occupation,  however.  which  is  pleasant,  lies  in  the  middle  between  too  violent 
exertion  on  the  one  hand,  and  languor  &  inactivity  on  the  other. 
It  is  derived  partly  from  the  impression  made  by  external  objects  on  our  senses  (of 
which  the  sight  is  far  the  most  considerable)  -  partly  from  reflexion  &  meditation,  & 
partly  from  the  influence  of  our  passions  -  with  most  men,  the  first  of  these  is  the  sreat 
source  of  occupation,  it  even  furnishes  the  original  materials  for  the  two  last. 
It  is  natural  to  expect  thcrcforc  that  we  should  receive  pleasure  from  the  view  of  those 
objects  which  excite  admiration,  wondcr  &  surprise,  These  emotions  have  a  tendency 256 
could  be  "managed  with  one  plough",  for  example  proportions  of  "hides".  5  At  other 
times,  he  suggested  that  they  could  be  made  according  to  either  the  value  of  the  land 
rated  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  or  the  exchange  value  of  the  produce  of  the  land. 
Attempting  to  calculate  the  balance  of  the  feudal  aristocracy  as  "60,000  knight's  fees 
. 
..  possessed  by  the  two  hundred  and  fifty  lordS",  6  he  stated  that  could  the  "worth"  of 
these  fees  be  known  -  "reckoned  in  some  writs  at  401.  a  year,  and  in  others  at  10"  -  he 
could  have  "exactly  demonstrated  the  balance  of  this  government".  7  At  the  same  time, 
he  also  threw  doubt  upon  whether  it  was  possible  to  make  an  accurate  calculation  of 
the  value  of  knights'  fees  according  to  the  number  of  hides  contained  within  a  certain 
territory.  "But  says  Coke,  it  [a  fee]  contained  twelve  plough-lands",  because  "one 
plough  out  of  some  land  that  was  fruitful  might  work  more  than  ten  out  of  some  land 
that  was  barren".  He  thereby  recognised  that  the  value  of  the  produce  of  a  hide  would 
vary  according  to  the  productivity  of  the  land. 
Millar  also  noted  this  "inaccurate  measure"  of  dividing  land  into  hides  "each 
comprehending  what  could  be  cultivated  by  a  single  plough"  as  the  "general  estimation 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  lands"  (HV,  1,129).  Nonetheless,  like  Hume  and  Smith,  he  made 
various  attempts  at  approximate  calculations  of  the  balance  of  property.  These 
calculations  attempted  to  assess  the  proportions  of  revenue  available  to  a  monarch 
which  could  then  be  used  to  support  a  standing  army.  Millars  interest  in  these 
calculations  was,  like  Harrington's,  an  attempt  to  have  exact  knowledge  of  the  balance 
of  power  between  the  monarch  as  a  large  landed  proprietor  and  the  people.  For 
example,  if  subjects  were  small  proprietors  whose  combined  revenue  was  less  than  the 
revenue  of  the  monarch,  then  the  militias  they  could  raise  in  a  conflict  of  interest 
would  be  less  well  maintained  than  the  standing  army  of  the  monarch.  The  balance  of 
power  would  therefore  be  inclined  towards  the  monarch  and  against  the  people. 
On  the  basis  of  these  calculations  Millar  could  therefore  give  an  argument  that 
would  explain  why,  with  the  exception  of  Cromwell's  English  commonwealth, 
historical  testimony  seemed  to  indicate  that  there  was  a  tendency  towards  a  republican 
form  of  government  in  small  countries  and  one  towards  absolute  monarchies  in  large 
countries.  Thus: 
"it  is  farther  to  be  considered  that  the  revenue  of  the  monarch  is  commonly  a  more 
powerful  engine  of  authority  in  a  great  nation  than  in  a  small  one.  The  influence  of  a 
sovereign  seems  to  depend,  not  so  much  upon  his  absolute  wealth,  as  upon  the 
5Pocock  J.  G.  A.  (ed.  )  (1977)  James  Harrington:  Oceana  and  otherpolitical  works,  Princeton:  p193. 
6Pocock  (ed.  ),  Harrington,  p  195. 
7ibid 
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(2)  Analysis  of  Moral  Approbation. 
The  operations  of  the  human  mind  appear  beautiful  &  are  approved  of  from  the  same 
circumstances  which  give  rise  to  the  beauty  of  external  objects. 
(a)  Those  particular  exertions  of  the  human  mind,  which  are  difficult,  uncornmon,  or 
unexpected  excite  admiration,  wonder,  or  surprise;  and  tho'  different  qualities  of  the 
mind,  when  considered  as  belonging  to  a  complex  object,  afford  also  that  pleasure, 
which  is  derived  from  uniformity  amid  variety. 
(b)  Certain  qualities  of  the  human  mind  have  the  beauty  of  utility  in  the  highest  degree. 
The  pleasure  derives  from  the  beneficial  exertions  of  an  intelligent  being  is  different 
from  that  produced  by  an  useful  machine;  being  accompanied  with  love  to  the  object 
by  which  the  pleasure  is  produced.  [p.  1351 
Difference  in  this  respect  between  the  understanding  and  affections  -  between  a  selfish 
&  benevolent  affections. 
These  last  have  a  uniform  tendency  to  the  good  of  mankind,  and  call  forth  in  every 
spectator  a  disposition  to  requite  the  good  that  is  intended. 
(c)  The  mental  operations  of  an  individual  give  pleasure  also  from  their  being 
agreeable  to  the  general  standard  of  human  nature.  *  12 
In  such  a  case  they  appear  proper  &  suitable  to  their  causes. 
our  standard  of  propriety  taken  from  the  ordinary  state  of  human  nature,  not  from  that 
which  is  displayed  on  singular  occasions.  @13 
[Different  views  suggested  by  violent  passions  from  those  which  take  place  in  the 
ordinary  situation  of  the  mind] 
When  the  three  foregoing  circumstances  concur,  when  a  benevolent  sentiment  is 
displayed,  when  it  is  agreeable  to  the  standard  of  propriety,  &  exhibits  at  the  same 
time,  an  uncommon  or  difficult  exertion,  it  excites  the  highest  approbation  and  is 
applauded  as  virtuous  &  deserving  reward.  [p.  1361 
(3)  Of  the  Sense  of  Right  and  Wrong. 
As  benevolent  affections  are  beneficial  to  mankind  and  suitable  to  the  causes  which 
produce  them,  so  malevolent  sentiments  have  the  opposite  aspect  &  appear  not  only 
hurtful,  but  unsuitable  to  their  causes. 
As  the  former  excite  love  &a  disposition  to  reward  so  the  latter  excite  resentment  &a 
disposition  to  punish. 
12-qbe  similarity  of  mental  operations  in  the  general  part  of  mankind,  is  a  source  of  beauty.  From 
this  similarity  we  are  led  by  custom,  to  form  a  general  standard  any  great  deviation  from  which  is 
displeasing  -  B. 
13@Qur  standard  is  taken  from  the  doctrines  of  Christianity  -  at  least  the  introduction  of  Christianity 
raised  very  much  the  standard  of  morals  -  D. 358 
Injustice  proceeds  from  an  improper  sentiment  or  affection,  tending  to  do  hurt,  but  the 
mere  sentiment  or  affection  does  not  seem  to  deserve  punishment  unless  followed  by 
the  action  which  it  had  in  view. 
The  hurt  occasioned  by  injustice  may  be  considered  not  only  as  it  affects  the  person 
immediately  injured  but  as  it  affects  society. 359 
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